SinoInsight 1
Since mid-April, the CCP’s political and legal affairs apparatus has seen more than a dozen officials investigated, a senior official transferred out, and one suicide, according to publicly available information. Of the 15 people investigated, five were retired and six were about to retire.
April 14
1. Song Xingwei (age 60, bureau rank), deputy Party secretary and deputy chief procurator of the Liaoning Provincial Procuratorate, was officially investigated and expelled from the Chinese Communist Party and his government job. In December 2020, Song was removed from office upon reaching retirement age.
April 15
1. Zhang Lincai (64, retired in May 2017), former Party secretary and president of the Wuqing District Court in Tianjin, was placed under investigation. Zhang rapidly rose up the ranks from September 2003, when he was promoted to deputy Party secretary of the Wuqing Political and Legal Affairs Committee, director of the Wuqing PLAC Office, and director of the Wuqing Leading Group on Dealing with Heretical Religions (official name of the anti-Falun Gong “610 Office”). Less than four years later, Zhang was promoted to president of the Wuqing District Court. Zhang Lincai’s “rocket” rise coincided with the peak period of the Jiang Zemin-initiated persecution campaign against Falun Gong.
2. Zhang Lijie (58, female), an inspection group member in the Fujian Provincial Public Security Bureau, was investigated. Previously, Zhang served as director of the Fujian PSB’s Political Department (April 2013 to August 2019), and was concurrently serving as deputy director of the Fujian PSB (August 2019 to April 2021) until she was purged.
3. According to mainland media reports that day, Liao Jinrong (55), director of the Ministry of Public Security’s International Cooperation Bureau, had been transferred to a “leadership position” in the PRC State Post Bureau and attended a meeting of the Office of the State Post Bureau director.
April 16
1. Ye Guobing (60), deputy director of the Jiangxi People’s Political Consultative Conference and deputy director of the Legislative Affairs Commission, was investigated. Ye spent the bulk of his career in the political and legal affairs apparatus, serving as deputy director of the Jiangxi State Security Department (March 2011 to September 2013) and deputy director and executive deputy director of the Jiangxi Public Security Bureau (March 2011 to March 2021).
2. Li Yunfeng (58), former deputy secretary-general of the Tibet PLAC, was investigated. Li spent the bulk of his career in the Tibet Public Security Bureau (August 1984 to January 2012), and served as Party secretary of the Nyingchi PLAC (January 2015 to September 2017) before moving up to the Tibet Provincial PLAC.
April 17
1. Gao Wenjun (57), president of the Taiyuan Railway Transport Intermediate Court of Shanxi Province, was investigated.
2. Ma Lina (53, female), director of the Beijing Municipal Procuratorate Political Department, reportedly fell to her death from her residence. The Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau stated that Ma suffered from depression and ruled out criminal causes.
- Analysis: On April 1, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification first supervision team (led by former Minister of State Security Geng Huicheng) commenced education and rectification work of the Beijing municipal government’s political and legal affairs apparatus. It is unclear if Ma Lina’s death is related to the rectification campaign.
April 19
1. Sun Baoshun (59, approaching retirement age), Party secretary of the Jinnan District PLAC in Tianjin, was investigated.
2. Zheng Jia (61, retired in August 2018), former Party secretary and chairman of the Shanwei People’s Political Consultative Conference in Guangdong Province, was investigated. Previously, Zheng was Party secretary of the Shanwei PLAC (August. 2012 – December 2016).
April 21
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission issued a report on its progress in inspecting the discipline and supervisory organs in the first quarter of 2021. According to the report, the central anti-corruption authorities filed 135,000 cases and sanctioned 116,000 people (including 98,000 for Party discipline issues) from January to March 2021. Of the sanctioned people, five were provincial/ministerial-rank officials, while 715 cadres were at the bureau rank.
April 22
1. Gui Xianmin (65, retired in May 2016), former deputy inspector of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau, was investigated.
2. Wang Chunhua (60, approaching retirement), former warden (deputy bureau rank) of the Xiaolongtan Prison in Yunnan Province, was investigated.
3. Chen Minghua (56), a full-time member of the Shanxi Provincial High Court’s Judicial Committee and the president of the Intermediate Court of Yangquan City, was investigated, expelled from the Party, and fired from his government jobs.
April 23
1. Xian Dongming (64, retired in October 2015), former inspection group member of the Yunnan High Court, was investigated.
2. Wang Hanwu (64, retired in January 2018), former chief prosecutor of the Hohhot City Procuratorate of Inner Mongolia, was investigated.
3. Jiang Guoping (60, approaching retirement), director of the Daxinganling Forest Public Security Bureau in Inner Mongolia, was investigated.
