SinoInsight 1
March 29
1. The PRC foreign affairs ministry and the Xinjiang provincial government held a joint press conference where they invited “graduates” of “vocational education and training centers” in the province to speak about their experiences. One such “graduate” was Tahiljan Tohti, who claimed to have learned “the national language, legal knowledge, vocational skills and de-radicalization knowledge,” as well as “enterprise management, laws and regulations,” at a center in Hotan Prefecture, and used the knowledge learned to open a restaurant and “earn more money and live a better life.”
However, Tahiljan Tohti also happened to feature in a July 2020 CCP propaganda video where he claimed to have graduated from Fudan University 15 years ago before returning to Xinjiang to start a property business and a restaurant with others. If Tohti did attend Fudan, one of the top colleges in China, then he speaks Mandarin fluently (this is evidenced in the video), and does not need to “learn the national language.” Also, assuming that the July 2020 CCP propaganda video is largely factual, Tohti is already in the restaurant and property business, and does not need more “vocational training.”
2. Nike and Adidas stores in Harbin city, Heilongjiang Province launched a “Four for 50 Percent Discount” sale, resulting in long queues outside those stores.
March 31
1. During a PRC foreign ministry regular press conference, spokeswoman Hua Chunying, in rebutting allegations of genocide by the U.S. and other countries, claimed that the population of Xinjiang increased “5.55 million to 12.8 million” in the past 40 years. In previous press conferences, Hua also claimed that Xinjiang’s population increased 25 percent between 2010 to 2018.
Days later, overseas Chinese language media outlets reported that the Xinjiang local government’s own population statistical data for 2019 only showed a 14.82 percent population increase from 2010 to 2018. The 25 percent figure appeared to be plucked from data compiled by a government-run research center in Xinjiang and the website of the Xinjiang branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In late March, Voice of America found in a review of official CCP statistics that births in Xinjiang decreased about half between 2017 and 2019, or down to 8.14 births per thousand in 2019 from 15.88 births per thousand in 2017.
April 1
The Shanghai municipal government implemented new population “service and management” regulations (上海市实有人口服务和管理若干规定) requiring all visitors to the city regardless of reason (work, medical treatment, tourism, visiting friends and relatives, etc.) to submit their personal details to the local government within 24 hours of arrival. Those who violate the regulations will be fined 5,000 yuan.
Radio Free Asia noted that the population management regulations are being piloted in Shanghai and will eventually be adopted in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and other big Chinese cities, citing a local lawyer. The media also quoted a businesswoman who travels between Shanghai and South Korea as saying that Shanghai is undergoing “Xinjiang-ization.”
April 2
1. In the fourth episode of “The War in the Shadows,” a 56-minute documentary produced by state broadcaster CCTV on terrorism in Xinjiang, former Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission deputy director Shirzat Bawudun was accused of supporting the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. Bawudun, who was formerly hailed as a “counter-terrorism hero,” was later arrested and handed a suspended death sentence. He and a handful of former senior Xinjiang officials were accused of being “two-faced people” in the documentary.
2. French newspaper Le Figaro interviewed “Laurène Beaumond,” a former CCTV French-language staff and an intern at other media outlets. Beaumond (a pen name) claimed that an article that CGTN said she wrote was a “sightseeing” piece completed when she visited Xinjiang in 2011 and 2016, or before the CCP started constructing concentration camps in 2017. Previously, the CCP cited her article as an example of a Western journalist debunking recent “fake news” on Xinjiang. Le Figaro condemned the CCP’s propaganda and influence strategy, and noted that the United States had designated the Party’s persecution of over a million Uyghurs in Xinjiang as genocide.
April 3
Mainland media reports and videos on Chinese social media show long queues of young men and women forming outside Adidas specialty stores in Heibei’s Shijiazhuang city.
OUR TAKE
1. The implementation of stringent populations surveillance and tracking measures in Shanghai indicates that the CCP is gradually rolling out successful aspects of the local control and “stability maintenance” regime in Xinjiang across mainland China. The fact that the CCP is rapidly reappropriating and exporting tools of persecution to China’s first-tier cities indicates that the communist regime’s sense of crisis and danger is growing stronger. Historically, the CCP clamps down on society when it feels embattled and endangered (Anti-Rightist Movement, Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen, etc.) and “liberalizes” when it feels strong and secure (early to mid-1980s, early 2000s).
