SinoInsight 1
Sept. 19
The CCP General Office issued regulations (推進領導幹部能上能下規定) and a circular on governing the promotion or removal of leading cadres, according to state mouthpiece Xinhua. All localities and departments are required to strictly abide by those regulations.
The circular noted that the regulations are a “fresh experience” (新鮮經驗) of strictly governing the Party (從嚴治黨) under the guidance of “Xi Jinping Thought.” The circular added that the regulations are of “important significance” for promoting the formation of an employment orientation and political environment in which “the capable will be promoted, the superior will be rewarded, the mediocre will be removed, and the inferior will be eliminated” (能者上、優者獎、庸者下、劣者汰), as well as constructing a “loyal, clean, responsible” (忠誠、乾淨、擔當) and “high-quality governing backbone team” (高素質執政骨干隊伍).
The circular instructed Party Committees at all levels and their organization departments to “earnestly” take up the “political responsibility” of “strictly governing the Party and officials” to promote the “normalization” of cadre promotion and removal. The circular further required officials to combine “strict control and generous love” (嚴管和厚愛) in managing cadres, as well as safeguard the enthusiasm of cadres for “work and doing business” (幹事創業). Also, officials who do not sufficiently enforce the regulations will be “seriously held accountable.”
Xinhua published the full text of the regulations and a history of its passage. The regulations were first reviewed and approved at a Politburo meeting on June 26, 2015; issued by the CCP General Office on July 19, 2015; revised at a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on Aug. 19, 2022, and issued against by the CCP General Office on Sept. 8, 2022.
The revised regulations listed 15 situations (up from 10 in 2015) in which officials who are “unsuitable for their current positions” should be “adjusted in a timely manner”:
- The political ability of the official is not strong enough to implement the decisions and deployments of Party Central.
- The ideals and beliefs of the official are shaken, and their positions on major principles are not firm.
- The official has a weak sense of responsibility and struggle spirit, as well as passively evades or fails to deal with urgent and difficult tasks, and major risks and tests.
- The official has a deviated view of political achievements, and cannot accurately grasp the “new development stage”; completely, accurately, and comprehensively implement the “new development concept”; and displays “inactivity” (不積極), “inaction” (不作為), and “chaotic behavior” (亂作為) in building the “new development pattern.”
- The official acts in an arbitrary fashion or is weak and lax, and does not implement or arbitrarily change the decisions made by the (Party) organization. The official also forms factions in the leadership team and undermines the political ecology.
- The official has a weak sense of (Party) organization, does not strictly implement the system of requesting instructions or reports on major matters, and refuses to implement the organization’s decisions without justifiable reasons.
- The official lacks a strong sense of professionalism and responsibility, performs responsibilities within the scope of duties perfunctorily, delays and evades (推拖繞躲) work, and delays the development of the regime’s agenda.
- The official has insufficient leadership ability, is unable to complete goals and tasks as required, and ineffectively advances major strategies, important reforms, and key tasks.
- The official’s decision-making results in the loss and waste of public funds, state-owned assets and state-owned resources, damage to the ecological environment, damage to public interests, and other consequences.
- The official has a bad working style, has prominent problems with formalism and bureaucratism, and causes adverse effects.
- The official misbehaves and causes adverse effects.
- The official’s spouse and children emigrate from China, and the spouse, children, and spouses of the children run external businesses.
- The official is deemed to be incompetent after an annual assessment, or is determined to be basically competent for two consecutive years and has less than two-thirds of votes in the democratic evaluation and competency assessments.
- The official is unable to perform normal work duties for more than a year due to health reasons.
- The official is not suitable to hold their current position owing to other circumstances.
Sept. 20
Xinhua reported that a “person-in-charge” at the Central Organization Department held a Q&A session with reporters on the regulations governing the promotion or removal of leading cadres.
The person-in-charge told Xinhua that resolving bureaucratic problems is of great significance in resolving regime crises. The person said, “Currently, the world is undergoing rapid changes that have not been seen in a century. China’s reform, development, and stability tasks are heavy, contradictions, risks, and challenges are many, and the test of governance is great; all these are unprecedented.