4. Wang Guangyin (60, reaching retirement), director of the Inner Mongolia High Court’s Executive Bureau, was investigated.
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping is looking to secure a norm-breaking third term in office at the 20th Party Congress next year. To do so, Xi needs to further consolidate power and eliminate rival factional influence (particularly the Jiang faction) over key sectors like finance, Hong Kong, and the political and legal affairs apparatus. The latest round of purges are aimed at rooting out regime-threatening corruption and weakening the “anti-Xi coalition’s” ability to undermine Beijing at crucial moments via the PRC’s bureaucracy in the lead up to 2022. Below is a brief overview of the current political and legal affairs apparatus “education and rectification” campaign to date.
From July to November 2020, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) piloted “education and rectification” work in 35 political and legal affairs (PLAC) organizations in Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Henan, Sichuan, and Shaanxi. PLAC organizations include public security bureaus, state security bureaus, judicial bureaus, courts, procuratorates, and prisons. According to official CCP figures, 2,247 PLAC officials were “handled” by the end of November 2020, including 2 bureau-level officials and 227 division-level officials. Also, 448 investigation cases were filed and 39 people saw their cases transferred to prosecution. Nearly 15 percent of the 16,000 public security officers in the five aforementioned provinces were punished during the pilot phase; assuming the same percentage of officials will be targeted by the end of the current “education and rectification” campaign in March 2022, then as many as 270,000 out of 1.8 million public security officers could be dealt with.
According to publicly available CCP data, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the National Supervisory Commission, and local government anti-corruption authorities investigated or punished 18 officials at the deputy ministerial rank and above, as well as 399 officials at the provincial level and below last year. Of the purged officials, five at the deputy ministerial rank and above, and 73 at the bureau rank, were from the political and legal affairs apparatus; among the regime’s many apparatuses, the political and legal affairs apparatus was the most heavily targeted for anti-corruption rectification work in 2020.
The “education and rectification” campaign official moved from pilot to the operational phase this February. The national-level political and legal affairs education and rectification mobilization and deployment meeting on Feb. 27 called on officials to “turn the knife blade inward, and scrape poison from bone.” The meeting also noted that “political loyalty is directly connected to the Party’s ruling position and the country’s long-term stability,” and that it is “necessary to learn deeply from the serious violations of discipline and the law by some political and legal affairs leading cadres, especially serious violations involving political discipline and political laws. Further, there must be a “thorough cleansing” of “cliques and factions” in the political and legal affairs apparatus, including “two-faced factions and two-faced people,” to “completely eliminate hidden political dangers.”
2. On April 12, CPLAC secretary general Chen Yixin visited Tianjin City for inspection work. Chen, who is also the deputy head of the National Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification Leading Group and director of the leading group’s office, said in Tianjin that “education and rectification” work has entered the “investigation, correction, and rectification” phase. In other words, inspectors are “going real and going hard” (动真碰硬), touching on important areas, and entering so-called “deep-water territory” (深水区) in “education and rectification,” according to Chen.
Chen Yixin and Xi Jinping were former colleagues in the Zhejiang provincial government. The personal connection is likely the reason why Chen was chosen to oversee the implementation of the ongoing and important “education and rectification” campaign (typically, leading group offices are responsible for policy implementation, and Chen is director of the National Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification Leading Group office) to place the “knife handle” (刀把子) of the Party more securely in Xi’s hands. With a trusted official in charge of the nuts and bolts of his political campaign, Xi will be less concerned (but not less wary) about the fact that Guo Shengkun, the CPLAC secretary and Chen Yixin’s immediate superior in the National Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification Leading Group, is a Jiang faction member.
3. The 20-year period for retroactive investigations is very unlikely an arbitrary figure. Two decades dovetails with the Jiang faction’s reign of dominance in the regime (1997 to 2012), as well as Jiang Zemin’s ongoing anti-Falun Gong political campaign (1999 to present), a major negative political legacy belonging to Jiang and his faction. All political and legal affairs officials who rocketed up the ranks during the Jiang era, and/or who are/were active contributors to Jiang’s anti-Falun Gong campaign, could be suspected of being Jiang faction members, associates, or supporters, and are liable to outed as “two-faced persons” and “cleansed” in Xi’s “education and rectification” campaign.
