SinoInsight 1
Recently, the Xi Jinping leadership has been stepping up its “sweeping black, eliminating evil” (“扫黑除恶”) anti-Mafia efforts.
On April 11, Tianjin Political Consultative Conference Party chief Sheng Maolin was publicly named as group leader of the Central Committee’s No. 17 Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Group. Presently, the group leaders of Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Groups No. 11 to No. 21 are all ministerial-level officials.
Meanwhile, at least 15 middle to high-ranking officials from the political and legal affairs apparatus have been purged as of the first half of April, according to publicly available information. Several of the 15 were purged for their involvement in “black” activities, including:
- Xie Maotian, former deputy chief procurator of the Jilin Procuratorate, investigated on April 1;
- Yang Huixin, former director of the Xinji City (Hebei Province) Public Security Bureau, was investigated and expelled on April 2;
- Jin Hu, deputy director and Party group member of the Longjing City (Jilin Province) Public Security Bureau, was investigated on April 3;
- Two deputy directors and the deputy commander of the criminal technology brigade at the Dali City (Yunnan Province) Public Security Bureau were investigated on April 7;
- Yan Zizhong, the former inspector of the Heilongjiang Public Security Bureau and the director of the Mudanjiang Public Security Bureau, was arrested on April 11;
- On April 12, the Tianjin Discipline Inspection Commission issued a notice which featured 17 typical cases of officials carrying out “protective umbrella” (abusing their official position to protect criminal gangs) work. Of the 17 cases, nine cases involved eight political and legal affairs apparatus officials. And of the eight officials, there were three public security bureau chiefs, one deputy chief, and one district Political and Legal Affairs Commission Party secretary.
OUR TAKE
1. Since the start of the year, the Xi leadership has accelerated the rectification of the regime’s political and legal affairs apparatus. Based on incomplete statistics, we found that at least 30 officials from the political and legal affairs apparatus were investigated, expelled, or sentenced in the first quarter of 2019. And as stated above, at least another 15 officials were purged in the first half of April.
After the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, we analyzed on several occasions that Xi would intensify efforts to clean out the political and legal affairs apparatus to weaken the Jiang faction’s control and establish his own. The apparatus rectification process appears to have become more obvious this year.
2. A look at the background and official rank of the various Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Group heads suggest that Xi Jinping is treating rectification work very seriously.
First, the newly appointed Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Group heads are ministerial-level officials. This means that they outrank the senior political and legal affairs apparatus officials in the provinces. Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretaries and Public Security Bureau chiefs (usually vice governors) are typically vice ministerial-level officials. Meanwhile, other senior provincial political and legal affairs apparatus officials are usually bureau-level officials and below. Thus, the Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Group heads have sufficient authority to hold all provincial political and legal affairs apparatus officials accountable for criminal activity.
Second, the Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Group leadership ranks are mainly selected from organizations other than the political and legal affairs apparatus, and are less likely to be partial in their work. Most of the Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil Supervisory Group officials have no background in the political and legal affairs apparatus, while only two previously worked in the Party’s anti-corruption agency.
3. The Xi leadership’s efforts to purge the political and legal affairs apparatus will unlikely translate into a relaxation of the regime’s present stability maintenance policies. On the contrary, Beijing needs to more tightly control society to prevent fallout from the escalation in the CCP factional struggle; factional struggles are “you die, I live,” and the Jiang faction still has deep roots in the political and legal affairs apparatus. The Xi leadership also needs to implement stricter societal controls to cope with the troubles that could stem from China’s continued economic slowdown. Put another way, Xi Jinping’s effort to rectify the political and legal affairs apparatus is aimed at controlling the apparatus, and controlling the apparatus allows Beijing to more effectively control society.
SinoInsight 2
On April 12, the Taiwanese government deported mainland Chinese academic Li Yi on national security grounds. Li was in Taiwan at the invitation of the pro-Beijing Chinese Unity Promotion Party (CUPP) to promote cross-strait reunification under the “one country, two systems” model.
OUR TAKE
1. The deportation of Li Yi is the latest in a string of tough actions taken against pro-China elements in Taiwan by the Tsai Ing-wen government. Notable moves include:
- In August 2018, a government inspection team searched the headquarters of the CUPP and its president Chang An-lo. Meanwhile, the government issued subpoenas to CUPP chairman Zhang Futang and CUPP members as part of an investigation as to whether they received funding from the CCP.
- On Sept. 26, 2018, the Taiwanese government began to demolish the Biyun Chan Temple in Taiwan’s Changhua County. Pro-CCP elements in Taiwan had previously converted the temple into a communist “patriotic education” shrine. The temple was torn down in seven days.
2. Tsai Ing-wen’s toughening stance towards pro-CCP elements in Taiwan indicates that she is getting in sync with the United States in countering the Chinese regime. And America has been strengthening the bilateral relationship:
- In late March and April, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives introduced the Taiwan Assurance Act to boost ties with Taiwan amid increasing PRC aggression and interference activities.
- In March, the Tsai government made a formal request to purchase over 60 F-16V fighter jets from the U.S., and America has granted tacit approval to that request.
- On April 4, the U.S. Department of Defense granted U.S. weapons manufacturer Raytheon a $9 million contract to upgrade Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense system over the next five years.
3. We believe that Tsai Ing-wen could see increased U.S. support if she continues to be tough on the PRC. Stronger U.S. backing could in turn bolster Tsai’s odds of winning re-election in January 2020.
