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China 2024 Outlook Review

◎ We made 27 predictions covering eight topics in our China 2024 Outlook. Twenty-four of those predictions were verified over the year, giving us a forecasting accuracy of 88.9 percent.

China’s economic problems persisted in 2024, including slowing trade, persistent real estate sector troubles, and spreading financial contagion. The deteriorating domestic situation likely led Xi Jinping to step up rectification efforts, particularly in the financial sector.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and other countries sustained efforts to counter the CCP threat, putting pressure on Beijing to rein in aggression.

Politics: 3 predictions, 3 verified

1. Xi Jinping’s enemies at home and abroad will continue to attack Xi over his governance failures and growing authoritarianism. Attacks on Xi could include the spreading of political rumors about Xi and his cronies (purges, assassinations, Xi looking to invade Taiwan, etc.) through various channels (Chinese language and Western media, social media, etc.).   VERIFIED  

  • March

    March 5: He Weidong, the second-rank vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, called for cracking down on the military’s “fake combat capabilities” during a meeting with the PLA delegation to the Two Sessions.

    Some Chinese commentators believe that He’s remarks were a reference to corruption in the PLA Rocket Force that was exposed in mid-2023 and indirectly implicated the first-rank CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia. Those commentators also noted that PRC state media did not report on He Weidong’s “fake combat capabilities” remark and He had not appeared in public for something, and suggested that these developments hinted at a split in the CMC leadership.

    March 24: Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping’s wife, visited Changsha City in Hunan Province to inspect grassroots tuberculosis prevention work in her capacity as the World Health Organization’s Goodwill Ambassador for Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, according to a report from the PRC National Health Commission.

    Some Chinese commentators believed that Peng’s high-profile public appearance in Hunan indicated that she was preparing to or being prepared to assume a prominent role in CCP elite politics in her capacity as first lady. Some commentators also likened Peng to Jiang Qing, the ambitious wife of Mao Zedong who served as first deputy director of the Cultural Revolution Group in 1966 and joined the Politburo three years later at the 9th Party Congress. Some have speculated that Peng could join the Politburo at the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee.

  • July
    July 15: An online rumor written in veiled language implied that Xi Jinping suffered a stroke while hosting the Third Plenum and the senior leadership of the CCP was thrown into chaos. The rumor added that those aware of the development were overjoyed and hastened to spread the news.
  • September
    Sept. 30: Li Ruihuan and Wen Jiabao were seated on either side of Xi Jinping at the reception dinner for the 75th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. This was a departure from previous receptions, where current members of the Politburo Standing Committee were seated beside Xi. Some Chinese observers believe that the seating arrangement was a sign that Xi was facing political trouble.

 

  • October

    Oct. 28: Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the CCP Politburo to review a comprehensive report on the third round of inspections of the 20th Central Committee. The meeting stressed the need to strengthen leadership team development, strictly implement democratic centralism, and promote the flexibility of leadership appointments and removals.

    Some overseas Chinese commentators and media believe that the call to promote democratic centralism at the meeting was a move by “anti-Xi” forces against Xi Jinping and possibly hinted at Xi’s waning influence.

2. Xi Jinping will continue stepping up “self-revolution” and anti-corruption measures in the regime as part of his effort to defuse crises, especially focusing on the financial system and sector as well as central and state-owned enterprises.   VERIFIED  

  • The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced on their website that 58 senior officials under central management were investigated and punished in 2024, or a 25 percent increase (45) from 2023. 2024 also saw the highest number of senior officials under management being purged since the 18th Party Congress in 2012.
  • The CCDI announced on its website that a total of 120 officials were investigated across key sectors in 2024, including the People’s Bank of China, the financial regulators, and the banking and insurance sector. This represented an increase of 7.14 percent more officials investigated in 2024 from a year ago. Of the 120 officials, 86 (71.67 percent of the total) were from the banking sector. Also, while the number of officials investigated in the insurance industry was relatively small in 2024, it was double the number in 2023.