At this juncture, Xi Jinping’s motivation for targeting Jiang Zemin’s anti-Falun Gong campaign appears to be primarily about factional struggle and CCP elite politics. While Xi has gradually eroded Jiang’s campaign since taking office in 2012, most obviously in dismantling the 610 Office as part of state and Party institutional reforms in 2018 and disbanding the anti-Falun Gong Hong Kong Youth Care Association in December 2020, the persecution of Falun Gong is still officially on the books in the PRC. Moreover, the CCP elite have historically targeted each other’s negative political legacies or have taken drastic action to protect their own to survive and dominate factional struggles. For instance, former PRC president Liu Shaoqi criticized Mao Zedong’s disastrous Great Leap Forward, and was later purged and persecuted to death for being a “capitalist roader” and “traitor to the revolution” during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Another example is Deng Xiaoping purging Party boss Zhao Ziyang and placing him under house arrest for challenging his decision to massacre student protesters in Tiananmen Square.
Regardless, we could very possibly see a “mainstreaming” of 20-year retroactive investigations across the PRC. As we explained on numerous occasions, Chinese officials tend to “prefer left rather than right” (寧左勿右) and adhere to the political orthodoxy of the day to ensure career security. During the Jiang era, many officials, including Party princelings like Bo Xilai, would vigorously participate in Jiang Zemin’s anti-Falun Gong campaign and rack up “transformation” numbers to score political achievements and win rapid promotion. Now, officials who are eager to earn political capital could open “20-year retroactive investigations” into political and legal affairs officials, especially against retired officials who are less able to block government action targeted at them, and rack up “education and rectification” scalps.
It would not be difficult for ambitious officials to “find” problems to pursue retroactive investigations. In late 2020, state propaganda outlets like Xinhua reported that the “sweeping black” and anti “protective umbrellas” campaigns launched in 2018, as well as more recent efforts, exposed numerous cases of criminals merely “serving sentences on paper” (紙面服刑). The criminals were found to have their sentences “commuted,” put on parole, or to be “serving” jail time outside prison. Retroactive investigations into who allowed those criminals to “serve sentences on paper” will almost certainly implicate multiple political and legal affairs officials per case. State media noted that the prevalence of “serving sentences on paper” is a reason why the “education and rectification” campaign saw “retroactive investigations spanning 20 years” (倒查20年) in the five provinces where it was piloted. Previously, 20-year retroactive investigations were only carried out in Inner Mongolia and targeted those involved in the “special rectification” of the province’s coal mining sector (see here and here).
In the brutal CCP officialdom, political patrons who used to serve as “protective umbrellas” to younger officials could find themselves at the mercy of their political clients. Proliferation of retroactive purges will undoubtedly trouble the Jiang faction greatly and force a Xi-Jiang factional showdown.
SinoInsight 2
Beijing’s clampdown in Hong Kong continues with a guilty verdict for a prominent local journalist last week and propaganda attacks. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong authorities take unusual and unexpected action with regard to Falun Gong in the city.
April 18
CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily issued a commentary attacking the Hong Kong University Students’ Union for “repeatedly and provocatively slandering ‘one country, two systems,’ and disrupting the constitutional order.” People’s Daily accused the Union of “frantically probing the edge of the bottomline” and declared that “the time to rein in the Students’ Union is now.”
In concluding, the commentary wrote, “Just look at Agnes Chow, who is currently serving a prison sentence … prisons and handcuffs await the anti-China elements who stir chaos in Hong Kong.”
April 19
According to a Hong Kong Free Press exclusive report, the Hong Kong government paid lobbying firms in the United States at least HK$84 million ($10.8 million) to arrange meetings between Hong Kong officials and U.S. politicians between 2014 and 2020.
The Hong Kong Trade Development Council’s efforts resulted in lobbyists holding at least six in-person meetings with DC politicians to discuss the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act on behalf of the Hong Kong government between late 2014 and early 2015, and in September 2019.
April 20
Ta Kung Pao, a pro-CCP Hong Kong newspaper, ran several articles critical of Falun Gong in Hong Kong. One article wrote: “The implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law has intimidated many anti-China and chaotic Hong Kong elements and organizations. However, Falun Gong is still in the streets, printing and distributing a large quantity of free newspapers, books, and periodicals promoting anti-communism … and [Falun Gong’s] websites are buzzing with activity. Is this institution really so miraculous that it can ignore laws and regulations?”
April 21
Stand News, a pro-democracy Hong Kong news site, reported that the Hong Kong Legislative Council will commence its second reading of a 2020 draft bill that will enact draconian amendments to the city’s immigration law (2020年入境（修訂）條例草案) on April 28. Stand News noted that the amendments will take effect on August 1 if the draft bill passes a third reading.