The person added that “a few cadres do not take responsibility, do not act, partake in chaotic behavior, wallow in a state of mediocrity (庸懶散躺), delay and evade (推拖繞躲), and seriously delay the development” of regime agendas.
OUR TAKE
1. The CCP General Office’s revised regulations governing the promotion or removal of leading cadres affirm our observation that Xi Jinping has been unable to overcome the “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” (政令不出中南海) problem in the officialdom despite having consolidated power to a high degree over the past decade.
The passage of the revised regulations also helps Xi lay the groundwork to break personnel reshuffle norms at the 20th Party Congress.
2. The initial release of the regulations governing the promotion or removal of leading cadres happened to coincide with fierce factional fighting in the CCP elite. The period during which the regulations were reviewed and approved by the Politburo (June 26, 2015) and issued by the CCP General Office (July 19, 2015) saw the Jiang Zemin faction mount an offensive against the Xi camp through the “financial coup” and the 709 crackdown on human rights lawyers.
In considering the Jiang faction’s actions at the time, as well as officials being too used to how things were done in the regime during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (“ruling the country through corruption,” etc.), Xi Jinping likely passed the regulations in 2015 to bolster his effort to “strictly govern the Party” and clean up the mess left by the Jiang faction. The regulations served to “institutionalize” the purging of Jiang faction officials and associates, many of whom would be “unsuitable for their current position” due to a lack of “political ability” (i.e. loyalty, responsibility, and willingness) to properly implement the Xi Party Central’s decisions and deployments.
Factional struggle could be a reason for the release of the revised regulations ahead of the 20th Party Congress, but this is not obvious from publicly available information. Rather, a more likely reason is that Xi is calling attention to the regulations now to justify breaking political norms, or at least give the impression that things were done “by the book,” with regard to appointing and removing some personnel at the upcoming major reshuffle. For instance, Xi will want the incumbent General Office director and key ally Ding Xuexiang to head the National People’s Congress, but elevating the latter could prove problematic if Xi is forced to overlook higher-ranked or better-qualified officials for the job. Xi could also be looking at making personnel arrangements to maintain the factional balance of the senior leadership without embarrassing allies, including appointments for Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua. Further, Xi could be looking for ready-made reasons to sideline officials with Jiang faction leanings like Wang Huning and Zhao Leji even though those officials are still technically qualified to stay on in the senior leadership per age norms. Finally, Xi could be looking to retain some allies who fail to make the “seven up, eight down” age cut, but are essential to his plans like General Li Zuocheng. We examined the aforementioned personnel scenarios in more detail in our 20th Party Congress forecast report.
3. The revised regulations governing the promotion or removal of leading cadres place a premium on officials being loyal to Xi Jinping and whether or not they can properly implement Party Central’s orders. The fact that the Xi leadership feels a need to refine the regulations (increasing the number of situations in which officials who are “unsuitable for their current positions” should be “adjusted in a timely manner” from 10 to 15, for instance) seven years after they were issued indicates that the problems that the regulations were supposed to address have worsened instead of improved over time.
As Xi strove to “strictly govern the Party” and control society more tightly to deal with factional problems since the second half of his first term, officials found themselves having to walk on eggshells for fear of committing political mistakes. Alienated by Beijing, many officials resorted to the usual tactics (bureaucratism, “prefer left rather than right,” “one-size-fits-all,” “the top has policies, but the bottom has countermeasures”, etc.) of complying with Party Central instead of changing their ways for the better to turn things around in the regime per the wishes of the Xi leadership.
The revised regulations indicate that Xi wants officials to be more flexible and innovative in implementing Party Central’s policies and reforms as the regime comes to terms with unprecedented crises. However, officials are steeped in Party culture, have long prioritized their self-interests over the interests of the CCP regime, and have come to loathe the Xi leadership for making tough demands on them without providing ample reward (contrast with near-unchecked opportunities for corruption during the Jiang era). Despite the General Office’s calls to heed the revised regulations, officials will more likely than not stick with their usual approaches to policy implementation like “preferring left rather than right,” or see if they can escape responsibility and political risks through “inaction” and “chaotic behavior.”
