The CCP shows relative indifference to AUKUS; the PLA says to guard against a ‘Lin Biao armed coup’

On Sept. 15, President Joe Biden announced AUKUS, a new trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Mainstream media outlets framed the deal as a move by the U.S. and its allies to counter China. However, a senior Biden-Harris administration official said that the “partnership is not aimed or about any one country.” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin also said in a press conference that AUKUS “is not aimed at anything or anyone. The intent here is to help improve our trilateral cooperation and our capabilities across the board.” British prime minister Boris Johnson also told Members of Parliament that the deal was “not intended to be adversarial” to China.

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According to a White House background call on AUKUS, the security pact will see the three countries cooperate in areas like cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and undersea capabilities. The countries will also “sustain and deepen information and technology sharing” to pursue “integration of security and defense-related science, technology, and industrial bases, and supply chains.”

AUKUS’s first major initiative will see the U.S. help Australia deliver a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, with the three countries working over the next 18 months to “identify the optimal pathway of delivery of this capability.” Australian prime minister Scott Morrison said that he expects the first of the nuclear submarines to be built by 2040, but does not know how much a fleet will cost.

Australia notified France that it will withdraw from a $66 billion deal to buy French-built submarines. Australia had already spent AU$2.4 billion (about $1.8 billion) on the French project after a deal was reached in 2016. The first of the French submarines were supposed to be delivered in 2027.

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France was furious at Australia’s submarine decision and the AUKUS pact. According to a New York Times report, “President Biden’s national security adviser informed France on Wednesday morning that the United States had reached the deal with Australia,” or only a few hours before the deal was sealed. French ambassador to the United States Philippe Étienne said that he “learned about the deal from news reports, followed by a call from Jake Sullivan” the White House National Security Advisor.

In an interview with France-Info radio, French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian expressed “total incomprehension” at Australia’s move. He added, “This brutal, unilateral and unpredictable decision reminds me a lot of what Mr. Trump used to do. I am angry and bitter. This isn’t done between allies.” Le Drian also said, “It was really a stab in the back. We built a relationship of trust with Australia, and this trust was betrayed.”

The New York Times reported that France “angrily” canceled a Sept. 17 gala at its Washington embassy to commemorate the 240th anniversary of the Battle of the Capes over the Biden-Harris administration’s submarine decision. The event was meant to celebrate the French navy’s assistance to America in 1781 during the Revolutionary War. France’s top naval official, who traveled to DC for the event, returned to Paris early, according to The Hill.

On Sept. 17, France recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Australia to protest the submarine deal. The ambassadors returned to Paris for consultations, and the French government will determine when they return to their posts. This was the first time in history that France recalled its ambassador to the United States. The New York Times noted that the move is a “severe diplomatic step that is usually used against adversaries.”

French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said in a statement, “This exceptional decision is justified by the exceptional gravity of the announcements made on 15 September by Australia and the United States.” He added, “The cancellation of the Attack class submarine program binding Australia and France since 2016, and the announcement of a new partnership with the United States meant to launch studies on a possible future cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines, constitute unacceptable behavior between allies and partners, whose consequences directly affect the vision we have of our alliances, of our partnerships and of the importance of the Indo-Pacific for Europe.”

The New York Times reported that the U.S. and Australia “went to extraordinary lengths to keep Paris in the dark as they secretly negotiated a plan to build nuclear submarines.” However, some American officials “regret they did not insist that the Australians level with the French about their intentions earlier” given the blowup. The Times added that “the Chinese government also did not get a heads-up,” but did not indicate the source for that information.

Josep Borrell, the European Union’s top diplomat, said he was “not aware” of AUKUS and “we were not involved.” He added that while the defense pact would not strain the EU-Australia relationship, he understood “how disappointed the French government will be.” Borrell also said, “We Europeans must look at the autonomy we must strive to have … it’s one way of waking up Europeans and saying ‘look you need to take the initiative.’”

A senior EU member state official told the Financial Times that AUKUS “came as a complete surprise for [the EU] and of course it’s embarrassing.” The EU had rolled out a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific around the period that AUKUS was announced. According to a Q&A about the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, “The EU’s approach to the region is one of cooperation not confrontation,” and the bloc will “pursue its multifaceted engagement with China, engaging bilaterally to promote solutions to common challenges, cooperating on issues of common interest and encouraging China to play its part in a peaceful and thriving Indo-Pacific region.”

New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Ardern said on Sept. 16 that New Zealand was not asked to be part of AUKUS and did not expect an invitation because “the anchor of this arrangement are nuclear-powered submarines.” New Zealand enacted policies in the 1980s to stay nuclear-free. Ardern noted that the new tripartite alliance does not diminish New Zealand’s close ties with Australia, the UK, and the United States.

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The CCP reacted to AUKUS with standard “wolf warrior” bluster. PRC foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said the three countries “seriously undermined regional peace and stability, intensified the arms race and undermined international non-proliferation efforts.” He added that the “relevant countries should abandon the outdated Cold War zero-sum mentality and narrow-minded geopolitical perception, respect the will of the people of regional countries and do more to contribute to regional peace, stability and development. Otherwise, they will only end up shooting themselves in the foot.”

