SinoInsight 1
Politburo meeting
Sept. 9
Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo where three draft documents for the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Central Committee were proposed and discussed, according to state media reports. The documents are the draft report for the 20th Party Congress, the draft report of amendments to the CCP constitution, and the draft work report of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to be delivered at the 20th Party Congress. The meeting also reviewed a report on the implementation of Xi’s “eight-point regulations” by the 19th Central Committee (十九屆中央政治局貫徹執行中央八項規定情況報告) and a work report on “rectifying and reducing the burden on the grassroots since the 19th Party Congress” (關於黨的十九大以來整治形式主義為基層減負工作情況的報告).
Regarding amending the Party constitution, the meeting said that revising the constitution at the 20th Party Congress is in line with the “new situation and new tasks,” and is conducive to the regime and Party building. The meeting added that “major theoretical viewpoints and major strategic ideas” (重大理論觀點和重大戰略思想) established at the 20th Party Congress would be added to the Party constitution so that it can “fully reflect” the latest achievements of “Sinicized Marxism” and the “new concepts, new ideas, and new strategies for governing the country” since the 19th Party Congress.
Xi’s overseas trip
Sept. 12
PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying announced that Xi Jinping would be attending the 22th meeting of heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand at the invitation of the Uzbekistan president. Hua added that the Kazakhstan president had also invited Xi to make a state visit.
Sept. 13
State mouthpiece Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping had articles in his name published in the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan media.
Kazakhstan
In an article titled, “Promoting China-Kazakhstan Relations to Achieve Greater Development in the Future” (推動中哈關係在繼往開來中實現更大發展) in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Xi noted that it was the 30th anniversary of “friendly relations” between both countries and their “cooperation achievements.” He then proposed further developing the “China-Kazakhstan permanent comprehensive strategic partnership” and building a “China-Kazakhstan community with a shared future.”
Xi put forth four points of “deployment and planning” for improving the bilateral relationship:
- Both sides should continue to develop good-neighborly friendship. China is willing to work with Kazakhstan on the “top-level design of bilateral relations” from a “strategic and long-term perspective.” Both sides should continue to firmly support each other on issues involving “each other’s core interests and major concerns,” and “constantly consolidate the political foundation of China-Kazakhstan relations.”
- Both sides should continuously deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. China is willing to work with Kazakhstan to focus on the “post-pandemic era, continue being a pioneer in the joint construction of the ‘Belt and Road,” and improve the level of investment and trade facilitation.”
- Both sides should firmly defend common security. China is willing to deepen cooperation with Kazakhstan in law enforcement, security, and defense. Both sides should also work together to combat the “three evils” (violent terrorist forces, ethnic separatist forces, and religious extremist forces in Central Asia), drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, and ensure the safety of large-scale cooperation projects such as oil and gas pipelines between both countries as well as personnel. Both sides resolutely oppose “external interference” and will work together to achieve lasting peace and long-term stability in the region.
- Both sides should comprehensively strengthen international cooperation. China and Kazakhstan should closely cooperate in multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, and “China + Five Central Asian Countries” (中國+中亞五國), as well as oppose unilateralism and camp confrontation.
Uzbekistan
Xi’s article in the Uzbekistan newspaper Narodnoye Slove was titled, “Jointly Create a Better Tomorrow of China-Uzbekistan Relations” (攜手開創中烏關係更加美好的明天). The article noted that Xi was visiting at the invitation of Uzbekistan president Shavkat Mirziyoyev to discuss bilateral plans and to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. The article also praised historical figures who “pioneered” Sino-Uzbekistan friendship in ancient times, praised Uzbekistan’s achievements during its 31 years of independence, and the achievements of China-Uzbekistan cooperation.
Xi raised four points for strengthening the bilateral relationship:
- Both sides should increase mutual support and consolidate bonds of mutual trust. They should strengthen high-level exchanges, enhance political mutual trust, deepen the exchange of experience in state governance and administration, and oppose any interference in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs.
- Both sides should deepen beneficial cooperation, and seek common development and prosperity. China and Uzbekistan should take the opportunity of the 10th anniversary of the “Belt and Road Initiative” in 2023 to build on the past and build on the momentum of “cooperation.”
- Both sides should strengthen security cooperation, and resolve risks and challenges. China and Uzbekistan should deepen cooperation in the field of security, take a clear stand against any forces undermining regional stability, and create a secure external environment for both countries to develop.
- Both sides should intensify people-to-people cultural exchanges and promote people-to-people bonds. China and Uzbekistan should speed up the mutual establishment of cultural centers and Luban Workshops (PRC-sponsored external technical training colleges; akin to Confucius Institutes) in Uzbekistan.
Sept. 14
Xi Jinping arrived in Kazakhstan and held talks with Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
According to state media reports, Xi said that both countries have created many “firsts” in their relations, including in settling boundary questions, laying cross-border oil and gas pipelines, conducting international production capacity cooperation, and building a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership.
