SinoInsight 1
The 20th Central Committee held its First Plenum on Oct. 23. The plenary session elected the CCP general secretary, as well as members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee. The plenum also determined members of the Secretariat, the Central Military Commission, as well as approved the secretary, deputy secretaries, and members of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) that were elected at the first plenum of the 20th CCDI.
State mouthpiece issued the communiqué of the First Plenum and the list of new personnel. As widely expected, Xi Jinping was elected to a third term in office.
OUR TAKE
In examining the new Politburo and the ranking of its members, we believe that they will be assigned the following posts (the only officials with confirmed posts at the time of writing are Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, Li Xi, Zhang Youxia, and He Weidong):
Table 1 (Source: Xinhua)
The “Normal General Secretary Version 1” list in our 20th Party Congress forecast report correctly identified five of the seven (71 percent) Politburo Standing Committee members, 16 of the 24 members (68 percent) of the Politburo, and 160 out of 205 members (78 percent) of the Central Committee.
Below are our early observations regarding the new Politburo and its Standing Committee and what it says about the current state of CCP elite politics. We will be releasing further analysis on the potential posts that the new Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members will get in the next issue of the newsletter, as well as deeper analysis and takeaways about the 20th Party Congress personnel reshuffle in the upcoming weeks.
1. The composition of the Politburo and its Standing Committee suggests that Xi Jinping’s current political strength is slightly higher than that of a “normal general secretary” as defined in our 20th Party Congress personnel forecast report.
From our preliminary assessment, it appears that Xi was able to get his way on personnel appointments in greater part because he secured leverage over his factional rivals and other Party elite (through information gathered after investigations into Xiao Jianhua, Sun Lijun, Fu Zhenghua, and others; having placed under “control” Alvin Chau, Jack Ma, and Ye Jianming; etc.) before the Party Congress, as opposed to his having accumulated greater “quan wei” (authority and prestige) within the regime on account of his achievements or improved relations with other leading cadres.
2. Xi broke several norms of personnel reshuffle in elevating his allies, trusted officials, loyalists, and technocrats to the Politburo and its Standing Committee.
First, Xi himself took a third term, breaking modern leadership renewal norms.
Next, Xi largely stuck to the “seven up, eight down” (with the exception of two officials in specialized occupations). But he appeared to have taken liberties in removing many older leading cadres, including political allies like Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, when adhering to updated regulations on the subject (推進領導幹部能上能下規定). The current Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee membership suggests that political loyalty, and not age or ability, are more important criteria to Xi in selecting leading cadres.
For instance, former Tianjin Party secretary Li Hongzhong, who is known for his flattery and open displays of loyalty towards Xi, made the Politburo even though he is close to retirement age (66) and could be later confirmed as the second-rank vice premier. By contrast, 59-year-old Hu Chunhua failed to make the Politburo and its Standing Committee; we earlier analyzed that Hu has an unfavorable political background. However, Hu is still a member of the 20th Central Committee; this suggests that he could still be appointed PRC vice president, a vice chairman of the National People’s Congress, or a vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
3. The popular speculation before the 20th Party Congress that “Xi (Jinping) is on the decline, Li (Keqiang) is on the rise” has been thoroughly debunked by the outcome of the personnel reshuffle. As we noted earlier, it cannot be ruled out that the speculation either originated from or was taken advantage of by the Jiang Zemin faction to drive a wedge between Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao. However, the popularity of the speculation could have had an effect in growing Xi’s paranoia and partly influenced his decision to leave out Wang Yang from the new Politburo Standing Committee.
4. The inclusion of Wang Huning and Zhao Leji in the Politburo Standing Committee suggests that the Jiang faction still retains outsized influence in the CCP regime. The Jiang faction’s lingering influence could be a reason why Xi warned in delivering his 20th Party Congress work report about “a number of prominent issues and problems — some of which had been building for years and others which were just emerging” that occurred under his predecessors. The Jiang faction’s influence could also explain why the Hong Kong government suddenly removed a national security bill from its list of draft legislation to be deliberated in the current legislative session in the week before the 20th Party Congress, a curious development which indicated that Xi needed political leverage against the Jiang faction.
