◎ We believe that there is now a serious epidemic in Wuhan and the beginnings of a humanitarian crisis in mainland China.
◎ Articles by Taoran have to be scrutinized for what is not said as much as what is said to gain actual insights into what Beijing might or might not be thinking.
◎ Xi’s “people’s leader” tag is a sign of weakness, not strength.
◎ Presenting our China 2020 outlook.
◎ Messaging from China and the U.S. suggest that both sides want to make the deal happen.
◎ The “phase one” trade deal is a political “Catch-22” for Xi Jinping, whose “quan wei” and grip on power is far less secure than popularly believed.
◎ While the CCP has sought to extricate itself from the Hong Kong quagmire, its measures have thus far only caused it to sink in deeper.
◎ A closer examination of recent developments suggests dim prospects for the “phase one” trade deal and future Sino-U.S. trade agreements.
◎ Secretary Pompeo’s speech affirms several trends in U.S. policy toward the PRC which we have identified since July 2018.
◎ Mike Pence generally adopted a more conciliatory tone towards China in his Wilson Center speech as compared with his fiery, hard-hitting Hudson Institute speech in October 2018.
◎ We look at some key factors that would make or break trade negotiations between America and China.
◎ The Trump administration is complementing the CCP’s delaying tactics with a “phase-by-phase” approach to a trade deal, and is falling into the CCP’s trap.
◎ The CCP does not want a trade deal on Trump’s terms to begin with because such a deal would cause existential problems for the communist regime.
◎ The CCP’s goal of “advancing to retreat” is to calm things down in the city and focus its energies instead on other pressing matters, such as the Sino-U.S. trade war and the 2020 Taiwan presidential election.
◎ If the CCP has identified that Trump will do anything to get his trade deal, they will definitely call his bluff and turn the trade deal into his greatest weakness.