SinoInsight 1
On June 10, the National Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification campaign held its first press conference. Chen Yixin, the secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and deputy head of the National Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification Leading Group, introduced the progress of the first segment of rectification work and follow-up measures to be taken.
Political and legal affairs apparatus “education and rectification” campaign results announced at the press conference include:
- A total of 12,576 political and legal affairs officials nationwide “took the initiative” and surrendered to the discipline inspection authorities.
- Investigation cases were opened against 27,364 political and legal affairs officials who are suspected of violating Party discipline and the law, and 1,760 of those officers were detained.
- Political and legal affairs officials guilty of Party discipline and legal infractions were subjected to four categories of punishment. Of the 72,312 police officers punished in the first segment of rectification work, 83.5 percent were subjected to penalties under the first category (various degrees of verbal warnings and criticisms); 13 percent met with the second category of punishments (formal warnings and suspensions); 2.1 percent were punished under the third category (removed from office, demotions, Party probation, or Party expulsion); and 1.4 percent were dealt with under the fourth category (criminal prosecution and sentences).
- A total of 2,503 senior political and legal affairs officials (secretaries of local Political and Legal Affairs Commissions and the heads of public security bureaus, procuratorates, and courts) from various cities and counties were reshuffled, along with an unspecified number of officials in political and legal affairs leadership teams or important posts.
The current phase of the “education and rectification” campaign that officially kicked off on Feb. 27 targets the nearly 2.7 million political and legal affairs officials at the city and county level. A total of 16 central supervision groups have been dispatched across the country, and an online reporting platform has been set up to facilitate the campaign.
The campaign will also carry out “comprehensive investigations” into:
- Cases involving commutation, parole, and temporary service of sentences outside prison recorded in the national prison system since 1990;
- Political and legal affairs officials and their family members involved in business-related violations;
- Retired judges and procurators involved in legal profession-related violations and who acted as “judicial brokers” (司法掮客, or legal affairs officials who abused their position to let off law breakers).
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From June 1 to June 10, mainland media and government reports revealed the probe of another nine active or retired (five) provincial-level political and legal affairs officials.
June 1
1. Gan Rongkun (age 59), a member of the Standing Committee of the Henan Provincial Party Committee and secretary of the Henan Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commissions, was investigated.
June 2
2. Meng Yongshan (65), chief prosecutor of the Qinghai Provincial Procuratorate, voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Per PRC official norms, Meng technically should be five years retired.
3. Gao Weili (61, retired in November 2020), the former member of the first inspection team of the Heilongjiang Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, was investigated. Before moving to his final poste in May 2018, Gao was at a prefecture-level city procuratorate in Heilongjiang.
June 4
4. Xiang Jinhua (62, retired in April 2019), a former vice president of the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, was investigated.
5. Sun Jianguo (67), a former Henan Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission inspector, voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Per PRC official norms, Meng should be seven years retired.
6. Yan Jianzhong (63, retired in January 2018), a former deputy inspector of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Prison Administration Bureau, was investigated.
June 9
7. Wang Xinyuan (60, close to retirement), a deputy head of Beijing’s Fengtai District and former director of the Fengtai Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, was investigated.
June 10
8. Li Shaohua (64, female, retired in February 2018), a former Shandong Provincial Procuratorate Party Group deputy secretary and deputy chief prosecutor, was investigated.
9. Zhao Tao (51), a member of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee and deputy director of the Tibet Public Security Bureau, was investigated.
OUR TAKE
1. The political and legal affairs “education and rectification” campaign developments above show that Xi Jinping’s effort to cleanse the apparatus’s ranks is both intense and broad in scope.
As we have been noting in newsletters since the start of this year, Xi and the CCP are faced with mounting internal and external pressures. Therefore, Xi has to tighten his grip on the Party’s “knife handle” (the political and legal affairs apparatus) lest the Jiang Zemin faction or other elements of the “anti-Xi coalition” leverage their influence over the regime’s “stability maintenance” system to give Beijing even bigger headaches.