2. The CCP’s Xinjiang propaganda strategy and “wolf warrior” diplomacy are less effective and even self-defeating when accounting for domestic contradictions and the current geopolitical climate.
This is the first time since the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 that the international community has formed a “united front” against the CCP over a human rights crisis in China. Previously, countries and companies were willing to overlook the persecution of religious and ethnic groups in China out of consideration for business, political, and geopolitical interests. Now, however, Western political and geopolitical interests are in favor of getting “tough on China” over Xinjiang, and businesses have to follow suit lest they run afoul of the current political and geopolitical climate. Countries are also willing to support each other in the face of PRC economic coercion; Communist China’s boycott of Australian wine and Taiwanese pineapple did not do as much damage as intended, if at all, because the international community stepped in to make up the unnatural drop in Chinese demand for those products. With the international community keen to call out the CCP, debunk Party propaganda, and stand up to its thuggish diplomacy, the brutal persecution campaign in Xinjiang is quickly turning into a quagmire and huge political liability for the Xi Jinping leadership.
Worse for Beijing, domestic contradictions are seeing its propaganda and diplomatic efforts backfire in real-time. Decades of ideological brainwashing have taught the Chinese people to look out for their interests first in the endless communist “struggle” (鬥爭). While the Party has leveraged jingoistic nationalism in recent years to achieve its political and geopolitical goals, this type of nationalism is very shallow and is quickly discarded when it comes into conflict with self-interests. Thus, for all the talk of Chinese celebrities “loving Xinjiang cotton,” regular citizens have no qualms with queuing up outside Nike stores to buy up discounted products (which can be sold again online at inflated prices).
Further, the CCP is not helped by the fact that PRC national sports teams have expensive, long-term contracts with Nike, Adidas, and other international brands. For instance, Nike has been sponsoring the PRC professional soccer league since 2009, and signed a 10-year, 3 billion yuan contract in May 2018. China’s national soccer team also signed a 12-year contract with Nike in 2015. Nike also signed a 10-year sponsorship contract with the Chinese Basketball Association in 2018 for an undisclosed amount, and the PRC liaises with Nike and the NBA to hold training camps in China. Finally, the Chinese Athletic Association renewed a 12-year contract with Nike on Jan. 8, 2020.
In sum, the CCP is caught in a Catch-22 in responding to international pressure over Xinjiang. Beijing will lose face if it fails to push back strongly against the international community, who are holding the regime to account over gross human rights violations, including genocide and crimes against humanity, against the Uyghurs. But propaganda, boycotts, and “wolf warrior” diplomacy are falling flat as the Chinese people, and the regime to a degree, prioritize self-interests over nationalism, and with the international community willing to draw the line on Xinjiang. On the current trajectory, the CCP will lose the information war with the international community over the Xinjiang issue, and will be outed as a paper tiger. This in turn will affect CCP elite politics as Xi’s factional rivals gain another legitimate reason to demand that Xi Jinping appoint a successor instead of pushing for a norm-breaking third term.
3. The purge of ex-Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission deputy director Shirzat Bawudun and the recent disclosure of his downfall in the “War in the Shadows” documentary is almost certainly linked with the Xi-Jiang factional struggle.
Shirzat Bawudun’s career marks him as an associate or member of the Jiang Zemin faction. From 1989 to 2000, Bawudun served in the political security section of the Hotan District Public Security Bureau (the political security section is an earlier incarnation of the Domestic Security Protection Bureau, a security organ very roughly analogous to the FBI, if the FBI also arrested dissidents). From 2000 to 2011, Bawudun climbed from a county-level political security deputy head to deputy director of the Xinjiang Justice Bureau; the period of Bawudun’s rocket rise up the ranks coincided with Jiang Zemin’s Falun Gong persecution campaign and the growing importance of the political and legal affairs apparatus in the regime to facilitate that persecution. From July 2011 to April 2016, Shirzat Bawudun headed the United Work Front Department in Urumqi City, before returning to the Xinjiang political and legal affairs apparatus in May 2016 to head the Xinjiang Justice Bureau. About a year later, Bawudun became deputy director of the Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission.
Jiang faction officials Wang Lequan (September 1995 to April 2010) and Zhang Chunxian (April 2010 to August 2016) headed Xinjiang when Shirzat Bawudun’s was in ascendance. The appointment of Chen Quanguo, a Xi loyalist, marked the beginning of the end of Bawudun’s political career and other officials in Xinjiang’s political and legal affairs system with suspect factional alignments. Bawudun was demoted in May 2018 with his transfer to the Xinjiang Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference to serve as its secretary-general, a sinecure, deputy bureau post. Four months later, the provincial mouthpiece Xinjiang Daily announced his investigation.