3. The worsening of China’s internal and external crises could lead to escalations in the CCP factional struggle and trigger political Black Swans.   VERIFIED  

  • November

    Nov. 28: The CCP authorities announced that CMC Political Work Department director Miao Hua was being investigated for “serious violations of discipline.”

    Chinese observers consider the probe of Miao to be the biggest political “Black Swan” event in China in 2024.

Economy: 6 predictions, 5 verified

4. The CCP authorities will continue with monetary easing, but deflation in China could persist in the first half of the year and prove hard to reverse.   VERIFIED  

  • In 2024, the PBoC cut interest rates three times (February, June, and October). The 1-year loan prime rate (LPR) was reduced from 3.65 percent to 3.30 percent, and the 5-year LPR was lowered from 4.30 percent to 4.00 percent.
  • The PBoC implemented three reserve requirement ratio cuts in January, April, and September 2024, reducing the RRR from 11.0 percent to 9.75 percent and releasing 2.2 trillion yuan in liquidity.
  • The PBoC made net purchases of 1 trillion yuan in government bonds between August and December 2024.
  • China’s broad money supply (M2) increased by about 17 trillion yuan in 2023, representing a year-on-year increase of 11.5 percent.

5. China’s real estate sector debt crisis will continue to spread and worsen, and home prices will continue to fall.   VERIFIED  

  • In its 2024 first-half report published on Jan. 14, 2025, China real estate giant Country Garden revealed that its total revenue declined by 55 percent year-on-year to about 102.1 billion yuan, sustained pre-tax losses of about 10.8 billion yuan, and saw its interest-bearing debt increase to over 250 billion yuan.
  • Major state-backed Chinese real estate developer Vanke noted in its performance forecast on Jan. 27, 2025 that it suffered a net loss of 45 billion yuan in 2024 (down 470 percent compared to a net profit of 12.163 billion yuan in 2023) and had total interest-bearing debt of 331.025 billion yuan in 2024.
  • Overseas Chinese Town Holdings, a Shenzhen-based state-owned Chinese real estate enterprise under the State Council’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, defaulted on 42 million yuan in debt on Dec. 31, 2024.
  • According to data from China Index Academy, new home prices in 100 key cities rose by 2.68 percent cumulatively in 2024, while second-hand home prices fell by 7.26 percent (the decline widened by 3.73 percent compared to 2023).
  • Dongxing Securities estimated that new home prices in 70 key cities fell back to May 2019 levels in 2024, while second-hand home prices declined to April 2017 levels.

6. Financial contagion in China could see more financial institutions default and go under.   VERIFIED  

  • April
    April 1: Sichuan Trust announced it had entered bankruptcy proceedings. Its troubled product, TOT (trust of trusts), had a total scale exceeding 25 billion yuan.


    April 9: Shanghai Hehe Shouchuang, an asset management firm with a scale of 30 billion yuan, issued a notice of default. The company had overdue payments possibly exceeding 4.5 billion yuan.

    April 11: Minsheng Trust announced that it had been taken over by Citic Trust and Huarong Trust.

    April 12: The trust institution under China Minmetals Corporation issued a notice that three of its trust products had overdue payments. These products were linked to eight urban investment platforms in Kunming, five of which were state-owned enterprises, with a total overdue amount approaching 650 million yuan.

  • Mainland media reports indicate that there were 188 fewer banks in China in 2024. Of the 188 banks, one was a city commercial bank, 76 were rural credit institutions, and over 100 were village banks.
  • Reuters reported that at least 290 rural Chinese banks and rural cooperatives were merged into larger regional lenders in 2024. In comparison, 14 small financial institutions were dissolved and 120 small and medium-sized banks underwent mergers and restructuring in 2023.

7. The local government debt crisis will intensify and local government financing vehicles could continue to see technical defaults.   VERIFIED  

  • October
    Bloomberg News reported that defaults of so-called non-standard products, or fixed-income investments that are not publicly traded, have surged to record highs. Analysts estimate the size of the sector to be around $800 billion. Data provider Financial China Information & Technology Co. noted that 60 non-standard products tied to local government financing vehicles have defaulted or warned of repayment risks in the first nine months of 2024, up 20 percent from the same period in 2023. The figure hit the highest level on record in data going back to 2019.
  • December
    China Pengyuan Credit Rating noted in a report that risks associated with non-standard LGFV debt intensified in 2024, with 66 non-standard risk events recorded by the end of October 2024.

