SinoInsight 1
From April 20 to April 23, Xi Jinping went on an inspection tour in Shaanxi Province. He was accompanied by several senior officials, including allies Liu He (PRC vice premier), Ding Xuexiang (CCP General Office director), and He Lifeng (National Development and Reform Commission chairman).
Xi’s first stop was the Niubeiliang National Nature Reserve located in the Qinling Mountains in Shaanxi’s Zhashui County. There, Xi stressed the importance of ecological preservation and called on officials to be “ecological guardians.” Xi also instructed officials to draw lessons from a disciplinary case involving the illegal construction of villas in the Qinling Mountains.
On April 22, Xi visited Shaanxi Automobile Holding Group, Xi’an Jiaotong University, and Great Tang All Day Mall. State media photographs showed Xi donning a surgical mask while indoors and when in close proximity to people, and without a mask when outdoors and practicing social distancing. Most photographs also showed Xi looking relaxed and in control.
On April 23, state mouthpiece Xinhua News Agency published a report on Xi’s Shaanxi tour. According to the report, Xi emphasized during his inspection tour that officials must “do a good job” of the “six stabilities” (employment, finance, foreign trade, foreign and domestic investments, job expectations) and implement the “six guarantees” (employment, basic livelihood, market entities, food and energy security, supply chain stability, operations of grassroot institutions).
Xi’s trip to Shaanxi and the Qinling Mountains is politically significant due to two factional struggle incidents connected with the area.
The Qinling Mountains case involves insubordination and “passive resistance” by local officials to the Xi leadership. In May 2014, the central government ordered local Shaanxi officials to tear down illegal villas built in the nature reserves of Qinling Mountains, because the development of the villas was damaging the environment. Xi also issued six separate “important instructions” specifically requesting that the villas be torn down. The local officials, however, did not act on orders and even submitted fake reports to the central government on the progress of demolition work. Work to remove the villas only began in July 2018 after Central Commission for Discipline Inspection deputy director Xu Lingyi personally made two inspection trips to Shaanxi. Zhao Zhengyong, the Shaanxi Party Secretary at the time, was purged in January 2019. The Qinling Mountains case is an example of local officials deciding to sit on their hands instead of complying with orders from Zhongnanhai because Xi lacks “quan wei” (權威) and they are uncertain whether Xi or his political rivals have the upperhand in the CCP factional struggle.
Meanwhile, the “Shaanxi 100 Billion Mining Case” (“陝西千億礦權案”, henceforth referred to as the “Shaanxi case”), a long-running and Byzantine legal incident involving several interest groups, became a heated “battleground” for proxies in the CCP factional struggle last year. In February 2019, a breakthrough in the “Shaanxi Case” that appeared to have been engineered by the Xi camp was met with a reversal after intervention from the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, a Party organ that has long been controlled and influenced by the Jiang Zemin faction. We previously analyzed the “shock turn” in the “Shaanxi Case” and the roles of former state television presenter Cui Yongyuan and incumbent PRC chief justice Zhou Qiang here.
Xi’s Shaanxi tour also comes amid a series of personnel movement in the PRC and in Hong Kong:
April 19
The PRC Ministry of Public Security announced an investigation into Sun Lijun, the vice minister of public security.
April 20
PRC justice minister Fu Zhenghua steps down as the ministry’s deputy Party Secretary.
April 21
Hong Kong chief executive Carrie Lam appoints five new ministers in the cabinet reshuffle after the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests.
OUR TAKE
Xi’s Shaanxi tour offers insight into the CCP factional struggle, Beijing’s current epidemic measures, and the CCP’s concerns.
1. Xi’s trip to Shaanxi, a province where politically significant developments unfolded, coincides with high-level purges and reshuffles involving high-level personnel in the CCP regime’s political and legal affairs apparatus (Sun Lijun and Fu Zhenghua) and the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government. Both developments are almost certainly meant to feed off one another to advance Xi’s political messaging.
We believe that Xi Jinping is sending several political signals to the Party:
- Xi wants CCP cadres and officials to know that his political position is secure.
- Xi wants to show cadres and officials that he has the upperhand in the CCP factional struggle.
- Xi is warning those who continue to oppose him or are still aligned with the Jiang faction or other rivals in the regime’s political and legal affairs apparatus that they should fall in line with him or be dealt with.
- Xi wants local cadres and officials to be confident in his leadership’s handling of the coronavirus epidemic, and hence comply with the central government’s orders to ensure the normal resumption of work and life in their localities.
Put another way, Xi’s Shaanxi trip and recent personnel developments are designed to both reassure and intimidate CCP cadres and officials.
Officials in the political and legal affairs apparatus who oppose Xi face high levels of political risk. Should Xi maintain his advantage in the factional struggle, he could even order an investigation into PRC chief justice Zhou Qiang, and possibly during the 2020 Two Sessions at the earliest (May or June).