Global Times said that the submarine deal will bring “nuclear-powered submarine fever” across the globe, while a commentator warned that Australia could become a “potential nuclear war target.”

CCP propaganda outlets and diplomats, however, did not go beyond the usual rhetoric or overly hyped up the issue. Beijing also did not appear to make special protests despite AUKUS being billed by Western media outlets, commentators, and think-tanks as an effort to counter the PRC and even enter the West into a new “cold war” with China.

Some Western commentators even got quite personal. Australian Strategic Policy Institute head Peter Jennings told the Associated Press that Australia’s decision to buy nuclear submarines was “a response to China’s increasing military might, aggressive bullying of Australia and intimidation of Japan and Taiwan,” and recommended that Australia name its first nuclear submarine the “Xi Jinping” because “no person is more responsible for Australia going down this track than the current leader of the Chinese Communist Party.”

1. At a glance, the AUKUS security pact seems what mainstream media outlets are describing it as, namely, the latest effort by the U.S. and its allies to counter China. The sale of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia would undoubtedly bolster Western allies’ efforts to check the CCP’s increased militarism in the Indo-Pacific region and send a message to Beijing that its belligerent behavior will be met with pushback. And while further details of the pact are scant, increased military, industrial, scientific, technology, and information sharing among Western allies would theoretically make efforts to counter China more effective and force Beijing to reconsider its coercive “wolf warrior” approach.

AUKUS may have been intended to put the CCP on notice, but Washington appears to have royally botched its rollout. While the Biden-Harris administration has been stressing the need to work with allies and partners to deal with China from a “position of strength,” the AUKUS deal succeeded in badly angering France and overshadowing the EU and its own plans for engaging with the PRC. The CCP would undoubtedly note how AUKUS has strained relations among the Western allies, as well as how Washington, Brussels, and major European powers are not on the same page on countering China. With its penchant for “divide and conquer,” the CCP could next step up efforts to exploit and widen the rift in the Western alliance to hinder rival countries from effectively meeting the “China challenge.”

There are no doubt many factors influencing the decision of the three countries to introduce the AUKUS pact when and in the manner that they did. And of those factors, the Biden-Harris administration’s domestic political calculations could be one in light of America’s recent calamitous withdrawal from Afghanistan. As we wrote at the time, “in view of mid-term elections in 2022, probes into the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election, and ‘great power competition’ with China and Russia, the Biden-Harris administration could next endeavor to restore America’s damaged credibility over Afghanistan and bolster its flagging domestic support.” If not for France’s angry reaction and the EU’s talk of “autonomy” and taking the “initiative,” the announcement of a “tough on China” defense pact so soon after the Afghanistan debacle would unambiguously help the administration boost its legitimacy abroad by demonstrating America’s commitment to its allies in standing up to the PRC.

Whether the Biden-Harris administration succeeded in bolstering its legitimacy domestically with the AUKUS pact is also debatable. When AUKUS was announced, the American public, and particularly those skeptical of President Biden and his family’s past dealings with Communist China, appeared to be more focused on whether chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley had acted inappropriately in making secret calls to PLA General Li Zuocheng during the Trump administration. China watchers and members of the intelligentsia also appear to have mixed feelings about AUKUS; news that Australia’s military capabilities are being upgraded with an eye on China are dampened by the angering of France and the straining of alliances.

2. Publicly available details about AUKUS also suggest that the CCP may not have too much to fear from it. For one, the delivery date of Australia’s nuclear submarines is decades away (2040, according to Australian prime minister Scott Morrison), and the U.S., UK, and Australia will spend the next 18 months identifying “the optimal pathway of delivery.” A lot could happen over the next year-and-a-half and before 2040. After all, Australia did cancel its submarine deal with France five years from the date it was signed and after spending nearly two billion U.S. dollars on the project. Two decades is also a lot of time for the CCP to both prepare for Australia’s yet-to-be-acquired capabilities and sabotage the AUKUS project before it comes to fruition (influence campaigns, coercion, political warfare, propaganda, United Front operations, espionage, etc.).

Further, the world will almost certainly be a very different place by 2040 when Australia could receive its first nuclear submarine. Assuming the CCP is on track with its plans, it would have “modernized” the People’s Liberation Army by 2035 and be a third of its way towards having a “world-class” military (2050) by 2040. Advances in military technology, including CCP asymmetrical warfare developments, could also mean that nuclear submarines might not be as relevant twenty years later, or Australia might need more than a fleet of eight submarines to keep up with the CCP’s capabilities. The uncertainties of the AUKUS submarine initiative and its lack of short-term, endangering threat to the PRC could be a reason why the CCP did not kick up a huge fuss over the defense pact.