8. China’s exports will continue to slow.   VERIFIED  

  • In 2024, China’s total trade increased by 3.8 percent year-on-year to reach $6.16 trillion. Exports increased by 5.9 percent year-on-year to reach $3.58 trillion while imports increased by 1.1 percent year-on-year to reach $2.59 trillion. Compared to the lockdown period in 2022, China’s trade, total trade, exports, and imports decreased by 2.3 percent, 0.5 percent, and 4.8 percent respectively.

9. China’s continued economic weakness and deterioration will draw attention to demographic decline and other related troubles.

Military: 2 predictions, 2 verified

10. The CCP authorities will take steps to avoid provoking serious military conflict on or near the PRC’s borders, including by carrying out high-level military communications with the United States.   VERIFIED  

  • January
    January 17: China and the Philippines co-hosted the 8th meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea in Shanghai. Both sides reaffirmed that the South China Sea dispute is not the entirety of bilateral relations and agreed to manage differences through dialogue and consultation.
  • July

    July 2: China and the Philippines held the 9th BCM on the South China Sea in Beijing. During the meeting, both sides signed an arrangement on improving the maritime communication mechanism between the two countries and agreed to establish a hotline to prevent sovereignty disputes from escalating into conflicts.

    July 21: The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs announced that it had reached a temporary arrangement with China regarding the resupply of the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal.



  • September

    September 9: Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, held a video call with General Wu Yanan, commander of China’s Southern Theater Command. This was the first such interaction in years.

    September 11: China and the Philippines held the 10th BCM Head of Delegation Meeting in Beijing. Both sides agreed to maintain diplomatic communication on maritime issues.

    September 12-14: The U.S. Department of Defense sent Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Chase, responsible for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia affairs, to attend the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. Chase held multiple discussions with PRC officials.

  • October
    October 23: Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Russia, marking their first formal meeting in five years. Xi stated that China and India are “partners, not competitors.” Following the meeting, border troops from both countries began withdrawing from two disputed locations, signaling a potential end to the four-year-long military standoff.


  • November
    November 6-8: China and the U.S. held the second working group meeting and annual conference of the 2024 China-U.S. Maritime Military Safety Consultation Mechanism in Qingdao.

11. The People’s Liberation Army will still conduct small-scale military operations along the PRC border, as well as engage in minor conflicts involving non-military or paramilitary forces in the South China Sea and East China Sea.   VERIFIED  

  • March
    March 5: Two Philippine coast guard vessels were tracked, blocked, and intercepted by PRC coast guard and maritime militia while attempting to deliver supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal.
  • April
    April 2-3: The People’s Liberation Army conducted live-fire joint military exercises on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border.

  • June
    June 17: The Philippine Armed Forces attempted to resupply troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal but were intercepted by the PRC coast guard. During the confrontation, PRC coast guard personnel armed with melee weapons boarded a Philippine military vessel, leading to physical clashes.
  • August

    August 27-29: The PLA conducted large-scale live-fire military exercises on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border.

    August 31: The Philippines and the PRC accused each other of deliberately colliding vessels near Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. This was the fifth maritime standoff between the two countries in a single month.



  • September
    September 29: A Vietnamese fishing boat was attacked by PRC law enforcement officers near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, injuring 10 crew members.
  • October
    October 15: A vessel suspected to be part of the PRC’s maritime militia intentionally rammed the Philippine fisheries vessel “BRP Datu Cabaylo” while it was conducting a routine patrol near Thitu Island in the South China Sea.

  • December

    December 4: Philippine officials reported that a PRC coast guard vessel fired water cannons and carried out dangerous interception maneuvers against a Philippine patrol boat near Scarborough Shoal, leading to a tense standoff.

