SinoInsight 1
Biden administration’s China moves
May 23
1. During the Q&A session of a joint press conference with Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, President Joe Biden was asked whether he considered removing U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports. Biden replied, “I am considering it. We did not impose any of those tariffs. They were imposed by the last administration, and they’re under consideration.”
Biden was also asked if he was “willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan,” to which he answered, “Yes.” He added, “That’s the commitment we made … We agree with the One China policy; we’ve signed on to it and all the attendant agreements made from there.”
After the press conference, an unnamed White House official told media outlets, “As the President said, our policy has not changed. He reiterated our One China Policy and our commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. He also reiterated our commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with the military means to defend itself.”
When asked if the U.S. would send troops to Taiwan in the event of invasion by the PRC during a Quad fellowship announcement photo spray on May 24, Biden said, “The policy has not changed at all. I stated that when I made my statement yesterday.” When asked if the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was “dead,” Biden said, “No.”
International observers hotly debated Biden’s May 23 remark about America’s willingness to defend Taiwan militarily, including whether he really meant what he said due to earlier “gaffes” on the same subject, and whether U.S. strategic ambiguity was over.
The CCP stuck to its usual rhetoric. In an op-ed published in the South China Morning Post on May 26, PRC ambassador to the United States Qin Gang accused the U.S. government of “hollowing out” the one-China policy, violating “basic norms governing international relations,” “substantially upgrading its official relations with Taiwan,” and emboldening “separatists” to “turn the Taiwan Strait into a dangerous powder keg.” The “Taiwan question is part of China’s internal affairs that brook no external interference,” he added.
2. The U.S. launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The initial 13 IPEF partner countries are Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. Taiwan was not included in the framework, and China’s future membership was not ruled out.
The IPEF is not a free trade agreement and offers no tariff relief to its members. Countries in the framework instead negotiate with each other on items under four pillars—supply chain resiliency, clean energy and decarbonization, tax and anti-corruption, and trade—, including the standards they are willing to abide by, how the standards will be enforced, whether their domestic legislatures will need to ratify them, and how to add potential future members.
PRC foreign minister Wang Yi said that China welcomes initiatives to strengthen regional cooperation but “opposes attempts to create division and confrontation.”
May 24
Leaders of the Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan, U.S.) met in Tokyo and issued a joint statement. The leaders “strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, and freedom of navigation and overflight,” and reaffirmed their resolve to “uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.”
The leaders also discussed COVID-19 and global health security, infrastructure, climate change, cybersecurity, critical and emerging technologies, space, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the Quad Fellowship. The statement did not mention China or Taiwan.
May 26
Secretary of State Antony Blinken introduced the Biden administration’s China strategy in a speech at George Washington University.
Notable excerpts from Blinken’s speech include:
- “… we must defend and reform the rules-based international order …”
- “… we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order – and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China. China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”
- “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War. To the contrary, we’re determined to avoid both.”
- “We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China – or any other country, for that matter – from growing their economy or advancing the interests of their people.”
- “China’s transformation is due to the talent, the ingenuity, the hard work of the Chinese people. It was also made possible by the stability and opportunity that the international order provides.”
- “Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.”
- “… the Biden administration’s strategy can be summed up in three words – ‘invest, align, compete.’”
- “We will invest in the foundations of our strength here at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our democracy.”
- “We will align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause.”
- “And harnessing these two key assets, we’ll compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.”
- “We have profound differences with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government. But those differences are between governments and systems – not between our people.”
- “We do not seek to transform China’s political system.”
- “We don’t expect every country to have the exact same assessment of China as we do … This is not about forcing countries to choose. It’s about giving them a choice …”
- “There’s another area of alignment we share with our allies and partners: human rights … We’ll continue to raise these issues [Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong] and call for change – not to stand against China, but to stand up for peace, security, and human dignity.”
- “This lack of reciprocity [in market access] is unacceptable and it’s unsustainable.”
- “The United States does not want to sever China’s economy from ours or from the global economy – though Beijing, despite its rhetoric, is pursuing asymmetric decoupling, seeking to make China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China.”
