SinoInsight 1
On July 29, Xi Jinping promoted People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force political commissar Xu Zhongbo to the rank of general, the highest officer rank in the PLA.
On July 30, Xi chaired the CCP Politburo’s twenty-second study session, themed on the modernization of the PLA and national defense. Xi delivered remarks regarding the military during the study session, held on the eve of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. Key points from Xi’s remarks include:
- A strong nation (强國) requires a strong military (强軍), and a strong military guarantees national safety.
- A strong military is required to guarantee “peace and development,” and the military must “faithfully follow the Party’s commands.”
- Overall planning for the modernization of the military and the regime must be viewed in relation to each other (全黨全國一盤棋). The PLA and local governments must also cooperate to advance the military and defense modernization agenda.
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping has been rapidly promoting General Xu Zhongbo up the ranks since his inauguration in 2012.
- 2013: Xu, then head of the 26th Group Army (later renamed as the 80th Group Army) political work department (corps deputy leader grade), was promoted to group army political commissar (corps leader grade).
- Feb. 2016: Xu was appointed political commissar of the Western Theater Command Ground Forces (theater command deputy leader grade), a promotion.
- July 2017: Xu was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.
- Oct. 2017: Xu was appointed an alternate member of the 19th Central Committee.
- Dec. 2017: Xu was appointed political commissar of the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (theater command leader grade), a promotion.
- July 2020: Xu was transferred to the PLA Rocket Force to serve as political commissar.
- Aug. 2020: Xu was promoted to the rank of general.
Xu Zhongbo, 60, received several “exceptional promotions” (破格提拔) up the ranks. In under five years, he climbed three grades from corps leader to theater command leader; per regulations, PLA officers must serve at least two years at their grade before being eligible for promotion. Meanwhile, Xu was promoted to general after holding his lieutenant general rank for slightly over three years; before changes were made to sync the rank and grade of senior officers at the corps level and higher, PLA senior officers were typically promoted after holding a rank for at least four years.
Xu’s meteoric rise affirms our analysis after the 19th Party Congress in 2017 that Xi Jinping had trouble consolidating control over the military and would gradually promote new leaders to bring the military, long under the sway of the Jiang Zemin faction, more fully under his control.
2. There are three likely reasons why Xi chose to hold a Politburo study session on the “strong military” theme: to commemorate the 90th PLA Day on Aug. 1, prepare the CCP for the Sino-U.S. “new cold war,” and bolster his political position to better handle CCP factional struggle escalation. Of the aforementioned possible reasons, Xi’s concerns about factional struggle far outweigh considerations for the other two.
The CCP has been advancing military modernization since 2015, with Xi emphasizing a “strong military” since 2017. What has now changed for the CCP since then, particularly in recent months, is that the U.S. and its allies are increasing their military presence and stepping up joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Ramped up U.S. and allied military activity in the Indo-Pacific compels the CCP to bolster its forces there and issue tough-sounding propaganda to show Chinese nationalists the CCP regime is not cowed by external powers.
The Sino-U.S. “new cold war,” however, is just one of a “perfect storm” of problems facing Xi and the CCP. Xi’s factional rivals will almost certainly seize upon his failures as an excuse to challenge his paramount position and force him to relinquish power (by appointing a successor, placing more emphasis in the “collective leadership” model, etc.). Xi’s rivals are expected to challenge him at the annual Beidaihe meetings in the summer, before CCP Central Committee plenary sessions, and at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. To maintain his paramount position, buffer challenges or even intimidate his enemies into nonaction, Xi needs to consolidate his power to an even greater degree and strengthen his grip on key levers of power within the regime, such as the military. Tightening control over the military involves winning over the loyalty of senior military officers through promotions and investing more resources into the PLA.
SinoInsight 2
On July 27, the customs department of the Wuhan City Public Security Bureau issued a notice that required state agencies, state-owned enterprises, as well as various civilian and military work units (danwei) to meticulously regulate the issuance and approval of travel documents to employees seeking to travel abroad for personal reasons. Local disciplinary organs are to void the passports of employees who are unable to offer their passports to work unit organization departments when notified. The notice was subsequently deleted from the Wuhan customs department’s website for reasons unknown.
OUR TAKE
1. The fact that the CCP is tightening immigration controls is a sign it feels imperiled and needs to prevent Party members from jumping ship. The CCP is also likely shaken by virologist Dr. Li-Meng Yan’s escape to the United States and her exposé of the CCP’s coronavirus cover-up, and will preemptively deny other “defectors” the opportunity to follow suit. We will not be surprised if other local governments have released, or will release in the near future, immigration control notices similar to that issued by the Wuhan Public Security Bureau customs department.
The Wuhan customs department’s notice affirms a prediction in our China 2020 outlook that “the CCP could restrict cadres and civil servants from leaving the country, such as by withholding their passports.”
2. We also predicted in our China 2020 outlook that “CCP officials could attempt to defect and expose the regime’s dirty secrets.” With the CCP tightening control over Party members’ emmigration, as well as the Trump administration considering travel restrictions for CCP members, we could indeed witness CCP defections and exposés in the near future.
SinoInsight 3
The past week saw at least 16 personnel reshuffles involving officials at the deputy ministerial level and above. Four of the reshuffles were senior provincial-level positions while three were positions in the ministries and Party personnel affairs:
July 30
- Li Wei (age 50), director of the first bureau of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, was promoted to deputy governor of Jilin Province.
- Shen Beili (age 57), commissioner of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in the Macao Special Administrative Region, succeeded Li Jun as deputy minister of the CCP International Liaison Department.
