SinoInsight 1
Several members of the 20th Politburo were appointed to new posts over the last week.
Oct. 26
Li Shulei (58), the former propaganda executive vice minister, attended a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in his new capacity as head of the Central Propaganda Department.
Oct. 27
Shi Taifeng (66), the president of the Central Party School and vice chairman of the NPC’s education, science, culture, and health committee, attended a meeting of the Central United Front Work Department in his new capacity as head of the Central United Front Work Department.
Oct. 28
1. Chen Jining (58), the former mayor of Beijing municipality, was appointed Party secretary of Shanghai municipality. Yin Yong, the deputy mayor of Beijing municipality, was named acting mayor of Beijing municipality, replacing Chen.
2. Huang Kunming (65), the former propaganda chief, was appointed Party secretary of Guangdong Province.
Oct. 29
Chen Wenqing (62), the minister of state security, was appointed Party secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC).
Oct. 30
Chen Yixin, the secretary-general of the CPLAC, officially replaced Chen Wenqing as minister of state security.
Chen Yixin was Xi Jinping’s former subordinate when the latter was Zhejiang Party secretary, serving as deputy director of the Zhejiang Provincial General Office, deputy secretary-general of the provincial Party Committee, and director of the provincial Policy Research Office. After taking office, Xi would promote Chen swiftly up the ranks and appointed him to various posts in the localities and the central government to boost his qualifications. Chen became CPLAC secretary-general in March 2018 and later oversaw a two-year anti-corruption campaign to “scrape the poison off the bones of our political and legal apparatus” starting in July 2020. In a meeting to launch the campaign, Chen compared it with the Yan’an Rectification Movement. Early in February 2020, Chen was appointed deputy head of a central leading group in charge of COVID-19 response.
Analysis: Chen Yixin is a confidant of Xi’s and appeared to play a crucial role in helping the latter with his rectification efforts. By appointing Chen as minister of state security, Xi could be looking to mount a major effort to cleanse the intelligence apparatus, which has long been influenced by the Jiang faction via Zeng Qinghong.
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Many observers believe that Xi Jinping is currently totally dominant in the CCP and secured “overwhelming victory” at the 20th Party Congress because he was able to appoint many of his allies to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Some observers say that the entire Politburo Standing Committee is composed of members of the “Xi faction.”
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping came out ahead personnel-wise at the 20th Party Congress, but getting many of his preferred personnel into the top leadership does not indicate that he is presently all-powerful. As we noted in an earlier assessment, Xi’s political strength is slightly higher than that of a “normal general secretary” as defined in our 20th Party Congress personnel forecast report. At the time, significant indicators that Xi was not totally dominant included his inability to criticize the “incorrect political line” of Jiang Zemin at the 20th Party Congress (Xi was only able to hint at his displeasure of the Jiang faction’s era of dominance in his work report), Xi not taking the Party Chairman title, and the retention of two Politburo Standing Committee members with Jiang faction backgrounds (Wang Huning and Zhao Leji) in the new Standing Committee. Our previous assessment of Xi’s political strength has since been further confirmed by the “Two Establishes” not being added to the revised Party constitution per the recently released full text (see SinoInsight 2 for details).
Given that Xi does not have overwhelming political strength and with his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) still largely established on propaganda, his inclusion of many allies, trusted officials, and technocrats in the Politburo and its Standing Committee at this time reflects Xi’s insecurity and hints at vulnerabilities, not omnipotence.
If Xi were truly confident in his “quan wei” (authority and prestige), he would be willing to maintain a semblance of factional “balance” in the top leadership and tolerate the presence of officials who are perceived as having different views from him. However, Xi chose instead to pack as many allies as possible into the Politburo and its Standing Committee, eased out old allies with diminished influence (the Hu camp), and elevated two officials associated with his chief rivals in the Standing Committee. This imbalanced personnel arrangement indicates that Xi cannot afford the luxury of “intra-Party democracy” because he does not have the “quan wei” to make it work for him. To get around his “quan wei” limitations and accommodate factional rivals in the Politburo Standing Committee, Xi has little choice but to replace old allies who may not be totally onboard with his agenda based on their reputation and surround himself with old colleagues and loyalists who are more likely to obey and properly implement his orders.
The inclusion of many of Xi’s allies, trusted officials, and technocrats in the Politburo and its Standing Committee is also less an indication that the “Xi faction” is completely dominant, but rather a sign that Xi lacks trust and confidence in those whom he has not worked with before. Were Xi more secure about his power, he would have no qualms with installing the best man for the job for key roles instead of relying on inexperienced allies whom observers perceive to be mere “yes-men” to take up key posts.
