This analysis is from the Jan. 26, 2026 newsletter.
***
Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under investigation
Jan. 24
1. Jiang Bin, a spokesman for the PRC Ministry of National Defense, announced at a routine press conference that the CCP Central Committee has decided to open a formal investigation into Zhang Youxia, member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, member of the CMC and Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC.
2. The PLA Daily published a front-page editorial on the probe of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli titled, “Resolutely Win the Tough, Protracted, and Overall Battle Against Corruption in the Military” (堅決打贏軍隊反腐敗鬥爭攻堅戰持久戰總體戰).
The article stated that the investigation into Zhang and Liu once again demonstrates the CCP authorities’ “rock-solid resolve to carry the anti-corruption struggle through to the end,” and their “firm stance of showing no leniency toward anyone, regardless of who they are or how high their position may be, if they engage in corruption.” It described the handling of Zhang and Liu as a “major achievement” in the anti-corruption campaign.
The article noted that Zhang and Liu, who were senior leaders in the Party and the military, had “seriously betrayed the trust and heavy responsibilities entrusted to them by the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission; seriously trampled on and undermined the CMC Chairman Responsibility System; seriously fueled and exacerbated political and corruption problems that weaken the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party’s governing foundations; seriously damaged the image and authority of the CMC leadership; seriously undermined the political and ideological foundation of unity and progress among officers and soldiers across the entire military; caused grave damage to political military-building, the political ecosystem, and the development of combat effectiveness; and produced extremely adverse effects on the Party, the state, and the military.”
The article said that all officers and soldiers must resolutely support the decisions of Party Central, resolutely obey Party Central’s command, the CMC, and General Secretary Xi, and ensure a high degree of centralization, unity, purity, and consolidation within the forces.
The article further explained that the current concentrated crackdown on corruption does not mean that corruption is worsening despite efforts to combat it (越反越腐, “the more it is fought, the more it persists”), but rather that investigations are becoming more thorough (越挖越深, “digging deeper and deeper”). The article also urged the entire military to “resolutely implement the major decisions and deployments of Party Central, the CMC, and General Secretary Xi,” to “unite closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and to fully implement the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
3. The South China Morning Post cited a source familiar with the matter as saying that the CCP elite had been briefed on the investigation of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on Jan. 23. The source added that Zhang was “accused of corruption and of failing to rein in his close associates, family members and relatives,” as well as blamed for “not flagging problems to the Party leadership at the first instance.”
A second source said that Zhang was formally detained by the military’s anti-corruption investigators on Jan. 19.
Jan. 25
The Wall Street Journal, citing sources familiar with the matter, claimed that a high-level briefing on the allegations against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on Jan. 24 claimed that Zhang was being probed for reportedly “forming political cliques,” accepting “huge sums of money in exchange for official promotions” in the big-budget procurement system, and for leaking “core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons” to the United States.
The people familiar with the matter said that some of the evidence against Zhang came from Gu Jun, the former general manager of the state-owned company China National Nuclear Corp., which oversees all aspects of the PRC’s military and civilian nuclear programs. The CCP authorities had announced an investigation into Gu on Jan. 19.
The people also said that the briefing linked Zhang’s case to former defense minister Li Shangfu by alleging that Zhang promoted Li in exchange for large bribes.
Finally, the people noted that Xi has commissioned a task force to carry out a deep-dive probe into Zhang’s tenure as commander of the Shenyang Military Region (2007 to 2012). The task force is reportedly now in Shenyang and has opted to stay in local hotels rather than military bases, “where Zhang would have a network of support.”
Current state of the CMC
The purge of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli means that the only remaining members of the CMC are Xi Jinping (CMC chairman) and Zhang Shengmin (newly promoted CMC vice chairman). The other CMC members have been successively taken out in recent years:
- August 2023: Li Shangfu, a CMC member and defense minister, was investigated.
- November 2024: Miao Hua, a CMC member and director of the CMC Political Work Department, was investigated.