5. If members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee are to receive the posts that we identified in the table above, then it appears that the political status and factional leanings of the officials were more important than their ability in the Xi leadership’s determination of the current arrangement.
For example, Wang Huning and Zhao Leji were both elevated in ranking in the Politburo Standing Committee and will likely receive new and more important posts. Wang and Zhao have Jiang faction backgrounds.
Meanwhile, Xi’s allies joined the Politburo Standing Committee despite lacking qualifications and/or political achievements. Li Qiang’s “zero-COVID” disaster in Shanghai did not stop him from joining the Politburo Standing Committee and very likely replacing Li Keqiang (no relation) as premier; we anticipated Li Qiang’s elevation to the Politburo in May 2022 when many observers believed that he was finished politically. Meanwhile, Cai Qi’s performance in running Beijing municipality is mediocre and he has no experience or qualifications in theoretical research. But Cai’s appointment as first-rank secretary of the Central Secretariat suggests that he is poised to replace Wang Huning as chief overseer of propaganda and ideological work. Finally, Ding Xuexiang has no provincial leading cadre experience but will likely become the first-rank vice premier.
6. The Politburo shrank from 25 members to 24 members, with the director of the National Supervisory Commission likely being left out based on our extrapolation of posts. Meanwhile, the United Front Work Department head (Li Ganjie) could be reincluded into the Politburo after being left out at the 18th Party Congress, replacing a vice chairman of the National People’s Congress.
7. Xi’s allies will likely secure all key posts in the political and legal affairs apparatus. This sets the stage for the Xi leadership to make big “self-revolution” moves in the future and further cleanse the political and legal affairs apparatus of Jiang faction influence.
From the current personnel list, minister of state security Chen Wenqing looks likely to become the next secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the post will not go to Wang Xiaohong as we earlier analyzed. But Wang received an exceptional appointment as the last-rank secretary of the Central Secretariat and will become a state councilor in 2023.
Supreme People’s Court president Zhou Qiang was appointed to the Central Committee but will likely step down from his current post because his two terms are up. Zhou will likely be appointed as a deputy director of a special committee in the National People’s Congress or the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Also, barring unforeseen circumstances, procurator-general Zhang Jun could replace Zhou Qiang as president of the Supreme People’s Court as we previously analyzed, and Ying Yong could replace Zhang as procurator-general (Ying was elected to the 20th Central Committee despite not being a delegate to the 20th Party Congress).
8. Both Wang Yi and Zhang Youxia will serve in the Politburo despite being in their 70s (Wang turns 70 next year). They were likely granted a retirement exception under Xi’s revised regulations governing the promotion or removal of leading cadres because they have professional qualifications and valuable experience that will benefit the regime.
Zhang Youxia was retained as CMC vice chairman instead of being replaced by the younger Li Zuocheng likely because he has more experience in the Sino-Vietnamese war than the latter. Zhang has also spent more time in higher command than Li, having served as a commander of a military region as early as 2005, while Li was stuck in promotion purgatory until Xi came to power in 2012. Xi is likely counting on Zhang’s wealth of experience to help the CCP navigate potential conflicts with China’s neighbors and the West.
Additionally, Xi could have taken into account his closer relationship with Zhang Youxia (both their fathers were leading military officers in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia revolutionary area), as well as the latter’s political capital and networks as a “second generation red,” when deciding to retain his services as CMC vice chair.
SinoInsight 2
Later, state mouthpiece Xinhua tweeted that “Hu Jintao insisted on attending the closing session of the Party’s 20th National Congress, despite the fact that he has been taking time to recuperate recently.” In another tweet, Xinhua continued, “When he was not feeling well during the session, his staff, for his health, accompanied him to a room next to the meeting venue for a rest. Now, he is much better.”
State broadcaster CCTV’s evening primetime “Xinwen Lianbo” program featured Hu in a shot in its coverage of the 20th Party Congress closing ceremony.
