SinoInsight 1
The CCP has been stepping up its “wolf warrior” diplomacy ever since Xi Jinping congratulated Joe Biden on Nov. 25. Notable actions in the week of Dec. 7 include:
Dec. 7
1. PRC foreign minister Wang Yi said in a video dialogue with the board of the U.S.-China Business Council that it is “most urgent” for the two countries to “work together to remove all sorts of barriers to achieve a smooth transition in China-U.S. relations.” He added, “we need to strive to restart dialogue, return to the right track and rebuild trust in this next phase of relations.”
2. The Good Neighbor North District Church in Hong Kong announced that the church’s HSBC bank account had been frozen, as well as the HSBC bank accounts belonging to pastor Roy Chan and his wife. The next day, Chan said that police searched his church, a separate meeting site, and the church’s three homeless shelters.
Pastor Chan and members of his church supported the anti-extradition bill protests last year.
Dec. 9
PRC ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankia remarked during the virtual U.S.-China Business Council 2020 annual gala, “As the wheel of history rolls forward, the China-U.S. relationship will not and does not need to go back to the past. But important historical lessons must be remembered to build a better future.”
Dec. 10
1. PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said during a regular press conference, “If some people call China’s diplomacy ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ just because we fight back and speak the truth in the face of unscrupulous attacks, slanders and denigration, I don’t see any problem in living with that ‘wolf-warrior’ title, as long as we are fighting for China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, national dignity and honor, and international fairness and justice.”
2. Wang Chen, a vice chairman of the PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) and Politburo member, attended the annual AmCham China’s Appreciation Dinner in Beijing. The U.S. government recently sanctioned Wang and 13 other NPCSC vice chairpersons over clamping down on Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms via the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL).
Dec. 11
1. Speaking at the “Symposium on the International Situation and China’s Foreign Relations” in Beijing, Wang Yi said, “it’s time for anti-China forces in the U.S. to put an end to their perverse actions.” He also called for “rebuilding the strategic framework for sound and steady China-U.S. relations.”
2. Jimmy Lai, owner of Apple Daily newspaper, was charged under the NSL for “colluding with foreign forces,” and specifically, requesting a foreign country or institution “impose sanctions on blockade, or engage in other hostile activities” against Hong Kong or the PRC. During a court hearing the following day, a judge denied Lai bail and adjourned his case until April 2021.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: “Hong Kong’s National Security Law makes a mockery of justice. Jimmy Lai’s only ‘crime’ is speaking the truth about the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarianism and fear of freedom. Charges should be dropped and he should be released immediately.”
3. A Hong Kong court found pro-democracy student activist Tony Chung Hon-lam guilty of desecrating the PRC flag outside the Hong Kong legislature building and participating in anti-extradition bill protests in 2019.
OUR TAKE
1. In facing a Trump administration that is tough on China, the CCP deployed a range of tactics, including in negotiating the Sino-U.S. trade deal (see here, here, here and here), to “delay and wait for change” (以拖待變). From the Party’s perspective, its strategy has borne fruit with President Donald Trump seemingly on his way out and a compromised Joe Biden naming pro-China personnel to his roster.
We wrote previously that Biden’s vagueness on China will have the CCP “licking its chops.” The recent round of refined but escalated “wolf warrior” diplomacy affirms our analysis. Wang Yi’s angle is to get the U.S. business community to comply with Beijing and disavow the Trump administration’s China policies. Hua Chunying deliberately skewed facts and played the victim card in defending “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Wang Chen speaking to U.S. business elites mere days after he is sanctioned by the Trump administration is the CCP’s way of signaling it is no longer afraid of the latter, and is looking to dictate the terms in dealing with Team Biden.
Meanwhile, Cui Tiankai’s “wheel of history” comment is perhaps the most egregious yet subtle “wolf warrior” move of the lot. In asserting that “China-U.S. relationship will not and does not need to go back to the past,” Cui is insinuating that the U.S. is mistaken if it believes the CCP will settle for a return to “engagement” under Biden. The CCP now believes America is “beaten” by the 2008 financial crisis and the coronavirus, and it is America who must rely on the PRC, not the other way around per the decades of “engagement.” Also, the CCP wants the U.S. to know it will not forget “historical lessons,” or the Trump administration’s adversarial stance towards the PRC, and will keep “remembering” this at opportune moments to pressure America into concessions to “build a better future” for Beijing.