    December 29: Japan’s 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters reported that in 2024, PRC coast guard vessels were present in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands for 353 days, setting a new record.

Society: 4 predictions, 3 verified

12. The spread of diseases and illnesses on the mainland could reach the scale of an epidemic. However, the CCP authorities are unlikely to revive “zero-COVID” measures and would instead attempt cover-ups of such outbreaks and their spread.   VERIFIED  

  • January to April: The spread of COVID-19 continued into 2024. Pediatric and adult hospital departments in many regions were overcrowded, with severe cases such as “white lung” pneumonia and regular pneumonia emerging, per overseas Chinese media and Chinese social media reports. The death toll rose, with crematoriums in many areas operating beyond capacity, leading to queues or reliance on scalpers. Beijing expanded its crematorium facilities; Beijing, Hebei, Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, and other regions were severely affected, with widespread street-side paper-burning memorial rituals and frequent sudden deaths among young and middle-aged individuals.
  • February to April: Per overseas Chinese language media and social media, variant strains of COVID-19 appeared to be spreading in China, leading to hospital queues of one to two hours. Many people across regions reported that COVID-19 has been renamed “Influenza A” as the CCP authorities sought to cover up the truth. Netizens also reported rising death tolls and crematoriums continuously overwhelmed. Netizens further noted that a significant number of young and middle-aged individuals have died in northeast China, Wuhan, Shanghai, and other areas, with long queues at crematoriums.
  • December: Per overseas Chinese language media and social media, the COVID-19 epidemic in China appeared to reach a peak, with hospitals resembling the situation during the major outbreak three years ago. Reports claimed that pediatric and adult wards were fully occupied, and cases of “white lung” pneumonia surged. Netizens noted that sudden deaths increased significantly, crematorium furnaces broke down from overuse, and there were long queues for cremations. Funeral service providers in Zhejiang, Shanghai, and other areas report being overwhelmed with transporting bodies, with premium cremation furnaces running at full capacity.

13. The CCP authorities will step up its control over Chinese society, especially with regard to speech and public opinion. The CCP’s measures could make it appear increasingly paranoid and dangerous.   VERIFIED  

  • May
    May 15: Major Chinese social media platforms, including Tencent, Douyin, Kuaishou, Weibo, Bilibili, and Xiaohongshu, issued a special governance announcement targeting content with “harmful value orientations.” The platforms also called for strict crackdowns on content promoting ostentatious wealth and materialism.

  • June
    June 11: The State Administration for Market Regulation releases a guiding opinion on strengthening Party-building work for the rideshare delivery workforce targeting over 12 million annually active rideshare delivery workers from major platform companies for control and ideological indoctrination activities.
  • September
    September 15: Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily reports that Zhu Hengpeng, deputy director of the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and director of its Public Policy Research Center, was severely disciplined for allegedly engaging in “improper discussion” of Party Central’s policies.
  • October
    October 1: Premier Li Qiang signs a State Council decree promulgating the Regulations on Network Data Security Management. The new regulations, which take effect from Jan. 1, 2025, retain broad and vague definitions of national security risks, potentially leading to an increase in arbitrary enforcement.

  • December
    The Cyberspace Administration of China announced that it had interviewed 11,159 website platforms, issued warnings or fines to 4,046 platforms, shut down 10,946 websites, and closed 108,000 accounts during the year.

14. The CCP authorities could struggle in their pursuit of “stability maintenance” as local government financial shortages persist or worsen and there are more protests and demonstrations over deteriorating conditions in China (including civil servants demanding payment of their wages, etc.).   VERIFIED  