Many observers believed that Hu Jintao’s exit, which took place after journalists were allowed into the hall, was a factional struggle incident where Xi had purged Hu and humiliated him in the process. Some commentators speculated that Hu was perhaps unhappy at Xi leaving out Li Keqiang and Wang Yang—Hu’s allies—from the 20th Central Committee, and was looking to vote against Xi during the closing ceremony. This prompted Xi to remove Hu from the proceedings before voting could take place, the commentators said. Others also speculated that Hu posed a last-minute challenge to Xi, which led to his being “forcibly” escorted out.
While dramatic, the probability that Hu Jintao’s abrupt exit from the 20th Party Congress closing ceremony had anything to do with factional struggle is low; it is much more probable that poor health was indeed the reason for his being led out of the venue.Speculation of Xi Jinping purging Hu over a last-minute challenge flies in the face of factional struggle logic. Xi and Hu are politically allied against the Jiang faction, and the Hu camp has shown no indication that it has turned against the Xi leadership. Hu also lacks the political strength to challenge Xi even if he wanted to; Hu had been unable to pose a problem to the Jiang faction when he was in office, and presents even less of a problem to the Xi leadership now. Further, Hu has little incentive to publicly stir up a fuss at the 20th Party Congress and bring trouble upon his son Hu Haifeng, who is the Party secretary of Zhejiang’s Lishui City.
The idea that Hu would suddenly be fed up with Xi for leaving out his allies from the incoming Central Committee also makes no sense considering that the Party elite would have finalized the personnel reshuffle list before the 20th Party Congress commenced, and very likely at Beidaihe in mid-August. CCP factional struggles in the modern era mostly unfold behind closed doors, and the Party elites would have resolved their differences out of public sight so as to maintain an image of “consensus” to the outside world. Any disagreements over personnel would have been settled behind the scenes and in advance of the Party Congress, not at the closing ceremony of the key conclave. Moreover, video footage of Xi and Hu at the opening ceremony show that the two have a friendly relationship. Neither Xi nor Hu have incentive in hurting their and the Party’s image at a crucial time; it would be political suicide for Xi to openly sacrifice his ally for all the world to see.
The speculation about Xi-Hu “factional struggle” also falls flat in the face of official developments. Xinhua’s statement about Hu’s health and CCTV’s shot of Hu in “Xinwen Lianbo” show that he is not in political trouble and are strong indications that the former Chinese leader was not purged. Meanwhile, the authorities’ subsequent censorship of discussion about the incident appears to be an attempt to cover up an awkward and embarrassing last-minute situation; if Xi had intended to humiliate Hu, the CCP authorities would not have censored information about Hu’s early exit and instead allow it to spread more widely. The lack of “humane” reaction from the other Party elites to Hu being led out is also within expectations; having several elites fussing over an elderly cadre detracts from the stoic, unflappable image that the CCP wants its leaders to project.
Observers who are convinced that Hu had been brutally “manhandled” out of the Great Hall of the People because Xi wanted to dramatically remove a “factional rival” and intimidate the other elites should consider why the latter did not do a better job choreographing the deed. It would have suited Xi’s “strongman dictator” image more for him to have People’s Liberation Army troops or CCDI officials march up to Hu, arrest him on the spot, and drag him out kicking and screaming. Instead, just one steward was sent to escort Hu away, followed by a more senior official, and Hu spoke to Xi and patted Li Keqiang on the shoulder on his way out—hardly a chilling way to send a message to the Party about who’s in charge and what will happen to those who “challenge” Xi. The poor “choreography” of the “purge of Hu Jintao” indicates that the incident was very unlikely to have been a scripted event.
Instead of factional struggle, Hu having health problems is a mundane, but more plausible, explanation for his early exit from the 20th Party Congress closing ceremony. Overseas Chinese language media have long rumored that he suffers from various ailments pertaining to altitude sickness that were acquired during his time serving as Party secretary of Tibet; we view such rumors with healthy skepticism, but if accurate, those ailments could be a reason why he had to leave early. More reliably, state footage of Hu attending Xi’s 2015 grand parade showed him clenching his fist and his left hand shaking incessantly; observers suspected that Hu might be suffering from Parkinson’s disease. There is also the possibility that Hu took a COVID test earlier that day that was suddenly discovered to be positive (we do not rule out sabotage); this could explain why the steward was quite insistent and forceful in getting Hu to leave the premises.