2. We warned in June 2019 that the CCP will attempt to “Pearl Harbor” the U.S. through “unrestricted warfare” strategies, divide American society, and “shape the 2020 U.S. presidential election.” Several suspicious election-related incidents in the past three months suggest that the CCP could have played an interfering role, if only indirectly. Legacy media outlets covered up Hunter Biden’s laptop and the Biden family’s China scandal in the lead up to the election; the CCP paid legacy media outlets nearly $2 million in “printing, distribution, advertising, and administration” expenses over the past six months. Dominion voting machines used in the contested states that produced highly irregular statistical data in favor of Biden have circuitry components sourced from China-based manufacturers; China-made components are known to be compromised. Further, lawyers contesting the election on behalf of Trump say they have evidence of “a significant planeload of ballots coming in” from China.
In the event that concrete evidence of CCP interference is discovered, President Trump could impose sanctions on the PRC under an executive order he issued in September 2018. The uncovering or disclosure of such evidence could even swing the election in Trump’s favor. This would undoubtedly place the CCP’s “wolf warrior” diplomats in a very awkward position and escalate the Sino-U.S. “new cold war.”
3. Recently, more and more countries are speaking out against the CCP’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy. On Dec. 10, European Union ambassador to China Nicolas Chapuis said that the EU will find common ground with the U.S. to stand up to Beijing’s bullying. “In a country like mine, France, where China has had a positive image for more than 300 years, for the first time in French history, China’s image is negative,” he said.
Regardless of who occupies the White House come January 2021, Beijing will face an expanding and more vocal global anti-CCP bloc. Should Trump secure a second term, CCP “wolf warriors” and propagandists will be put on the spot when his administration hits upon traditionally “taboo” topics that the Party fights to excise from public discourse. For instance, the Trump administration could officially categorize the CCP’s persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang as an act of genocide.
The Trump administration could also spotlight and condemn the CCP’s forced harvesting of prisoners of conscience, the majority of whom are Falun Gong practitioners. According to a news report, a Falun Gong adherent who met Secretary Pompeo along with other representatives of groups persecuted by the CCP on Dec. 3 raised the organ harvesting issue, and Pompeo replied he was “well aware of forced organ harvesting and that the [State Department] was looking into the issue.” This August, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback condemned the “horrific” organ harvesting taking place in the PRC. And in designating human rights violators on International Human Rights Day on Dec. 10, Pompeo singled out a Falun Gong case when discussing the PRC. “The world cannot stand idly by as the PRC government perpetrates horrific and systematic abuses against people in China,” his statement said.
SinoInsight 2
In the morning of Dec. 11, PRC state media reported that Xi Jinping chaired a Politburo meeting. Key points of the meeting include:
- 2020 was a “very unusual year” and the CCP had faced the most “severe challenges and major difficulties” since the regime’s establishment. The meeting is satisfied that the CCP had “maintained strategic stability, accurately judged the situation, carried out careful planning and deployment, and acted decisively” this year.
- The meeting touted the success of the CCP’s 13th Five-Year Plan implemented under Xi’s leadership, highlighting poverty alleviation goals and China’s return to regular economic operations amid a pandemic. However, the meeting acknowledged the “many new uncertainties in the coronavirus era and international environment.”
- The meeting discussed economic work for 2021, including “strengthening anti-monopoly measures and preventing the disorderly expansion of capital,” promoting “stable and healthy development” of the property market, and “resolving and preventing various risks.”
- The meeting emphasized the “leadership of Party Central with comrade Xi Jinping at the core” and called for “strictly governing the Party” (從嚴治黨), including the investigation of corruption cases “interwoven with political and economic issues.”
In the afternoon, the CCP Politburo held its 26th study session of the 19th Central Committee on national security work. In addressing the study session, Xi said regime security is “carved in the bones” of the CCP since its founding, and listed 10 requirements for national security:
1. Uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over national security.
2. Adhere to “national security with Chinese characteristics.”
3. Uphold the “people’s safety.”
4. Strike a balance between development and security.
5. Political security is top priority, and the security of the regime and the political system must be safeguarded.
6. Conventional and unconventional risks must be dealt with.
7. Prevent and resolve national security risks.
8. Strengthen international security cooperation and build a universally safe “community of shared future for mankind.”
9. Advance the modernization of the national security system and capabilities.
10. Strengthen “Party building” (i.e. indoctrination) of national security officials.
OUR TAKE
1. The focus on regime security at the Politburo meeting and study session seems at odds with the CCP’s propaganda about how China is a financial and coronavirus “safe haven,” as well as the “eradication” of poverty on the mainland. Those who believe that Xi Jinping is “unrivaled” in the CCP regime may presume he is being overly cautious, seeking further consolidation of power, or is signaling greater crackdowns in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and in the mainland.