  • June
    June 5: Radio Free Asia reported that, due to financial constraints, local governments reduced the duration of surveillance and forced dissidents to “travel” during the 35th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests from the usual ten days to one week.
  • August
    August 22: Chinese media outlet Benliu News reports that over 700 grid workers in Hanjiang District of Putian City in Fujian Province, have not been paid for six months. The monthly salaries of the workers were just over 2,200 yuan (about $310).
  • Data from the PRC Ministry of Finance shows that in 2024, local government fiscal revenue was approximately 17.66 trillion yuan (down 3.8 percent) and expenditure reached about 34.07 trillion yuan (up 2.4 percent), resulting in a deficit of roughly 16.41 trillion yuan (up 9.9 percent).
  • In 2024, layoffs and salary cuts affected government departments, public institutions, and state-owned enterprises.
  • Reports from Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and other areas indicate that civil servants, including police, faced salary reductions of around 20 percent. News of government financial shortages and unpaid wages was even more widespread.
  • China’s financial sector, known for high salaries, saw widespread pay cuts in 2024. Employees’ base salaries were reduced by 25 percent at China International Capital Corporation, the country’s largest investment bank. Senior executives at Ping An Bank faced salary cuts exceeding 40 percent. Additionally, banks such as China Merchants Bank, Tianjin Bank, and Weihai Bank not only cut salaries but also implemented “reverse salary recovery,” demanding employees repay previously issued performance bonuses.
  • A report by China Labour Bulletin recorded 1,508 cases of collective worker actions in 2024, with unpaid wages and overdue social security contributions remaining core worker demands. Many companies disregarded workers’ rights in decision-making, and trade unions at all levels were criticized for severe formalism, leading to frequent worker protests.

15. Should internal and external crises in China develop to a point where the central government loses credibility, some local governments and military garrisons could begin to operate in an autonomous fashion as they look to take matters into their own hands.

Hong Kong: 2 predictions, 2 verified

16. The U.S. could impose more sanctions on Hong Kong and PRC officials over the CCP’s erosion of freedoms (including the passage of Article 23 of the Basic Law) and abuse of human rights in Hong Kong.   VERIFIED  

  • April
    April 8: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced on the State Department website visa restrictions targeting multiple Chinese mainland and Hong Kong officials for undermining Hong Kong’s democratic institutions.
  • September
    September 11: The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act, which allows the President to revoke the diplomatic privileges and immunities of Hong Kong’s offices in the U.S.

17. Hong Kong’s economy and financial market could see more deterioration and turbulence. Hong Kong could also see more capital outflows.   VERIFIED  

  • In 2024, Hong Kong’s real GDP growth slowed to 2.5 percent, down from 3.2 percent in 2023.
  • In 2024, Hong Kong’s residential property prices declined by 6.8 percent.
  • In 2024, the Hang Seng Index rose by 17.7 percent over the year, a reversal from a 13.8 percent decline in 2023. However, the index experienced pronounced mid-year volatility, driven by mainland Chinese policy shifts and global interest rate dynamics. The annual trading range reached 56 percent, underscoring heightened market fluctuations.
  • In 2024, derivatives trading volume in Hong Kong surged to a record high, with 22 million open futures and options contracts, signaling a sharp increase in investor hedging demand amid heightened market turbulence and uncertainty.
  • In 2024, Hong Kong’s Balance of Payments (BoP) recorded a full-year deficit of $89.7 billion, an increase from $79.9 billion in 2023, indicating growing pressure from net capital outflows.

Cross-Strait relations: 4 predictions, 4 verified

18. The U.S. will continue to strengthen its support for Taiwan in various aspects, including militarily (sales of military equipment and weapons systems, training, joint drills, etc.) and supporting Taiwan’s membership in some international organizations.   VERIFIED  

  • January
    January 31: U.S. Army Special Forces are permanently deployed to Taiwan, providing training for the first time on outlying islands such as Kinmen and Penghu to enhance Taiwanese forces’ defensive capabilities.

  • February

    February 21: The U.S. State Department approves a $75 million arms sale to strengthen Taiwan’s communication and defense capabilities.

    February 22: A bipartisan delegation led by Rep. Mike Gallagher, Chair of the U.S. House Select Committee on China, visited Taiwan.

  • April
    April 24: President Joe Biden signed a supplemental bill providing up to $2 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan. This allows Taiwan to purchase U.S. weapons through loans and grants, with an annual cap of $1 billion.

  • May

    May 14: Reuters reported that the U.S. and Taiwanese navies conducted an “unpublicized” joint exercise in the Western Pacific in April. The exercise involved around six naval vessels from both sides.

