SinoInsight 1
Spontaneous gatherings held between Nov. 25 to Nov. 28 in many cities and institutes of higher learning across mainland China quickly turned into anti-lockdown and even anti-regime protests as anger over Beijing’s “zero-COVID” policy and the problems it caused boiled over. The gatherings were originally meant to commemorate a lockdown-related fire tragedy on Nov. 24 in the city of Urumqi in Xinjiang Province. Chinese sources said that there were demonstrations in at least 19 provinces and 91 institutes of higher learning. Meanwhile, China Dissent Monitor (run by Freedom House) tallied at least 27 protests across China from Nov. 26 to Nov. 28. Australian think-tank ASPI estimated 43 protests in 22 cities.
Similar but smaller-scale protests were also held in Hong Kong in the city’s central business district area and on some college campuses over the weekend. Sporadic protests continued in some areas like Guangzhou City into the week of Nov. 28.
The protests later gained the moniker of “blank paper revolution” (白紙革命) as many demonstrators were spotted holding aloft blank white sheets of A4-sized paper. Protesters explained that the blank paper was a reference to a Soviet-era joke about how no slogans were needed because “everybody knows” what the problems in the regime were and what was being protested. At the various demonstrations in the streets and on school campuses, the protesters brought flowers to commemorate the Urumqi fire tragedy, waved the PRC flag, sang “The Internationale,” the PRC anthem, and popular Hong Kong protest songs, demanded freedom, called for an end to “zero-COVID” measures, and even requested that Xi Jinping and the CCP “step down.”
The mass protests in China were widely covered by the Western press and attracted significant international attention. Some analysts began speculating that the protests could push Beijing to end “zero-COVID” earlier than expected, with Goldman Sachs assigning a 30 percent probability to China reopening before the second quarter of 2023.
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The CCP authorities generally reacted to the protests over the weekend with some arrests, but appeared to be restrained in their aggression towards the protestors despite the expression of anti-regime sentiments in some areas. A resident from Shanghai who participated in local protests on Nov. 26 told The Wall Street Journal that “perhaps the police were waiting for instructions from above.” From Nov. 28, police presence was heavily increased in major cities and areas where protests broke out. Passersby were regularly stopped for security checks, with police officers demanding that people, and especially college students, hand over their phones for inspection to see if they contained banned apps like Telegram, Twitter, and VPNs. Meanwhile, a provincial education official told the Financial Times that the authorities had urged colleges to send students home as quickly as possible to check further dissent on campuses.
The authorities also took the following actions:
‘Appeasement’
Nov. 26
1. Li Pan, deputy director of the Chongqing Municipal Health Commission, said at a press conference that “epidemic-free neighborhoods” (無疫小區) and “epidemic-free communities” (無疫社區) will not participate in three rounds of latest mass nucleic testing in the city. Li added that streets and towns with no positive cases over the past five days, as well as neighborhoods and communities with generally no positive cases in the past five days with the exception of some streets and towns, need not participate in the latest round of mass testing.
2. Officials in Henan’s Zhengzhou City said at a press conference that all areas of the city with the exception of high-risk places are to halt centralized nucleic acid testing and revert to low-risk area epidemic management. High-risk areas include Xinzheng City (temporary control measures extended to Nov. 29), as well as parts of Zhongmu County, Dengfeng City, Xinmi City, and Xingyang City.
Nov. 27
Beijing municipality held a press conference on epidemic prevention and control. Wang Daguang, head of the Beijing community prevention and control group, said that new “temporary management and control measures” should be publicly announced as soon as possible. He added that the measures should be “explained well” and outbreaks should be “brought under control and resolved quickly,” with the control time not exceeding 24 hours.
Nov. 28
1. The Guangzhou Municipal Health Commission issued a notice on mass nucleic testing in whole districts or some streets in several districts. The notice said that those with no social activities, including homebound elderly, students who take online classes, and people who work from home, do not need to participate in the mass testing if they have no need to go out so as to reduce the risks of cluster infections.