2. How the Xi leadership is cleaning up the political and legal affairs apparatus is reminiscent of an earlier campaign to rectify the military. Intense purges and mass personnel reshuffles are carried out in mid-ranking areas (cities and counties), which have the effect of disrupting entrenched factional or interest networks in the apparatus. Newly appointed officials then vigorously perpetuate the rectification campaign through investigations and other measures to secure political capital and career prospects; over time, a new “political correctness” will permeate the officialdom.
Meanwhile, the removal and retirement of older political and legal affairs officials leave them and their cronies exposed to investigation and punishment. The more senior retired or retiring officials are particularly vulnerable because they would have greater opportunities to make enemies over the course of their career, and are thus more likely to be reported on. This group of officials would have climbed the ranks during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012), and are now being preyed upon by younger officials who owe their career and loyalty to the Xi leadership.
Based on our research of rectification campaigns under Xi, probes will progress up the ranks to the provincial level and above; the swatting of “flies” (lower ranking corrupt officials) is necessary to determine chains of patronage and factional allegiance, thus building a case against the “big tigers” (higher ranking corrupt officials). As things are currently progressing, senior provincial and legal affairs officials at the provincial rank and higher could meet their downfall before the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
3. The political and legal affairs apparatus has long demonstrated resistance towards Xi Jinping despite the latter’s many efforts to cleanse its ranks. Indeed, the purge of former Political and Legal Affairs Commission chief Zhou Yongkang and several of his cronies who ran provincial branches of the PLAC did not result in greater obedience and loyalty towards Xi from the apparatus, but instead led to prominent challenges of Xi’s “quan wei.”
For example, Xi appeared to leverage the huge public uproar over the “Lei Yang Incident” (see here and here) back in May 2016 to rectify the political and legal affairs apparatus. The arrest of the Beijing public security officials responsible for Lei Yang’s death seemed to suggest that Xi was on the verge of a breakthrough. However, things took a turn in October that year after the five political and legal affairs officials “allowed” tens of thousands of retired military veterans to surround the Central Military Commission headquarters in Beijing as they demanded better welfare. This episode was remarkably similar to the so-called “siege of Zhongnanhai” incident in April 1999 when Beijing municipal public security officers deliberately directed 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners who were looking to petition the central government over a crackdown in Tianjin to “surround” the CCP leadership headquarters; Jiang Zemin subsequently used the “Zhongnanhai incident” to justify the Falun Gong persecution campaign. As for the “Lei Yang Incident,” local prosecutors failed to charge the five officials involved (they were later disciplined by the Party) and Xi Jinping was widely slammed by the public for failing to ensure justice in a clear-cut case of official abuse.
Other examples of political and legal affairs apparatus challenges to Xi’s authority include a shock reversal of what was supposed to be the delivery of justice in the high-profile “Shaanxi 100 Billion Mining Case” (“Shaanxi case”) in 2018, and efforts by the apparatus to restrict the freedoms of former CCTV presenter Cui Yongyuan (see here and here). Cui appeared to weigh in on the “Shaanxi case” and exposed potential malfeasance by Supreme People’s Court president Zhou Qiang on behalf of the Xi camp.
SinoInsight 2
Domestic and foreign pressures keep growing for Xi Jinping. Notable recent developments include:
Domestic
Discourse/societal control
On June 8, PRC state media announced that the national fight against pornography and illegal publications (掃黃打非) working group launched a “clean internet” collective campaign from June 8 to Oct. 1 to “specifically rectify harmful information and undesirable content on the Internet.” The working group’s campaign will be implemented by the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the National Radio and Television Administration.
The national office for the fight against pornography and illegal publications noted that as of the end of May, the authorities have handled over 1.55 million pieces of harmful online information, banned and shut down more than 6,400 illegal websites, investigated 960 cases relating to pornography and illegal publications, and 70 major internet-related cases nationwide.