Regardless of what really happened to Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s real factional rivals and the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” crowd will almost certainly take advantage of it to further tarnish Xi’s already bad international image and undermine the Xi leadership. Xi could look to change public perception by having Hu make prominent public appearances in the near future and make other gestures to signal that his political ally is in the clear. But Xi will likely find it a challenge to reverse public perception about the political “Black Swan” event that many observers believe that they witnessed. If so, Hu’s unexpected exit has the potential to trigger or encourage real political Black Swans in China.
SinoInsight 2
1. At an event at Stanford University, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “there has been a change in the approach from Beijing toward Taiwan in recent years … instead of sticking with the status quo that was established in a positive way, a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and that Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.”
Blinken added, “If peaceful means didn’t work, then [Beijing] would employ coercive means – and possibly, if coercive means don’t work, maybe forceful means – to achieve its objectives. And that is what is profoundly disrupting the status quo and creating tremendous tensions.”
2. European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said in a five-page paper prepared for foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg that the EU should pursue “realistic and robust engagement” with China, according to a Reuters report.
“The message from China now is one of competing,” Borrell said, adding that Europe should reduce its dependency by “diversifying supply chains for technologies and critical raw materials and avoiding new vulnerabilities,” according to Reuters.
3. Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s domestic intelligence service, said, “When I speak with foreign partners about China, they always say: Russia is the storm, China is climate change. So we are going to have to brace for this climate change in the coming years.”
Oct. 18
The United Kingdom announced that it is taking steps to prevent active and former British military pilots from training members of the People’s Liberation Army.
Oct. 19
1. In a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council, chief of US naval operations Admiral Michael Gilday said when asked how the U.S. should respond to Xi Jinping’s remarks about Taiwan separatism at the 20th Party Congress, “It’s not just what President Xi says, but it’s how the Chinese behave and what they do. What we’ve seen over the past 20 years is that they have delivered on every promise they’ve made earlier than they said they were going to deliver on it. So when we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule it out.”
2. In an interview with The Washington Times, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Samuel Paparo said that his forces are ready to defend Taiwan from PRC military moves.
When asked to comment on Secretary Blinken’s remarks about Beijing’s “faster timeline” for reunification, Paparo said, “This is a decade of concern, so I absolutely see the logic of the secretary’s discussion.”
3. Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, told Reuters that the U.S. government is considering a plan to jointly produce weapons with Taiwan. Possible arrangements include the U.S. giving technology to manufacture weapons in Taiwan, or the production of weapons in the U.S. using Taiwanese parts, Reuters reported, citing Nikkei.
A U.S. State Department spokesperson told Reuters, “The United States is looking at all options to ensure the rapid transfer of defensive capabilities to Taiwan. The United States’ swift provision of Taiwan defensive weaponry and sustainment via Foreign Military Sale and Direct Commercial Sale is essential for Taiwan’s security and we will continue to work with industry to support that goal.”
4. Chen Ming-tong, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, told reporters on the sidelines of parliament that the “Beijing authorities” have “no possibility of winning in using force to attack Taiwan” and the PRC would face international sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the event of an invasion.
The Beijing authorities would “forfeit the so-called great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and become a sinner of the Chinese people,” Chen said.
Oct. 20
Politico’s China Watcher newsletter said that Xi’s 20th Party Congress speech “provides a window into the Chinese leader’s increasingly bleak view of the future of U.S.-China relations and could intensify moves by the U.S. to pursue policies and partnerships to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”
Oct. 21
At the end of a two-day EU summit with EU-China relations on the agenda, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, “The discussion showed that we’re witnessing quite an acceleration of trends and tensions. It was very clear from the Congress that President Xi is continuing to reinforce the very assertive and self-reliant course China has taken.” She added, “The Chinese system is fundamentally different from ours and we are aware of the nature of the rivalry.”
French President Emmanuel Macron said, “We have made strategic errors in the past with the sale of infrastructures to China.”
Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said, “That doesn’t mean there can’t be any economic relations with China but it means we shouldn’t be building that kind of strategic and critical dependencies on an authoritarian country.” She also said that “technology is key here” and “this might not be an issue today but it certainly will be in the future.”