- October 2025: He Weidong, a Politburo member, CMC member, and CMC vice chairman, was expelled from the Party and the military.
When Zhang Youxia’s removal is confirmed, this would be the first time since 1989 that the CCP has purged two sitting Politburo members before the end of their terms. In 1989, the Party removed Zhao Ziyang (then CCP General Secretary and first-ranked CMC vice chairman) and Hu Qili (then Secretary of the Central Secretariat) from the Politburo and its standing committee over their “soft” handling of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations.
Our take
The purge of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli — two active members of the CMC — is the most tumultuous political development to hit the PLA since Xi Jinping came to power. This development appears to be a continuation of the fallout from the PLA Rocket Force scandal in 2023 that led to the downfall of two defense ministers (Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe) that year, the top military political leader (Miao Hua) in 2024, and nine generals near the end of 2025.
1. The high-level purges almost certainly have a destabilizing effect on the CCP, but are unlikely to shake up CCP elite politics much. The manner in which Zhang Youxia was marginalized demonstrates that Xi Jinping’s power remains, for the time being, beyond challenge. Also, Xi’s grip on the military is strong enough to crush coup attempts and allow him to retain control over the CCP regime; that being said, Beijing’s official characterization of Zhang’s case points to discontent towards Xi in the PLA. Concurrently, Xi’s purge of Zhang mostly debunks persistent rumors that predominantly circulate in overseas Chinese-speaking circles claiming that Xi has “lost power” and has been stripped of control over the military.
One popular belief of the “Xi losing power” camp is that Zhang, with the backing of Party elders, had effectively sidelined (架空) Xi some time in 2025 and is the one who is actually in control of the PLA and the CCP. But if this was indeed the case, then Xi would never be able to purge Zhang as the latter would have almost certainly restricted Xi’s movements and actions (Zhang, after all, supposedly controlled the Party’s all-important “gun”) given the “you live, I die” nature of factional struggles in the CCP elite.
The “Xi losing power” camp’s argument that Zhang Youxia was actually in control becomes even more unpersuasive in considering past precedent. Hu Jintao was genuinely sidelined by Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction for the bulk of his tenure, and was unable to move against Jiang and his lackeys even after being targeted by multiple assassination attempts despite being CMC chairman. Hu could only go after key Jiang faction lieutenant Bo Xilai in his last year in office due to the seriousness of the Wang Lijun incident and the political earthquake that resulted. The strength of the Jiang faction at the time also meant that Hu could not move against Zhou Yongkang, Bo’s chief accomplice in a coup attempt against Hu, while in office.
2. Officially, the Xi leadership justified its removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on the grounds that they had committed egregious offenses that endangered the CCP regime. The PLA Daily’s Jan. 24 editorial used exceptionally harsh wording and phrases to condemn the two generals, more severe than that used previously against He Weidong and Miao Hua. The official response to Zhang and Liu’s purge was also more rapid than in previous high-level PLA probes, underscoring the gravity of the situation and the urgent need to issue a definitive political line to the entire Party and military.
In the CCP’s political culture, how condemned officials are characterized (定性) is not merely a prelude to a legal trial, but also the core of the final political “verdict.” It determines the historical standing of the purged official, the fate of their associates, and the specific “lessons” the entire Party and military are expected to internalize. Categories of characterization include:
- Disciplinary violations (違紀): Breaches of Party rules. Considered an internal organizational matter.
- Legal violations (違法): Breaches of state law. Typically refers to bribery or corruption.
- Political problems (政治問題): Fundamental deviations involving political line, policy, or loyalty.
- Usurping Party power/splitting the Party (篡黨奪權/分裂黨): The highest level of political accusation, implying a direct challenge to the CCP’s supreme authority.
When the PRC defense ministry announced the probe of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and seven other generals in October 2025, it used the following phrases in characterizing them:
- “Serious violations of Party discipline.”
- “Suspected of serious duty-related crimes.”
- “Extremely large amounts involved.”
- “Extremely serious in nature.”
- “Extremely adverse impact.”