Xi added that China “highly values” its relationship with Kazakhstan and will support the latter in “safeguarding national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in taking reform measures to preserve national stability and development.”
Xi also said that it was important for both sides to “work together for high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, boost cooperation in areas such as economy and trade, production capacity, connectivity and COVID-19 response, and expand innovation cooperation in such fields as big data, artificial intelligence, digital finance, cross-border e-commerce, green energy and green infrastructure.”
Tokayev awarded Xi with the Order of the Golden Eagle, the highest order of Kazakhstan awarded to individuals in recognition of their significant contribution to the country.
Taiwan card?
Sept. 6
Cai Xia, a former Central Party School professor currently residing in the U.S., published a nearly 8,000-word piece in Foreign Affairs magazine that was heavily critical of Xi Jinping. Cai barely criticized the CCP in her article and looked back on the Jiang Zemin era with rose-tinted lenses.
In the conclusion, Cai Xia wrote that the “only viable way” of undermining Xi is “a humiliating defeat in a war.” If Xi were to attack Taiwan, “there is a good chance that the war would not go as planned, and Taiwan, with American help, would be able to resist invasion and inflict grave damage on mainland China. In that event, the elites and the masses would abandon Xi, paving the way for not only his personal downfall but perhaps even the collapse of the CCP as we know it,” she wrote.
Sept. 7
In a discussion at the Defense News Conference 2022, U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy Colin H. Kahl said, “I do not think that China wants to put themselves in a position that Russia finds itself in today, which is invading a democratic neighbor — one that I think would generate an enormous amount of global sympathy.”
Kahl added, “It’s no mystery that Xi Jinping has given his military until 2027 to develop the military capabilities to forcefully reunify with Taiwan — if he makes the decision to do that. But I’ve seen no indication that he’s made that decision to do so.”
Sept. 13
Reuters reported that the U.S. is considering options to preemptively sanction the PRC to deter it from invading Taiwan, and Taipei is pressuring the European Union to do the same, citing sources familiar with the matter.
Reuters’ sources say that the sanctions could go “beyond measures already taken in the West to restrict some trade and investment with China in sensitive technologies like computer chips and telecoms equipment.”
A non-U.S. official said that the White House is “focused on getting countries on the same page on sanctions, including “coordinating between Europe and Asia, and avoiding provoking Beijing.” Some analysts told Reuters that the People’s Liberation Army could be the focus of sanctions.
Meanwhile, six sources briefed on Taiwan-Europe discussions told Reuters that Taiwan broached sanctions against the PRC with European officials after Russia invaded Ukraine. Also, top Taiwanese officials have intensified calls for sanctions in recent weeks. Taiwan has not requested anything specific, but has asked Europe to plan what actions it may take in the event of a PRC attack and to warn China privately that it would be met with consequences.
Sept. 14
1. The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted to pass the Taiwan Policy Act (TRA) of 2022 by 17 to 5.
Co-sponsored by Senate foreign relations committee chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Senate budget committee ranking member Lindsey Graham, the TRA contains several measures that would boost Taiwan’s security and deter a PRC attack. Menendez previously described the bill as the “most comprehensive restructuring” of U.S. policy towards Taipei since the 1979 TRA.
Noteworthy measures include:
- Providing Taiwan with $4.5 billion in weapons and security assistance over the next four years.
- Create a $2 billion loan facility to help Taiwan buy more weapons and make it eligible for a war reserve stockpile program.
- Amending the TRA to say that the U.S. must provide weapons to Taiwan to help it carry out a strategy to “deny and deter acts of aggression” by the People’s Liberation Army.
- Formally designating Taiwan a “major non-NATO ally.”
- Rename the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington, the “Taiwan Representative Office.”
- The director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) shall have the title of “Representative” and require Senate confirmation. This is tantamount to raising the AIT to a quasi-embassy.
The 2022 TRA would still require a vote in the full Senate and House after passing the Senate foreign relations committee. There is currently no House version of the bill.
2. Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Washington, hosted about 60 lawmakers from Europe, Asia, and Africa who back sanctions on the PRC for acting aggressively towards Taiwan at the ROC diplomatic mission in Washington, according to Reuters.
The lawmakers include members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and are expected to sign a pledge to get their governments to adopt “greater deterrence against military or other coercive” actions by the PRC against Taiwan, according to a draft reviewed by Reuters.
“We will campaign to ensure our governments signal to the PRC that military aggression towards Taiwan will cost Beijing dearly,” the draft read. “Economic and political measures, including meaningful sanctions, should be considered to deter military escalation, and to ensure trade and other exchanges with Taiwan can continue unimpeded.”
The draft added that relations between the lawmakers’ countries and Taiwan are not for Beijing to determine and that they would push for increasing visits to Taiwan by lawmakers.