One of the items in the immigration amendments directs the Hong Kong Secretary for Security to grant permission to the Director of Immigration to allow or deny the transportation of “certain passengers” without stating if it applies to people entering the city or leaving it. Hong Kong lawyers and commentators called on the Hong Kong government to clarify the item as they are concerned that the authorities will use the vague law to prevent pro-democracy activists and other blacklisted people from leaving the city. Lawyers and commentators are also concerned that the immigration amendment can be abused to stop Hong Kong residents from traveling abroad for work, education, immigration, or other reasons, as well as prohibit emigrated Hong Kong residents from returning to the city.
The Hong Kong Security Bureau later issued a statement “strongly condemning” local media for “making false and misleading statements.” The statement was understood by many to be a reference to the Stand News article.
April 22
1. Choy Yuk-ling, a prize-winning journalist with Hong Kong public broadcaster RTHK, was found guilty of making false statements to obtain public records for a report that criticized the Hong Kong police over their handling of a controversial triad attack at a subway station and its surroundings in 2019 during the anti-extradition bill protests. Choy was fined HK$6,000 (about $775).
2. The Hong Kong police announced the arrest of eight men who vandalized and damaged Falun Gong information booths around the city. In a statement, the police said that they were responding to numerous reports made on April 2 and April 3 that alleged deliberate sabotage and destruction of the Falun Gong street booths and their property, including over 90 banners and pamphlets worth HK$30,000 (about $3,866). After investigation, the police made the arrests from April 14 to April 22.
The Hong Kong police said in their statement that the Falun Gong case is still under investigation and do not rule out more arrests. The police also warned that vandalism is a serious crime and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison upon conviction. Finally, the police stated that any individual who commits a crime will be “fairly and impartially” investigated regardless of background, and that crimes will not be tolerated.
According to The Epoch Times, a mobster who attacked six Falun Gong booths in Hong Kong in December 2020 was also subsequently arrested. The case was handled by the Mong Kok Criminal Investigation Department.
April 23
1. The Hong Kong Epoch Times reported that a majority of the eight men who were recently arrested for vandalizing and destroying Falun Gong property have triad backgrounds, citing police sources. Police sources also say that they are currently investigating the men’s motivation for targeting the Falun Gong information booths, while police officers from the New Territories South Region Crime Squad are presently investigating the attack on the Hong Kong Epoch Times printing press on April 12. Further, the police sources say that the Hong Kong police “attach great importance to cases of political vandalism” and “will never allow anyone to commit such crimes under any pretext.”
However, the Hong Kong Epoch Times’s printing press has been attacked five times since 2006, and a review of publicly available information indicates that the police have not cracked a single one of those five cases. Further, the police failed to make arrests for vandalizing and damaging Falun Gong information booths or practice sites until the December 2020 case and the recent one announced on April 22.
2. The Hong Kong government announced the approval of 11,500 square meters of government land to build permanent offices and ancillary facilities at the cost of HK$8 million (about $1.031 million) for the CCP’s Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
OUR TAKE
1. The above developments affirm our previous analysis of why Beijing is strengthening control over Hong Kong. To briefly recap, Xi Jinping is stopping Hong Kong from transforming into a “counter-revolutionary base” that “hostile foreign forces” can exploit to undermine Communist China, deny the Jiang faction and other CCP interest groups who oppose him the opportunity of taking advantage of chaos in the city to upend his rule, and preventing Hong Kong from turning into an “anti-Xi base.”
The curbing of “anti-Xi” and “counter-revolutionary forces” entails the arrest and prosecution of pro-democracy activists, sympathetic journalists, and even thugs and pro-Beijing elements who might be aligned with Xi’s factional rivals. Immigration control allows the Hong Kong authorities to keep out “undesirables” or prevent people from fleeing the city; the immigration amendments reported by Stand News affirm our China 2021 Outlook prediction that “the CCP will unlikely impose direct immigration controls in Hong Kong.” Meanwhile, Xi going after factional rivals involves weakening the power of Hong Kong property tycoons and making sweeping personnel reshuffles in the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus.
2. The Hong Kong police’s arrest of people who attacked Falun Gong sites in the city may be puzzling to most observers given that adherents of the spiritual discipline are famous for being anti-CCP and that the Hong Kong authorities have been busy rounding up those who oppose them and Beijing. Recent anti-Falun Gong hit pieces by the pro-CCP Ta Kung Pao also express a sense of exasperation at why the Hong Kong government has not yet moved in on the “anti-communist” Falun Gong practitioners. Those who are observant will note that PRC state and Party propaganda outlets have no qualms in issuing commentary attacking college student unions in Hong Kong and other “chaotic elements,” but tend to stray away from bashing Falun Gong or media outlets run by Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong.