Even Xi’s allies have struggled to carry out Party Central’s decisions and deployments in a manner that is fully compliant with the 15 situations listed in the revised regulations. For example, Li Qiang in Shanghai persevered with the more flexible “precise zero-COVID” for two years because the city did not suffer mass outbreaks. Because Li had been “responsible” for delivering economic performances for Shanghai, his seemingly “arbitrary” implementation of “dynamic zero-COVID” was overlooked by Beijing. With the COVID situation sharply worsening early this year, however, Li Qiang and his colleagues in the Shanghai leadership likely felt that they had to “firm” on “major principles,” confront the “urgent and difficult task” at hand head on, and display “sufficient leadership ability” in executing Party Central’s decisions and deployments with regard to epidemic prevention and control.
The Shanghai leadership team’s diligence in implementing “zero-COVID” badly affected the city and the regime’s economic growth and almost certainly will impact the annual assessment of those officials. Worse, lockdowns in Shanghai affected the global supply chain, made foreign capital warier about political risk in China, and accelerated the withdrawal of capital and supply chains from the mainland. Ironically, Shanghai’s leading cadres ended up delaying the regime’s development even as they strove to “make adjustments in a timely manner” in their zeal to demonstrate credentials for their respective positions. More ironically, Li Qiang and some other leading cadres in Shanghai will likely be promoted at the 20th Party Congress despite having effectively sabotaged the Xi leadership’s agenda.
SinoInsight 2
People’s Daily Online reported that the Jiangsu COSCO Foundation for Helping the Elderly held its 10th anniversary summary and commendation ceremony in Wanshou Hotel in Beijing on September 12. Some 60 people, including retired cadres, relevant personnel from central state organs, colleges in Beijing, and foundation members, participated in the event.Other mainland media reported that Song Ping, a 105-year-old veteran CCP cadre, sent congratulations to the event via video. The reports say that Song appeared to be in good physical condition in the video and expressed his thoughts clearly, logically, and fluently. Song is quoted as saying in the video, “Reform and opening up is the only way for contemporary China to develop and progress, and the only way to realize the Chinese dream.”
At the time of writing, mainland media only retained information about Song Ping sending congratulations via video while censoring other parts of his speech.
Background: Song Ping is currently the oldest living CCP cadre and retired Politburo Standing Committee member in the regime. He is considered to be Hu Jintao’s “political mentor,” and is believed to have recommended Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping for promotion. After Xi took power, Song Ping made several public appearances at critical times to back Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and take down of “tigers.”
Sept. 14
Hong Kong media outlet HK01 published an article by Zheng Yongnian, the director of the Advanced Institute of Global and Contemporary China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, titled “Globalization and Opening Up Made China, There is No Reason for Reform and Opening Up to Change” (全球化和開放造就中國 改革開放沒有理由變).
Zheng repeated the CCP line that China is facing “major changes unseen in a century.” He then noted that the West is not only promoting de-globalization, but is making great efforts to decouple from China so as to contain China’s continued rise and interrupt China’s modernization. Zheng expressed concerns about rising nationalist and populist sentiments against the West in Chinese society, as well as misunderstandings about Beijing’s “dual circulation” policy.
Zheng pointed out that some people believe that “external circulation” is no longer important and that the PRC should turn to “internal circulation” as quickly as possible. He added that some have also started to justify “closing the country” academically by citing the history of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Zheng argued that the decoupling process between China and the West will inevitably accelerate if reactions to changes in the external environment become too intense and emotional. He also wrote that historical experience suggests that China could become a closed country again if isolationism is regarded as the “correct ideology.”
Zheng Yongnian then expounded on the importance of keeping China “open” by drawing lessons from history. He wrote that countries that are more open will enjoy higher and more sustained levels of economic development. On the flipside, countries that are closed “will fall behind, and when they fall behind they will be beaten.” Zheng cited the example of a “closed” Soviet Union being defeated by the “open” Western bloc. He added that Russia has been trying to integrate with the West in modern times, and its ruling elite rarely rejects the West.