While severe, the accusations against the nine generals remained within the realm of duty-related crimes. By contrast, the accusations against Zhang and Liu venture into the political realm:
- “Seriously trampling on and undermining the CMC Chairman Responsibility System”
- This entails that Zhang and Liu had potentially overrode Xi’s command authority on certain matters, sanctioned unauthorized troop movements, concealed major military intelligence, or refused to execute Xi’s orders. Since Zhang oversaw military operations and Liu controlled the Joint Staff Department (the “nerve center” of the PLA), they are de facto capable of “mutiny” or “insurrection.”
- “Seriously fostering and exacerbating political and corruption problems that undermine the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party’s governing foundations.”
- The accusation of “endangering the Party’s governing foundations” suggests that what Zhang and Liu did represented an existential, deep-seated threat to the CCP. This implies that Zhang and Liu’s “clique” sought more than financial gain, and had potentially formed an “independent kingdom” (wide-spanning interest network) capable of rivaling Party Central. It is not implausible that the duo were indeed behind an interest group that could endanger the regime as Zhang is a Party princeling with rare combat experience (giving him valuable political credentials in the CCP) and Liu controlled the PLA’s operational command system.
- “Seriously damaging the image and authority of the CMC leadership.”
- The actions of Zhang, Liu, and other generals in the 20th CMC — which Xi handpicked — have led to the dismantling of nearly the entire CMC membership. This represents a severe blow to Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige).
- “Seriously undermining the political and ideological foundation of unity and progress among officers and soldiers across the entire military.”
- This indicates that the downfall of Zhang and Liu is psychologically damaging to the PLA. Before their investigation, members of the 20th CMC were responsible for the military’s political indoctrination. Now those who were considered to be loyal to Xi are accused of betraying him. In particular, Zhang’s “betrayal” — as a family friend of Xi and a representative of the “second generation reds” — has shattered the myth that the princelings are loyal to Xi and fundamentally shakes the military’s belief in the political ethics of the top leadership.
- “Causing extremely serious damage to political military-building, the political ecosystem, and the development of combat effectiveness.”
- The nine generals were accused of damaging the “political ecosystem,” whereas Zhang and Liu are accused of much more. This characterization essentially designates Zhang and Liu as “political enemies” (政治敵人) of the Party, while He, Miao, and others are only at the level of “two-faced individuals” (兩面人).
- “Causing extremely adverse effects on the Party, the state, and the military.”
- The collective and widespread corruption of the PRC’s highest-ranking generals expose the failures of the Xi leadership’s efforts at political indoctrination and the anti-corruption campaign.
3. We are skeptical about some of the information about Zhang Youxia’s case that has been reported in English language media.
In the case of the South China Morning Post, the newspaper is owned by the Alibaba Group and leans pro-Beijing. It cannot be ruled out that the details about Zhang’s alleged offenses that SCMP reported are part of the CCP’s attempt at damage control by “leaking” a sanitized version of what the general is being investigated for.
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal’s information about Zhang Youxia supposedly leaking nuclear secrets to the U.S. is reminiscent of an earlier allegation involving another purged official. In December 2026, Politico claimed that Qin Gang and “relatives of top rocket force officers had helped pass Chinese nuclear secrets to Western intelligence agencies.” However, we noted that the allegation was unlikely as Qin “would not be able to obtain them in his capacity as foreign minister and is very unlikely to have ample opportunities in the foreign service to cross paths with senior PLA officials who would be privy to such classified information.” We also expressed skepticism that Qin had “died, either from suicide or torture” as Politico claimed; our assessment was subsequently affirmed when Qin made a public appearance in October 2025.
The allegation that Zhang divulged nuclear secrets is slightly more believable because he would be able to access them as CMC vice chair. But given that Zhang holds such a senior post and is virtually unable to leave China, leaking classified information would carry risks vastly disproportionate to any potential gains for him, leaving him with virtually no incentives to take such action.
