SinoInsight 1
Sept. 28
1. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced that the National Supervisory Commission had completed its investigation into Liu Yanping, the former head of the discipline inspection and supervision team of the Ministry of State Security. Liu’s case had been transferred to prosecutors in Changchun City for review and prosecution.
The supervisory authorities found that Liu had abused his positions and accepted a “particularly huge” amount of property in exchange for favors. The authorities found that his corruption began when he was deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security’s security bureau (before 2009) until he was head of the Ministry of State Security’s discipline inspection and supervision team.
2. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced that the National Supervisory Commission had finished investigating Shen Deyong, a standing committee member of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and director of the CPPCC Social and Legal Affairs Committee. The top procuratorate added that Shen has been formally arrested on suspicion of taking bribes.
3. The Heilongjiang Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection announced the investigation of Zhao Yaguang, a former Party Committee member and deputy director of the Heilongjiang Provincial Public Security Bureau, was being investigated for “serious violations of discipline and the law.”
A native of Heilongjiang, Zhao spent the bulk of his career in the provincial public security system before retiring in October 2015.
Sept. 30
1. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced that Zhang Bencai, the former chief prosecutor of the Shanghai People’s Procuratorate, was expelled from the Party and his office.
Zhang was previously investigated formally on June 1 for “serious violations of discipline and the law.”
2. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced that Wang Dawei, the former deputy governor and provincial public security director of Liaoning Province, was expelled from the Party and his office.
Wang was investigated on March 1 for “serious violations of discipline and the law.”
3. Xinhua announced that Xie Zhonghua, a former Party Committee member of the Panzhihua Municipality in Sichuan Province and the former Panzhihua Municipal Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary, was expelled from the Party and his office. Xinhua added that Xie’s case had been transferred to prosecutors for review and prosecution.
OUR TAKE
1. Liu Yanping is one of seven senior public security officials whom the CCP anti-corruption authorities named as members of the “Sun Lijun political gang.” Six of the seven members were sentenced over the past fortnight.
Liu could be sentenced before the 20th Party Congress commences on Oct. 16. If so, he could be handed a prison sentence ranging from around 15 years on the low end to life behind bars.
2. Several of the political and legal affairs officials listed above also happen to be Jiang faction associates or have a career background that suggests Jiang faction patronage. The Xi leadership could be keeping up the momentum of sentencing, expelling, and investigating Jiang faction associates and supporters in the leadup to the 20th Party Congress to put on notice senior Jiang faction members like Zeng Qinghong, Guo Shengkun, and Meng Jianzhu in case they are having thoughts about causing trouble for Xi Jinping before the major political conclave or hindering his third-term bid.
Given the close proximity of the Party Congress, Xi is unlikely to order a purge of fresh “big tigers” in the coming weeks unless the Jiang faction or others in the “anti-Xi coalition” take bold action to challenge and undermine the Xi leadership. Xi, however, could continue investigating, expelling, and sentencing political and legal affairs officials in an effort at intimidating his political foes into inaction while he moves ahead and secures his 20th Party Congress political agendas. But if Xi’s rivals are insufficiently deterred, they could still attempt some mischief, including spreading or facilitating the spread of damaging information and rumors about Xi and his allies.
SinoInsight 2
1. Xi Jinping, other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and PRC vice president Wang Qishan presented flower baskets at the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square to mark Martyrs’ Day in the morning of Sept. 30.
State mouthpiece Xinhua’s report of the occasion contained the usual boilerplate propaganda about Xi and the CCP more broadly.
2. The State Council held an evening reception in the Great Hall of the People to celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the PRC on Oct. 1. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Qishan, and nearly 500 domestic and foreign guests were in attendance.
In a speech, premier Li Keqiang hailed the Party for “overcoming” all kinds of difficulties and obstacles over the past 73 years, as well as having “achievements” in development that attracted global attention. He added that the upcoming 20th Party Congress is a “very important conference” because this is an “extremely unusual” year in the PRC’s development. Li also praised “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” for having secured “new achievements” in the face of “complex and challenging developments both within and outside China,” adding that it “wasn’t easy to do.”
Li noted that the CCP had “stabilized economic fundamentals” and dealt with the “shock of unexpected factors.” With regard to Hong Kong and Macau, Li re-emphasized the full implementation of the “one China, two systems” policy in administering Hong Kong and Macau. With regard to Taiwan, Li said that the PRC firmly opposes “Taiwan independence” separatist moves and external interference, actively promotes the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and looks to “jointly create” with the ROC a “great historical cause for the reunification of the motherland and national rejuvenation.”
Near the end of this speech, Li Keqiang urged the Party to “unite more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” and follow the guidance of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” The Party should also “forge ahead in a concerted effort to build China into a great modern socialist country” and “realize the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Oct. 1
CCP Central Committee ideological journal Qiushi published an article by Xi Jinping titled, “The Historical Mission of the Chinese Communist Party in the New Era” (新時代中國共產黨的歷史使命). The over 3,400-character article was excerpted from parts of Xi’s 19th Party Congress report (決勝全面建成小康社會, 奪取新時代中國特色社會主義偉大勝利).
Noteworthy points in the article include:
- The CCP “came into being” after Marxism-Leninism was introduced to China about a hundred years ago. The CCP then waged a “tough and difficult struggle” to “realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and established its regime.
