SinoInsight 1
Hong Kong national security police arrested five members of the General Union of Hong Kong Speech Therapists for “conspiring” to publish “seditious” children’s books. The police seized around 550 children’s books, pamphlets, computers and cell phones in a raid. The chairman and vice chairman of the union were among the five arrested and were formally charged the following day. This was the first case of national security legislation being used to target publications in Hong Kong.
The children’s book in question featured stories where a village of sheep had to deal with a neighboring village of wolves. The Hong Kong police said that the sheep were meant to depict pro-democracy protesters who fought against riot police in 2019. Senior Superintendent Steve Li argued that the books could “poison” the impressionable minds of children and “cause children to hate the government and advocate violence.”
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions chairman Wong Nai-yun criticized the arrests and noted that such use of the national security law infringes on the freedoms of speech and creation guaranteed by Hong Kong’s Basic Law. “If even metaphors are out of bounds now, then nobody will be able to read ‘Nineteen Eighty-four’ and ‘Animal Farm,’” Wong said, adding that it is clear that the Hong Kong government wants to spread fear by providing vague “red lines.”
July 27
1. A Hong Kong court convicted pro-democracy protester Tong Ying-kit, 24, for “terrorism” and “inciting others to secession” under the Hong Kong National Security Law. Tong, the first guilty verdict under the new national security legislation, faces a life prison sentence for the two charges.
Tong was arrested on July 1, 2020, or a day after the National Security Law came into effect. He was then riding his motorcycle around a Hong Kong neighborhood with the protest banner, “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times” (“光复香港,时代革命”) when he collided with riot police who tried to stop him after swerving to avoid them. Tong became the first person to be arrested under the new national security regime.
2. The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) issued a statement expressing concern over the Hong Kong police’s dubious attempt to contact a female journalist who happened to livestream a prominent stabbing incident on July 1. After the stabbing had occurred, the journalist, accompanied by a HKJA lawyer, went to the police headquarters in Wanchai District to give a statement. The police said at the time that the journalist was “assisting in investigations,” and further police contact would be done through a lawyer and after informing the HKJA.
However, the Hong Kong police later showed up at the journalist’s home at 11:00 p.m. on July 26 to request that she accompany them to the police station to make further statements, according to the HKJA. The HKJA said that the police did not not notify them as previously promised, and had told the journalist that she did not need to have a lawyer present. At the police station, the journalist was issued a warning statement and asked to surrender her travel documents even though she was only “assisting in investigations” and not charged on national security grounds. When questioned by Hong Kong media outlets as to why they sought to confiscate the journalist’s travel documents, the police replied that persons who are “suspected of harming national security” must surrender their travel documents and be restricted from leaving the territory. The HKJA said that the police later returned to the journalist’s apartment to “collect evidence.”
In their statement, the HKJA asked the Hong Kong police to clarify the “assisting in investigations” status of the journalist and if so, why they “collected evidence” from her apartment and took away her passport. “How can journalists continue to work with a peace of mind if filming an incident casts suspicion on themselves,” the HKJA questioned.
The journalist was with the Hong Kong edition of Vision Times, a Falun Gong-affiliated media outlet, when she livestreamed the police stabbing incident on July 1, according to people familiar with the matter. The Hong Kong edition of Vision Times subsequently dismissed the journalist and deleted its YouTube channel.
OUR TAKE
1. The arrest of speech therapists over children’s books with metaphorical meaning under the Hong Kong National Security Law seems like overkill on the Hong Kong authorities’ part. However, the move serves the purpose of “killing chickens to scare the monkey” (殺鷄儆猴), or putting the entire Hong Kong population on notice and dissuading further pro-democracy/”anti-government” activities. Going after children’s books after the Apple Daily crackdown also drives home the point that the Hong Kong government and Beijing are dead serious about squashing dissent of all manner and levels, no matter how trivial.
With a “perfect storm” of ever-increasing domestic and external pressures facing the regime, Xi Jinping and the CCP need to ensure that there is zero chance of Hong Kong transforming into a “counter-revolutionary” and “anti-Xi” base. Clampdowns in Hong Kong could get progressively worse, especially ahead of “sensitive” dates and political conclaves for the Party. While the climate of fear has proven effective thus far, it also creates a “pressure cooker” environment ripe for Black Swans to emerge.