Analysis: Beijing’s “anti-pornography and illegal publications” campaign, like WeChat’s recent effort to “clean up” accounts that “spread historical nihilism, slander Party history, hype up scandals,” is primarily aimed at controlling public discourse and tightening the CCP’s stranglehold on society ahead of crucial periods for the Party.
Student protests
Large-scale student protests recently broke out at a number of independent colleges in the provinces of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Shandong:
- June 4 (Tiananmen anniversary): Students from the Zhijiang College of Zhejiang University of Technology bore banners in a protest.
- June 5: Students from Hangzhou Business School of Zhejiang Gongshang University held a large protest parade.
- June 6 – June 7: An estimated 3,000 to 4,000 students from the Nanjing Normal University College of Zhongbei in Jiangsu carried out a protest.
- June 10: A large number of students from the School of Business of Shanxi University protested on campus, resulting in a clash with the police.
The students were opposing a CCP plan introduced last May that would see them “transitioned” from college undergraduates into vocational school students after the merger of some independent colleges with vocational schools. As a result of the student protest, the education departments of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Shandong told mainland media that they were “suspending” the student “transitioning” plan.
Analysis: The CCP’s plan to cut back on four-year degree colleges and increase the number of vocational institutions is born out of economic necessity and generational changes. Young people in China are more interested in becoming online streamers/internet celebrities or even working for delivery apps than joining the manufacturing sector. This is bad news for the Chinese economy, which is still heavily reliant on manufacturing for growth. The CCP is also aware that it needs to raise the core competencies of Chinese workers so that the regime can be more competitive in producing higher quality goods and be more self-sufficient if key technologies like advanced semiconductors can be manufactured domestically.
The problem with the CCP’s plan to produce more skilled workers lies in the crude way in which it is being executed, i.e. merging colleges with vocational schools and forcibly “transitioning” college students into vocational school students. Such policies are the result of ingrained Communist Party culture; CCP officials concerned with accruing political capital and getting glowing annual work performance reviews likely overlooked the interests of students and the social impact of mandatory “transitioning” in coming up with the merger plan.
The CCP could revisit its Hong Kong playbook in handling the mainland student protests. The “concessions” by local education departments are likely empty gestures designed to get the students to back off. Once student presence on campus dwindles over the school holidays and protest gatherings fizzle, the authorities will likely swoop in and arrest protest leaders. Beijing, however, will have a problem if the protests instead gather steam and start breaking out in more areas across the country.
More commentaries targeting Xi
On June 10, Duowei News, a Beijing-based overseas Chinese language media aligned with elements of the “anti-Xi coalition,” published a commentary titled, “Who Will Supervise the Party Central Committee” (誰來監督黨中央). The commentary directly attacks the June 1 guidelines issued by the CCP Central Committee on strengthening supervision of leading officials and their leadership team (we analyzed the guidelines here), and hints that Xi Jinping, the number one leading official (“一把手”), is a dictator who is not subject to supervision.
Analysis: Duowei’s bold and repeated attacks (see here) against Xi are highly irregular, and indirectly validate Xi’s concerns about “another Party Central.”
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Beginning in March, various mainland media outlets kept republishing a prominent 1978 Guangming Daily commentary titled “Practice is the Sole Standard for Testing Truth” (實踐是檢驗真理的唯一標準 ). At the time it was originally published, Deng Xiaoping publicly praised the commentary piece and used it to broaden his refutation of then-Party Chairman Hua Guofeng and his “Two Whatevers” faction. Eventually, Deng “brought order out of chaos” (撥亂反正) by marginalizing Hua and his pro-Mao faction, becoming the CCP’s paramount leader, and launching his “reform and opening up” policy.