4. A senior cadre of Zhang Youxia’s standing — notably, a member of the “red aristocracy” with family connections to the paramount leader — would typically be afforded a “soft landing” even if they are guilty of serious corruption or poor performance. This is particularly so in considering that leaders who purge those whom they themselves promoted are engaging in self-indictment by the act. A combination of factors likely contributed to Xi Jinping’s decision to remove Zhang.
i) The removal of Zhang Youxia is the logical outcome of the Xi leadership’s investigation into the PLARF scandal in 2023 and efforts at “rectifying” the situation. The PLARF scandal led to probes of the corruption-prone equipment development system, where Zhang headed from 2012 to 2017 (PLA General Armaments Department, 2012—2015; CMC Equipment Development Department, 2015—2017). It is likely that anti-corruption investigators either discovered or were fed information concerning Zhang’s corruption during that period.
Xi’s willingness to take out Zhang over allegations of his corruption suggests that he must have been very frustrated by persistent and severe setbacks to his vision of transforming the PLA into a modern fighting force capable of power projection to match the PRC’s ambitions and taking Taiwan should the need arise.
ii) The nonstop revelations since 2023 that those whom Xi considers to be loyalists are in fact very corrupt and/or have undermined his agenda with their actions could have greatly heightened Xi’s paranoia and induced him to order purges that he previously could have second thoughts about undertaking. In turn, Xi’s willingness to purge his allies could have caused some of them to become more guarded and engage in suspicious activities (banding together, coordinating testimonies, or seeking protection from other political patrons) that would further fuel Xi’s paranoia and distrust. This creates a vicious cycle that would ultimately lead Xi to take out Zhang Youxia and potentially result in Stalin-style purges (if they are not already happening) in the military and the officialdom.
iii) Xi could be buying his own propaganda about “self-revolution” and “turning the knife inward.” By not declaring a conclusion to his anti-corruption campaign, Xi has to endlessly hold up “tigers and flies” to demonstrate the existence of corruption and vindicate his decision to be “always on the road” in struggling against it. This in turn incentivizes Xi’s investigators to go hunting for corruption everywhere, including on the persons of Xi’s own allies and loyalists. The discovery of yet more corruption will further convince Xi of the “rightness” of his ways and deepen his distrust of those around him, perpetuating the “self-revolution” cycle.
iv) Xi could have been manipulated by his political enemies and other discontents into purging Zhang Youxia and other allies. The CCP’s intelligence apparatus in particular was swayed by Zeng Qinghong and the Jiang faction, and could have had a hand in feeding “damning” information about Zhang and others to anti-corruption investigators or directly to Xi himself. External “anti-Xi” elements, including those who advocate a strategy of leadership change in China and foreign intelligence agencies, could also have had a hand in shaping the international information environment to influence the CCP intelligence apparatus’s assessments. For instance, the external information environment has continually cast doubt on Xi’s control over the PLA and the CCP (over the past two years) while lionizing “opposition” figures like Zhang Youxia (at least over the past year). There also appears to be a tremendous amount of information circulating about supposed fractures in the CCP elite during a period where actual factional struggle activity is at a low point following Xi’s power consolidation at the 20th Party Congress.
A highly paranoid Xi would be especially susceptible to “intelligence” that his allies and loyalists are betraying or about to betray him, and be more inclined to take action that makes himself more vulnerable to his real enemies. We previously wrote that “Xi Jinping’s remaining factional rivals and the ‘anti-Xi coalition,’ including elements opposed to Xi in the military or the CCP intelligence apparatus’s ‘hidden front’ (see here and here), to exploit the Xi leadership’s prioritization of national security matters to ‘manipulate’ the PRC leader into taking out his own allies and ultimately undermining his own interests.”
v) It cannot be entirely ruled out that Zhang Youxia had indeed attempted to move against Xi Jinping, but was unsuccessful. This would leave Xi with no choice but to purge Zhang now instead of letting him retire before the 21st Party Congress.