2. The Hong Kong police’s targeting of the former Vision Times journalist comes after pro-establishment lawmakers pressured the Hong Kong government over Falun Gong on July 7. In questioning Secretary for Security Chris Tang, the lawmakers insinuated that Falun Gong or other parties could have been involved in the July 1 stabbing incident, and that Leung Kin-fai, the person who stabbed a policeman, could have been “radicalized” by Falun Gong-linked media. As we previously analyzed, Chris Tang’s replies appear to reflect the Xi leadership’s stance on Falun Gong while the pro-establishment lawmakers seem to represent the views of the Jiang Zemin faction.
The police could have targeted the Vision Times journalist both as a way to get at Falun Gong and to send a warning to Hong Kong media in general. For the latter reason, the police are using “national security” as an excuse to frighten journalists into complete compliance and self-censorship. Once Hong Kong media fear to exercise their freedom of speech, the authorities will have a far easier time “maintaining stability” and acting with impunity to spread the CCP’s totalitarian rule in the city. Police coercion is already proving very effective, considering that the Hong Kong edition of Vision Times deleted its YouTube channel and fired the journalist who filmed the July 1 stabbing incident after her first brush with the police.
Meanwhile, there is nothing contradictory about Hong Kong police making inroads into Falun Gong despite Beijing’s restraint on that front. As we have explained on several occasions, Xi Jinping may be using the “Falun Gong card” as leverage against the Jiang faction, but Jiang Zemin’s persecution campaign remains on the books in China. Unless Xi decides to formally end Jiang’s persecution campaign and “rehabilitate” Falun Gong (for the Jiang faction, this is unlikely, but not unthinkable, considering Deng Xiaoping’s “rehabilitation” of so-called “rightists” and Cultural Revolution victims, moves which helped Deng get ahead in factional fighting following the death of Mao), he will certainly not disclose his full thinking on the Falun Gong issue to subordinates; factional struggle is very much an elite game with delicate intricacies. Xi’s subordinates are thus left guessing as to what Party Central really wants, and will “prefer left rather than right” (寧左勿右) and stick to official policy by default. With the persecution campaign not called off on the mainland, it is only natural for the Hong Kong Liaison Office and the city’s national security apparatus to go after Falun Gong when the opportunity arises, given official PRC policy and what seems like the absence of specific instructions on how to handle the issue.
However, the Hong Kong authorities’ lack of movement against Falun Gong after the National Security Law was implemented suggests that Party Central did leave some guidance on Falun Gong. Most glaringly, Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong have not been rounded up despite displaying “Heaven Will Destroy the CCP” (天滅中共) banners and The Epoch Times continuing to run its “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party” series, which is openly critical of the CCP. By sharp contrast, the police recently arrested speech therapists over children’s books that use metaphors in referring to the pro-democracy movement, the Hong Kong police, and the CCP authorities. We have explained that the Xi-Jiang factional struggle is most likely the reason for Falun Gong’s relative “immunity” in Hong Kong following the establishment of the national security apparatus.
Still, the “supra-authority” national security apparatus is a double-edged sword for Xi in the factional struggle. On the one hand, Xi can use the apparatus to tighten his grip over Hong Kong and target “anti-Xi” elements. On the flipside, disloyal elements in the Hong Kong establishment can also manipulate the national security apparatus to give Xi trouble. For example, “anti-Xi” elements can use the apparatus to create serious human rights issues in Hong Kong or target Falun Gong. Xi Jinping’s ability to play the “Falun Gong card” will be weakened if the world believes that he is extending Jiang’s persecution campaign to Hong Kong, giving his rivals an advantage in the fractional struggle.
SinoInsight 2
Li Weijie, the commander of the Beijing corps of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), published an article on implementing the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System (把貫徹落實軍委主席負責制落到實處) on the People’s Liberation Army’s official news website (81.cn).
Main points in Li’s article include:
- The CCP’s “absolute leadership over the military is the foundation of military-building and the soul of a strong military,” and “Comrade Xi Jinping” is the core of the Party Central.
- The implementation of the CMC Chairman Responsibility System is the “highest priority political task,” the “highest political requirement,” and the “highest political discipline.”
- It is necessary for the PAP to “resolutely rectify and investigate behavior such as reckless dissemination and belief in rumors; rash commentaries and discussions; the formation of cliques and factions; not implementing orders; breaking prohibitions, etc.” Also, “we must resolutely rectify and investigate [the aforementioned behavior], and use iron discipline to promote the establishment and implementation of CMC chairman responsibility.”
- The PAP must “resolutely resist [politically incorrect]” views such as “de-Partyization, depoliticization, and nationalization of the military.”