This year, Guangming Daily first republished the commentary on March 24 and specifically called attention to Deng’s affirmation of the piece. On May 31, Guangming Daily featured the commentary on its cover page and noted that Hu Yaobang was previously approved and republished when the latter was vice president of the Central Party School.
The mainland internet portal NetEase also started featuring old commentary pieces on its site last month. On May 5, NetEase republished a 2008 commentary by vice premier Liu He, but changed its title from the prosaic “Thirty Years of China’s Economy and Long-term Problems in the Future” (中國經濟三十年與未來長期問題) to the provocative “Without Reflection on the Disasters of the Cultural Revolution, There Would Be No Economic Growth in China Today” (沒有對文革災難的反思，就不可能有今天中國經濟的增長 ). On May 27, NetEase republished a piece titled “A Rare Record of a High-level Conversation With a Huge Amount of Information” (一份罕見的高層談話記錄，信息量巨大) which contained a dialogue between Nobel laureate Milton Friedman and former PRC leader Zhao Ziyang. Both articles were widely disseminated on the Chinese internet and sparked heated discussions.
Analysis: The circulation of the aforementioned articles suggests that influential cadres in the Party elite opposed to Xi Jinping are “concerned” that the latter’s “historical revisionism” and policies will lead the PRC to a second Cultural Revolution and economic crisis. Hence, media efforts are underway to equate Xi with Mao’s leftism and encourage a “bringing of order out of chaos.”
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Foreign
G7
In a joint communique issued on June 13, the G7 leaders:
- Called for a “timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID-19 Origins study” in China;
- Would “continue to consult on collective approaches to challenging [China’s] non-market policies and practices”;
- Called on China to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially in relation to Xinjiang and those rights, freedoms and high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law”;
- Stressed the importance of “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and expressed concerns about the “situation in the East and South China Seas and strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and increase tensions.”
While the statement expressed concerns about “forced labor in global supply chains, including state-sponsored forced labor of vulnerable groups and minorities”—a clear reference to the CCP’s practices in Xinjiang—it did not name China.
News outlets also report that the G7 is planning to roll out a Build Back Better World (B3W) infrastructure project to counter the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The project is elaborated on, but not named, in point 67 of the joint statement. According to Reuters, the White House said that “the G7 and its allies will use the B3W initiative to mobilize private-sector capital in areas such as climate, health and health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality.”
The Biden-Harris administration has been promoting the G7 meeting and the joint statement as a triumph for U.S. diplomacy in standing up to China. Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized in television interviews (see here and here) that the 2021 G7 joint statement mentioned “China” as opposed to the G7 leaders’ meeting in 2018. “It’s important in and of itself that there’s a focus on China,” Blinken told Chris Wallace of Fox News Sunday.
‘Lab leak’ theory and coronavirus cover-up
In the past week, mainstream media outlets continued to prominently cover the “lab leak” theory of COVID-19’s origins and float the idea of holding Xi Jinping and China accountable for covering up the coronavirus outbreak. Conservative media and Republican politicians also spotlighted the “lab leak” theory, with some pundits expressing vindication for having called attention to the theory last year when it was being heavily censored.
Former President Donald Trump and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly chimed in on the issue:
- June 7: In a Washington Post op-ed, Pompeo and Lewis Libby called on the Biden-Harris administration to lead an international coalition to “persuade China to curb its dangerous viral research activities, cooperate with the investigation of the coronavirus’s origins and, over time, pay some measure of the pandemic’s damages to other nations.” They also suggested that an “international coalition could impose heavy costs on CCP leaders and China’s economic activities.”
- June 12: During a rally in Wisconsin, Trump said that China should pay reparations for the COVID-19 pandemic and noted that $10 trillion “wouldn’t cover it.” Trump echoed an earlier call for reparations in North Carolina on June 5 where he said, “the time has come for America and the world to demand reparations and accountability from the Communist Party of China.” He also recommended imposing 100 percent tariffs on all goods from China and seeking $10 trillion in compensation from the CCP.
