◎ Trump should demonstrate the same vision of the national interest with China as he has displayed on Iran.
◎ Articles by Taoran have to be scrutinized for what is not said as much as what is said to gain actual insights into what Beijing might or might not be thinking.
◎ Xi’s Jan. 8 speech reveals his and the Party’s concerns about regime-threatening risks.
◎ The threats to global security go beyond those from the major “revisionist” powers.
◎ Luo Huining’s appointment does not signal that Beijing is taking a tougher stance on Hong Kong.
◎ Xi’s “people’s leader” tag is a sign of weakness, not strength.
◎ Presenting our China 2020 outlook.
◎ Washington’s view of its security partnership with Taiwan has evolved.
◎ Messaging from China and the U.S. suggest that both sides want to make the deal happen.
◎ President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are back to square one.
◎ We believe that Xi’s personnel moves are designed to ensure troop loyalty as he will face greatly heightened political risks should he go ahead and approve the signing of the “phase one” deal.
◎ The “phase one” trade deal is a political “Catch-22” for Xi Jinping, whose “quan wei” and grip on power is far less secure than popularly believed.
◎ The United States Congress has been determined not to remain on the moral sidelines as the Chinese Communist Party wields its dictatorial powers against the populations subject to its rule.
◎ Just because the organizers of the Human Rights Day rally have permission to go ahead with it does not mean that the event will be free from controversy.