Of course, there remains the possibility that Shirzat Bawudun was purged due to actual corruption and supporting terrorism. Officials in the political and legal affairs system have ample opportunities for corruption (“catch-and-release” fees, condoning crime for bribes, etc.), and Bawudun could harbor ethnic nationalism sympathies. However, the fact he is being very publicly outed as a “two-face person”—a term that hints at incorrect political loyalties—suggests that Bawudun is really a casualty of factional struggle. The recent spotlight on Shirzat Bawudun’s crimes also indicates that Beijing is “killing chickens to scare the monkeys” as part of an ongoing rectification of the political and legal affairs apparatus.
SinoInsight 2
The PRC government has been stepping up efforts to vaccinate the Chinese population against COVID-19 around the middle of March. Subsequently, state propaganda outlets began reporting cases of forced vaccination and other vaccine-related malpractices. Further, overseas media continue to report problems with PRC-produced vaccines, while mainland media remains silent on that front.
March 30
1. Top PRC respiratory diseases expert Zhong Nanshan said in an interview with mainland media that the COVID-19 vaccination rate in China is only 4 percent, an unacceptable figure if the PRC is to eventually ease strict migration controls and continue with “reform and opening up.” Zhong warned of a “very dangerous” situation where vaccination rates are high in most countries but not in China; in such a scenario, “there may well be an outbreak in China again.” The following day, Zhong Nanshan’s vaccination appeal topped Weibo’s trending search list.
Previously on March 22, PRC CDC director George Fu told mainland media that he hoped that vaccination rates in China would reach 70 to 80 percent by the end of 2021 or the beginning of 2022, thus “basically achieving herd immunity” in the country.
2. The local government of Yunnan’s Ruili City imposed traffic controls on five throughways passing through the city at about 10:00 p.m. Beijing time. The next day, all residents had to take a nucleic acid test.
March 31
1. According to a commentary piece by state mouthpiece Xinhua, some education institutions in China were found to have engaged in “simple and crude” vaccination practices. For instance, some schools and government departments are making being vaccinated for COVID as a requirement for level promotion and graduation, as well as teacher job performance assessments. The commentary noted that some work units have made vaccination mandatory for all staff, including individuals with special medical conditions that should exclude them from receiving the COVID vaccine.
The Xinhua commentary warned that “overly simplistic” vaccination requirements will “not only bring medical risks to people who are unsuitable to receive a vaccination, but may even increase some people’s resistance towards getting inoculated, which is not conducive for advancing vaccination work.”
2. Chinese netizens have been posting photos and videos on social media showing various “carrot and stick” measures used by local governments, schools, state-owned enterprises, and other work units to get people to receive a COVID vaccination. Examples collated by an overseas Chinese media outlet include:
- In a March 22 notice, the local government of Beijing Guangbaixi Road Community announced that residents aged 60 and up who have gotten a COVID vaccination will receive a carton of eggs.
- According to a notice by an undisclosed rural local government, residents who complete two doses of COVID vaccination by April 25 will receive a one-time 100 yuan cash subsidy. Cash subsidies of varying amounts aside, local governments are offering free vaccinations, public transport transfers, tickets to scenic tourist spots, holiday packages, and other “rewards” to those who have been inoculated for COVID-19.
- Per a pamphlet produced by the local government of Wancheng Town in Hainan Province, those who are not vaccinated are barred from taking public transportation; patronizing markets, supermarkets, and hotels; will be “blacklisted” and will not enjoy preferential government policies; and their children will be disadvantaged at work and school, enlisting in the military, buying property, etc.
- A vaccination notice by an undisclosed hospital stated that its staff must produce a medical specialist note to be exempt from vaccination. Those who can be vaccinated but refuse to do so will be transferred out or removed from their job. Finally, travel restrictions will be imposed on staff who have not been inoculated.
- In a widely circulated social media post, a Chinese netizen complained: “There were 10 major poisonous vaccine incidents in China previously, and the Changchun Changsheng vaccine case later. Now [the government] is telling me to get vaccinated without Phase III clinical data? I’m not a coward, I have a good memory!”