2. State mouthpiece Xinhua released three consecutive commentary articles urging local officials to put the Chinese people first in implementing the “zero-COVID” policy.
The titles of the articles are:
- “Do Our Best to Provide Convenience For the People” (盡最大努力為老百姓提供方便)
- “There Are No Small Matters at ‘Fangcang’ Hospitals” (方艙無小事)
- “The ‘Three Unswervings’ Are Magic Weapons for Victory” (“三個堅定不移”是製勝法寶; the “three unswervings” are “unswervingly adhere to the supremacy of the people and the supremacy of life”; “unswervingly implement the general strategy of preventing both imported cases and domestic resurgences”; and “unswervingly implement the ‘dynamic zero-COVID’ general policy.”)
Moving away from ‘zero-COVID’
Nov. 29
Chang Zhaorui, a researcher at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, told reporters at a State Council press conference that “international and domestic monitoring data confirmed that the pathogenicity and virulence of the Omicron mutant strains… are significantly weaker than the original strain and variant strains such as Delta.”
Meanwhile, Xia Gang, a National Administration of Disease Prevention and Control official, said that the PRC’s COVID-19 vaccines have shown “good protection against severe illness and death.”
Nov. 30
Guangzhou and Chongqing announced the easing of some “zero-COVID” restrictions, including allowing close contacts of infected people to quarantine at home if they fulfill certain conditions.
Dec. 1
Reuters reported that the PRC authorities are set to announce in the coming days a relaxation of epidemic prevention and control protocols, including allowing positive cases and close contacts to isolate at home under certain conditions, citing sources familiar with the matter. The sources also said that there will be a reduction in mass testing and regular nucleic acid tests.
Shifting blame
Nov. 29
Mi Feng, a spokesman of the PRC National Health Commission (NHC) and deputy director of the NHC’s propaganda department, said at a press conference of the Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council that lockdowns should be implemented and lifted quickly to reduce inconveniences caused to the public.
Cheng Youquan, director of the first surveillance department of the National Disease Control and Prevention Administration, said, “The problems highlighted by the public are not aimed at epidemic prevention and control itself, but focus on simplifying prevention and control measures.” He added that some localities have been taking excessive policy steps (層層加碼) or resorting to ‘one-size-fits-all’ (一刀切) approaches in carrying out “zero-COVID,” and neglected the demands of the masses. Cheng also noted that some localities arbitrarily expanded the scope of areas and personnel under control and locked down everything, kept areas under lockdown for extended periods without exiting lock down, carried out lockdowns haphazardly and without authorization.
Cheng said that various localities have set up special groups to “rectify” the problem of taking excessive policy steps. These groups are “effectively responding” to the problems reported by netizens and residents, and are reflecting those problems to the relevant local governments for resolution.
Stability maintenance
Nov. 27
1. Local official media Xinjiang Daily reported that the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee held a meeting on Nov. 26 that provincial Party secretary Ma Xingrui chaired.
The meeting said that it is necessary to do a good job in maintaining stability during the epidemic prevention period, including severely cracking down “in accordance with laws and regulations” on illegal and criminal acts like “spreading rumors, inciting troubles, and violently resisting epidemic prevention and control measures.”
On the day of the meeting, the Urumqi municipal government announced that the city had “basically” achieved “zero-COVID” at the social level and that the living order of residents in low-risk areas will be restored in a “phased and orderly manner.”
2. Local official media Beijing News reported that Tsinghua University announced on its official Weibo account that evening that the “Tsinghua Special Line” had been started early to allow students to travel home. Students can make advance online bookings and receive a free ride to seven public transportation hubs, including Beijing Railway Station and the airport, to begin their journey back.
3. The Sichuan provincial education department reportedly held an urgent video conference regarding the “safety and stability” of institutes of higher learning in the province, according to information circulating on the Chinese internet.
Four requirements on “preventing large-scale gathering activities on campus and strictly preventing cluster outbreaks” were put forth at the meeting:
- All institutes of higher learning must handle their respective “safety and stability” issues properly, and the public security bureaus will not intervene in principle.
