Foreigners turning cold on China and the resulting capital flight appears to be having an impact on CCP factional politics.
We believe that there is a very low probability of Xi Jinping having attempted to assassinate Li Keqiang, given their long-standing political alliance and the fact that as a political force, Li posed no threat to Xi.
We believe that politics and economics are two driving factors behind the Xi Jinping leadership’s decision to subject Hui Ka Yan to “mandatory measures” at this time.
Xi Jinping’s political problems will likely compound as more signs of the Chinese economy tanking emerge later this year and social instability rises.
Despite appearances, Secretary Blinken’s visit to China has not done much to thaw Sino-U.S. relations or change its current dynamics.
Xi Jinping has turned to propaganda, purges, and a softened diplomatic approach to tackle the “various risks, challenges, and difficult problems” facing the regime.
The Jiang faction could exploit Jiang Zemin’s death to undermine the Xi leadership by stirring up strong “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” sentiments in China and overseas.
Hu almost certainly knew the result of the personnel reshuffle beforehand, and is unlikely to have suddenly found reason to be upset with Xi over the reshuffle.
We were able to forecast the 20th Party Congress leadership reshuffle with good accuracy without relying on insider sources using our unique political risk assessment model.