- “On Taiwan, our approach has been consistent across decades and administrations. As the President has said, our policy has not changed … We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.”
- “Even as we invest, align, and compete, we’ll work together with Beijing where our interests come together … we’ll engage constructively with China wherever we can … No country should withhold progress on existential transnational issues because of bilateral differences.”
- “And to the people of China: we’ll compete with confidence; we’ll cooperate wherever we can; we’ll contest where we must. We do not see conflict.”
The PRC’s response to Blinken’s speech was restrained. In a regular press conference on May 27, foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin rolled out the standard accusations, criticisms, and propaganda on U.S.-China topics. Highlights include:
- “[Blinken] went to great lengths to spread disinformation, play up the so-called ‘China threat,’ interfere in China’s internal affairs and smear China’s domestic and foreign policy. The sole purpose is to contain and suppress China’s development and maintain the U.S. hegemony.”
- “The U.S. sensationalization of the so-called ‘China threat’ cannot solve its own problems, and will only lead the world to a dangerous abyss.”
- “… the U.S. side is completely confusing right and wrong when calling China ‘the most serious long-term challenge to the international order.’ People with discerning eyes can easily see that the so-called ‘rules-based international order’ is nothing but a set of ‘house rules’ established by the U.S. and a handful of other countries to maintain the so-called ‘order’ led by the U.S.”
- “Creating ‘small cliques’ is reversing the course of history … The U.S. creates the so-called ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ to rope in regional countries to contain China, and claims to ‘shape the strategic environment around Beijing.’ This move to gang up on China will get no support and is doomed to fail.”
- “The U.S. said that it does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ but it is doing quite the opposite. The US has been violating the political commitment it made to China time and again, trying to hollow out the one-China principle and embolden the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.”
- “The China-U.S. relationship is now at an important crossroads … We have noted that Secretary Blinken said in his speech that the U.S. is not looking for conflict or a new Cold War with China; it doesn’t seek to block China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China from growing its economy; and it wants to coexist peacefully with China. We are watching what the U.S. will do.”
Some PRC propagandists even expressed small delight at Blinken’s speech. Chen Weihua, the China Daily EU bureau chief, tweeted, “The Blinken talk, though with many distortions and exaggeration blaming China, is better than any talks since Pence at Hudson and Pompeo at Nixon Library.”
‘Anti-Xi, not anti-CCP’ discourse
May 24
George Soros criticized Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos.
Highlights of Soros’ remarks on Xi include:
- “Xi Jinping is sticking to a zero-COVID policy that can’t possibly be sustained.”
- “Xi’s worst mistake was to double down on his zero-COVID policy.”
- “Xi Jinping has many enemies. Nobody dares to attack him directly because he has centralized all the instruments of surveillance and repression in his own hands, but it is well known that there is dissention within the Communist Party. It has become so sharp that it has found expression in articles that ordinary people can read.”
- “Contrary to general expectations Xi Jinping may not get his coveted third term because of the mistakes he has made. But even if he does, the Politburo may not give him a free hand to select the members of the next Politburo. That would greatly reduce his power and influence and make it less likely that he will become ruler for life.”
May 26
In a speech introducing Secretary Blinken before he delivered the address on the Biden administration’s policy towards China, Asia Society president and former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd continued to single out Xi Jinping for the CCP’s behavior.
“ The truth is that China under Xi Jinping has changed,” Rudd said. “China under Xi now seeks to assert that power in the region and in the world in a manner we have not seen in half a century. That is because President Xi now seeks to change the status quo in a manner that advances his definition of China’s national interests and values.”
OUR TAKE
1. On paper, the Biden administration appears to have continued the Trump administration’s legacy of being tough on China, if not tougher, with its string of initiatives over the past week. However, a closer examination of those initiatives shows otherwise.