Xinjiang and Hong Kong
In a call with Politburo member Yang Jiechi on June 11, Secretary Blinken “underscored U.S. concern over the deterioration of democratic norms in Hong Kong and the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.”
Also on June 11, the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting was awarded to Buzzfeed journalists for their reports on the CCP’s detention camps in Xinjiang.
On June 12, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof called on the world to take action to punish China over its atrocities in Xinjiang and “other rogue behavior by President Xi Jinping,” including a partial boycott of the “Genocide Olympics” in Beijing in 2022 and eliminating Xinjiang products from the supply chain.
Miscellaneous
June 8
The Biden-Harris administration announced the establishment of a supply chains disruptions task force “to provide a whole-of-government response to address near-term supply chain challenges to the economic recovery,” including from China.
June 9
- The U.S. Senate passed the $250 billion, 2,400-page U.S. Innovation and Competition Act of 2021. While the legislation was widely billed as a serious bipartisan effort to allow America to counter and compete with China, it is also described as resembling the CCP’s “Made in China 2025” industrial policy and slammed for failing to actually safeguard the U.S. against CCP subversion, theft, and military aggression (see here and here).
- President Biden issued an executive order “on protecting Americans’ sensitive data from foreign adversaries,” including the PRC. The executive order also revoked President Trump’s ban on TikTok and WeChat.
- Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin issued a directive “initiating several major Department-wide efforts to better address the security challenges posed by China” per the recommendations of the Pentagon’s China Task Force.
- Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga referred to Taiwan as a country in his first one-on-one parliamentary debate with opposition leaders.
June 11
Romanian president Klaus Iohannis signed a bill that effectively bars PRC companies from participating in the country’s 5G telecommunications network.
June 12
Japanese prime minister Suga and President Biden discussed “China, and preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” in their one-to-one meeting at the G7.
OUR TAKE
1. Recent domestic troubles in the PRC highlight Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” problem and the seriousness of the factional struggle threat from “another Party Central.” To overcome those problems, Beijing has no choice but to step up “rectification” efforts and personnel reshuffles while clamping down tighter and tighter on society. However, the harder Xi cracks down, the more likely it is he will be met with greater resistance; historically, revolts break out when times are tough, governments are oppressive, and the people have nothing to lose.
We anticipate that Xi will run into more, not less, domestic and intra-Party troubles in the second half of 2021 as the CCP enters one “sensitive” period after another (Party centennial, Beidaihe, Sixth Plenum, etc.). The Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi coalition” have a very limited window of opportunity to undermine Xi and spoil his plans to take a norm-breaking third term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. The time crunch, huge personal interests at stake, and “perish together” mentality in the CCP factional struggle sharply raises the probability of political Black Swans emerging in China before the end of this year.
2. Domestic opponents are not the only ones targeting Xi Jinping’s “quan wei.” The G7 countries and the international community are spotlighting the CCP’s gross human rights abuses and other misbehavior under Xi with increased intensity, and at times have singled out the General Secretary for blame. This phenomenon adheres to the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy by an establishment think-tank that emerged in January, and smacks of deliberate collaboration rather than sheer coincidence.
To date, the external “anti-Xi coalition” is more bark than bite in undermining Xi. However, Xi’s factional rivals will almost certainly leverage heightened international pressure to push for his marginalization (force him to appoint a successor, etc.). The external “anti-Xi coalition” will look for signs that their pressure campaign is working and could step up their efforts accordingly to undermine Xi in the second half of the year, including taking concrete actions against China and more closely coordinating their attacks with Xi’s factional rivals on the mainland.
Countering external attacks will not be easy for Xi, especially with the PRC’s poor domestic performance and the CCP’s current focus on making itself “lovable” to the world. We do not rule out the possibility of Xi pre-emptively going “nuclear” with the negative political legacies of his chief factional rival when pushed to the brink by the domestic and international pressures arrayed against him.