Another possible reason why Beijing does not appear to be very perturbed by AUKUS is that it was already forewarned in some manner by the White House. A senior administration official said after the Biden-Xi phone call that President Biden “took the opportunity to explain the intention behind U.S. actions that are sometimes misinterpreted by Beijing as a means to undermine China.” In analyzing the Biden-Xi phone call, we noted that “Beijing will unlikely be overly alarmed by new U.S. ‘anti-China’ measures if Biden had informed Xi about them in their call to avoid, in the PRC’s words, ‘miscommunication, miscalculation and unintended conflict’; the CCP, however, will publicly express outrage when those measures are announced.” AUKUS counts as an “anti-China” action, but the CCP is not showing a level of agitation over it comparable to what was expressed during the Trump years over U.S. China policy. We believe that the lack of reaction from the CCP is less its surprise at “tough” action by the U.S. and its allies to counter China, and more a measured response to an expected outcome.

We also analyzed earlier that Washington “appears to be preparing to make concessions to Beijing,” including removing up to half of Trump-era tariffs and rolling back China policies by the Trump administration that were genuinely tough on the CCP. Should the Biden-Harris administration be planning to go ahead with concessions, then it makes sense for it to be announcing “tough” China policies (good from a marketing perspective, questionable in the details) now to later rebut critics and offset popular pushback from reversing Trump-era policies.

3. We believe that the jury is still out on whether AUKUS is a serious effort by the U.S. and its allies to counter China over the long-term, or whether it was introduced to resolve Washington’s short-term problems and ease America’s return to the “engagement” policy of the pre-Trump era. What AUKUS ultimately is could also change depending on the Biden-Harris administration’s political needs and the political situation in the CCP elite, especially with factional struggle between Xi Jinping and his rivals heading to a showdown.

Regardless of Washington’s approach, U.S. allies and partner nations are advised to cultivate, maintain, or strengthen a tough stance towards China to avoid being bullied by the CCP.

     SinoInsight  1     

• The issue of leadership over the army is a core issue of Marxist theory on army building.
• The fundamental principle and system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army was not conjured out of thin air, but was a historic, arduous exploration and great creation that came at the cost of blood.
• A review of history shows that at every critical moment, the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System becomes more critical and plays a more fundamental and decisive role.
• The Party’s absolute leadership over the military is a “political bottom line that cannot be challenged.” The op-ed cites four historical negative examples where the “political bottom line” was challenged: Zhang Guotao, who “established another Party Central” during the Red Army period; Wang Ming, who “engaged in factionalism” during the Anti-Japanese War period; Lin Biao, who “planned an armed coup” after the PRC was founded; and the “Gang of Four,” who sought to intervene in the military.
• After the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping “seriously investigated and dealt with serious violations of discipline and the law by Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Fang Fenghui, and Zhang Yang, as well as thoroughly eliminated their poisonous influence.” This “effectively resolved” the prominent problem of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military being weakened.
• The Party’s one hundred year history shows that “no matter how great the risks and challenges and what sort of dangers and risks are encountered, our military will proceed from victory to victory as long as it adheres to the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s army, and always obeys and follows the Party.”

OUR TAKE
1. The Qiushi op-ed on “upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over the military,” along with the recent promotion of generals, represent Xi Jinping’s latest efforts to consolidate his control over the People’s Liberation Army and demand that military officials remain loyal to him before the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress near the end of the year and in the lead up to the 20th Party Congress in 2022.

The op-ed also indicates the level of threat within the Party that Xi believes he faces, i.e. a very serious challenge to his leadership on par with Zhang Guotao establishing “another Party Central” and Lin Biao’s “armed coup” against Mao Zedong. The seriousness of the political threat facing Xi is underscored by him continually and prominently calling on Party members to heed the “correct leadership” of his Party Central and warning of “another Party Central” since the first half of the year.

Military issues aside, Xi faces substantial and steadily mounting risks in all major areas, including the financial and property sectors, escalating social contradictions and the breaking out of social conflicts, and pushback over the rectification of the political and legal affairs apparatus.

2. Xi’s call for the PLA to “focus on preparing for war and fighting wars” could be an expression of concern and a call to get ready in case external events such as border tensions with India or the harassment of Taiwan develop into greater conflict.

But in considering the Biden-Harris administration’s eagerness to engage with the PRC on the pretext of avoiding conflict, as well as Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley’s earlier assurance to General Li Zuocheng that the U.S. is “not going to attack or conduct any kinetic operations” against China, it seems less likely that Xi and the CCP are preparing the PLA for the break out of conflict in the short-term.

Xi also does not have incentive to wage war before the 20th Party Congress lest an unfavorable outcome undermines his bid for a norm-breaking third term. Moreover, handing out ammunition and equipment to troops in preparation for conflict could prove disastrous for Xi when his control over the PLA and sway over the Party is less secure than appearances suggest.

It is more likely that Xi’s recent call for the PLA to “focus on preparing for war and fighting wars” is aimed at boosting the military’s combat readiness over the long-term rather than a clarion cry for immediate kinetic conflict. Also, Xi may be getting the military ready to deal with internal rather than external conflict; the military will almost certainly be called upon to play an important role when factional struggle in the CCP elite comes to a showdown.