    May 26: A delegation led by Rep. Michael McCaul, Chair of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, visited Taiwan.

  • June

    June 5: The U.S. Congress is notified of potential arms sales to Taiwan, including $220 million in standard F-16 spare parts and $80 million in non-standard spare parts.

    June 18: The U.S. Congress is notified of potential sales to Taiwan, including $300 million for ALTIUS 600M-V drones and $60.2 million for Switchblade loitering munitions systems.

  • July 
    July 22: U.S. military personnel attended the annual Han Kuang military exercises as observers. Among the observers was U.S. Marine Corps Major General Jay M. Bargeron.

  • September

    September 16: The U.S. Congress is notified of a potential $228 million sale to Taiwan of spare parts return, repair, and reshipment.

    September 29: The U.S. announces $567 million in military aid to Taiwan under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the largest such package to date.

  • October
    October 25: The White House notified Congress of a $1.988 billion sale of NASAMS air defense systems to Taiwan.

  • November
    November 29: The U.S. Congress is notified of two military sales packages to Taiwan, including $32 million for F-16 spare parts and active electronically scanned array radar services, and $65 million for Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) and Expeditionary Force (EXFOR) services.

  • December
    December 20: President Joe Biden approved $571.3 million in defense support for Taiwan, including direct military aid. Congress is notified of additional sales, such as $265 million for command, control, communications, and computer modernization, and $30 million for MK 75 76mm gun mounts.

    In 2024, the U.S. increases the number of trainers in Taiwan to approximately 500 (a tenfold increase), covering various units, including 14-day reserve training and special operations guidance. This is a permanent commitment aimed at enhancing Taiwan’s overall military readiness.

19. William Lai Ching-te of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party will be elected as the new president of Taiwan. After his election, Lai could get tougher against the PRC authorities in words and actions.   VERIFIED  

  • May
    May 20: In his inaugural address, William Lai outlined his cross-strait policy platform, firmly stating that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other.

  • June

    June 14: In public remarks, William Lai declared that “Taiwan is already an independent country.”

    June 19: William Lai said that “only military strength can maintain peace with China, and the Taiwanese people will not yield to Chinese coercion.” He also welcomed accelerated U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to bolster its defense.

    June 22: In a speech, William Lai comprehensively asserted Taiwan’s sovereignty while maintaining Taiwan’s official national framework. Beijing responded with strong rhetoric and military pressure.

  • September

    September 1: In an interview, William Lai said that China’s desire to invade Taiwan is not driven by territorial claims but by its aim to “alter the rules-based world order” to achieve hegemony. He called for Taiwan to unite in resisting PRC aggression and emphasized that peace must be achieved in the right way.

    September 3: William Lai criticized China, questioning why it does not reclaim land occupied by Russia if its goal is territorial integrity. Lai added that the PRC’s true intent in invading Taiwan is to achieve hegemony in the Western Pacific.

  • October
    October 10: In the Republic of China’s National Day speech, William Lai reiterated Taiwan’s sovereignty, declaring that “the People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan” and emphasized that Taiwan and the PRC are not subordinate to each other.

  • November
    William Lai visited Pacific allies, including Hawaii and Guam, to strengthen diplomatic ties. The PRC strongly opposed the visits and threatened to take tough actions to suppress Taiwan’s independence and obstruct its international recognition.

20. The CCP will continue to take military actions to intimidate Taiwan. However, the probability of an invasion actually occurring is extremely low.   VERIFIED  

  • February 
    February 18: PRC coast guard intercepted and boarded a Taiwanese yacht near Kinmen. The move was seen as a precedent for pressuring Taiwan, intensifying gray-zone tactics, and threatening Taiwanese fishermen and maritime activities.
  • May
    May 23-24: The PLA conducted the “Joint Sword-2024A” military exercises in response to William Lai’s inaugural address.
  • July
    July: Over 430 PLA military aircraft enter Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, with activity levels nearing the peak seen in August 2022.