- Quickly start the secondary response mechanism for the “safety and stability” of institutes of higher learning in the province, and strictly control the occurrence of large-scale gathering activities on campus.
- Keep a close eye on students, faculty and staff, ethnic minorities, and third-party logistics personnel.
- Strictly prevent overseas-domestic collusion, as well as collusion between institutes of higher learning within the province, outside the province, and outside schools.
Nov. 28
1. Chen Wenqing, Party secretary of the Central Political and Legal Commission (CPLAC), presided over a plenary meeting of the central political and legal affairs apparatus to study Party Central’s recent decisions and deployments.
The meeting emphasized the necessity of “resolving conflicts and disputes in a timely manner” and “helping resolve the practical difficulties of the people.” Political and legal affairs officials are to “resolutely crack down on infiltration and sabotage by hostile foreign forces in accordance with the law,” “resolutely crack down on illegal and criminal activities that disrupt social order,” and “effectively maintain overall social stability.”
2. BBC reporter Edward Lawrence, who was previously arrested by the police in Shanghai while covering the protests, tweeted a video of police forcing passersby to delete photos they may have of the demonstrations.
Nov. 29
Reuters reported that the PRC authorities have started making inquiries into some of the people who participated in the weekend protests, citing people who attended the demonstrations in Beijing.
Two protesters said that callers claiming to be Beijing police officers told them to report to a police station that day with written accounts of their activities on the night of Nov. 27. A student was also asked by their college if they had been in a protest area and to submit a written account.
“We are all desperately deleting our chat history,” said another person who saw the Beijing protest, adding that the police are asking how they heard about the protest and their motive for attending.
Information campaign
Nov. 27 – Nov. 28
Suspected PRC government-connected accounts flooded Twitter with pornographic images, posts about escorts, gambling posts, and other useless information to hide searches for the anti-lockdown and anti-regime protests taking place in China, according to several Western media outlets and researchers. Some of the accounts had been dormant for months or years before making their spam posts.
A former Twitter employee told The Washington Post that the flooding technique was previously used to discredit a single account or a small group by linking them with escort ads. Twitter sought to fix the issue, and news and images of the various protests started appearing in searches late on Nov. 27.
Nov. 29
Hu Xijin, the former Global Times editor-in-chief, wrote in an article that local governments should not continue building large “fangcang” hospitals. He suggested that the money saved by halting or reducing the construction of those makeshift facilities should be instead used to increase the number of beds in regular hospitals, especially beds for intensive care, as well as boost reserves of medical supplies. Hu further pointed out that normal “fangcang” hospitals are not equipped to treat critically ill patients, but “high standard ‘fangcang’ hospitals” possess the means.
After Hu’s article was published, the search topic “recommend not to build large ‘fangcang’ hospitals in various localities” (建議各地別大規模建方艙了) trended on the Chinese internet.
OUR TAKE
1. The “blank paper revolution” appears to be a genuine social movement triggered by the CCP regime having pushed the Chinese people to the edge of their tolerance through the “zero-COVID” policy and increasing suppression of society in recent years.
There are certain similarities between the “blank paper revolution” and the anti-extradition bill movement in Hong Kong in 2019. Mainland college students, like their counterparts in Hong Kong, have become despaired by their bleak future prospects under “zero-COVID” and continued CCP rule. Being without hope, mainland youths are deciding to throw caution to the wind, shout “give me freedom or give me death,” and publicly call for Xi Jinping and the Party to step down.
The adaption of Hong Kong protest songs to the mainland context suggests that mainland Chinese are gradually understanding what brought the people of Hong Kong out on the streets in 2019 and earlier; at the time, many mainland Chinese mostly bought the CCP propaganda about the nature of the anti-extradition bill protests. Meanwhile, the parents of mainland students and some in the older generation have started to change their mind about the CCP authorities and have expressed subtle approval of the anti-lockdown and anti-regime protests.