2. Xi would likely have anticipated that the Party elite, the markets, and the international community would not take well to his 20th Party Congress personnel arrangement. Indeed, all three groups reacted very negatively to Xi’s reshuffle: The Hong Kong stock exchange plummeted sharply last week and an index of Chinese shares traded in Hong Kong fell to the lowest level since 2008; foreign analysts voiced concerns about the Chinese economy after considering the new lineup of PRC leaders; the president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China expressed dismay at Xi’s “absolute, unrestricted power” and said that people need to “get away from the idea that China’s policy is still basically tailored to economic growth”; and wealthy Chinese voted with their feet by activating “escape plans” to leave the mainland after the 20th Party Congress.
Xi, however, likely felt that he had no choice but to go ahead with his personnel reshuffle even if it deepened concerns among the CCP elite and spooked businesses, investors, and governments. We see three possible reasons why Xi pushed ahead with his power play.
First, Xi is already 69 and needs to hasten his power consolidation to realize his political ideals and agenda. While Xi centralized power in an incremental and gradual manner during his previous two terms to avoid creating too much political instability, he cannot afford to wait another five years to get his house in order and truly usher in the “Xi era.” For one, Xi will be nearing his mid-70s by 2027 and will find it even harder to demand a fourth term, especially if he continues to lack tangible political achievements — a very likely outcome given the CCP regime’s endemic leadership issues and the toughening stance of the international community. The domestic and external crises plaguing the PRC now are likely to get worse, not better, over the next five years, and Xi would be in a much worse position to consolidate his position amid “great changes unseen in the world in a century.” Having most of his preferred personnel in place now allows Xi to ram through his preferred policies with less opposition and meet his objectives, at least in theory.
Second, Xi likely assessed that he needs to assemble a “strong central leadership group” now to resolve “complex situations and arduous tasks” at home and abroad. Externally, Beijing faces mounting “great power” competition with the U.S. and its allies, geopolitical risks stemming from the PRC’s friendship with Russia, as well as a global recession and strong inflationary pressures. At home, Beijing has to cope with a rapidly deteriorating economy, the triggering of various systemic financial, debt, and banking risks, a demographic time bomb, the mess created by “zero-COVID,” and other socio-economic troubles. Xi will be betting that his “strong central leadership group” will enable him to turn crisis into opportunity and bring about the CCP’s “the East is Rising, the West is in Decline” prediction. But if the Xi leadership cannot overcome domestic crises and the “severe and complex international situation and the enormous risks and challenges that follow,” then the CCP’s plans for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” will fall well short of the hype; as social contradictions worsen and come to a head, Xi could find himself in dire political straits.
Third, Xi needs a “group of politicians” with “unprecedented unity” (see SinoInsight 3) in Party Central if he is to eventually criticize Jiang Zemin’s “incorrect political line,” eradicate the Jiang faction through “self-revolution,” and more firmly establish his “quan wei” in the CCP regime. Therefore, Xi risked facing blowback to his personnel reshuffle power play to ensure that most officials in the Politburo and its Standing Committee will “resolutely maintain a high degree of consistency with ‘Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core’ in ideology, politics, and actions,” particularly at crunch time.
Of course, Xi will find it challenging to achieve his political objectives despite having gathered a “strong central leadership group” at the 20th Party Congress. Many observers have pointed out that Xi has essentially created an echo chamber around himself, which makes it difficult for Beijing to reverse course on policy errors. Also, the Politburo and its Standing Committee may be largely obedient to Xi, but they may not be successful in ensuring that their subordinates overcome the deficiencies of the Party system and culture (“prefer left rather than right,” “one-size-fits-all,” prioritizing local interests over regime interests, adhering to “political correctness” above all, etc.).
A case in point is PRC consul-general in Manchester Zheng Xiyuan pulling the hair of a Hong Kong protester outside the consulate on Oct. 16, 2022, an incident that made international headlines and further tarnished Xi and the CCP’s image. When asked by Sky News if his behavior was acceptable for a senior diplomat in the United Kingdom, Zheng said that the protester had “abused my country, my leader… I think it’s my duty.” Such blatant “wolf warrior” behavior by Zheng runs counter to Xi Jinping’s instructions for officials to “strive to create a trustworthy, lovable and respectable” image and “tell the China story well.” Meanwhile, as a senior diplomat, Zheng is almost certainly aware of the negative impact his acting violently against protesters would bring to Xi and the CCP. However, Zheng still went ahead with his actions because he likely feared even more the possibility that his career would be affected if he did not show Xi that he “dares to struggle and is good at struggling.”