2. Political messaging aside, Xi’s Shaanxi trip also telegraphs Beijing’s attitude on the coronavirus epidemic. From Xi’s calm expression, his mask-wearing habit, and his interaction with the people in specific public venues (a school and a shopping area), Beijing wants to reassure the public that the Party has the epidemic situation under control and that the Chinese people should be comfortable in resuming work and leaving their homes. Xi’s attempt at reassurance is almost certainly aimed at facilitating efforts to rescue the Chinese economy.
3. Xi’s focus on the “six stabilities” and “six guarantees,” as well as the recent personnel developments, indicate that all is not well in the CCP.
The personnel developments, and particularly the purge of Sun Lijun, corroborate our assessment of an intensification of the CCP factional struggle.
Meanwhile, the “six ensures,” which were rolled out during a Politburo meeting on April 17, are a sign that the CCP feels endangered by the multiple crises facing the regime, including the coronavirus epidemic, a food crisis, countries and companies pulling supply chains out of China, and a sharply worsening Chinese economy.
SinoInsight 2
On April 20, PRC justice minister Fu Zhenghua was no longer listed as the ministry’s Party group deputy secretary (not deputy Party Secretary, a higher position) on the ministry’s website. This development drew widespread speculation about Fu’s political fate.
On April 21, Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) Party Secretary Guo Shengkun chaired the first meeting of a new Party leading group (平安中國建設協調小組) set up to handle “stability maintenance” work and “political security” issues. Except for Liaoning governor Tang Yijun, all the officials who attended the meeting were leading members of the CCP regime’s “stability maintenance” apparatus (public security minister Zhao Kezhi, state security chief Chen Wenqing, chief justice Zhou Qiang, People’s Armed Police commander Wang Ning, Central Military Commission PLAC boss Wang Renhua, etc.) and members of the CPLAC.
OUR TAKE
1. Fu Zhenghua’s career background marks him as a “turncoat” Jiang faction member. When he was promoted to PRC justice minister in March 2018, we observed then that the promotion does not “guarantee his safety” and Fu “is at high risk of being investigated, and could very well be purged the moment he shows signs of disloyalty in his new position.” We believe that our analysis from two years ago holds true today.
Some observers have pointed out that Fu is already 65 and his stepping down as deputy Party Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security is merely a normal part of his retirement process and hence he is not in trouble. While we concur that Fu’s retirement is imminent, we do not believe that he is out of the woods yet, particularly with his factional background.
If Fu Zhenghua is not suspected of resisting Xi or being disloyal in recent years and does not oppose Xi after stepping down, there is a slim chance that he could enjoy a relatively peaceful retirement. Fu’s political risks, however, remain very high given the state of the factional struggle and Party nature. First, Xi Jinping is still in the process of clearing out and consolidating his control over the regime’s political and legal affairs apparatus, and could yet dig up or receive significant dirt on Fu that warrants his purge. Second, Fu almost certainly made many enemies while executing his duties, particularly when he was investing Zhou Yongkang and other Jiang faction members as vice minister of public security. That means that many people have reason to report on Fu and make Xi suspicious of him. Third, developments in the CCP factional struggle could compel Xi to purge Fu regardless of how well or poorly the latter served under Xi.
Fu Zhenghua’s political fate and post-retirement safety will offer insight into the stability of Xi Jinping’s political position.
2. Fu Zhenghua was a notable absentee from the April 21 meeting of the new “stability maintenance” leading group. From the roster of attendees, it appears that Liaoning governor Tang Yijun has already taken Fu’s spot in the CPLAC. There is a very good chance that Tang will eventually replace Fu as PRC justice minister at the upcoming Two Sessions.
Tang’s career trajectory indicates that he is an official that Xi trusts. Xi and Tang served together in the Zhejiang provincial government; Xi was Zhejiang Party Secretary while Tang was a member and secretary-general of the provincial discipline inspection committee. In June 2005, Tang would be transferred to Ningbo City in Zhejiang to serve as the city’s deputy Party Secretary and discipline inspection chief. Tang’s career, however, appeared to briefly reach a “dead end” in Ningbo as he was promoted to a sinecure position (Ningbo Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference chairman) yet still considered young (50 years old) for a PRC official at the time. His career only “revived” after Xi Jinping started clearing out Jiang faction provincial officials in earnest in 2016. Tang was first promoted to Ningbo deputy governor and acting governor in May 2016, and eventually reached his current post after the 19th Party Congress in October 2017.
3. Recent personnel purges and reshuffles in the CCP regime affirm our analysis about the escalation of the CCP factional struggle. The factional struggle is becoming more and more ruthless as the mentality of the various factions shift from “you die, I live” to “perish together.”
Current trends in the CCP factional struggle will have far-reaching implications for Sino-U.S. relations and the political situation in China. There is a high probability of Black Swan events occurring in China in the second half of 2020.
