SinoInsight 1
On Feb. 13, the PRC State Council announced that Zhang Xiaoming, the director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), would be demoted to deputy director with responsibilities over daily operations.
Xia Baolong, a 67-year-old Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference vice chairman and secretary-general, replaces Zhang as HKMAO director.
OUR TAKE
1. International commentary on Xia Baolong paints him as a “hardline” long-term ally of Xi Jinping. A closer look at Xia’s career reveals a more complex picture.
Xia, like newly appointed Hong Kong Liaison Office director Luo Huining, is an official with Jiang Zemin faction associations whom Xi appears to trust enough to install in a key position.
Xia began his official career in Tianjin, a Jiang faction stronghold. In 2003, he was transferred to Zhejiang Province to serve as deputy Party secretary, which suggests that he was being groomed to take over provincial leadership positions. Between January 2004 to June 2007, Xia also concurrently served as Zhejiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission chief, a job which at that time was reserved for officials whom the Jiang faction-controlled political and legal affairs apparatus trusted to oversee the sweeping persecution campaign against the Falun Gong spiritual discipline. However, Xia “lost” the Zhejiang PLAC job after June 2007 and was only promoted to acting Zhejiang governor in 2011, or eight long years after he became the province’s deputy Party secretary. Thus while Xia Baolong owed a good part of his career to the Jiang faction, his relative lack of career progression during the Jiang era suggests that he either does not have strong factional allegiances to the Jiang faction or the Jiang faction does not fully trust Xia enough to elevate him to higher office.
Xia’s career also shows that he belongs in the category of officials that Xi trusts sufficiently to not purge and even place in key positions but not enough to be considered an ally. Xia and Xi were once colleagues in Zhejiang in 2003; Xi was then serving as Zhejiang Party secretary and Xia was his deputy. After Xi took office in November 2012, Xia was promoted Zhejiang Party chief in December 2012. In 2016, Party central selected Zhejiang as one of three areas to pilot the National Supervisory Commission system and Xia Baolong saw to it that Zhejiang was the first of the three areas to implement the system; Xia also called on local officials to dedicate themselves to the Xi leadership’s supervisory reform work. Xia Baolong’s show of loyalty to Xi seems to be a reason why he was promoted to a vice ministerial position in the national CPPCC (vice chairman and secretary-general) after stepping down as Zhejiang chief in 2018 due to age reasons (Xia was then 66).
Meanwhile, the general consensus that Xia Baolong is a “hardliner” because he oversaw the demolition of Christian crosses on churches in Zhejiang in 2014 does not hold water. The hardline campaign to tear down religious iconography during that period was a nationwide initiative that was not limited to Zhejiang; the campaign seemed more severe in Zhejiang due to the prevalence of churches in the province. It is also difficult to establish that Xia is a genuine “hardliner” given that he failed to hold on to his provincial PLAC chief job during the period when the CCP political campaign against Falun Gong was at a high-water mark (2004 to 2007) and saw his career stagnate for several years more; in contrast, officials like Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai were rapidly promoted up the ranks for enthusiastically advancing Jiang Zemin’s hardline political campaign.
Some commentators believe that Xi Jinping is going to get tougher on Hong Kong with the appointment of the “hardliner” Xia Baolong as HKMAO director. However, we have established in the previous paragraph that describing Xia as a “hardliner” is a misnomer. And if Xi does indeed wish to clamp down harder on Hong Kong, there is no one better suited for the job than Xia’s immediate predecessor Zhang Xiaoming; Zhang has amply demonstrated with his inflammatory rhetoric and with the Hong Kong government’s handling of the anti-extradition bill protests that he is the best candidate to oversee an escalation in the CCP’s hardline policy towards Hong Kong. Thus, it makes little sense for Xi to replace Zhang unless he is considering alternative solutions to resolving the CCP’s Hong Kong crisis.
2. We believe that Xi Jinping’s reasoning for appointing Xia Baolong as HKMAO director is similar to the reasoning behind the appointment of Luo Huining as Hong Kong Liaison Office boss.
The Xi leadership is almost certainly looking to reevaluate its Hong Kong strategy after failing to suppress the anti-extradition bill protests and witnessing the crushing defeat of the Hong Kong pro-establishment camp in local elections for district councilor. Before rolling out a new Hong Kong strategy or policy, Xi would likely want to gather fresh intelligence, get a more accurate read of sentiments on the ground, and find ways to marginalize or work around the entrenched Jiang faction networks in the Hong Kong and Macau affairs apparatus. Thus, it makes sense to appoint Xia and Luo, two retirement age officials no political baggage in the Hong Kong and Macau affairs apparatus (criteria that allows them to be more impartial in their new jobs and ensures that they are less likely to be compromised) yet who have Jiang faction associations and also demonstrated loyalty to Xi (criteria that mitigate complications arising from the factional struggle).