- All levels of the PAP must “have a deep understanding of the commander’s determination and intentions,” “strengthen crisis alertness and capabilities,” and be able to have troops operationally-ready when they are required (“拉得出、冲得上、打得赢”).
- The PAP must “respond quickly, act ruthlessly, and have zero tolerance” for personnel or matters that affect the implementation of the CMC Chairman Responsibility System.
July 27
According to a Nikkei Asia report, Xi Jinping could travel to Beidaihe to “appease Party elders said to be annoyed with the president.” Concurrently, there are rumors about Xi possibly not attending the informal conclave at Beidaihe.
OUR TAKE
PAP commander Li Weijie’s July 24 article is likely intended to rally support for Xi Jinping and demonstrate his personal fealty to the CCP General Secretary amid difficult times for Xi and the regime. Notably, Li’s article was published just after Xi concluded his “grand and exuberant” Tibet inspection tour (July 21 to July 23) and the tragic floods in Henan’s Zhengzhou City.
The points brought up by Li indicate that his piece does not just address Xi’s immediate “quan wei” and publicity problems. In particular, the points warning against spreading rumors, “forming factions and cliques,” and the improper implementation of orders show that Xi is still coming to terms with the military and paramilitary not fully executing what Zhongnanhai wants (政令不出中南海), a large presence of dissenting voices, and lingering factional struggle issues.
Xi’s chief factional rivals long held sway over the military and paramilitary service. Jiang Zemin used corruption to “win over” the PLA’s top brass during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012). It was an open secret that Jiang’s cronies, then CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, were exchanging bribes for rank and office during the Jiang-Hu era. Meanwhile, the paramilitary came under the dual leadership of the CMC and the PRC State Council during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance and Xi’s first term. The Jiang faction’s influence over the military and paramilitary made it tremendously powerful back in the day, and allowed Jiang faction lieutenants Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang to wield the PAP almost like a personal army in attempting a failed coup against Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping after the Wang Lijun incident in 2012.
After Xi took office, he prioritized reforms to wrestle control over the important “Party’s gun” (槍桿子) away from the Jiang faction. Personnel purges came first, leading to the downfall of Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, and many senior military officers aligned with the Jiang faction. Military reforms began in the second half of 2015 and Xi more prominently “replaced” the informal “CMC Vice Chairman Responsibility System” that Guo and Xu previously tapped to run the show with the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” in 2016 to consolidate his control over the PLA. Meanwhile, Xi installed his allies in top military posts and has been continually promoting a “young guard” of senior military officers to replace retiring officials who rose through the ranks during the Jiang-Hu era. Xi has also frequently reshuffled the senior leadership of theater commands and units to guard against the establishing of new factional networks and interests, as well as make it harder for ambitious senior officers to launch a coup.
Xi’s effort to control the PAP also started out with purges and personnel reshuffles, most notably the arrest of Zhou Yongkang. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has replaced the PAP commander three times, the PAP political commissar four times, and one time each for the deputy commander and deputy political commissar. Just like in the military, PAP senior officers were also constantly reshuffled from one unit to another every so often. Further, one PAP commander, one PAP deputy commander, and at least 12 PAP generals have been investigated over the past nine years. In 2018, Xi instituted reforms to end the dual civilian-military command over the PAP, preventing the political and legal affairs apparatus from potentially abusing its jurisdiction to mobilize the paramilitary for “stability maintenance” work or coup efforts.
Personnel reshuffles in the Beijing PAP corps are a microcosm of larger personnel movement. The Beijing corps is part of a larger corps overseeing the safety of the CCP’s senior civilian leadership and elites in the capital. Regular paramilitary duties aside, the Beijing corps is also responsible for handling counter-terrorism incidents across the country. The leadership of the Beijing corps has been changed four times since Xi took office, with Li Weijie being promoted to his current post from PAP deputy chief-of-staff in February 2020.
In considering the CCP factional struggle and the military and paramilitary, Li’s article is likely also meant to put Xi’s factional rivals on notice. Li is essentially cautioning that those who oppose Xi’s leadership will be dealt with “quickly, ruthlessly, and with zero tolerance.” However, the fact that Li needed to issue this warning in the first place hints at a disquieting degree of current opposition to Xi in the military, paramilitary, and from the Party elite more broadly, as evidenced from information in the July 27 Nikkei Asia report.
Meanwhile, the PLA Daily and other central media not republishing Li’s piece either affirms mounting opposition to Xi or indicates that the article was merely a personal statement and not representative of Party Central.