Like Zheng Xiyuan, other officials under Xi’s “strong central leadership group” will also be forced to balance their interests in implementing Party Central’s “decisions and deployments.” If they choose to follow in Zheng’s footsteps, then Xi and the CCP regime’s political risks, which are already at very high levels, will climb even more. Xi’s “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” problem is fundamentally a systemic one, and he will still be limited in overcoming it despite securing favorable personnel arrangements.
3. State mouthpiece Xinhua explained in an Oct. 22 article on the leadership selection process that “political standard” (政治標準) was Xi Jinping’s key consideration in appointing members to serve in the “two committees” (20th Central Committee and 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection). Other leadership selection criteria listed by Xinhua indicated that “political standard” really meant an official’s loyalty to Xi.
Of the 23 members of the Politburo (excluding Xi), there are 13 whose loyalty to Xi is more or less assured and will likely stand with Xi regardless of his political status. They are:
- Nine of Xi’s old colleagues, former subordinates, or local garrisoned military personnel in the provinces or in the central government. These include four subordinates and colleagues who served with Xi in Zhejiang Province (Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Chen Min’er, and Huang Kunming), two Central Party School subordinates (Li Shulei and Shi Taifeng), one subordinate from Fujian Province (He Lifeng), one subordinate from Shanghai (Ding Xuexiang), and a former 31st Group Army (now 73rd Group Army; based in Fujian) general (He Weidong). Xi appears to be relying heavily on people he had a working relationship with as he does not have a faction and network of personnel to tap into.
- Two officials who have a personal relationship with either Xi or his family (Zhang Youxia and Li Xi).
- Two officials who showed meritorious performance in helping Xi with his purges (Chen Wenqing and Liu Guozhong). Chen Wenqing was deputy Party secretary of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection under Wang Qishan and took over as head of the Ministry of State Security after Ma Jian, the former deputy minister of state security, was investigated by the anti-corruption authorities. Liu Guozhong tackled the construction of illegal villas in the Qinling Mountains after he took over as Party secretary of Shaanxi in January 2018, and announced the completion of a “comprehensive and thorough” rectification of the issue in March 2019.
Given that Xi loyalists comprise just over half of the Politburo (56.5 percent out of 23 Politburo members), Xi can hardly be said to have secured an “overwhelming victory.” Xi’s need of having loyalists in key posts saw him break several reshuffle norms:
- Li Qiang was elevated to the second-rank Politburo Standing Committee. This means that Li will likely be appointed premier at the 2023 Two Sessions without first serving as a vice premier.
- Huang Kunming was “parachuted” from the central government out to the localities to serve as Party secretary of Guangdong Province. The last time a Politburo member in a central government position was dispatched to the provinces was in March 2012 when then vice premier Zhang Dejiang, a Jiang faction member, temporarily replaced fellow Jiang faction member Bo Xilai as Chongqing Party secretary after the latter was purged.
- Li Shulei, who never before served as a full or alternate member of the Central Committee, was promoted directly to the Politburo and appointed head of the Central Propaganda Department. We predicted Li’s elevation and appointment back in June 2022.
- Chen Wenqing, the minister of state security, was picked over minister of public security Wang Xiaohong to serve as Party secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission; the job usually goes to the public security minister. We earlier anticipated that Xi would unlikely pick Wang to serve as CPLAC secretary because he would prefer having the latter “hold” the Party’s “knife handle” (public security system).
- Xi Jinping rehashed a personnel reshuffle maneuver he did with Xia Baolong in moving the 65-year-old Shi Taifeng to seemingly less prestigious positions before the 20th Party Congress (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences president in May 2022, vice chairman of the NPC’s education, science, culture, and health committee in June 2022). This gave the impression that Shi, who was at retirement age, was being moved to the “second-line” and staying in office. This arrangement allowed Shi to stay on until the 20th Party Congress where he was promoted to the Politburo and appointed head of the Central United Front Work Department.
Meanwhile, there are six technocrats in the Politburo: Ma Xingrui (aerospace), Yuan Jiajun (aerospace), Zhang Guoqing (military industry), Li Ganjie (nuclear safety), Yin Li (medical field), and Chen Jining (environmental expert, president of Tsinghua University). These technocrats owe their promotions to Xi, and can reliably be counted as “loyalists” as long as Xi preserves or improves his political status. However, it is unclear where these technocrats will ultimately stand should Xi’s political status and “quan wei” take a serious hit.
Finally there are four officials in the Politburo with Jiang faction backgrounds: Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Li Hongzhong, and Wang Yi. Wang Yi and Li Hongzhong won promotion after displaying loyalty to Xi, and will unlikely cause trouble for the latter as long as his political status is secure. Zhao Leji and Wang Huning will likely take Xi’s side on most issues to allay his suspicions and out of self-preservation, but could cause subtle mischief in their respective portfolios.
