SinoInsight 1
On the first day of the fourth session of the 13th National People’s Congress on March 5, the NPC issued the “Draft Amendments to the Organic Law of the National People’s Congress” (全國人大組織法修正草案) and the “Draft Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the National People’s Congress” (全國人大議事規則修正草案). The draft amendments were the first proposed changes to the NPC’s laws in over three decades.
Noteworthy proposed changes to the NPC’s organic law include:
1. The addition of a “General Provisions” (总则) chapter, which stressed that the NPC and its Standing Committee come under the leadership of the CCP, call on the NPC to adhere to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the legislatures (national and regional) of foreign countries.
2. Refined relevant regulations governing the NPC’s various special committees, including clarifying the functions and powers of the presidium and the standing chairman of the presidium, as well as expanding the powers of NPC chairman meetings. NPC chairman meetings are held to decide which bills and draft resolutions will be submitted to plenary meetings of the NPC Standing Committee, as well as set the regular work agenda for the NPC Standing Committee.
3. Laws regulating the new national supervision system committee were added.
4. The NPC Standing Committee’s powers to appoint and remove officials are expanded. After the implementation of the draft regulations, the NPC Standing Committee can appoint or remove officials at the recommendation of the State Council premier (Li Keqiang) when the NPC is not in session; officials other than the State Council premier can be removed upon the request of the NPC chairman (Li Zhanshu) and the premier; and members of the Central Military Commission can be appointed or removed at the recommendation of CMC chairman (Xi Jinping).
Noteworthy proposed changes to the NPC’s procedural rules include:
1. The NPC Standing Committee decides the date of its meetings, and may decide to hold in advance or postpone meetings where appropriate in the case of special circumstances. Before meetings, the NPC Standing Committee may organize delegates to discuss relevant draft laws and solicit opinions.
2. Meeting procedures will be streamlined where appropriate, including the review process of legal bills; deliberations of draft proposals; resignation of NPC Standing Committee members no longer need to be included in meeting agendas for deliberation and a vote; and delegate speeches during meetings should revolve around the meeting topic.
3. Increase procedures for the review, approval, and adjustment of five-year plans for national economic and social development.
OUR TAKE
1. The NPC draft amendments to its organic law and procedural rules are almost certainly geared towards aiding Xi Jinping’s bid for a norm-breaking third term in office at the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
First, organic law draft amendment makes clear that the NPC, which in name represents “all rights of the people” (一切權利屬於人民), must follow the leadership of the CCP. In turn, the CCP falls under the leadership of “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” This is an expansion of Xi’s “the Party leads everything” move to consolidate power in his leadership.
Second, the draft amendments will make it much easier for Beijing to pass legislation, change laws, and make key personnel reshuffles before the 20th Party Congress. Personnel reshuffles will likely take place during important political conclaves like the Sixth Plenum, the Seventh Plenum and the 2022 Two Sessions, as well as around the period of Beidaihe meetings.
Finally, the NPC is tasked with doing external United Front work to influence foreign legislatures, very possibly to get foreign legislatures to support pro-Beijing bills and curb scrutiny of the PRC on issues like human rights abuses, intellectual property theft, and spying.
The draft amendments could be passed as soon as April when the NPC Standing Committee holds its next meeting.
2. The proposed expansion of the NPC Standing Committee’s power to appoint or remove State Council officials aside from the PRC premier and when the NPC is not in session will grant Xi Jinping a significant advantage in the CCP factional struggle.
Currently, the NPC Standing Committee comprises NPC chairman Li Zhanshu and 13 other vice chairs. Li, however, has the final say on all matters under the CCP’s “democratic centralism” system. Li also happens to be a solid ally of Xi, and will follow Xi’s requests on personnel matters.
When the draft amendments are passed, Li Zhanshu can potentially target the four State Council vice premiers, namely, Han Zheng, Sun Chunlan, Hu Chunhua, and Liu He. Liu is the “safest” of the four because he is a Xi ally and is due to retire at the 2023 Two Sessions. That being said, it is entirely within the realm of possibility for Liu to step down early from his position (and possibly become a NPC vice chairman) to make way for Xi’s potential candidates to replace premier Li Keqiang. Should efforts by Western establishment elites to prop up “moderates” in the CCP as part of an “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy become more apparent, and if Xi’s political situation turns out to be even more precarious than external signs indicate, the likelihood of such a personnel reshuffle will increase.
