Analyzing the CCP’s response to Pelosi’s Taiwan trip; more discipline inspection and supervision team leader are reshuffled

     SinoInsight  1     

Aug. 3
The PRC State Council released information regarding several leadership personnel appointments and removals at some ministries and agencies.

Six officials received new appointments:
1. Zhang Chunsheng (age 58), deputy secretary-general of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and director of the General Office of the CCDI and National Supervisory Commission (NSC), was transferred to the Ministry of Civil Affairs to serve as deputy minister of civil affairs (sub-ministerial rank).

2. Gao Zhidan (59), deputy director of the General Administration of Sport of China, was promoted to director of the agency (ministerial rank).

3. Zhang Zuqiang (51), Party group secretary and director of the Beijing Municipal Meteorological Bureau, was promoted to deputy director of the China Meteorological Administration (bureau rank).

4. Li Wentang (57), member of the Chinese Academy of Governance faculty committee and director of the Department of Literature and History Teaching and Research, was promoted to director of education (sub-ministerial rank) of the Chinese Academy of Governance.

5. Zhu Jianping (57), deputy director of the National Civil Service Administration, was promoted to director of the agency (sub-ministerial rank).

6. Zhao Sujing (58, female,), deputy director of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation sports department, was promoted to vice chairman of the executive council of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (bureau rank).

Nine officials were removed from their positions:
1. Song Demin (59, retired) was removed as deputy minister of education.

2. Liu Hao (59) was removed as deputy minister of justice. Liu had earlier been transferred to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate to head the discipline inspection and supervision team in the Procuratorate.

3. Wei Shanzhong (59) was removed as deputy minister of water resources. Wei had earlier been transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources to head the discipline inspection and supervision team in the ministry.

4. Gou Zhongwen (65, retired) was removed as director of the General Administration of Sport of China.

5. Li Jianming (59) was removed as deputy director of the General Administration of Sport of China. Li had earlier been transferred to the State Taxation Administration to head the discipline inspection and supervision team in the agency.

6. Liu Junchuan (59) was removed as deputy director of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office. Liu had earlier been transferred to the Central United Front Work Department to head the discipline inspection and supervision team in the Department.

7. Yu Yong (60, retired) was removed as deputy director of the China Meteorological Administration.

8. Wang Meimei (61, female, retired) and Xiang Zicheng (60, retired), both vice chairmen of the executive council of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, were removed from their post.

OUR TAKE
Of the personnel reshuffles above, those involving the anti-corruption authorities are the most noteworthy. Four sub-ministerial rank officials were assigned to helm the discipline inspection and supervision team in various State Council agencies and ministries. As these officials are close to retirement age, they are unlikely to remain at their posts for too long.

Meanwhile, Zhang Chunsheng appeared to have received a flat transfer with his appointment as deputy minister of civil affairs after serving as deputy secretary-general of the CCDI and director of the General Office of the CCDI and NSC. While the Ministry of Civil Affairs is less influential than the CCDI, Zhang is now the sixth-rank official in the ministry, whereas he was merely a senior aide to the leadership of the CCDI in his previous post. In this regard, Zhang can be said to have received a promotion with his new appointment.

Zhang Chunsheng spent his formative years in various State Council agencies. He once served in the Office of Economic Reform and the National Development and Reform Commission (July 1995 to Aug. 2003) before moving to the National Population and Family Planning Commission (Aug. 2003 to Dec. 2016) where he eventually headed its legal affairs department (June 2013 to Dec. 2016). Zhang was later transferred to the anti-corruption authorities where he rose quickly up the ranks. Five months after he was made director of the 10th Discipline Inspection Office of the CCDI (Dec. 2016), Zhang was promoted to deputy secretary-general of the CCDI and director of the General Office of the CCDI (April 2017 to Oct. 2017). Six months after that, he was appointed to the Standing Committee of the CCDI’s Party Committee. Zhang’s transfer to the Ministry of Civil Affairs appears to be a reward from the Xi leadership for his anti-corruption services.

The CCDI and the NSC currently have 48 discipline inspection and supervision teams stationed in the central government, ministries, and national bureaus. Of the 48 teams, 22 are stationed in a single work unit, while the remaining 26 are each tasked with monitoring several work units (between two to 16). Since the start of the year, the Xi leadership has reshuffled eight discipline inspection and supervision team leaders, while three of the 48 teams presently do not have a leader. Previously, the Xi leadership reshuffled six discipline inspection and supervision team leaders before the 19th Party Congress, 11 in 2020, and 12 in 2021.

Currently, 12 of the 48 discipline inspection and supervision teams are headed by an official that is approaching retirement age. Counting the three vacancies, the Xi leadership will likely have to make at least 15 discipline inspection and supervision team leader appointments before the 20th Party Congress.

     SinoInsight  2     

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OUR TAKE
1. Official mainland media have not reported public appearances by senior CCP officials after they attended the reception of an event marking the 95th anniversary of the founding of the PLA at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on July 31. This suggests that Xi Jinping and his Party elite colleagues are currently at Beidaihe for their annual work-vacation and informal political conclave.

2. Thus far, most of the commentary pieces and criticisms about Pelosi’s Taiwan trip from the various PRC ministries and departments are published in state mouthpiece Xinhua News Agency or state broadcaster China Central Television, both of which are affiliated with the PRC State Council. Regional outlets across mainland China then republish commentary from Xinhua or write op-eds on the basis of Xinhua commentary.