Zheng further argued that today’s China was created by globalization and openness, including the promotion of China’s rapid urbanization, the widespread diffusion and application of Western technologies in China, the rise of private enterprises, and the release of China’s demographic dividend.
Sept. 15
1.Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published an article by Xi Jinping titled, “Upholding and Developing Socialism With Chinese Characteristics Must Be Consistent” (堅持和發展中國特色社會主義要一以貫之). The article is excerpted from a speech by Xi at a seminar on learning and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the spirit of the 19th Party Congress on Jan. 5, 2018 attended by Central Committee members, alternate members, and leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial levels.
The article stressed that socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era is the fruit of the CCP’s “great social revolution” and the continuation of the “great social revolution” led by the Party, and must therefore be carried out consistently. The article added that socialism with Chinese characteristics did not fall out from the sky but is a “valuable achievement” of the Party and the people after untold hardships and at various costs, and that it is “extremely difficult to get this result.”
The article added that “the flag determines the direction, and the road determines fate.” Treading the “wrong” path will see the regime “fail to achieve our goals” and even “interrupt the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The article emphasized that Xi Jinping’s rule is “a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and not any other new era.” If the Party is to realize its historical mission in the new era in a new historical position, it is most fundamental that it holds high the “great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
2.Xinhua published on its website a more than 7,000-character commentary titled, “Zhong Hua Lun: Doing a Good Job in Development and Security” (鍾華論: 辦好發展和安全兩件大事). The article expounds on what is written in the fourth volume of Xi Jinping’s “The Governance of China” on “coordinating epidemic prevention and control and economic and social development” under the topic of “integrated development and security.”
The article noted that security is the premise of development and development guarantees security. The article then touts “coordinating development and security” as a “major strategic thought” proposed by Party Central with “Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and that it is based on the new development stage, the new international and domestic situation, and the new situation. “Coordinating development and security” is also an “important element” of “Xi Jinping Thought” and has “great practical and far-reaching historical significance.”
The article also praised Xi Jinping for “coordinating development and security” to cope with domestic risks and challenges stemming from the pandemic, 10 years of economic growth, “changes unseen in a century,” food security, and the new “dual circulation” economic landscape.
OUR TAKE
Zheng Yongnian’s article in HK01 shows that public debate over the CCP’s promotion of revisionist Ming and Qing history and Xi Jinping’s “semi-isolationist” agenda is ongoing.
It is noteworthy that Zheng, who Chinese language media often refers to as the Xi leadership’s “[national] economic adviser” (經濟國師) after he and other economists attended a symposium chaired by Xi Jinping in August 2020, published his piece in HK01, a Hong Kong publication that appears to have replaced Duowei News’ as a purveyor of messaging from the various CCP factions. It is possible that Zheng is merely concerned about where the Xi leadership’s “dual circulation” policy would lead to and decided to present scholarly remonstrations in a Hong Kong media outlet.
Another possibility is that Zheng is in fact representing the voices of Party elites and elders who are opposed to Xi. According to a Sept. 20 article in the Chinese language Voice of America, Xi is becoming an increasingly unpopular figure among members of the elite and Party princelings ever since he amended the Party constitution in March 2018 to remove term limits for the PRC president and vice president. Those in Xi’s “second generation red” cohort have been calling for him to be replaced to “save the Party” from time to time even though the authorities have been heavily suppressing and censoring speech. A “second generation red” member and long-time worker in the CCP system told VOA recently that 90 percent of her fellows do not support Xi’s bid to extend his tenure, with some of them being very fervent about the issue. VOA’s information is partially corroborated by Song Ping, otherwise known as a supporter of Xi, declaring that “reform and opening up” is the “only way for contemporary China to develop and progress.”
Meanwhile, the recent Qiushi article and Xinhua commentary appear to be a counter to voices challenging Xi’s “semi-isolationism” and apparent move away from “reform and opening up.” The Xi leadership is trying to explain in those articles that its “semi-isolationism” is justified for safeguarding the regime’s “development and security” and the so-called “new development stage.” Thus, instead of rejecting “reform and opening up,” Xi is arguing that he is really “coordinating development and security” to better resolve the risks and challenges facing the regime.