Zhao Leji has displayed flashes of “publicly complying but privately defying” (陽奉陰違) Xi during his second term. For example, the anti-corruption authorities under Zhao moved against very few high-level officials during Xi’s second term even though took out many “flies”; progress against the “Sun Lijun political gang” was made only after Xi ally Wang Xiaohong rose to key posts in the public security system, and the credit for taking out Sun and other Jiang faction members appears to belong to Wang, not Zhao. Zhao also overstepped the boundaries of his portfolio in reprimanding anti-corruption officials in Gansu Province and other areas that he inspected in 2020 for not carrying out “610 Office” work, according to a report by Minghui.org, a clearinghouse for information about the persecution of Falun Gong. The Xi leadership had earlier dismantled the “610 Office” as part of Party and state institutional reforms in March 2018 and divided its functions between the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Public Security. As head of the CCDI, Zhao is not responsible for “610 Office” work and was, strictly speaking, defying the will of “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” by ordering anti-corruption officials to pursue duties that they are not supposed to be doing. Moreover, Zhao was urging his subordinates to carry out the duties of an organization that was formally abolished more than a year prior. Xi Jinping not taking action against Zhao and keeping him in the Politburo Standing Committee suggests that Xi was either not aware of Zhao’s “disobedience,” or that he knew but was hard-pressed to do anything because the Jiang faction still retains outsized influence in the CCP regime.
The Jiang faction’s lingering influence and Zhao Leji’s actions that aided the Jiang faction’s cause could be a reason why the latter was elevated above Wang Huning in the Politburo Standing Committee. Wang only moved up one spot from being the fifth-ranked to the fourth-ranked member of the Standing Committee, but Zhao rose from being the sixth-ranked to the third-ranked member. If reshuffle norms hold, Zhao and Wang will likely serve as the next chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference respectively at the 2023 Two Sessions. Promoting Zhao and Wang to prestigious positions is by no means a bad thing for Xi. On the one hand, the Jiang faction would likely have been appeased somewhat by Xi’s “major compromises”; this could explain why the Jiang faction arrived at a “consensus” with the Xi camp on his 20th Party Congress political agendas. On the other hand, Xi wrestled control over propaganda and anti-corruption—important tools of control—away from the Jiang faction while reducing the latter’s opportunities to sabotage his leadership by having their representatives in less “operational” portfolios.
Given that the Xi-Jiang factional struggle is still ongoing, the official in charge of the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs becomes more crucial to Xi Jinping’s agenda than who leads the National People’s Congress. During Xi’s first two terms, Hong Kong frequently descended into chaos under the oversight of Jiang faction officials (Zhang Dejiang in the 18th Central Committee and Han Zheng in the 19th Central Committee) as the city became a proxy battleground for the Xi-Jiang struggle. But if Xi puts a loyalist in charge of Hong Kong affairs, he could next move to turn the tables on the Jiang faction by playing the “Falun Gong card” in Hong Kong (see here, here, here, here, here, here, and here) or other factional struggle maneuvers. Currently, Xi ally Ding Xuexiang is the seventh-rank Politburo Standing Committee member and looks likely to replace Han Zheng as the chief overseer of Hong Kong matters.
SinoInsight 2
Oct. 26
State mouthpiece Xinhua published the full text of the revised constitution of the CCP and a nearly 10,000 character-long article summarizing how the updated Party constitution was “birthed” (讓黨旗在新征程上高高飄揚 — ‘中國共產黨章程 [修正案]’ 誕生記”; henceforth referred to as the “Summary”). Xinhua also published an interview with a “person-in-charge” of the 20th CCP Secretariat on the amendments to the Party constitution.
According to the Summary, the CCP revised its constitution at each Party Congress from the 13th to the 20th to “timely reflect the Party’s major achievements in theoretical innovation and practical development.” The 20th Party Congress adopted 50 amendments in total, including 37 amendments to the constitution’s General Program and 13 amendments to its articles.
The Summary said that Party Central stuck to two principles in amending the constitution. First, the previous theories and thoughts of the Party and its leaders would remain unchanged, and “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (henceforth referred to as “Xi Thought”) would be fully implemented. Second, only revisions that had consensus within the Party would be made to maintain the overall stability of the constitution; this allowed the constitution to fully reflect “the latest achievements of modernization of Marxism in China,” fully reflect the “governance, new concepts, and new ideas” proposed by Party Central (with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core) since the 19th Party Congress, and fully reflect the Party’s “fresh experiences” in adapting to the “new requirements” of the Party’s “new situations and new tasks.”
