CCP deploys an extensive propaganda campaign to prop up Xi’s leadership amidst economic and diplomatic troubles.
China’s official economic data for August and the first eight months of 2025 show entrenched deflationary pressures, a worsening of the real estate crisis, and weakening consumption. Barring transformative reforms, the Chinese economy is unlikely to turn around in the short term and Beijing will likely have to significantly manipulate data to hit its goal of around 5 percent annual growth. Already, China’s economic troubles are forcing local governments to backtrack on a frugality drive to revive the catering sector, while economic-related social problems are mounting.
The Chinese Communist Party also faces strong headwinds abroad. Sino-U.S. trade, technology, and military tensions persist despite several rounds of bilateral talks. Geopolitical pressures simmer as Western countries indicate that Beijing’s support of Russia’s war in Ukraine could have consequences for Beijing, and more nations become wary of the CCP threat and hegemonic ambitions.
Amid this backdrop of adversity, Xi Jinping has been making preparations to starve off opposition to his rule and lock in a fourth term as head of Communist China.
Parade and propaganda
The Xi leadership has been leveraging the Sept. 3, 2025 military parade and the narrative of China’s victory against Imperial Japan during the Second World War to bolster Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and position him as the right man to lead the regime through turbulent times.
By prominently hosting world leaders at the Beijing parade and talking about China’s role in the “world anti-fascist war,” Xi likely intended to showcase the notion of himself and Communist China upholding the liberal post-war global order as the U.S. is perceived to take a step back to focus on the domestic front. In his speech at the parade, Xi declared that the Chinese people “firmly stand on the right side of history, joining hands with people of all nations to build a community with a shared future for mankind.” Xi added that “justice will prevail, peace will prevail, and the people will prevail,” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable.”
Beijing’s parade was viewed internationally as the “coming-out party” of the “axis of autocracies” (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran). However, state media stuck with the CCP’s framing of the event as a glorious celebration of the Party’s ahistorical achievements. In numerous commentaries after the parade, state and Party media pushed propaganda and weaved in the subtext of rallying the Chinese people to unite around Party Central (with Comrade Xi at the core) to confront present-day complex challenges, overcome difficulties, and secure the so-called “two miracles” of rapid economic development and long-term social stability.
The scale and form of the CCP’s parade and post-parade propaganda resemble the theoretical campaigns rolled out before the Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee and the 20th Party Congress to build up Xi Jinping before his third term. Notably, the Third Plenum issued a historical resolution that effectively elevated Xi’s status in the Party, while the 20th Party Congress promoted the centrality and preeminence of Xi and his political theory (“Two Establishes”) to the regime.
Therefore, the recent propaganda commemorating the 80th anniversary of the “War of Resistance Against Japan and the Global Anti-Fascist War” appears to be partly meant to provide narrative and theoretical buttressing for Xi to justify staying in power — despite having presided over numerous governance failures and courted strong external pushback against Communist China — come the 21st Party Congress in 2027.
Military control
Another sign that Xi Jinping is making preparations to extend his tenure can be glimpsed from his handling of the military. Historically, a CCP leader’s control over the Party’s “gun” or lack thereof has been a reliable marker of his political strength and influence. Revelations of serious corruption by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the equipment and logistics apparatus around mid-2023, with some of Xi’s key military allies and loyalists involved, almost certainly came as a blow to Xi and eroded his “quan wei.”
Since the corruption revelations, the Xi leadership has pressed ahead with rectification efforts via the anti-corruption campaign and personnel reshuffles. Among the first to be purged were defense minister Li Shangfu and virtually the entire senior leadership of the PLARF. Near the end of 2024, Xi ally and Central Military Commission Political Work Department director Miao Hua was officially investigated, and the military’s political work apparatus was subjected to rectification shortly after. In March 2025, CMC vice chairman He Weidong vanished from public view and has not resurfaced since.
On Sept. 12, the 17th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress announced the expulsion of four generals. Zhang Lin (logistics), Gao Daguang (political work), Wang Zhibin (political work), and Wang Chunning (People’s Armed Police/Beijing City’s security) all held sensitive positions that the Xi leadership would be particularly concerned about, and appear to have been removed as part of ongoing anti-corruption investigations.
The Xi leadership has resorted to more than just purges to keep the upper echelons of the PLA in line. No senior officer has been promoted to full general thus far this year, an unusual development in light of the several promotions that are typically handed out in previous years. Footage of the 2025 Beijing military parade also mainly saw colonels or senior colonels walking through the capital’s main thoroughfare, with few generals in sight. By contrast, during the 2019 parade, 89 generals were announced as they led 59 formations for that year’s event. Further, the commander of the 2025 parade, Lt. Gen. Han Shengyan, held a lower rank than those in the past.
By keeping senior officers on their toes, Xi hopes to ensure that the PLA stays firmly subordinated and loyal to him, and will go along with his decisions at the 21st Party Congress.
Financial sector purge
Party princelings and other members of the CCP political elite are the group that presents the most viable roadblock to Xi Jinping’s attempt to take a fourth term. This group, however, has a vulnerability that Xi appears to be exploiting to keep them in line, namely, the involvement of many of their members in the financial sector and financial corruption.
On Sept. 6, the CCP’s anti-corruption authorities announced that Yi Huiman, the former head of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, was placed under investigation. Mainland media reported that Yi’s case involves systemic corruption in the financial sector, as well as collusion between officials and businesses.
Yi climbed steadily up the ranks of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China during the Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era, and was likely favored by the CCP elites who oppose Xi to replace his ally Liu Shiyu in 2019 when the latter was forced out following a stock market crash. Yi’s likely connections with “anti-Xi” elements in the Party elite and his currently being investigated allows Xi to proverbially dangle the incriminating and entangling evidence gathered from Yi’s case over the heads of his political enemies in the lead up to the 21st Party Congress. With his opponents in check, Xi would be hoping to strong-arm them into accepting his “re-election” as CCP boss against their wishes.