The “blank paper revolution” protesters have thus far adopted innovative methods of demonstration to avoid giving the CCP authorities a proper excuse to crack down on them. Holding up blank sheets of paper, flowers, or simply standing silently are “you know what I mean” (你懂的) signaling that work well in the PRC context and make life difficult for the censors. Some people have also begun sharing remarks from Xi Jinping and his father Xi Zhongxun on WeChat to get around the censors while expressing their dissatisfaction with the CCP regime. Examples include:
- Xi Jinping: “The Chinese people have stood up and have united. They are not afraid of anything and cannot be provoked.”
- Xi Jinping: “It is not a good idea to mess with the Chinese people. No matter how they (those who mess with the Chinese people) pass the buck, they will be nailed to the historical pillar of shame.”
- Quoting the “Biography of Xi Zhongxun”: “The people should be allowed to speak, and the people should be encouraged to care about national affairs.”
- “Biography of Xi Zhongxun”: “A revolutionary political party is not afraid to hear the voice of the people; silence is the most frightening thing.”
2. Local governments tend to put their own interests first before the regime’s in implementing policy. Local officials also usually look out for their personal political prospects in deciding on an approach to resolving problems.
Therefore, it is not surprising that local governments and officials have thus far attempted to quell the “blank paper revolution” in a low-key manner and proactively stop protests from expanding. This includes using various forms of “appeasement” like sending students home early and announcing that the people’s interests will be looked after first in epidemic prevention and control. Meanwhile, public security bureaus have stepped up police presence in key areas to prevent people from gathering.
Local officials can be expected to quietly move against “protest leaders,” divide the masses by offering “carrots and sticks,” blame “hostile foreign forces” for local protests, restrict the movement of certain groups of people under the pretext of “epidemic prevention and control” (manipulating health codes, etc.), and signal to the central government that “all’s well” in their area to avoid being penalized for allowing the people to express anti-regime sentiments. Once “safety and stability” has been more or less restored, the local authorities will look to settle scores (秋後算賬) with protesters.
3. The CCP regime has always embraced “deceit, perniciousness, and struggle” (假, 惡, 鬥) even as it projects itself as being “great, glorious, and correct” (偉, 光, 正). This means that Beijing will not admit that its mistakes led to the “blank paper revolution” but will instead move to suppress the outpouring of social discontent through strong “stability maintenance” measures. Beijing will also likely find scapegoats (local governments and officials, “hostile foreign forces,” etc.) to blame for the protests while using propaganda to set itself up as the “savior” of the Chinese people. We have already seen a version of this from the CCP’s playbook in quelling the anti-extradition bill movement in Hong Kong.
The CCP’s pernicious nature and CPLAC secretary Chen Wenqing’s call for “resolute crackdowns” set the stage for severe and possibly bloody suppression of subsequent demonstrations if local domestic security forces believe that protesters have crossed a line. Beijing may not necessarily want to shed the blood of angry citizens and escalate matters, but will have little control over the situation should local officials “prefer left rather than right,” adopt “one-size-fits-all” approaches, and go to extremes in quelling protests.
The Xi leadership will likely still move to ease “zero-COVID” because domestic and external crises leave it no choice but to move in that direction. However, Beijing will attempt to reopen China and gradually walk back epidemic prevention and control measures in a manner that suggests the shift is completely out of Xi and the CCP’s volition; the CCP will never admit that it was under pressure from the protests.
4. Foreign businesses, investors, and governments may believe that the “blank paper revolution” protests will compel Xi Jinping to end “zero-COVID” in China quickly. Some businesses and investors may even be inclined to keep their operations and capital in China, or even increase their investments in the mainland, in anticipation of the coming reopening.
We are not optimistic that Xi will be able to move away from “zero-COVID” soon even if he wants to. We previously explained that Xi will struggle to overcome systemic problems in the CCP regime, face the “cobra effect” and other resistance from groups with interests in maintaining “zero-COVID,” and encounter challenges from his lingering factional rivals (see here, here, here, and here). In particular, Xi’s enemies at home and abroad could look to manipulate the overflowing anti-regime sentiments in China to be more focused on Xi than the CCP. This means that Xi cannot abandon “zero-COVID” too quickly lest he handicaps himself by removing a crucial tool of “stability maintenance” just when opposition towards himself and the CCP is mounting.