April 1
Per the PRC National Health Commission’s COVID-19 Q&A section on its website (updated March 31, 2021), people are not required to take nucleic acid and antibody tests before vaccination. The NHC also does not recommend antibody testing for people who have been vaccinated.
The NHC’s vaccination requirement and recommendation raises questions about the CCP’s confidence in the effectiveness of PRC-produced vaccines (whether or how long the human body will produce and retain COVID-19 antibodies after vaccination), and suggests that Beijing may be prioritizing information control over health security (detection of the coronavirus post-vaccination will aggravate people’s doubts about the vaccine).
April 2
Taiwanese news outlets note that countries that are using PRC-produced vaccines like Brazil, Chile, Turkey, and Pakistan are seeing an increase in confirmed cases and an intensification of the local epidemic situation.
April 3
Mainland media outlets reported that the Hungarian authorities had issued a Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificate for Sinopharm’s COVID-19 vaccine. Sinopharm also announced that its vaccine is the first PRC-produced vaccine to receive emergency authorization use in the European Union.
Per mainland media framing, readers may get the impression that the Sinopharm vaccine is more or less approved for use throughout the EU and the GMP certificate “will greatly enhance the competitiveness of China-produced vaccines in Europe.” However, while mainland media note that GMP is a quality control system, they do not mention that the system does not certify a vaccine’s effectiveness or safety.
April 4
1. The PRC National Health Commission announced that China has administered 136.677 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines as of April 3. To date, the CCP has not officially announced any cases of serious side effects or death stemming from PRC-produced vaccines.
2. The Hong Kong government announced that 479,000 residents received their first COVID-19 vaccine dose, of whom 328,000 received the Sinovac CoronaVac vaccine and 150,000 obtained the Fosun Pharma-BioNTech Comirnaty vaccine. Meanwhile, about 77,000 residents received their second dose of CoronaVac.
According to Hong Kong media reports, 14 people have died after receiving COVID vaccinations as of April 2. Of the 14, two were given Fosun Pharma-BioNTech Comirnaty shots and 12 were vaccinated with Sinovac’s CoronaVac. Given the Hong Kong government’s present numbers, the mortality rate of those vaccinated with CoronaVac (36.6 per million) is three times higher than those who received Comirnaty (13.3 per million).
OUR TAKE
1. We warned in our China 2021 Outlook that “China-produced vaccines may have serious quality defects, leaving those vaccinated susceptible to the coronavirus.” The various news items above suggest that our prediction is on track for verification.
The two most suspicious pieces of information that point to dubious PRC vaccine quality are the Chinese NHC’s recommendation that those who have been vaccinated not do antibody testing, as well as the death of over a dozen people in Hong Kong who have received PRC-produced vaccines contrasting with the complete lack of post-vaccination death reporting by mainland media outlets.
2. There are several reasons why the CCP is keen to step up vaccination rates in China, including beating other countries to herd immunity (and faster economic recovery), bragging rights (especially against the U.S.), and assuaging people at home and abroad about the safety of PRC-produced vaccines.
However, what appears to be low effectiveness of PRC-produced vaccines is placing Beijing between a rock and a hard place when it comes to accelerating vaccination. On the one hand, higher vaccination rates should mean greater regime security and prestige, presuming the vaccines work as advertised; otherwise, the CCP is walking into another public health crisis. On the other hand, CCP officials “prefer left rather than right” (寧左勿右) to accrue political capital and stay politically correctly, leading to some of the extreme cases that we spotlighted above as they pursue higher vaccination rates.
3. The CCP is gambling on the effectiveness of its coronavirus vaccines to bring the Chinese population to herd immunity and literally restore the health of the regime. Early signs indicate that Beijing could “succeed” in its vaccination plan; should “carrot and stick” efforts to physically get shots in people’s arms fall short, propaganda and data manipulation will take care of the rest.
Regardless, questions surrounding PRC-produced vaccines mean that China is not guaranteed to achieve herd immunity even if Beijing “hits” its vaccination target. In fact, forced injections of less proven vaccines complicate the epidemic situation in China, especially if those who have been vaccinated develop serious side effects or die. Relaxation of pandemic travel restrictions under the conditions of faux-herd immunity will also worsen China’s epidemic situation.
Businesses, investors, and governments must look beyond the CCP propaganda headlines and seemingly impressive official data, and closely monitor the coronavirus situation in places where PRC-produced vaccines are being rolled out.