  • August
    August: 31 PLA military aircraft (including drones) and 12 warships operated in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding areas for 24 hours, reinforcing daily threats.

  • September
    September 11: Financial Times reported that Seal Team 6 has been planning and training for a Taiwan conflict.
  • October
    October 14: The PLA launched the “Joint Sword-2024B” military exercises in response to William Lai’s National Day speech. The 13-hour drill was large in scale, but the shortest on record.

  • December

    December 9-12: The PLA conducted an unannounced large-scale military exercise lasting four days, in what appeared to be a response to William Lai’s Pacific tour.

    Throughout the year, PLA military aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ over 2,000 times, marking a record high.

21. There could be increasing calls in the West (U.S. legislators, academics, commentators, think-tanks, media, etc.) to recognize Taiwan as an independent nation or a sovereign entity separate from the PRC.   VERIFIED  

  • January
    January 16: In an article titled “Face Reality, ‘Democracy Advocate’ Biden: Taiwan Is Already Independent,” former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton called for the U.S. to recognize “de facto Taiwanese independence.”
  • May
    May 22: In a speech, former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged the U.S. and the international community to “recognize Taiwan as a sovereign and independent country” because it “reflects reality.” Pompeo added that doing so would deter a potential PRC invasion and preserve Taiwan’s status quo.
  • September
    September 17: At a Hudson Institute event on September 17, Mike Pompeo issued a statement calling for U.S. officials to recognize Taiwan as an independent nation separate from Communist China.

US-China relations: 3 predictions, 3 verified

22. Sino-U.S. relations will remain tense even if there is greater bilateral engagement.   VERIFIED  

  • February

    Feb. 15: FBI director Christopher Wray warned about the “China threat” at the Munich Security Conference

    Feb. 19: A U.S. delegation warned Beijing in a visit to China that the U.S. and its allies will take action if the PRC attempts to alleviate its industrial overcapacity problem by dumping goods on international markets, two senior Treasury officials told the Financial Times.

  • March
    The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. and China “very quietly” extended the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement.
  • April

    April 2: President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping had a phone call. In the call, Biden raised U.S. concerns over the PRC’s support of Russia’s defense industrial base, the PRC’s unfair trade policies and non-market economic practices, and other issues.

    April 26: During a press conference in Beijing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “I reiterated our serious concern about the PRC providing components that are powering Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.”

  • May

    May 1: The Federal Communications Commission moved to bar Huawei, ZTE, and other foreign companies deemed to pose U.S. national security concerns from certifying wireless equipment.

    May 14: President Joe Biden increased tariffs on $18 billion in Chinese goods, including electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, steel, aluminum, critical minerals, solar cells, ship-to-shore cranes, and medical products.

    May 15: The PRC issued a strong protest to news that the U.S. and Taiwan had conducted joint naval drills in secret.

    May 22: The PRC announced that it had taken measures against 12 U.S. companies — including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics — and their senior executives in response to the U.S. arming of Taiwan and sanctions on Chinese companies.

  • August
    Aug. 25: Financial Times reported that White House National Security Advisor and PRC foreign minister Wang Yi had several “secret” backchannel meetings in various locations around the world, including in Malta and Thailand.

  • September
    Sept. 10: US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell accused the PRC of directly supporting Russia’s “war machine.”

    Sept. 18: US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, “Frankly, the Cold War pales in comparison to the multifaceted challenges that China presents. It’s not just the military challenges. It’s across the board. It’s in the Global South. It is in technology.”

    Sept. 22: President Joe Biden was caught on hot mic telling leaders of the Quad, “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region, and it’s true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South China, South Asia and the Taiwan Straits.”

  • The PRC announced a ban of several rare minerals to the United States, including gallium, germanium, antimony, and so-called superhard materials.

23. The U.S. will continue to counter the CCP threat in areas that threaten U.S. national security, including technology (artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, EVs, etc.) espionage and surveillance, and various human rights issues.   VERIFIED  

  • February
    Feb. 29: President Joe Biden ordered the Commerce Department to launch an investigation into foreign-made software in cars, citing Chinese technology as a potential national security risk.