As we wrote in the Nov. 28 edition of this newsletter: “Prolonged flip-flopping on ‘zero-COVID’ will be hazardous to the “health” (political legitimacy) of the CCP regime and Xi’s personal political situation. The regime will remain susceptible to Black Swan events and other chaos should the many difficulties facing China lead to mass unrest and escalate intra-CCP factional struggle.”
Businesses, investors, and governments must account for Beijing’s “flip-flopping” on “zero-COVID” in their decision-making and assessing political risk in China.
SinoInsight 2
Former CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin died at age 96 from leukemia and multiple organ failure in Shanghai at 12:13 p.m. Beijing time on Nov. 30, according to state mouthpiece Xinhua in an announcement at 4:34 p.m. Official mainland media and government websites later grayed out their respective websites in tribute to Jiang’s passing.
Xinhua published a nearly 5,000-character obituary of Jiang. The obituary gave the former Party boss a very high political evaluation, writing that Jiang was “an outstanding leader with high prestige; a great Marxist; a great proletarian revolutionist, statesman, military strategist, and diplomat; a proven communist fighter; an outstanding leader of the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics; the core of the Party’s third generation leadership collective; and the main creator of the important political theory of the ‘three represents.’”
In recollecting Jiang’s life and career, the obituary left out certain problematic details such as his attending university under Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime and later serving as a Japanese collaborator during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The obituary noted Jiang’s “clear-cut stance” on the “severe political disturbance” that took place in China in 1989 (student protests at Tiananmen and elsewhere), but omitted his persecution of Falun Gong and the Party’s historical evaluation of the campaign. Jiang’s tenure was summarized as follows: “Under the collective leadership of the Party’s third-generation leadership with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core, we calmly responded to a series of international emergencies related to our country’s sovereignty and security, overcame difficulties and risks arising in the political, economic, and natural worlds, and guaranteed that the ship of reform and opening up and socialist modernization always advances in the right direction.”
The obituary cast Jiang’s controversial transfer of power to Hu Jintao in a positive light. Jiang was said to have proposed handing over the reins to Hu at the 16th Party Congress “for the long-term development” and “stability” of the “Party and the country,” but retained the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to “fully support Hu Jintao” after considering the “complex and changing international situation and the arduous tasks of national defense and military building at the time.”
The obituary further praised Jiang’s contribution to the regime in building the military and Party theory, adding that his death was an “immeasurable loss” to the CCP. The obituary added that Party Central urged the “whole Party, whole military, and the people of all ethnic groups in the country to turn their grief into strength and carry on the legacy of Comrade Jiang Zemin,” as well as express their condolences with practical actions. Party members and cadres were also called on to “more consciously unite around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” as well as continue adhering to the Party’s leadership and theories, including the “three represents.”
Xinhua also announced the establishment of a funeral committee for Jiang Zemin’s wake and the list of comrades who belong to the committee. Xi Jinping is chairman of “Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Funeral Committee” and the committee includes 687 active and retired senior Party, government and military officials. The CCP further announced official activities to mourn Jiang at home and abroad.
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On Nov. 30, the National Radio and Television Administration’s network audio-visual department issued a series of instructions on commemorating Jiang Zemin’s death to various media, social media, and internet platforms, according to leaks obtained by Chinese netizens.
The instructions include:
- Jiang Zemin’s memorial service will be held on Dec. 6. Platforms are to observe “mourning period” taboos from Nov. 30 to Dec. 7.
- Home pages and client terminals of websites and webpages are to use a monochrome palette during the mourning period. However, the monochrome palette is not to be used for content related to Xi Jinping and 20th Party Congress topics.