Whenever the CCP admits to problems, however, chances are the problems are much more serious than what is made public. Over the course of the year, we have delved into several of the “severe challenges and major difficulties” facing the regime since its establishment in 1949, including rapid economic decline and weak recovery, troublesome financial elites, the coronavirus, and a growing global anti-CCP bloc bolstered by the Trump administration’s tough China actions. On top of that, Xi still has yet to decisively settle the “you die, I live” factional struggle in the Party’s elite, and faces substantial personal political risks.
In other words, Xi and the CCP are not going through the motions in again emphasizing regime security. Things may be looking up for Xi and the CCP if Team Biden accedes next year (see SinoInsight 1), but the severity of Communist China’s domestic woes means it must focus on the “survival” component of its “survival-dominance” dynamic in 2021.
2. “Political security is a top priority” for the CCP now more than ever as it struggles to get private entrepreneurs and their massive businesses to toe the Party line. The CCP is particularly wary of giant Chinese technology firms like Alibaba and “maverick” CEOs like Jack Ma; with their substantial capital and control over society via the widespread adoption of their tech, companies like Alibaba and WeChat are in competition with the CCP over who really runs the regime. Thus, Xi and the CCP need to wield the hammer to preserve “political security” to keep the Party in its paramount position—even if it means derailing lucrative deals for the companies and detrimenting the regime’s reputation (see Ant Group’s scrapped IPO).
For Xi, political security also means winning the CCP factional struggle. Xi will be particularly concerned about bringing the intelligence apparatus, which traditionally uses a decentralized chain of command, in line with his leadership and making sure that the apparatus is less swayed by factional rivals. The requirement of strengthening “Party building” of national security officials could be aimed at bringing the intelligence apparatus in line. In general, officials who persistently side with factional elements against Xi could find themselves investigated in corruption cases “interwoven with political and economic issues” and purged as “national security” threats.
Talk of “security of the regime and the political system” and “unconventional risks” allude to ideological confrontation with the United States. The CCP is cognizant that prolonged ideological battle will lead to its downfall, and hence PRC “wolf warrior” diplomats and propagandists frequently attack the “Cold War mentality” of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and others.
3. The Politburo meeting and study session highlights the CCP’s “survival-dominance” dynamic and the weaknesses inherent in the CCP system.
Take the promotion of Xi’s leadership and focus on his economic “successes,” including “poverty alleviation” and pandemic recovery. On the one hand, for the sake of boosting “quan wei,” Xi must say the CCP, under his leadership, has dominated the coronavirus and rescued the PRC’s economy. On the other hand, the regime cannot afford to rest on its laurels, given its actual, current predicament, if it wants to survive its “many new uncertainties.”
Xi and the CCP fear the global anti-CCP bloc, and seek “international security cooperation” to survive this threat to regime security. In Xi’s call to “strengthen international security cooperation and build a universally safe ‘community of shared future for mankind,’” the actualization of a “community of shared future for mankind” translates to CCP world dominance.
A key weakness of the CCP system is embedded in Xi’s requirement for officials to strike a balance between “development and security.” CCP officials are prone to “tunnel vision” in following the central government’s set goals as they strive to accumulate political capital and win promotions, often sidelining important but politically unrewarding duties in the process. Xi is undoubtedly acutely aware of this systemic flaw in the officialdom, and thus spells out clearly that officials need to execute both “development” (economy, opening up the financial sector, etc.) AND “security” (surveillance, stability maintenance, etc.) well. This request may end up backfiring on the regime, however, as officials struggle to find the elusive “balance”; for instance, officials tend to “prefer left rather than right” (寧左勿右) and will naturally prioritize “security” over “development” in most cases. This results in stunted, lopsided progress for both “development and security,” to the regime’s detriment.