Oct. 22
Australia and Japan signed a new security agreement in a bilateral meeting in Perth with an eye on China’s maritime activities, according to news reports leading up to the meeting.
Under the agreement, Japan’s military would carry out joint training and exercises with the Australian military in northern Australia. Both countries would also collaborate in the areas of space, cyber, and regional capacity building, as well as expand intelligence sharing. “In the event of emergencies that may influence regional security, we will consult and study possible responses,” said Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida.
Kishida also said, “We concurred that our special strategic partnership had risen to a new and higher level. He added that Australia and Japan share fundamental values and interests in “an increasingly harsh strategic environment.”
In an Oct. 19 interview with the Guardian Australia, Japan’s ambassador to Australia Shingo Yamagami said that both countries will share intelligence assessments about China under the security agreement.
OUR TAKE
1. The West has been steadily ramping up pressure on Xi Jinping and the CCP in recent weeks, a phenomenon that we have been tracking in recent newsletters (see here and here). The West and the international community’s awakening to the CCP threat, exposure of its driving Marxist-Leninist ideology, and efforts to stand up to and push back against the brutal regime are much welcome after decades of sleepwalking on the subject while the Party pursued its “survival-dominance” agenda.
Businesses, investors, and governments must heed the international community’s mounting efforts to challenge the PRC and the corresponding trend of rising political risks in China.
2. Recent U.S. warnings that the CCP could attempt its “reunification” of Taiwan on a “much faster timeline,” and particularly “reunification” by force, are rather surprising given previous assessments on the topic. In a Congressional hearing in March 2021, then-U.S. Indo-Pacific Command head Admiral Philip Davidson said that the threat of a PLA invasion could come “in the next six years,” or 2027. And until early October this year, several U.S. officials have repeated that the CCP wants to have the capability to take Taiwan by 2027 or that there is no threat of an imminent invasion, including U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy Colin H. Kahl, and CIA deputy director David Cohen.
We see several possible explanations, some of which could be mutually inclusive, for Washington’s abrupt reassessment of Beijing’s Taiwan invasion timeline.
- The U.S. could have obtained new intelligence or come up with new analyses indicating that the PLA is preparing for an invasion ahead of schedule. However, we have been unable to observe signs that Beijing is getting ready to take Taiwan early from publicly available information, and especially in studying the CCP’s own propaganda.
- The U.S. could believe that Xi Jinping hinted in his 20th Party Congress speech that an invasion of Taiwan is imminent, or could come even earlier than previously assessed. However, we analyzed that Xi signaled precisely the opposite, that is, he is looking to be less belligerent and ambitious in the near term as he seeks to preserve regime security in the face of growing external and internal crises.
- The U.S., after considering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is suggesting that Beijing now has a “faster timeline” for taking Taiwan to deter a potential PLA invasion should the PRC decide to exploit a worsening situation in eastern Europe, put the Xi leadership on notice, and give Taiwan impetus to speed up its own defense preparations.
- The U.S. could be attempting to “encourage” businesses and investors to withdraw from China by playing up geopolitical risks and fears of an early PLA invasion of Taiwan.
- The U.S. and its allies are adhering to the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy and are looking to goad Xi into invading Taiwan before he is ready and while the U.S. still has sufficient military and economic strength so that Xi would suffer a “humiliating defeat in a war” and be ousted.
If the Xi leadership does nothing or reacts cautiously in the face of Western pressure, it risks courting even more pressure as the PRC is exposed for being a paper tiger. Beijing would be able to control the situation at home for a time given its tight control over information channels, but this could lead to real humiliation when external pressures trigger embarrassing incidents that the regime cannot obscure from the Chinese public. At that juncture, the Xi leadership would also be compelled to invade Taiwan or lash out against the U.S. and its allies in ways that lock Beijing into a vicious cycle of rising external tensions, with critical consequences for Xi and the CCP regime.
As Xi Jinping faces more “lose-lose” and dead-end scenarios, he will be increasingly compelled to make the choice between preserving the CCP regime or finding alternative ways of securing his own legacy. When crises come to a head, whichever path Xi takes will bring political Black Swans and tremendous change to China.