It should be noted that strategic and policy reevaluation on the part of the Xi leadership does not entail a relaxation in the CCP’s hardened stance on Hong Kong. We see no evidence that Xi or the CCP plans to shift away from the tough stance that has been in place since December 2019. However, the reevaluation period does afford the Hong Kong people “breathing space” of sorts to regroup and plan their next move. The outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) on the mainland would also force the CCP to think twice before attempting to quickly ram through the national security legislation Article 23 in Hong Kong.
3. The demotion of Zhang Xiaoming offers some insight into the state of the CCP factional struggle between the Xi camp and his political rivals.
The fact that Zhang was demoted and not purged suggests that Xi Jinping still lacks “quan wei” to move decisively against his main political opponents, including the Jiang faction. Yet seeing how the demotion of Zhang could go through indicates that Xi currently has a very slight advantage over his rivals in the factional struggle stalemate. And if Xi’s rivals are planning to take advantage of the coronavirus outbreak to launch a coup against him, then the demotion of Zhang can be considered to be a move by Xi Jinping to put would-be coup plotters on notice.
SinoInsight 2
Over the past week, the Hubei provincial government saw several personnel reshuffles that appeared to be a reaction to the coronavirus outbreak.
On Feb. 8, Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary general Chen Yixin was appointed deputy head of the national team overseeing the handling of the coronavirus outbreak in Hubei. Chen previously served as Hubei deputy Party secretary and Wuhan Party secretary.
On Feb. 10, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Hubei Health Commission Party secretary Zhang Jin and director Liu Yingzi were being removed from their posts and would be replaced by Wang Hesheng, a deputy director in the PRC’s National Health Commission and a new member of the Hubei provincial Party committee.
On Feb. 13, PRC state media announced the removal of Jiang Chaoliang as Hubei Party secretary and his being replaced by Shanghai mayor and Xi Jinping ally Ying Yong. Wuhan Party secretary Ma Guoqiang was also removed and replaced by Jinan Party secretary Wang Zhonglin.
OUR TAKE
1. The personnel reshuffles in Hubei Province were a foregone conclusion given how the local officials handled the coronavirus outbreak.
From a disease control perspective, local officials were slow to react to the outbreak of the coronavirus when it surfaced in December 2019. After Beijing acknowledged the coronavirus outbreak, the Wuhan authorities made several controversial decisions that worsened the situation. From the remarks of Wuhan mayor Zhou Xianwang to state broadcaster CCTV in a Jan. 27 live interview, it appears that the decision to lockdown Wuhan City was a local initiative. However, the city’s authorities executed the lockdown in a crude manner that adversely affected the livelihood of city residents, triggered societal panic, and had a questionable impact in stopping the spread of the coronavirus. The problems in Wuhan were then amplified nationwide as other cities enacted copycat lockdowns. If there was already a humanitarian crisis before Beijing announced the human-to-human transmission of the coronavirus on Jan. 20, the actions of the Wuhan and Hubei authorities appeared to have aggravated the situation.
From the CCP’s “stability maintenance” perspective, the Hubei authorities also fared very poorly. The Wuhan and Hubei local governments’ questionable epidemic control and prevention work drew intense international scrutiny and criticism, which in turn heaped pressure on the CCP regime and “core” leader Xi Jinping. Worse for the regime, the international community began to lose confidence in China’s economic prospects and the CCP’s crisis management ability. The outpouring of domestic and international anger over the death of “whistleblower” doctor Li Wenliang has also led some observers to believe that the CCP is facing its worst existential crisis since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989—a perception that bodes ill for the Chinese communist regime.
The sacking of Hubei officials is clearly an effort by Party central to preserve larger regime interests by sacrificing lower elements. Beijing is likely hoping that public anger and international scrutiny can be directed at inept local officials and administration instead of the entire CCP system.
2. To prevent the eruption of greater social contradictions, both the CCP and Xi Jinping have an interest in curbing the spread of the coronavirus and stopping local governments from making rash decisions out of self-preservation. Thus, it is understandable why Xi would want to install competent officials whom he trusts in Hubei Province to oversee epidemic prevention and control work and ensure that the local government is properly implementing orders from Party central.
SinoInsight 3
On Feb. 6, PRC vice premier and Politburo member Sun Chunlan met with health inspectors in Wuhan and told them to carry out epidemic prevention and control work per “wartime conditions.”
On Feb. 10, Xi Jinping likened epidemic prevention and control work to a “people’s war” while inspecting the Beijing municipal government’s epidemic prevention and control work. Xi also noted that epidemic prevention and control work in Hubei and Wuhan are top priorities.