  • March
    March 6: Bloomberg reported that the U.S. government pressed the Netherlands, Germany, South Korea, and Japan to further tighten restrictions on the PRC’s access to semiconductor technology.
  • April

    April 18: FBI director Christopher Wray said that PRC government-linked hackers have burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure and are waiting “for just the right moment to deal a devastating blow.”

    April 24: President Joe Biden signed into law the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which bans operations related to TikTok completely within the United States unless ByteDance makes a qualified divestiture as determined by the U.S. president.

  • June
    June 25: The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Falun Gong Protection Act, which addresses the CCP’s long-running persecution of Falun Gong in China.
  • July
    July 2: The Biden administration revoked eight licenses in 2024 that had allowed some companies to ship goods to Huawei, according to a document first reported by Reuters.
  • October
    Oct. 21: The U.S. Justice Department proposed new rules to protect federal government data or the bulk personal data of Americans from getting into the hands of countries like China, Iran and Russia by placing new limits on certain business transactions.

  • December

    Dec. 2: The Biden administration unveiled new regulations aimed at curbing the PRC’s ability to develop advanced semiconductors, including imposing export restrictions on 24 types of chipmaking equipment, three categories of software crucial for chip development, and U.S.-origin and foreign-made high-bandwidth memory to China.

    Dec. 23: The Biden administration launched a trade probe into China’s production of older types of computer chips that are vital for cars, dishwashers, telecom networks, and military weaponry.

24. The U.S. could maintain or strengthen its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. could also hold more joint military exercises and reach military agreements with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.   VERIFIED  

  • February
    Feb. 1: The U.S. and the Philippines announced four new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites, which support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the forces of both countries.
    Feb. 14: The U.S. deployed five aircraft carriers in the western Pacific.

  • July
    July 28: The U.S. upgraded the U.S. Forces Japan to a joint force headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities.
  • December
    The U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners likely held more military exercises in 2024 than in 2023, primarily due to the inclusion of RIMPAC, the introduction of FREEDOM EDGE, and expansions in exercises like Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center and Balikatan.

China and the world: 3 predictions, 2 verified

25. The international community could heighten its vigilance towards the CCP threat and step up cooperation to counter the CCP.   VERIFIED  

  • April
    April 7: Combined forces of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States held a Maritime Cooperative Activity within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone.

    April 23: The European Union launched an investigation into the PRC’s procurement of medical devices.

  • May 
    May 25: The Group of Seven finance chiefs criticized the PRC’s engagement in the global commerce system. In a statement, they said: “While reaffirming our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration, we express concerns about China’s comprehensive use of non-market policies and practices that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. We will continue to monitor the potential negative impacts of overcapacity and will consider taking steps to ensure a level playing field.”

  • June

    June 11: Dutch military intelligence said that PRC cyber espionage was more extensive than it had initially thought. “Targets included dozens of Western governments, international organizations, and numerous companies operating in the defense industry,” the MIVD agency said in a statement.

    June 12: The European Commission said it will impose extra duties of up to 38.1 percent on imported Chinese electric cars from July

  • July

    July 10: NATO heads of state and government issued a declaration noting that the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies continue to challenge our interests, security and values.” The statement added that the “deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the PRC and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order, are a cause for profound concern.”

    July 11: Germany announced that it would phase out Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE from its 5G core network from 2029.

26. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and conflicts in the Middle East will increasingly resemble “frozen conflicts” and are unlikely to escalate into a broader East-West confrontation. The non-resolution of those conflicts would contribute to ongoing tensions between the PRC and the West.   VERIFIED  

  • Neither the Russia-Ukraine conflict nor conflicts in the Middle East were resolved by the end of 2024. Meanwhile, Donald Trump — who won the 2024 U.S. presidential election — had pledged on the campaign trail to end the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as get tough on China.

27. The emergence of new diseases and illnesses in China could lead to another pandemic. However, governments may be reluctant to reimpose COVID-era prevention and control measures due to local recessionary pressures and the unpopularity of those measures in many places.

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