The Summary added with the adoption of the Party constitution revisions at the 20th Party Congress, the whole Party is required to “deeply understand” the “decisive significance” of the “Two Establishes,” more consciously carry out the “Two Safeguards,” fully implement “Xi Thought,” and be “unwavering” in maintaining a high degree of consistency ideologically, politically, and action-wise with “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.”
The 20th Party Congress also called on Party organizations at all levels and all Party members to “hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, carry forward the great spirit of Party building, strengthen the ‘four consciousnesses,’ persevere in the ‘four self-confidences,’ and achieve the ‘Two Safeguards,’” under the “resolute leadership” of “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” Party organizations and Party members are also required to “more consciously study, abide by, maintain, and safeguard the Party constitution” to “unite and strive for the comprehensive construction of a modern socialist country and the comprehensive promotion of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
In his interview with Xinhua, the “person-in-charge” of the 20th CCP Secretariat said that the purpose of amending the Party constitution is to promote the uniting of the whole Party’s will and actions, deepen the study and implementation of “Xi Thought,” and better activate the “fundamental guiding role” of Xi’s “scientific theory” (“Xi Thought”). The “person-in-charge” added that the whole Party must deeply understand the “decisive significance” of the “Two Establishes,” fully implement “Xi Thought,” and implement Xi’s political theory “throughout the entire process of Party and state work.”
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The full text of the revised Party constitution contained the following noteworthy amendments:
General Program
- Chinese Communists, “with Comrade Xi Jinping as their chief representative” since the 18th Party Congress, have been “integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and fine traditional [Chinese] culture.”
- “Carry forward the fighting spirit and build up our fighting ability” was added to the list of “fundamental reasons” for the PRC’s “achievements and progress since reform and opening up began.”
- A new paragraph (the 10th in the amended Party constitution) beginning with the sentence, “Since its founding, the CCP has remained true to its original aspiration and founding mission of seeking happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation” was added to the General Program.
- “Comprehensively promote national rejuvenation through the path of Chinese modernization” was added in the paragraph on socialist construction in China.
- “Accelerate efforts to foster a new pattern of development that is focused on the domestic economy and features positive interplay between domestic and international economic flows, and pursue high-quality development” was added to the paragraph on the fundamental task of socialist construction.
- In touching on national security, the line “coordinating development and security” was added.
- “Elevate our people’s armed forces to world-class standards” was added in the segment on the military.
- “Resolutely oppose and deter separatists seeking ‘Taiwan independence’” was added in the segment on Taiwan.
- The CCP “shall hold dear humanity’s shared values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom, uphold justice while pursuing shared interests,” was added in the foreign policy segment.
- In discussing the basic requirements of Party building, “the entire Party must improve the capacity for political judgment, thinking, and implementation and become more self-motivated and resolute in implementing the Party’s theories, lines, principles, and policies” was added. Also added was the sentence, “the Party is always on the road of self-revolution,” and a segment on the “adherence to the Party’s organizational line for the new era.”
Party member obligations
The requirements of “strengthening the ‘four consciousnesses,’ persevering in the ‘four self-confidences,’ and achieving the ‘two safeguards’” were added.
Basic conditions to be met by leading cadres
Leading cadres at all levels are urged to “oppose privilege-seeking mindsets and practices.”
1. In analyzing how Xi Jinping could amend the Party constitution after the Politburo announced the decision in early September, we said that he could enshrine his theoretical work, revised history, and political slogans of the past decade. We added that Xi is less likely to add the title of “people’s leader” to the Party constitution, reinstate the Party Chairman position, or shorten Xi’s political theory to just “Xi Jinping Thought.” Our analysis was based on our assessment of Xi’s political strength after the Beidaihe meeting, which we laid out in our 20th Party Congress forecast report.
Our analysis of the likely amendments and what would not be included was largely affirmed with the publication of the full text of the revised Party constitution. Xi basically added several political theories that were proposed in his “historical resolution” and/or promoted in propaganda after the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee, including “self-revolution,” “dual circulation,” “common prosperity,” and the integration of Marxism with “fine traditional Chinese culture.” Also, contrary to the predictions of most mainstream China watchers and media outlets, Xi did not add “people’s leader” to the Party constitution, shorten his theory to “Xi Jinping Thought,” or reinstate the Party Chairman position.