On Feb. 11, the Guangzhou People’s Congress and the Shenzhen People’s Congress passed emergency legislation to authorize municipal and district authorities in the respective cities to requisition private premises, vehicles, equipment, and other materials “according to the needs of epidemic prevention and control.”
Early morning on Feb. 11, the Wuhan epidemic prevention and control headquarters issued two documents (Notices No. 11 and No. 12) that forbid infected patients from seeking treatment outside the district which they reside in and placed all residential communities in Wuhan on lockdown.
In the evening of Feb. 12, the epidemic prevention and control headquarters in Zhangwan District (Shiyan City, Hubei Province) issued a document (Circular No. 27) implementing “wartime control” measures effective from 2400 hours on Feb. 12. The “wartime control” measures would see the lockdown of all apartment blocks for a period of 14 days, and the Zhangwan District epidemic prevention and control headquarters would decide whether or not to extend or shorten the lockdown duration.
As of Feb. 12, the PRC authorities announced 15,152 new confirmed cases of the coronavirus in mainland China. Of the 15,152 cases, 13,332 cases were from Hubei Province. On Feb. 11, the authorities announced 2,015 new confirmed cases in mainland China, of which 1,638 came from Hubei. Based on the official figures, there were 7.5 times more new confirmed cases of the coronavirus on Feb. 12 as compared to Feb. 11 for the whole of mainland China, and 8.1 times as many new cases in Hubei Province over the same period.
On Feb. 13, “Chang’an Sword,” the official WeChat account of the Central PLAC, quoted Chen Yixin, the deputy head of the national team overseeing the handling of the coronavirus outbreak in Hubei, as saying that it is still not fully clear how many people are infected in Wuhan. Chen said that according to calculations by relevant parties, the base number of infected people in Wuhan “may be relatively large.”
OUR TAKE
1. The CCP is not merely engaging in rhetoric when it equates epidemic prevention and control work to a “people’s war” or observes that the country is in “wartime conditions.” Rather, the CCP has acknowledged that battling the coronavirus outbreak is very much like fighting an actual war, with both central and local governments forced to burn through an immense amount of resources to stay in the fight while factories incapacitated by the quarantine measures are unable to meet wartime levels of production. Put another way, the CCP has indirectly affirmed that there is a very severe epidemic on the mainland.
2. When Sun Chunlan talked about “wartime conditions” on Feb. 6, the CCP officially announced 3,143 new confirmed cases of the coronavirus that day. By Feb. 11, the official number of new confirmed cases for the day had fallen to 2,015, a decrease of 35.6 percent.
The decrease in new confirmed cases between Feb. 6 and Feb. 11 suggests that the CCP’s epidemic prevention and control measures are working. However, the escalation of those measures during that period (to the point where individual apartment blocks are placed on lockdown) suggests otherwise. The sharp increase in new confirmed cases between Feb. 11 to Feb. 12 with no explanation from the authorities virtually confirms that the CCP has been continually engaging in a cover-up with regard to the coronavirus outbreak.
There are two likely reasons for the sudden jump in new confirmed cases between Feb. 11 to Feb. 12. First, the CCP has a habit of massaging its data when it can no longer adequately conceal the truth of the situation. Second, the newly appointed Hubei senior officials could find it to be in their interest to see that numbers that better reflect reality (but still not the actual figures) are published so as to contrast themselves from their “incompetent” predecessors. Regardless, the CCP is almost certainly still engaging in a cover-up, and we believe that the actual figure of confirmed cases is many times higher than what the authorities are reporting.
3. Another sign that the coronavirus outbreak is much more severe than official figures indicate is the passing of legislation in Guangzhou and Shenzhen which allow the local government to requisition private property.
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are first-tier cities in Guangdong Province, one of the wealthiest provinces in mainland China. If top cities in Guangdong need to requisition private property to tide over the epidemic emergency, then this suggests that the coronavirus outbreak has placed the CCP’s finances under tremendous pressure.
Government requisitioning in the CCP regime comes with deeply troubling implications. Given CCP characteristics, officials will almost certainly look to exploit the requisitioning legislation to carry out “legal robberies” in the name of “epidemic prevention and control.” Whole families could conceivably be forcibly “quarantined” (whether or not they are infected is a separate issue) elsewhere while the local government seizes their property. And if those people whose property have been requisitioned do get infected and die, the local government will not have to worry about returning the confiscated property.
We believe that the People’s Congresses of Guangzhou and Shenzhen have opened a Pandora’s Box with the passage of requisitioning legislation. The CCP regime will quickly find itself with another major crisis when other local governments introduce similar legislation.