Han Zheng and Sun Chunlan face greater risk of being targeted because they are members of the Jiang Zemin faction that rivals Xi. However, Han’s removal is very unlikely unless he openly challenges Xi because he is a Politburo Standing Committee member and is slated for retirement at the 20th Party Congress. Sun could find herself in trouble if Xi needs a scapegoat for the CCP’s botched handling of the coronavirus outbreak in the early weeks of 2020.
Hu Chunhua’s career safety is a toss-up—he represents a threat to Xi because he has been tipped to succeed the latter as Party boss, but has political protection through his association with former Party boss and Xi factional ally Hu Jintao. Put another way, Hu Chunhua’s political future is tied to the state of the factional struggle: If Xi has an overwhelming advantage, Hu will be untouched and could even secure promotion (possibly replacing Li Keqiang as premier); if Xi is feeling the heat, Hu could be sidelined at moment’s notice (ongoing retroactive anti-corruption investigations in Inner Mongolia could pave the way for Hu’s purge or retirement).
The proposed expansion of the NPC Standing Committee’s powers over personnel matters will also affect all heads of ministries and commissions. As chairman of the CMC, Xi Jinping can also appoint or remove any CMC member. Further, many of the current 157 NPC members are Jiang faction officials, some of whom were made to “retreat to the second line” (退居二線) to the NPC after being sidelined in Xi’s rectification of personnel in the provinces and key apparatuses. If Xi can find suitable officials to replace the Jiang faction officials in the NPC, he would likely take advantage of the draft amendments after their passage to remove the lingering Jiang presence in the regime’s rubber stamp legislature.
3. Xi Jinping scrapped term limits for the PRC presidency and vice presidency in 2018, but not the PRC premier. This means that Li Keqiang will definitely have to step down at the end of his second term as premier at the 2023 Two Sessions (Li will almost certainly exit the Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress).
Who could replace Li Keqiang as premier? Per the CCP’s unofficial “[sixty] seven up, [sixty] eight down” (七上八下) retirement norm, the only vice premier who can replace Li is Hu Chunhua. However, Hu’s political position is wobbly (see point 2), and is not an automatic shoo-in for the premiership. In the event of the removal or retirement of a sitting vice premier, the passage of the draft amendments could potentially see the appointment of Xi allies Li Qiang (Shanghai Party secretary) and Li Xi (Guangdong Party secretary) before the 20th Party Congress as a replacement, paving the way for either to succeed Li Keqiang as premier.
SinoInsight 2
Countries around the world, including smaller nations, continue to stand up to Communist China. Some notable developments this month include:
March 4
Lithuania announced plans to “open a Lithuanian enterprise office in Taiwan by the end of the year,” according to a spokeswoman for the economy and innovation minister. The Eastern European country also expressed the intention of leaving the PRC-led 17+1 format.
March 16
1. In its “Integrated Review” policy paper, the United Kingdom described China as a “systemic competitor” and “by far the most significant geopolitical factor in the world today.”
2. According to a joint press statement issued during U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Japan, “The United States and Japan acknowledged that China’s behavior, where inconsistent with the existing international order, presents political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the Alliance and to the international community.” The statement also noted that the American and Japanese foreign ministers “shared serious concerns regarding the human rights situation in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”
3. Lithuania established the Lithuania-Taiwan Forum to promote relations with Taiwan. The organization comprises more than 50 members, including chairman and former Lithuanian education minister Gintaras Steponavicius, economic minister Ausrine Armonaite, deputy foreign minister Mantas Adomenas, and Vilnius mayor Remigijus Simasius.
March 18
Ukraine blocked the takeover of aircraft engine maker Motor Sich by Beijing Skyrizon Aviation. The move was reportedly undertaken at the urging of former Trump administration National Security Advisor John Bolton in 2019.
March 19
Switzerland issued its first ever China foreign policy strategy. In a press conference, Swiss foreign minister Ignazio Cassis said that human rights and trade interests are two key issues of the Sino-Swiss relationship. Cassis also said, “Politically, China remains de facto a one-party state with increasingly authoritarian tendencies and the suppression of dissidents and minorities.”
March 22
1. The European Union sanctioned four PRC officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the first European sanctions against Communist China since Tiananmen in 1989. On the same day, the U.S., the U.K., and Canada released a joint statement on Xinjiang, and America sanctioned two Xinjiang officials “in unity with our partners.”