2. What Xi added or did not add to the Party constitution at the 20th Party Congress reflects his political strength now and in the immediate months before the important CCP conclave.By seeking the integration of Marxism with “fine traditional Chinese culture,” Xi reveals that he has no confidence that unadulterated Marxism-Leninism possesses sufficient allure and ability to bring about his “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Further, as we previously wrote, “Xi’s effort to use ‘fine traditional Chinese culture’ as a theoretical underpinning for the Party’s ideology represents an inadvertent repudiation of the CCP’s previous campaigns to purge the nation of traditional culture; indirect admission that the Party was in error on such an ideologically significant issue subtly undermines the regime’s political legitimacy.” Thus, Xi is actually eroding the Party’s legitimacy in amending the Party constitution to call for the integration of Marxism with “fine traditional Chinese culture.”
Meanwhile, Xi’s “Two Establishes” (“establishing Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of Party Central and the core of the whole Party” and “establishing the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”) were not added to the Party constitution despite it being heavily hyped in propaganda before the 20th Party Congress. For example, Central Policy Research Office director Jiang Jinquan noted in a Nov. 12, 2021 press conference that the “Two Establishes” represent the “call of the times, the choice of history, and the will of the people.” And in a nearly 12,000-character article by Central Party History and Documentation Research Institute dean Qu Qingshan that was published on July 7, 2022, the “Two Establishes” was described as the “profound summary of the historical experience of the Party’s century of struggle, and especially of the great practical struggle since the 18th Party Congress,” and is “the most important political achievement formed under the historical conditions of socialism with Chinese characteristics entering a new era.”
Instead, Xi had to settle for just the inclusion of the shortened form of his “Two Safeguards,” “four consciousnesses,” and “four self-confidences” (the concept of those theories were earlier added to the Party constitution at the 19th Party Congress) to the Party constitution. The non-inclusion of the “Two Establishes,” which has been described in propaganda as “the most important political achievement of the decade of the new era,” suggests that the Party elites had strongly objected to it and were unable to come to a consensus on adding Xi’s theory in a way that would “maintain the overall stability of the constitution.” Put another way, Xi’s position as the Party’s “core” is nowhere near as “established” and unchallenged as is popularly believed.
Xi being unable to add his “Two Establishes” to the Party constitution indirectly refutes the theory by some China-watchers that Xi had intended to “humiliate” Hu Jintao by removing him early from the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress and asserting his “quan wei” for the world to see. If Xi does not even have sufficient political strength to sway the Party elites into agreeing to include his “Two Establishes” to the Party constitution, he definitely does not have enough political strength and “quan wei” to make a “show of force” and compel Hu to exit the Great Hall of the People early to satisfy a twisted political agenda. (For more on the Hu Jintao incident, see here and here).
SinoInsight 3
Oct. 24
Party Central held a press conference to introduce and interpret the 20th Party Congress work report. During the press conference, officials basically rehashed propaganda narratives that have been circulating since the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee.
The officials in attendance include: Chen Yixin (secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission); Jiang Jinquan (director of the Central Policy Research Office); Mu Hong (executive deputy director of the Central Office of Deepening Reform and deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission); Wang Jianxin (director of the propaganda department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission); Tang Fangyu (deputy director of the CCP General Office); and Sun Yeli (deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department).
Speaking at the press conference, Jiang Jinquan said that Xi Jinping had resolved several problems within the Party during his decade in office that are “more worthy of attention,” including:
- After 10 years of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party, the “laxity and softness of Party governance has been fundamentally reversed,” and “serious hidden dangers in the Party, the country, and the military have been eliminated.”
- The Party faced many “risks and challenges” and “contradictions and problems” over the past decade. Xi was tasked with “getting to root of the problem, as well as tackling chaos and eliminating evil; the difficulties of overcoming strongholds and removing persistent maladies were rare in the world and in history, and change was not easy to come by” (“正本清源、治亂祛邪任務之重，攻克堡壘、清除頑瘴痼疾難度之大，世所罕見、史所罕見，變革來之不易”).
- Great changes (in Xi’s decade in charge) were achieved by resolving prominent contradictions within the Party. Over the past 10 years, Party Central “unswervingly strengthened the Party’s overall leadership; promoted comprehensive and strict governance of the Party; made efforts to resolve the problem of weakening, blurring, and diluting Party leadership; persistent rectified the ‘four winds’; resolutely punished corruption; cleared hidden political dangers within the Party; and eliminated the implicit concern of the Party not being itself.” As a result, “the Party’s leadership became stronger, the Party’s political ecology was renewed, and a fundamental political guarantee for achieving great changes was provided.”
Oct. 26
1. A report on the official website of the Lishui municipal government of Zhejiang Province noted that the Standing Committee of the Lishui Party Committee and leading cadres in the municipality held a meeting on the morning of Oct. 25. Hu Haifeng (the son of Hu Jintao), Party secretary of Lishui, presided over the meeting and conveyed the “spirit of the 20th Party Congress.”