One would expect the CCP to be rushing to denounce practitioners displaying “Heaven will destroy the CCP” (天滅中共) banners around the city, publishing literature exposing the Party, and reporting on topics that greatly displease Beijing. But the CCP’s “wolf warrior” diplomats and propaganda mouthpieces have been invisible on the Falun Gong issue in Hong Kong, while they have been spoiling for a good fight over other Hong Kong issues or the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. It is also not as if the CCP fears more outside pressure over its attack of another persecuted group; after all, the Party has “allies” in the form of Western mainstream media, which have turned hostile towards Falun Gong practitioner-run media outlets like The Epoch Times in recent years. Meanwhile, the promotion of international religious freedom under President Donald Trump is not a priority for the Biden-Harris administration.
Readers of this newsletter will recall from the first entry above and past issues newsletter (see here and here) that Falun Gong is a major issue in the Xi-Jiang factional struggle. While there is a slight chance that Beijing and the Hong Kong authorities could be acting duplicitously—arresting anti-Falun Gong thugs first to allay suspicions before launching a massive crackdown later—their recent actions and non-actions against Falun Gong in Hong Kong are so out-of-character as to rule out skullduggery, at least for the moment. We believe that it is more likely that the recent arrest of anti-Falun Gong elements in Hong Kong and on the mainland (under the political and legal affairs apparatus “education and rectification campaign) are related to the factional fighting in the CCP elite, and points to an escalation of the Xi-Jiang struggle.
3. The Hong Kong police’s arrest of anti-Falun Gong elements is no mean feat for Beijing given the Jiang faction’s iron grip over Hong Kong over the past two decades, and indicates that Xi Jinping has greatly enhanced his control over the city over the past year.
Key political moves by Xi to consolidate control in Hong Kong include:
- January 2020: Luo Huining replaces Wang Zhimin as director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office.
- February 2020: Xia Baolong replaces notable Jiang faction member Zhang Xiaoming as director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Zhang is demoted to deputy director.
- July 2020: The Hong Kong National Security Law is implemented on July 1 and Xi expands the presence of the PRC’s supra-authority national security organization into Hong Kong. Luo Huining is appointed national security advisor of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and effectively becomes Hong Kong’s de facto “top leader” (一把手).
- November 2020: Zheng Lin replaces Li Haitang as Hong Kong Liaison Office propaganda director
- December 2020: The Hong Kong Youth Care Association officially disbanded. In the same month, the Hong Kong police arrested a thug who attacked six Falun Gong booths in Hong Kong.
- January 2021: Pro-CCP media in Hong Kong report that over half of the 480-strong Liaison Office staff had been reshuffled in 2020, including the addition of 100 staff (part of the 480) to “strengthen supervision over Hong Kong.”
- February 2021: Wang Songmiao was transferred to the Hong Kong Liaison Office to serve as its secretary-general.
- March 2021: Hong Kong media report that Yin Zonghua, a deputy director of the Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and overseas Chinese committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, could become Hong Kong Liaison Office deputy director in charge of economic affairs, trade, and PRC-run institutions. That month, people started attacking Falun Gong sites in Hong Kong, allegedly on the others of the Shenzhen Communist Party branch.
- April 12, 2021: The Hong Kong Epoch Times printing press is attacked by four masked men with sledgehammers.
- April 14 – April 22, 2021: Hong Kong police arrest eight men responsible for attacking Falun Gong sites in the city.
The Hong Kong Liaison Office’s leadership ranks consist of one director, seven deputy directors, and one secretary-general. Seven of the nine personnel were reshuffled to Hong Kong after Xi took office, with two of the seven having only minimal working experience in the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus and the remaining five having no experience in Hong Kong. And of the two long-time officials who have not been touched, deputy director Yang Jianping is 62 and can retire at any time, while deputy director He Jing is 57 and close to retirement; retirement age for Liaison Office deputy directors is 60, but they can technically stay on longer if their experience is needed. Put another way, Xi Jinping has more or less wrestled the Hong Kong Liaison Office from the Jiang faction’s grasp, and has greater control over the city via the supra-authority national security organization.
On the flipside, the fact that Xi had to impose a national security law on Hong Kong and do so much reshuffling work to make some headway on factional struggle matters (“just” arrest some anti-Falun Gong thugs) is testament to how strongly the Jiang faction controlled the city in the past 20-plus years. Whether the four masked men who attack the Hong Kong Epoch Times printing press are eventually arrested or not will serve as a bellwether of Xi’s political control over the city, and how much remaining influence the Jiang faction has. And should it come to pass, the arrest of the printing press attackers will be a significant sign that “something is rotten in Zhongnanhai,” and that Black Swans are just over the horizon in China.