Meanwhile, People’s Daily, a propaganda organ of the CCP Central Committee and an important channel for Party Central to telegraph its views to Party members and the world, sought to deflect attention away from Pelosi’s visit. As seen from the front-page headlines from Aug. 2 to Aug. 10 that we listed above, People’s Daily, and by extension Party Central, was focused on establishing Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” to improve his bid for a norm-breaking third term at the 20th Party Congress. People’s Daily also featured several articles on its front-page during the aforementioned period that sought to whitewash China’s economic deterioration and suggest that the regime is still developing “healthily.” The publication of just one front-page commentary critical of the Pelosi trip in People’s Daily indicates that Xi and Party Central were looking to sweep the incident under the rug as quickly as possible and avoid amplifying it lest it affects Xi’s 20th Party Congress agenda.

There was a noticeable reduction in propaganda pieces promoting Xi Jinping on the front-page of People’s Daily from Aug. 5 to Aug. 10. There are several likely reasons for this, including the fact that it was then several days after the seminar for provincial and ministerial-rank leading cadres and the Central United Front Work Conference were held, as well as Xi and other senior officials going incognito in Beidaihe.

There is also a possibility that Xi had been fiercely challenged by Party elites over his handling of Pelosi’s Taiwan trip while at Beidaihe, resulting in significantly reduced efforts to promote him in propaganda. As we previously analyzed, former People’s Liberation Army Air Force general Liu Yazhou had openly questioned Xi’s ability to lead the CCP to victory in a “decisive battle” over Taiwan and called for “a change of commander-in-chief,” and other Party elites who oppose Xi are likely to hold similar views. Xi’s unwillingness to escalate matters beyond “encircling” Taiwan with military drills as he strives to keep things stable to “victoriously welcome the opening of the 20th Party Congress” would have affirmed Liu Yazhou’s accusation and emboldened Xi’s rivals to take him to task for his meekness.

The impact of Pelosi’s Taiwan trip on CCP elite politics will likely become clearer after Beidaihe is over. How Xi is promoted in propaganda after Beidaihe concludes would offer insight into the security of his position and whether or not factional struggle in the Party elite has intensified. If Xi fails to reach a consensus within the Party on his political agenda, he is likely to step up purges ahead of the 20th Party Congress and even target the political legacy of chief rivals like Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction.

3. The CCP’s military, propaganda, and diplomatic reactions to Pelosi’s Taiwan visit suggest that they were somewhat blindsided by her actually going ahead with it despite earlier PRC intimidation. To avoid losing face and being held accountable for misjudging the situation, propaganda and diplomatic officials (Hua Chunying, Lu Shaye, Xiao Qian, etc.) steeped in Party culture (“prefer left rather than right,” “campaign-style,” etc.) have defaulted to the “wolf warrior” approach. This runs contrary to “telling the China story well” and creating a “trustworthy, lovable, and respectable” image for the PRC as Xi Jinping ordered in June 2021.

CCP officials tend to act tough at crunch time because the Party’s earlier political campaigns have shown that it is less risky career-wise to “prefer left rather than right” than show weakness by being moderate and “lovable.”

4. Pelosi’s Taiwan trip brought both pros and cons for the PLA, with the disadvantages outweighing the advantages.

On the one hand, the Pelosi visit gives the PLA an excuse to cross the median line in the Taiwan Strait and conduct “encircling” military drills on a more regular basis. Constant drills will also drain Taiwan’s energy and rack up military expenses for the ROC; mainland China (world no. 2 GDP) has its economic problems, but is in a far stronger position to “win” a battle of financial attrition with Taiwan (GDP about 27.5 times smaller than the mainland in 2021) over military spending. The downside to carrying out frequent drills around Taiwan is increased opportunities for military accidents and incidents to break out in the Taiwan Strait, which could lead to greater and unwanted conflict before the CCP is ready to take Taiwan. The international community will also be even warier of the CCP’s expansionist ambitions, causing foreign companies to withdraw their funds from the mainland or make contingency plans to do so as they account for Ukraine-type situations.

Meanwhile, the PLA’s failure to push the envelope in confronting the U.S. over Pelosi’s trip lends further credence to the view that the CCP, for all its bellicose rhetoric, is actually a “paper tiger.” This conclusion, however, is less observable due to the Biden administration’s decision to de-escalate tensions in the immediate aftermath of Pelosi’s trip (withdrawing aircraft carriers from the region in which the PLA conducted its drills, suspending the routine test launch of an Air Force Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, etc.). Washington’s conciliatory approach to the PRC’s military maneuvers ended up emboldening the PLA to extend its drills around Taiwan by three days to further intimidate the Taiwanese people and gauge U.S. and international response.

5. The PLA’s announcement that it was ending military drills around Taiwan coincided with the KMT’s announcement that it was sending a delegation to the mainland. It is likely that the KMT trip to China is part of CCP united front and propaganda tactics to ease its loss of face over Pelosi’s Taiwan visit and regain some initiative in its broader “reunification” effort.

The KMT’s mainland trip further confirms to the Taiwanese people that the CCP has infiltrated and influenced Taiwanese politics and political parties to a significant degree. The KMT’s move also undermines earlier efforts by party chairman Eric Chu to brand the KMT as being “anti-CCP” and “pro-U.S.” When visiting the States in June, Chu declared that the 1992 Consensus reached between the KMT and the CCP is a “‘no consensus’ consensus,” and pledged to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities if the KMT is returned to office.

Eric Chu’s remarks, however, now ring hollow in light of the mainland trip by the KMT delegation after Pelosi traveled to Taipei. If the CCP was behind the KMT’s move, then it cannot be ruled out that some PRC agencies (Taiwan Affairs Office or the United Front Work Department) decided that it was worth sacrificing the credibility of an infiltrated Taiwanese political party to help restore some of the PRC’s own credibility on the “Taiwan Question.”