5. The downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli will produce a chilling effect across the PLA, the CCP bureaucracy, and among the “red aristocracy.”
i) The CMC has been effectively reduced to the “one-man rule” of Xi Jinping. Newly promoted CMC vice chairman Zhang Shengmin, who was previously the PLA’s discipline inspection chief, could be made to prioritize the overseeing of anti-corruption work in the military while broadly covering the roles (military affairs and political work) of the purged CMC vice chairmen. In a sense, the CMC has been transformed into an “expanded discipline inspection committee” with professional military decision-making potentially being supplanted entirely by political vetting.
ii) As chief of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli was responsible for coordinating joint operations across all theater commands and service branches. His investigation means that the top-level design of the entire combat command system, emergency contingency plans, communication codes, and even nuclear button protocols may face scrutiny and reset. While second-line officers have undoubtedly been tapped to take over Liu’s responsibilities, the PLA has entered a temporary state of “brain death” until the Xi leadership finds a permanent replacement and concludes probes associated with Liu in the Joint Staff Department.
iii) A power vacuum is likely to emerge within the PLA’s command hierarchy. The unofficial scale of Xi’s purge of the senior ranks of the military could be quite significant, particularly among the lower general ranks. Newly promoted generals (such as Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan) likely have insufficient “quan wei” or influence to immediately command respect down the ranks. Meanwhile, officers at all levels could start to engage in mutual denunciations for self-protection, driving down unit cohesion and morale.
iv) Mid-to-senior level officers could become even more passive and bureaucratic as they search for political survival in an environment where they feel that even the slightest mistakes get severely punished. Officers could also attempt to pass the buck on making the final call on issues such as equipment procurement and exercise planning, thereby lowering the PLA’s administrative and training efficiency. Such behavior in the PLA will eventually seep over into the civilian side, impacting the CCP’s governing efficacy on the whole.
v) The rise of political work and disciplinary cadres like Zhang Shengmin could create a situation where those who carry out purges enjoy easier paths to promotion that those who undertake the comparatively harder task of military modernization. This could lead to the marginalization of professional officers who excel in military affairs, while cadres skilled in political opportunism occupy high-level positions. Over time, this will seriously degrade the PLA’s professional quality.
vi) Xi Jinping’s purge of Party princeling and family friend Zhang Youxia signals to the “red aristocracy” that none of them are safe anymore. This could silence some of the criticisms of Xi and his policies that undoubtedly are voiced as princeling gatherings. However, the bulk of “anti-Xi” elements will unlikely be intimidated into ceasing their resistance towards Xi, and could adopt greater caution to circumvent surveillance.
6. The PLA will likely be temporarily “blunted” as a fighting force while Xi Jinping is subjecting it to Stalin-style purges and brainwashing. Notably, the removal of Liu Zhenli, the replacement of several theater commanders, and ongoing efforts to rectify corruption in the equipment development and political departments will likely prove disruptive to military operations and major plans. The PLA will need some time to get itself back up to speed to be able to undertake complex military operations such as an invasion of Taiwan.
While the PLA’s leadership and organization are currently in disarray, it should not be discounted as a threat. Xi’s goal with the high-level purges and intensification of political indoctrination is to strengthen the PLA. Also, the CCP’s effort to modernize and expand the military continues apace in various areas (such as shipbuilding, fighter building, and missile development) even as the top level of the PLA is being subjected to rectification. Should Xi find even a modicum of success in rooting out systemic issues contributing to corruption, the PLA could emerge from the current debacle as a more professional, proficient, and reliable fighting force in the future.
Amid the current chaos, the PLA still has the ability to play a role in the CCP’s external behavior. The PLA will likely continue mostly unabated with its drills, harassment, intimidation, and gray zone operations in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Straits. And while an invasion is unlikely, the PLA still possesses the operational conditions to implement a “quarantine” or “blockade” of Taiwan. An “inhibited” PLA is also dangerous in the currently very low-probability scenario where Xi Jinping becomes highly irrational and decides to invade Taiwan or launch/join a war elsewhere to create external distractions to relieve an intense build-up of internal pressures as various crises facing his leadership come to a head.