Hu said in his speech that the 20th Party Congress was an important meeting with “epoch-making and milestone significance.” He requested that Lishui cadres transform their resolute support for the “Two Establishes” into practical actions to resolutely achieve the “Two Safeguards.”
2. Mainland media reported that a wake for the late Xu Guangchun, the former Party secretary of Henan Province and former head of the Standing Committee of the Henan Provincial People’s Congress, was held in Zhengzhou City in the morning of Oct. 25. Eleven active national leaders, including Xi Jinping, and 16 retired national leaders, including Hu Jintao, expressed their condolences and sympathies in various ways.
Oct. 27
Xi Jinping led the new Politburo Standing Committee on a trip to the CCP’s old revolutionary base at Yan’an in Shaanxi Province.
According to Xinhua, the Politburo Standing Committee first visited the Yangjialing Revolutionary Site in the northwestern part of Yan’an City. The CCP held its Seventh Party Congress in Yangjialing in 1945, and Mao Zedong consolidated power in the Party with his Yan’an Rectification Movement from 1942 to 1945. At Yangjialing, Xi said that the Seventh Party Congress was an “important milestone” in the Party’s history. He noted that the CCP achieved “unprecedented unity” under Mao through the Yan’an Rectification Movement; established “Mao Zedong Thought” and added it to the Party constitution”; and formed a group of “tried-and-tested” politicians who “held high the banner of Mao.” The Seventh Party Congress “showed the right direction for the Party to keep moving forward from victory to victory,” Xi said.
The Politburo Standing Committee then visited the former cave dwelling of Mao and other founding revolutionaries. Xinhua noted that the cave was where the “cycle” conversation took place. During the conversation, Mao Zedong said that his answer for how China can escape the historical cycle of “rise-and-fall” was allowing the people to supervise the government, according to Xinhua. Xinhua added that Xi’s “second answer” to the “cycle” conversation was “self-revolution” of the Party.
The Politburo Standing Committee concluded its tour of Yan’an by visiting the Yan’an Revolutionary Memorial Hall. There, Xi delivered a speech where he described Yan’an as the “holy land” of the Chinese revolution and the “cradle of New China.” In Yan’an, the CCP went from “low tide to high tide, achieved a historic turning point, and turned around China’s future and destiny,” Xi said. He mentioned that he had lived and worked in the Yan’an area for seven years; his father had also lived and worked there during an earlier period.
Xi also pointed out that Party Central and the Red Army faced very difficult conditions at Yan’an at the time as they were encircled militarily and blockaded economically by the enemy. The encircled and blockaded CCP then launched a mass production campaign to achieve self-reliance. Xi said that Mao and the other founding revolutionaries used “Yan’an style” to defeat “Xi’an style” (a reference to the Kuomintang government), and “opened up a new situation” for the revolution by relying on “millets and rifles.” He urged the whole Party to “carry forward the spirit of struggle, improve struggling skills, resolutely overcome various difficulties and challenges on the road, and rely on tenacious struggle to open up new horizons in the development of the cause.”
Finally, Xi stressed that the 20th Party Congress had formulated major policies for the Party and the country for the current and future periods, and drawn up a “grand blueprint for advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in a comprehensive manner with Chinese-style modernization. He said, “Let’s embark on a new journey and move towards a new goal of struggle!”
1. Xi Jinping is sending several political signals by leading the Politburo Standing Committee on a trip to Yan’an.
First, Xi is signaling to those in the regime who are concerned that he could take “the evil road of changing the [red] flag” by traveling to Yan’an, the “holy land” of the revolution and the “cradle of New China,” that he is still dedicated to the CCP’s original revolution, draws inspiration from the founding revolutionaries, and is dedicated to preserving the “red” regime.
Second, Xi is subtly highlighting his “red” roots and “birthright” to rule the regime as a “second generation red.” The Yan’an revolutionary base (Yan’an Soviet) grew out of the Shaanxi–Gansu Border Region Soviet Area (Shaan-Gan Soviet) that was founded by Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun and Liu Zhidan in 1933. The Shaan-Gan Soviet eventually became the Yan’an Soviet after Mao Zedong and the Red Army retreated there at the end of the CCP’s Long March. Xi Zhongxun was purged and nearly buried alive by the Red Army when the latter sought to seize power ahead of Mao’s arrival to Yan’an; Mao later arrived “just in time” to “save” Xi Zhongxun (Mao is widely believed to have been behind the purge of the Shaan-Gan Soviet leadership). Xi’s mention of his father having worked and lived in the area is a nod to that early period in the CCP’s history.
