◎ Several proposals in the 2019 government work report seemingly cancel out each other or will contradict Xi’s push to have the “Party lead everything”
◎ There is a pattern in recent years of “explosive information” about CCP elites being revealed during crucial periods in the factional struggle.
◎ The CCP factional struggle will escalate as Xi tries to force through reforms to meet U.S. trade demands.
◎ A proposed schedule of nuclear and missile dismantling would be part of a good-faith showing by Kim.
◎ The collapse of Aiwujiwu and pinganfang.com suggests that the business model of “property + financing + internet services” is failing in China.
◎ The CCP’s political and legal affairs apparatus continues to oppose the Xi leadership, and the factional struggle intensifies.
◎ The sentencing of Fang Fenghui at this time hints at three possible political developments.
◎ The propaganda narratives in Xinhua lay the groundwork for Xi to agree to U.S. demands on sensitive issues like structural reform without losing face at home.
◎ Xi has pressing need to compromise, and Trump will not accept a “superficial” trade deal.
◎ Manufacturers may eventually shift out of China to Vietnam and an economically liberalized North Korea.
◎ History has taught that an American president’s credibility on a major U.S. domestic issue can be transferable to tests of will in the international arena, for good or ill.
◎ America could have the ZTE model in mind in enforcing the trade deal.
◎ The remarks of Li Chunsheng are a further sign that the CCP is feeling the pressure from rising social tensions.