- During the mourning period, new online entertainment content should not be put up, current entertainment content should be removed from homepages and suspended in popups, and “like” functions should be halted.
- All media presenters are to refrain from using “auspicious” (開門紅) sayings or red backdrops during broadcasting during the mourning period. Presenters and stage managers are also forbidden from mentioning the names of CCP leaders or discussing political information.
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Initial reaction to Jiang Zemin’s death in China appeared to be weighted towards his unpopularity and negative legacies. According to a Radio Free Asia report, some commented that his passing was real “this time,” a reference to past misinformed reports that Jiang had died, notably those by overseas Chinese language media outlets in July 2011. Others called for people to latch on to the momentum of the “blank sheet revolution” and take to the streets to mark Jiang’s death. Still others recalled that Jiang “turned the whole country corrupt,” promoted corrupt officials, clung on to the CMC chairmanship for two extra years, was a “great strategist” with women (Jiang was a notorious womanizer), turned the Party away from morals, and brought the regime to the brink of collapse. Yet some others remarked that the “head of the persecution of Falun Gong” had died and offered consolation to “all persecuted Falun Gong practitioners.” Meanwhile, many netizens “liked” the news of Jiang’s death when it was reported on major Chinese social media platforms, a sign that they disapproved of him.
Jiang Zemin was remembered much more fondly in the West. Many Western scholars, journalists, and China watchers recalled Jiang as being “fun,” “open,” “liberal,” and even reform-minded. Obituaries of Jiang in Western media outlets tended to praise him and condemn Xi Jinping. Some observed that the glowing reminiscences of Jiang in China are partly due to people disliking Xi. A handful of regime critics and Western human rights activists called attention to Jiang’s role in promoting the CCP’s authoritarianism at home and abroad, including “internet censorship, religious persecution, and transnational repression,” according to Sarah Cook, Freedom House’s Research Director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
OUR TAKE
1. The mixed reaction to Jiang Zemin’s death in mainland China and in the West reflects how different parties benefited or suffered during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012).
Members of the PRC elite, including Party cadres, businessmen, investors, and executives, who made fortunes and accrued interests during Jiang’s rule and when the Jiang faction dominated the Hu-Wen leadership tend to remember him fondly and downplay his authoritarianism. The PRC elite who benefited under Jiang and the Jiang faction also tend to frown upon the Xi leadership for restricting their opportunities to “make a fortune while keeping a low profile” (悶聲發大財) and purging many of their fellows for corruption. China’s youths who grew up during the more prosperous Jiang-Hu years and who are finding their future prospects dimmed under Xi also have reason to be “nostalgic” about Jiang. Likewise, those in the West who gained from the PRC “opening up” during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance but who saw their interests reduced or harmed under Xi tend to apply rose-tinted lenses in commemorating Jiang’s passing and gloss over his gross human rights abuses and authoritarian streak when reviewing his legacy.
Meanwhile, the mainland Chinese who suffered from Jiang “ruling the country through corruption” (以貪治國), particularly the poorer classes, remember him as being very corrupt, clownish, and even traitorous (Jiang signed away Chinese land in settling a border dispute with Russia in 2001 and was a Japanese collaborator in his youth). They recall his rule as causing them hardships and mainly favoring those who were already at the top. Human rights activists in China (including rights defense lawyers) and abroad who closely tracked abuses under Jiang found them to be no less egregious than under Xi.
We previously noted (see here and here) that Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction are responsible for laying the foundation for the PRC’s techno-totalitarian control over China (“Golden Shield,” “Golden Tax,” “Great Firewall of China,” etc.), beginning the PRC’s military build-up; brutally persecuting Falun Gong practitioners and forcibly harvesting their organs and those of other prisoners of conscience; using the 2009 Urumqi riots to launch the persecution campaign against Uyghur Muslims; perpetuating the CCP’s longtime persecution of Tibetan Buddhists, House Christians, and other religious believers; as well as covering up the outbreak of SARS in 2003. We also observed that “so-called ‘liberal’ and ‘moderate’ Party leaders like Deng and Jiang never untethered themselves from communist ideology and also worked to advance the Party’s domination agenda, albeit through the strategy of ‘hiding strength, biding time.’ (韜光養晦)”
2. Obituaries for CCP leaders are sensitive and highly political documents that seek to glorify the Party on the one hand and enshrine the political legacy of the deceased on the other. This means that the Party elite have to carry out political bargaining and arrive at a “consensus” on what to include in such documents before they are published. Influential factions have a say on how they want their apex patron to be remembered, and the incumbent Party leader is also allowed to weigh in on the finer points of the obituary.
