◎ Given significant developments across the Taiwan Strait over the ensuing two years, it is time for a more substantive conversation between the two democratic presidents.
◎ Any “backsliding” by North Korea at this stage would be counterproductive for Kim Jong Un as it would likely cause the U.S. to redouble its focus on resolving trade with China.
◎ Gu Zhuoheng’s tweets and Cui Yongyuan’s “reappearance” appear to connect a trail of breadcrumbs which point to an intensification of the CCP factional struggle.
◎ The timing of the plunge and other odd developments suggest that CCP factional politics could be a factor influencing the recent sell-offs.
◎ The spotlighting of qigong at the Two Sessions is connected with the “you die, I live” factional struggle in the CCP.
◎ How did the failure to secure a declaration of all North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, let alone a specific commitment to destroy them, somehow move the ball forward?
◎ Several proposals in the 2019 government work report seemingly cancel out each other or will contradict Xi’s push to have the “Party lead everything”
◎ There is a pattern in recent years of “explosive information” about CCP elites being revealed during crucial periods in the factional struggle.
◎ The CCP factional struggle will escalate as Xi tries to force through reforms to meet U.S. trade demands.
◎ A proposed schedule of nuclear and missile dismantling would be part of a good-faith showing by Kim.
◎ The collapse of Aiwujiwu and pinganfang.com suggests that the business model of “property + financing + internet services” is failing in China.
◎ The CCP’s political and legal affairs apparatus continues to oppose the Xi leadership, and the factional struggle intensifies.
◎ The sentencing of Fang Fenghui at this time hints at three possible political developments.
◎ The propaganda narratives in Xinhua lay the groundwork for Xi to agree to U.S. demands on sensitive issues like structural reform without losing face at home.