SinoInsight 1
Recently, the CCP and the Hong Kong government continue to work towards the Hong Kong national security law proposed by the PRC’s National People’s Congress at the Two Sessions last month.
June 6
- The PRC Hong Kong Liaison Office held a meeting with 21 Hong Kong delegates to the NPC and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference to solicit views on the proposed national security law. Hong Kong Liaison Office chief Luo Huining said that the law is in line with the “one country, two systems” arrangement and the “rule of law” in Hong Kong. He stressed that “things that have been decided on should be done resolutely and must be actualized” (“决定了的事，就会坚决地做，切实兑现”).
June 8
- During a webinar to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the release of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office deputy director Zhang Xiaoming said that “Hong Kong’s major problem is not economic, housing, employment … or young people’s mobility,” but a “political problem.” He also accused the “opposition camp and foreign forces” of attempting to turn Hong Kong into an “independent or semi-independent political entity.”
- Prominent Hong Kong pan-democrat Martin Lee said during a television interview that the NPC Hong Kong national security law will destroy “one country, two systems” and that Beijing will find it difficult to win support for the move. He also said that it was better for Hong Kong to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law instead and that the pan-democrats could support the local national security law if there are safeguards in place to prevent the abuse of the law to erode human rights and freedoms.
June 9
- The NPC Standing Committee announced the agenda for its fifty-ninth meeting from June 18 to June 20. Noticeably missing from the agenda was a review of the proposed Hong Kong national security law.
- Tens of thousands of people in Hong Kong participated in “mobile protests” (“流水式”游行) to mark the anniversary of a million-strong anti-extradition bill rally in 2019. Riot police used pepper sprays and pepper-spray projectiles to disperse protesters and arrested 53 people.
June 10
- Hong Kong Secretary for Security John Lee told the South China Morning Post that the Hong Kong police force is establishing a dedicated unit to enforce the NPC Hong Kong national security law. The unit will be ready to enforce the law “on the very first day” it comes into effect and will have “intelligence gathering, investigation and training capabilities.”
- The Hong Kong government announced that elections for the city’s Legislative Council will be held on September 6 this year and the nomination period is scheduled for July 18 to July 31.
OUR TAKE
1. Luo Huining’s remarks on June 6, Zhang Xiaoming’s remarks on June 8, and John Lee’s revelation of a dedicated police unit to enforce the national security law betray the CCP’s “murderous intent” (殺氣) on Hong Kong. When handling sensitive issues, the CCP will first attempt to deceive, buy off, and use threats before resorting to violent measures to get its way. The CCP is preparing to get tough on Hong Kong because it has almost certainly come to the conclusion that the U.S. is waging the “new cold war” in earnest (particularly by ramping up ideological battle against the CCP; see SinoInsight 1). This is evidenced by Zhang Xiaoming stressing that the Hong Kong problem is a political problem (a very serious issue in the CCP regime) rather than an economic one, a 180 degree flip in rhetoric from the previous year.
Concurrently, the CCP appears to be quite concerned about U.S. action against it over Hong Kong. This is reflected in the NPC Standing Committee “delaying” the passage of the proposed Hong Kong national security law by not reviewing it in June, a move we anticipated on May 25. If the law is not reviewed in June, then regular procedure would mean that the review would only be conducted in August or even October.
Depending on how the Hong Kong situation develops, the CCP could conceivably hold interim meetings outside regular procedure to review and pass the national security law. At present, the probability of the CCP accelerating the passage of the national security law is still remote (see second point).
2. We wrote on May 21 that the CCP is “very likely hoping that the passage of the NPC’s Hong Kong national security law will spur the Hong Kong government and pro-Beijing legislators to ram through Article 23 of the Basic Law.” With the Trump administration threatening to sanction the PRC over the national security law, the CCP has even greater incentive now to get Hong Kong to pass Article 23 so that it can avoid having to go through with passing the NPC Hong Kong national security law and deny the U.S. a strong reason to sanction the PRC (the Trump administration could still impose sanctions over religious freedom and other human rights issues).
We also wrote on May 21 that the CCP is “also likely betting that the Hong Kong people will be so demoralized by the passage of the NPC’s Hong Kong national security law that they do not put up strong resistance to the passage of Article 23.” In other words, the CCP has decided to open with a “sky-high price” (NPC national security law) so that the Hong Kong people will be more willing to accept a concession (Article 23) they would not previously have even considered. Martin Lee’s remarks on June 8 indicate that the CCP’s strategy is working to an extent. Continued protests in Hong Kong, however, suggest that the Hong Kong people, while demoralized to a degree, are far from defeated.
3. The U.S. and the international community must remain vigilant over the Hong Kong issue and keep up pressure on the CCP so that the regime will be more hesitant to use violence in the city.
SinoInsight 2
On June 10, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the release of the 2019 International Religious Freedom Report during a press conference. Pompeo noted that the CCP’s state-sponsored repression against religion “continues to intensify” in China. He also sought to contrast the PRC and the United States: “The contrast couldn’t be more clear: During the best of times, China ruthlessly imposes communism. And amidst the most difficult challenges the United States faces, we work to secure freedom for all.”
The opening paragraph of the 2019 International Religious Freedom Report’s section on China states that the PRC constitution “cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought” and notes that “Chairman Xi Jinping” decrees that all CCP members must be “unyielding Marxist atheists.” Previous editions of the International Religious Freedom Report released by the Trump administration (2016 to 2018) do not make references to the ideological nature of the CCP regime.
Later in the day on June 10, Pompeo tweeted that the Trump administration has made “religious freedom its top priority” and that the U.S. will not “stand idly by while abusers of this first American freedom persecute, discriminate against, and revile people because of their beliefs.”
Official PRC and Party media outlets, who previously attacked Pompeo mercilessly over his remarks targeting the CCP regime, were unusually quiet about his religious freedom comments. The Global Times sniped at Pompeo in a June 11 commentary about the coronavirus situation in America. Meanwhile, state broadcaster China Central Television mentioned in a June 11 commentary on racism in America that Pompeo had talked about promoting religious freedom, but did not go into details.
The PRC’s “wolf warrior” diplomats also kept their criticism of Pompeo to a minimum. When asked to comment on Pompeo’s rebuke of the PRC on religious issues, PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that the international religious freedom report and Pompeo are “full of ideological bias” and “seriously interfered in China’s internal affairs.”
OUR TAKE
1. Secretary Pompeo’s religious freedom statements on June 10 and the ideological references in the 2019 International Religious Freedom Report are part of the Trump administration’s effort to challenge the CCP on ideological, values, and moral fronts. We previously looked at the strategic significance of the prioritization of international religious freedom by the Trump administration.
2. The CCP did not lash out strongly at Pompeo for rebuking its persecution of religious groups in China because the issue is an especially sensitive one for the CCP regime. Calling attention to U.S. criticism of religious persecution in China, including the live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners and the mass incarceration of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, will invite intense scrutiny of the CCP both domestically and abroad. Thus, the CCP would rather avoid the religious freedom issue and condemn Pompeo and the United States over less sensitive topics.
There is also a possibility that the CCP’s “unwillingness” to push back against Pompeo is linked with the timing of the release of the 2019 International Religious Freedom Report. June 10 is the anniversary of the establishment of the “6-10 Office,” a powerful extralegal organization that coordinated the Chinese communist regime’s brutal persecution of Falun Gong. The CCP would definitely have noted the “coincidence” and would seriously consider the possibility that it is being put on notice by the Trump administration.