July 31
- Xiao Yaqing (age 61), director of the State Administration for Market Regulation, succeeded the retiring Miao Wei as Party Secretary of the organization department of the PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
- Cao Lijun (age 48), mayor of Hebei’s Changde City, was promoted to vice governor of Sichuan Province.
- The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) website announced that Li Shulei (age 56), deputy Party Secretary of the CCDI and deputy director of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC), was elected Party Secretary of the CCDI-NSC office in Party Central during the first delegates meeting of the disciplinary and supervision bodies on July 26.
August 1
- Xin Changxing (age 57), deputy Party Secretary of Anhui Province, was appointed acting governor of Qinghai Province to fill up a vacancy.
- Wang Fengchao (age 55), vice governor of Sichuan Province, was transferred to Sichuan’s Chengdu City to serve as vice mayor.
- Luo Qiang (age 57), mayor of Chengdu, was transferred to the position of Sichuan vice governor.
- Li Gang (age 55), director of Sichuan’s Development and Reform Commission, was promoted to vice governor of Sichuan.
- Wang Zhanying (age 55), Party Secretary of Henan’s Shangqiu City, was promoted to deputy governor of Henan Province.
August 2
- Hu Heping (age 57), Party Secretary of Shaanxi Province, succeeded the retiring Luo Shugang as Party Secretary of the PRC’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
- Liu Guozhong (age 57), governor of Shaanxi, succeeded Hu Heping as Shaanxi Party Secretary.
- Zhao Yide (age 55), deputy Party Secretary of Hebei Province, succeeded Liu Guozhong as Shaanxi governor.
OUR TAKE
1. The flurry of personnel changes come just before senior CCP officials are scheduled to retreat to the Beidaihe beach resort where informal but consequential discussions (including topics like key personnel appointments) take place. We believe the recent personnel reshuffles, particularly those in Shaanxi Province, are connected with the CCP factional struggle.
2. We previously analyzed Xi Jinping’s tribulations with the Shaanxi officialdom, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and the Jiang Zemin faction (see here and here). Given Xi’s recent contentions with Shaanxi, he would naturally wish to replace leading members of the provincial government with officials who are less likely to be disloyal and have the ability to see that his orders are duly carried out by the recalcitrant local officialdom.
Shaanxi’s new Party Secretary and governor were plucked from the state government side instead of the Party governing apparatus. Also, new Shaanxi governor Zhao Yide was an old colleague of Xi’s at Zhejiang Province. The recent appointment of senior leaders in Shaanxi Province conforms to a personnel reshuffle “pattern” that Xi relies on as a workaround to address shortcomings caused by his factional struggle with the Jiang faction and his own lack of a faction. Having no faction or followers prior to his ascension to Party boss in 2012, Xi’s best tactical option was to promote former colleagues with whom he had a degree of familiarity with. Also, while many senior Party governing apparatus officials owed their careers to the Jiang faction and were likely to be less loyal to Xi, the officials who climbed the ranks in the parallel state government apparatus tended to be technocrats who were less likely to have a personal stake in the factional struggle.
Xi’s promotion of technocrats, however, can be hit-and-miss. Technocrats are well-educated and have the know-how to get things done, but can lack the political savvy to effectively deal with treacherous factional schemes. Take the case of former Shaanxi Party Secretary Hu Heping. Hu, a technocrat official, enjoyed rapid promotions under Xi, rising from head of the Zhejiang Organization Department (2013) to Shaanxi boss (2017) in barely four years. However, Hu appeared to be helpless in the “Shaanxi 100 Billion Mining Case” saga (“陝西千億礦權案”) in late 2018, unable to promptly deal with corrupt local officials responsible for the illegal construction of villas in Shaanxi’s Qinling Mountains. Hu Heping’s transfer to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism suggests his future career progression will be limited.
3. Xi Jinping’s Shaanxi personnel reshuffles and the appointment of Li Shulei as Party Secretary of the CCDI-NSC office in Party Central could be intended to put Politburo Standing Committee member and CCDI Party Secretary Zhao Leji on notice.
Zhao Leji was Shaanxi Party Secretary from March 2007 to November 2012, and his tenure overlapped with disgraced Shaanxi governor Zhao Zhengyong (no relation to Zhao Leji). Zhao Zhengyong, who was purged in January 2019, is believed to be culpable in the Shaanxi officialdom’s insubordination toward the central government in the Qinling Mountains case. It is possible that Xi suspects Zhao Leji and Zhao Zhengyong of having contributed in “passively resisting” Party Central on the Qinling Mountains case and the Shaanxi mining case.
If Xi suspects Zhao Leji, then Li Shulei’s recent appointment could be Xi’s way of stepping up oversight into and “leashing” the CCP’s anti-corruption boss. Li is a Xi ally, having served as Xi’s deputy at the Central Party School in 2007 and enjoying “rocket promotions” up the ranks after Xi became Party boss in 2012.
4. We believe the CCP factional struggle will intensify going forward as Xi Jinping struggles with a “perfect storm” of domestic and international woes. Personnel reshuffles are an uncontroversial way for Xi to gradually overcome his factional enemies. Xi can be expected to constantly remove and reshuffle officials in the lead up to the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Xi, however, will likely be forced to make risky purges and attempt even more drastic measures (like investigating retired or active Politburo Standing Committee members) should the U.S. hit the CCP with measures that directly impact the Party elite (travel restrictions, sanctions over sensitive human rights issues, etc.). Political Black Swans could surface in China before the year is over.