2. Over 30 European think-tank directors issued a statement in support of individuals and entities targeted by PRC retaliatory sanctions over Xinjiang, including Swedish and German researchers, and the Mercator Institute for China Studies.
3. The Paraguayan government said that individuals with unproven ties to the PRC government had offered the country PRC-made vaccines on condition that Paraguay break ties with Taiwan.
March 23
1. In meetings with his counterparts from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, Secretary Blinken spoke about addressing the challenges of a “more assertive and aggressive Russia and China.”
March 24
1. Speaking at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Secretary Blinken said that the U.S. “won’t force our allies into a ‘us or them’ choice with China.” He explained that while “Beijing’s coercive behavior threatens our collective security and prosperity” and is “actively working to undercut the rules of the international system and the values we and our allies share … that doesn’t mean that countries can’t work with China where possible, for example, on challenges like climate change and health security.”
2. Secretary Blinken and EU top diplomat Josep Borrell agreed to launch the European Union-United States Dialogue on China to discuss topics such as “reciprocity, economic issues, resilience, human rights … security, multilateralism, and areas for constructive engagement with China such as climate change.”
They also agreed that “relations with China are multifaceted, comprising elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry.”
3. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in a press conference that the alliance is looking to “step up and work even more closely with partners, both in our neighborhood but also in the Asia Pacific, also to address the rise of China.”
Stoltenberg said that China is “not an adversary,” but the country “doesn’t share our values” and its rise had “direct consequences to our security.”
4. In a letter to the UK foreign minister, 15 UK members of parliament called on the British government to sanction Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo for his previous role in overseeing “the implementation of a heavy-handed repression and surveillance of Tibetan religious and cultural life.”
5. Estonian MEP Riho Terras said that Estonia should exit the PRC-led 17+1 format. “Our own Foreign Intelligence Service has pointed out the activities of the Chinese secret services and their use of ‘soft power,’” he wrote in a letter to Estonia’s foreign minister.
6. Lithuania officially left the 17+1 format, according to a German MEP and the director of a Czech NGO.
OUR TAKE
1. In our China 2021 Outlook, we wrote that “the world will pay more attention to the CCP’s human rights abuses and the ‘China challenge.’” The developments listed above indicate that our forecast is on track for verification.
2. Some of the recent efforts by countries to stand up to China appear to be coordinated, as seen by actions taken by the U.S. and her European allies. While Washington appears to be leading the joint U.S.-EU pushback against Beijing, much of what the Biden-Harris administration has done so far is largely a continuation of Trump-era, hardline China policies, minus clear definition of the ideological dimension of the CCP threat. In particular, Secretary Blinken’s March 24 speech in Brussels promotes “soft engagement,” and is consistent with the Biden-Harris administration’s softer, targeted approach to China.
While it is still early days and things may change further down the road, current developments suggest that the U.S. and EU are both pursuing an “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy. In contrast to the Trump administration, neither Washington nor Brussels have clearly distinguished between the CCP and the Chinese people; neither have identified the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist organization bent on world domination; and both are focusing on CCP human rights abuses (Xinjiang and Hong Kong) that negatively impact Xi Jinping in the intra-Party factional struggle, while ignoring no less egregious human rights abuses (forced organ harvesting and Falun Gong) linked with his chief political rival (the Jiang faction).
3. Establishment media, commentators, and think-tanks have been framing the Biden-Harris administration as “tough on China.” But the weak performance of Biden officials at the Sino-U.S. meeting in Alaska and the pro-Beijing backgrounds of the administration’s China policy officials indicate to other countries that Washington may not be the most reliable ally to count on in dealing with the “China challenge.” Yet countries have reason not to throw in their lot with Communist China, especially after the Trump administration has heightened the world’s awareness about the CCP’s ideologically driven hegemonic ambitions, gross human rights abuses, and other malign behavior, including intellectual property theft, economic theft, and cyber attacks.
Beijing may find little comfort in the fact that America is fitting its “the East is rising and the West is declining” propaganda narrative. Instead of kowtowing to the PRC, countries around the world are raising their guard against the manifest CCP threat, some without waiting for cues from a compromised Washington. Like the Qin kingdom during China’s Warring States era (475–221 B.C.), Beijing is finding that its aggressiveness and clout are banding the “six states” (the international community) against it. Growing international pressure against the PRC will pose problems for Xi Jinping as he makes a bid for a norm-breaking third term in office at the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