The very high political evaluation granted to Jiang Zemin reflects several points:
- The Jiang faction still retains considerable influence in the CCP regime and has leveraged that influence to extract a glowing obituary for their figurehead.
- Xi Jinping’s political strength and “quan wei” (prestige and authority) in the regime are still established on propaganda and his firm adherence to Party orthodoxy. As such, Xi cannot denounce Jiang or his political theory without undermining his own basis of power, but instead has to mostly “acknowledge” the legacy of his chief rival as being part of the CCP’s “glorious” history.
- Xi’s present political strength is about at the level that we previously assessed (greater than five years ago, but nowhere near totally dominant; see here and here). While Xi has implicitly criticized the “prominent issues and problems” of Jiang Zemin’s rule (including the Hu era) in his “historical resolution” and 20th Party Congress work report, he is not strong enough to denounce Jiang and his “incorrect political line” outright. Moreover, Xi has undercut his own “quan wei” somewhat by heading the “Jiang Zemin Funeral Committee” and sanctioning the very positive obituary for Jiang.
Some China watchers believe that the obituary’s positive spin on Jiang’s handover of power to Hu Jintao was meant by Xi’s rivals to deliberately contrast the two leaders and make Xi come off worse. It is possible that Jiang faction elements who gave their input in the writing of the obituary were looking to highlight Jiang Zemin’s “compliance” with leadership tenure norms established under Deng Xiaoping with the intention of indirectly criticizing Xi’s flouting of the norms. However, Xi probably felt that he could live with this positive spin of Jiang’s handover to Hu because it was also mentioned that Jiang broke leadership tenure norms (staying on as CMC chairman for two more years until 2004) for the “long-term development” and “stability” of the regime, which obliquely “justifies” Xi’s own norm-breaking third term. Moreover, Xi could have granted the Jiang faction a “win” on the succession issue in exchange for them going along with his suggestions on how Jiang should be remembered in other parts of the obituary.
One obituary subject that Xi almost certainly got his say in was Jiang Zemin’s persecution of Falun Gong. If the Jiang faction had their way, they would declare that their figurehead had victoriously “crushed” Falun Gong in the early 2000s and defended the regime from “turmoil” or other descriptions along those lines. The complete absence of the anti-Falun Gong campaign from Jiang’s obituary, however, indicates that Xi does not think that it was a worthy political achievement and that it deserves to be part of the CCP’s “glorious” historical legacy. Like the delaying of Article 23’s passage in Hong Kong before the 20th Party Congress, the omission of the Falun Gong persecution campaign from Jiang’s official obituary suggests that Xi has, at least for the moment, refrained from clearly stating the CCP regime’s stance on Jiang’s political legacy and keeping the “Falun Gong card” in play against the Jiang faction.
3. The Jiang faction could exploit Jiang Zemin’s death to undermine the Xi leadership by stirring up strong “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” sentiments in China and overseas. They could also look to latch on to “nostalgia” for a more “liberal” PRC under Jiang to fuel and direct the “blank paper revolution” in a markedly “anti-Xi” direction. Finally, the Jiang faction could be hoping for or looking to provoke potentially destabilizing countrywide displays of public mourning over Jiang Zemin (the 1976 and 1989 Tiananmen incidents occurred after the death of Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang respectively), which could lead to savage crackdowns that bloody Xi Jinping’s hands and discredit his leadership.