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping’s move to amend the Party constitution at the 20th Party Congress is likely meant to enshrine his theoretical work (“Sinicized Marxism,” etc.), revised history (“Four Histories,” “historical resolution,” etc.), and political slogans (“Two Establishes,” etc.) of the past decade to further consolidate his position.
Given the propaganda apparatus’s promotion of narratives and themes in Xi’s “historical resolution” after the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, we believe that Xi could some or all of the following in some form to the Party constitution:
- “Two Establishes”;
- “Self-revolution”;
- “New concepts, new ideas, and new strategies for governing the country”;
- “New leap in the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism”;
- Linking the “second centenary goals” and struggle with the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Despite broad speculation, we believe that it is less likely for Xi to add the title of “people’s leader” to the Party constitution, reinstate the Party Chairman position, or shorten Xi’s political theory to just “Xi Jinping Thought.”
2. We previously explained that Xi’s travels abroad at this time reflect his confidence in his domestic political position and a sign that he has already secured key political agenda items at the 20th Party Congress (taking a third term, favorable personnel reshuffles, etc.).
Xi is looking to strengthen relations with Central Asian countries, and particularly those that produce oil, to somewhat offset the pressures facing the PRC from the U.S.-led global order and its climate agenda. Xi is also looking to revive “Belt and Road” development and stabilize the CCP’s agenda of external domination amid setbacks stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war and the PRC’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Meanwhile, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are hoping for China and Russia to throw them an economic lifeline and shore up their national security as the U.S. and its allies move away from fossil fuels.
Russia’s recent military reversals in Ukraine’s northeastern region of Kharkiv come as both good and bad news for Xi. On the one hand, Russia will become more dependent on the PRC and will be less able to exert its influence over Central Asian countries, a situation that is beneficial to the CCP’s domination agenda. On the other hand, Xi and the PRC further risk offending the U.S. and its allies if Xi appears to draw closer to Russia’s Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Strengthening China-Russia camaraderie and bilateral ties could invite further and unwanted Western pressure upon Xi and the PRC ahead of the 20th Party Congress.
In the long term, the CCP regime will be pro-Russia and adopt a confrontational stance against the West as it looks to protect and assert its interests in a “new cold war” with the U.S. and its allies. However, publicly available information (see Kahl’s remarks above and here) indicates that Xi currently does not want to escalate tensions and provoke conflict with the West; we believe this could change after Xi secures his personal political position at the 20th Party Congress and if China’s economic situation improves. Xi is also presently more interested in courting foreign investments to grow China’s “real” economy and reverse economic deterioration; foreign investors are becoming increasingly wary of China as they account for Beijing’s geopolitical risks and the CCP’s human rights abuses that could have implications for ESG benchmarks.
Xi’s efforts to thread the needle in dealing with the U.S. and its allies while retaining friendly relations with Russia have resulted in a loosening of censorship restrictions in China with regard to commentary and reports on Russia. While the CCP still officially adopts a “neutral but Russia-leaning” stance, social media and “self-media” discussions on the mainland about the Ukrainian counter-offensive and the Russian military’s losses are currently not being shut down. This contrasts with strong censorship of anti-Russian messaging early on in the Russia-Ukraine war, and suggests that Xi and the CCP are leaving room for themselves to work with the West.
Given recent developments regarding Taiwan, we do not rule out a scenario where the U.S. and its allies take advantage of Russia’s predicament and/or the deteriorating domestic situation in China to step up pressure on the PRC and escalate “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” measures (including provoking Xi into invading Taiwan) before the 20th Party Congress. Washington and its allies are likely to maintain pressure on Xi Jinping even after he secures another term as they seek to nudge the PRC in line with their climate and other global agendas.
3. News of Washington planning preemptive sanctions against the PRC, international lawmakers calling for greater deterrence against China, and the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ passage of the 2022 TRA would give Xi a headache. While the bill has some ways to go before it is fully passed and it is unclear if sanctions will be imposed, those developments suggest that America is prepared to support Taiwan even if it means provoking the PRC and crossing its “red lines.” Apart from having the PRC propaganda and foreign affairs apparatuses issue harsh rhetoric, Xi has no good options for pushing back against the TRA, sanctions, and international solidarity with Taiwan before the 20th Party Congress assuming he persists in not desiring to provoke conflict with the U.S. and its allies before the important conclave is held.
Not being able to respond adequately to challenges from the U.S. and its allies would weaken Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) to a degree. But unless the West makes major moves (e.g. recognizing the Republic of China’s sovereignty, clearly supporting “Taiwan independence,” etc.), the blow from these challenges to Xi’s position may yet be insufficient to derail his political agenda for the forthcoming Party Congress.
Washington could conceivably use the 2022 TRA and the threat of preemptive sanctions as bargaining chips to extract concessions from Beijing. If the PRC is willing to go along with the U.S. and its allies on certain issues (climate agenda, condemning and sanctioning Russia, etc.), the latter group could dial back their provocations on Taiwan and other issues.