Third, Xi is overtly drawing parallels between his and Mao’s consolidation of power and rise to paramount leadership in the CCP. Like Mao, Xi added his political thought to the Party constitution, had an “answer” to the “cycle” conversation, achieved “unprecedented unity” within the Party around his leadership after a political campaign (anti-corruption campaign), and formed a “group of politicians” who are “holding high” his “banner.” Xi is also indicating that the 20th Party Congress he presided over, like the Seventh Party Congress that upheld Mao’s “quan wei,” will “show the right direction for the Party to keep moving forward from victory to victory.” We earlier analyzed that Xi has borrowed tokens of Mao’s “quan wei” to boost his own; Xi is doing something similar in taking the new Politburo Standing Committee to Yan’an.
Fourth, Xi’s observations about the CCP’s predicament in Yan’an and how they overcame existential crises are very likely an attempt to hint to the Party that the regime now faces a similar situation. Instead of a civil war with the Kuomintang, the CCP has to turn around a rapidly deteriorating economy and is being “encircled” by the U.S. and its allies. Washington is “blockading” the PRC by retaining the Trump administration’s tariffs and restricting China’s access to advanced semiconductors, while the West and China’s neighbors are strengthening alliances and military cooperation to counter the PRC. Xi’s “solution” to the “blockade and encirclement” by the international community is stepping up the PRC’s efforts to achieve “self-sufficiency,” or meeting “Xi’an style” with “Yan’an style” to “open up a new situation” for the CCP. Xi also wants the Party to be prepared to carry out “tenacious struggle” like their revolutionary forebears at Yan’an to keep alive the regime’s prospects of survival and dominance.
Fifth, Xi could be signaling that his “self-revolution” campaign will be a Yan’an Rectification Movement-style effort to purge the Party ranks of lingering factional rivals, those with disloyal inclinations, and others opposed to his rule, and bring “unprecedented unity” to the CCP (see points two and three).
Finally, Xi is looking to consolidate his efforts to boost his “quan wei” at the 20th Party Congress and spur the “whole Party” to “move towards a new goal of struggle” under his leadership.
2. Jiang Jinquan’s remark at the Oct. 24 press conference about how Xi Jinping was able to achieve “great changes” during his decade in charge by “resolving prominent contradictions within the Party” is partly an attempt to play up Xi’s dismal political “achievements,” partly an effort at signaling to the world that Xi’s actions at centralizing power were aimed at preserving the regime, and partly an oblique way of indicating that Xi had to overcome intense factional struggle just to get things done during this previous two terms. In other words, Jiang’s remark affirms our assessment that Xi “is the most in control of the CCP regime as he has ever been over the past decade” after getting the better of his factional foes and having elevated many of his allies to top office at the 20th Party Congress, and that “the ‘Xi era’ can now be said to have truly begun.”
Jiang’s remarks also correspond to Xi’s remarks in Yan’an about how Mao achieved “unprecedented unity” within the Party through the Yan’an Rectification Movement. Unlike Mao and unfortunately for Xi’s remaining factional rivals or disloyal officials, Xi has signaled that there is no end date to his own rectification campaign (the anti-corruption campaign) with his “second answer” to the “cycle” conversation—the revised CCP constitution states that “the Party is always on the road of self-revolution.”
From their respective statements, Xi Jinping and Jiang Jinquan are obliquely indicating that the Xi leadership intends to continually “rectify” the regime even though Xi is now in a paramount position. We believe that the remaining members, associates, and loyalists of the Jiang faction will be Xi’s top targets in his “self-rectification” campaign.
3. The news reports about Hu Jintao and his son Hu Haifeng appear to affirm our analysis that Hu Jintao’s early exit from the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress was not the outcome of factional struggle (see here and here). Instead of being purged as many China watchers predicted, Hu Haifeng continued to carry out his regular duties as Liushui Party secretary. Hu Jintao was also able to send condolences to a deceased Party official, something that he would not have been able to do if he was purged and placed under some form of control.
We believe that Xi’s “self-revolution” campaign is not aimed at the Hu camp (Tuanpai), which was not strong to begin with and has little remaining influence. Rather, the Xi leadership will continue cleaning up the Jiang faction, which has flown under everyone’s radar of late. The Jiang faction was curiously “forgotten” at the 20th Party Congress, partly due to Jiang Zemin’s no-show at the opening and closing ceremonies, many observers wrongly identifying Wang Huning and Zhao Leji as Xi’s allies, and with Hu Jintao’s early exit grabbing the world’s attention. But as we wrote in the Oct. 27, 2022 newsletter, “having set the precedent of ‘removing’ a predecessor, Xi will have no qualms about going after Jiang Zemin next.”