In all of the aforementioned scenarios, the Jiang faction would likely be hoping for or looking to provoke the Xi leadership into ordering or being viewed as responsible for a “Tiananmen-like” event in China. Another bloody and very public massacre of Han Chinese will likely trigger massive societal outrage and give “anti-Xi” forces in the regime a solid reason to cast him as a “sinner of history” (歷史罪人) and convene special “expanded” meetings of the top leadership to marginalize Xi and “bring order out of chaos” (撥亂反正).
Xi’s rivals appeared to be behind efforts to provoke Beijing into ordering Tiananmen-style crackdowns in Hong Kong during the Umbrella Movement and the anti-extradition bill protests; Xi’s imposition of a national security regime in Hong Kong seems to be at least partly aimed at ensuring that his factional enemies can no longer exploit popular protests in the city that compels Beijing to move in with the People’s Liberation Army for tough action that ultimately undermines the Xi leadership.
Rumors of Jiang’s impending death have been circulating since at least August 2022 and became more prominent around mid-November. This suggests that the Jiang faction was likely aware that their figurehead was on his last legs for some time and would have been on the lookout for opportunities to cause or worsen trouble for Xi around the estimated period of Jiang’s demise. For instance, while the “blank paper revolution” appeared to have sparked organically, it was fanned in part by protesters being able to record live broadcasts and an odd lack of social media censorship when demonstrations were ongoing. While it is possible that the censorship “gap” was caused by disgruntled individual officials who wanted to support the anti-lockdown protests in their own way, foul play by lingering Jiang faction officials in the propaganda and security apparatuses also cannot be ruled out. After all, two of the seven members of the Jiang faction-associated “Sun Lijun political gang” (Deng Huilin and Liu Xinyun) were former directors of cyber operations at the Ministry of Public Security, and they could have left behind lackeys who are in positions to create a censorship “gap” when the “blank paper revolution” was ongoing.
Xi ally Wang Xiaohong may be finally in charge of the public security ministry, but he will need time to weed out the remaining Jiang faction loyalists in the ranks and truly bring the Party’s “knife handle” under Xi’s control. Until then, the Jiang faction remnants in the regime are still capable of causing outsized trouble for the Xi leadership when factional conflicts come to a head.
4. If leaks about the National Radio and Television Administration’s instructions to various media, social media, and internet platforms on how to commemorate Jiang’s death are accurate, then they indicate that Xi Jinping remains disapproving in his attitude towards the deceased leader and does not wish to give Jiang too much “limelight.”
We believe that while the Xi camp and Jiang faction may be in a “truce” during the mourning period, Xi will likely seek to re-establish his “quan wei” afterward and resume or even step up efforts to “rectify” the regime of Jiang faction influence. With Jiang dead, Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong and those associated with him (including the intelligence apparatus) naturally become the next targets.
Given the “you die, I live” and volatile nature of factional struggle, Xi could very well find himself in a very disadvantageous position (such as in the aftermath of a bloody crackdown on protesters) even though the balance of the struggle is currently in his favor. This could force Xi to play the “Falun Gong card” and attempt other “nuclear options” to hold the remnants of the Jiang faction broadly accountable for the regime’s evils and excesses. The Jiang faction without its titular head will look to do likewise to Xi. This could even extend to playing its own version of the “Falun Gong card” by subtly attempting to get overseas Chinese and foreign media, as well as popular online personalities in the overseas Chinese community, to inadvertently “shift blame” for the campaign to Xi’s leadership, along with the CCP regime’s many other ills. This approach could make use of the fact that in public perception, Xi and the CCP are often seen as synonymous. Should they see the need, Jiang faction remnants and their associates could suddenly bill themselves as anti-Xi and anti-CCP “defenders of democracy” as the clique prepares to become “a cicada shedding its skin” (金蟬脫殼) per the ancient Chinese military strategy. Regardless of how the CCP factional struggle plays out in the wake of Jiang’s death, the likely escalation of tensions within Zhongnanhai will sharply raise the probability of political Black Swans emerging in China.