- The CCP is “deeply aware” that it is “necessary to establish an advanced social system that conforms to the reality of the PRC” to “realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Also, by “responding to the will of the people and having the courage to reform and open up,” the road to “socialism with Chinese characteristics was opened up.”
- A “great struggle must be waged” to “realize the great dream [rejuvenation of the Chinese nation].” Party members must adhere to the Party’s leadership and socialist system, safeguard the PRC’s sovereignty, “guard against various risks, as well as resolutely overcome all difficulties and challenges in the fields of politics, economics, culture, society, etc., and in the natural world.”
- The whole Party must “more consciously strengthen the principle of Party spirit, have the courage to face problems head-on, dare to scrape poison from bone, eliminate all factors that undermine the Party’s advanced nature and purity, and eliminate all viruses that erode the healthy body of the Party.”
- The whole Party must have “more confidence in the road [of socialism], theoretical confidence, system confidence, cultural confidence, take neither the old road of closure and rigidity nor the evil road of changing the [red] flag, maintain political determination, adhere to practical work, and always adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
1. Li Keqiang’s speech at the reception to mark the PRC’s 73rd founding anniversary continues the Xi leadership’s effort to play up (“extremely unusual” year, “complex and challenging developments both within and outside China,” etc.) the difficult domestic and external troubles facing the CCP regime so as to better “spin tragedy into victory” for Xi Jinping and flip around his various policy failures into “achievements.” That Li needs to resort to such tactics to uplift the “achievements” of his boss, however, further underscores our analysis that Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) is established on propaganda and is hence more fragile than appearances would suggest.
Meanwhile, Li’s relatively moderate remarks about Taiwan and “reunification” releases at least two signals. First, the Xi leadership is not presently prepared to carry out an “armed reunification” of the ROC, and the likelihood of such a move before the 20th Party Congress is virtually nil. Even after the conclave, Beijing would prefer to achieve “reunification” by non-military means if at all possible before the 2024 Taiwan elections even as the PLA builds up its invasion capabilities. Second, the Xi leadership, wary of geopolitical maneuverings by the United States and its allies, as well as the deteriorating situation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, would be incentivized to avoid courting confrontation over Taiwan or appearing provocative at least until the 20th Party Congress is over.
2. State broadcaster CCTV’s video of the PRC 73rd anniversary reception reveals some nuggets of information about the current state of elite politics in the CCP.
CCTV’s footage showed that former members of the Politburo Standing Committee and Party elders were not in attendance. This contrasts with the early years of Xi Jinping’s tenure; for instance, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were seated on either side of Xi at the 65th anniversary reception in 2014. However, Party elders and veteran cadres stopped appearing at PRC anniversary receptions after 2015; that year, Xi consolidated his control over the military after suffering suspicious “accidents” such as the “financial coup” and the “Tianjin explosion.” The continued non-attendance of veteran cadres and Party elders at this year’s edition of the PRC anniversary reception shows that Xi has been successful in limiting the influence of gerontocracy on CCP politics for some years now.
CCTV’s footage also shows what appears to be security personnel seated at each table in the row of tables closest to that of the top CCP leaders. The close monitoring of trusted officials and invited guests indicates that Xi Jinping is very wary of and remains highly vigilant to possible mischief by opposition forces within the Party. The state broadcaster’s footage too appeared to show security personnel behind the photographers for the event.
3. Xi’s Oct. 1 Qiushi article appears to telegraph several signals to the Party and the CCP elite.
Xi is making his stance clear on certain landmark CCP policies so as to strengthen intra-Party “consensus” on him staying on in power at the 20th Party Congress. For instance, Xi’s vow to not “take the old road of closure and rigidity” shows that he does not plan to revert to Mao Zedong’s outright totalitarianism or turn the PRC into a “closed” country. Meanwhile, Xi’s pledge to not take “the evil road of changing the [red] flag” indicates that he will not pursue “Western-style democracy” but will instead work to preserve the regime and “always adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics.” These signals are likely intended to assuage both the leftists in the regime, who are concerned that Xi could be secretly working to undermine the Party and Marxism, as well as the pro-Deng Xiaoping crowd, who are afraid that Xi will abandon “reform and opening up” in pursuit of “isolationist” policies. Should Xi manage to placate the various interest groups in the Party, they would in theory be more willing to rally around “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” after he extends his tenure and ease the Xi leadership’s governing pressures.
Xi is also signaling to his factional rivals and corrupt officials that his “rectification” of the regime will not stop. To safeguard the regime and his leadership, Xi will “scrape poison from bone, eliminate all factors that undermine the Party’s advanced nature and purity, and eliminate all viruses that erode the healthy body of the Party.” This is likely intended to put on notice the Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi coalition” in case they are planning an “October surprise” for Xi around the 20th Party Congress period.
The Qiushi article also conveys a message of which its authors may or may not be aware: that confidence in the CCP’s system of beliefs and ideals is weak. Held to scrutiny, Xi’s turn to nationalism (“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”) clashes with his constant promotion of communist ideology; Marxism-Leninism calls for the eventual abandonment of the nation-state on the road to classless utopia. After decades of capitalism-driven development, Xi’s emphasis on nationalism performs more like an attempt to keep the Party and its ideology relevant—and thus shore up his personal leadership—by equating the survival of the Communist Party with the destiny and good fortune of the Chinese people. For the CCP, a lack of political legitimacy and dissonant relationship with Chinese culture fuel its inherent dread of ideological confrontation and any serious effort to differentiate between the Party and the Chinese people.