Debate about whether President Biden meant what he said about militarily defending Taiwan overshadowed recent signs that hint at U.S. commitment to Taiwan being not as solid as advertised. For instance, Taiwan was not included in the IPEF because it would have “irked Beijing,” according to the Associated Press; news after Biden’s trip to Tokyo that the U.S. is looking to have talks with Taiwan to “deepen the U.S.-Taiwan trade and investment relationship” in “a few weeks” could be aimed at dispelling the sense that Taiwan had been overlooked for the IPEF in the face of PRC pressure. Taiwan’s bid to join the World Health Assembly (WHA) was also rejected on the same day that Biden made his controversial comment; Taiwan had U.S. support in joining the WHA, but the PRC was successful in blocking Taiwan’s bid regardless. Further, Taiwan was not mentioned in the Quad joint leaders’ statement.
In early May, Taiwan expressed frustration about years-long delays in the delivery of U.S. Stinger missiles and M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers that it had on order. The U.S. had also refused to sell Taiwan weapons it had requested like the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter, arguing that Taipei should instead be looking into weapons with “asymmetric capabilities.” Experts believe that the Biden administration was “taking too hard a line” and should let Taiwan determine what it needs for its defense.
Meanwhile, Secretary Blinken’s speech on the administration’s approach to China differed sharply in essence from that of his predecessor’s despite seemingly similar stances on critical topics. For instance, the Biden administration, like the Trump administration, appeared to differentiate between the Chinese people and the CCP per Blinken’s speech. Yet Blinken was referring to a “ruling Chinese Communist Party … under President Xi (Jinping),” a key caveat with “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” vibes. In contrast, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly called out the CCP, its Marxist-Leninist ideology, and its “virulent strain of communism” with no caveats in his two landmark speeches (see here and here) outlining the Trump administration’s approach to China. Further, Pompeo clearly distinguished between the CCP and the Chinese people in his speeches (“communist government in China today is not the same as the people of China”; “the Chinese people … are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party”) while Blinken used vague phrasing (see above) with room for plausible deniability. Near the end of his speech, Blinken also directed the Biden administration’s desire to “compete, cooperate, and contest” not to the PRC or the CCP, but “to the people of China,” curious phrasing that appears to again conflate the ruling Party and the Chinese people.
In his speeches, Pompeo exposed the CCP’s focus on “struggle and international domination,” outlined its pernicious behavior, and noted that “Communist China is already within our borders.” He added that the CCP’s actions and ideology meant that the U.S. and its partners “can’t treat this incarnation of China as a normal country, just like any other.” While Blinken also noted the CCP’s capabilities, rule-breaking activities, and “intent to reshape the international order,” he did not expose the Party’s ideology but stressed that “we do not seek to transform China’s political system.” Moreover, Blinken sought to frame the PRC as a normal country, noting (almost admiringly) that China is the world’s second-largest economy, has “world-class cities and public transportation networks,” “some of the world’s largest tech companies,” and a “rapidly modernized” military that “intends to become a top tier fighting force with global reach.”
Given the seriousness of the CCP threat to the U.S. and the world, Pompeo urged countries to work together to meet the China challenge “clearly and with great courage” lest Communist China “change us.” In contrast, Blinken noted that the U.S. does not “expect every country to have the exact same assessment of China as we do” and left the choice on how to deal with China up to them.
All in all, Blinken’s speech indicates that the Biden administration is choosing to downplay the CCP threat and the urgency of resolving it. Instead, the Biden administration prefers to view the totalitarian CCP regime as a normal country and is willing to “engage constructively with China” whenever it can. Further, the Biden administration is looking to use the China issue to advance its domestic agenda. Secretary Blinken’s speech largely affirms our previous analyses of how the Biden administration is going to approach China (see here, here, and here).
The CCP’s lack of exaggerated response to Blinken’s speech suggests that it is not overly perturbed by the Biden administration’s China strategy. For example, official state and Party media just ran Wang Wenbin’s response to Blinken’s speech and barely issued any commentary on the issue. Wang also only accused Blinken of spreading “disinformation,” as compared to the stronger accusation of “lying” that CCP media and propagandists frequently lobbed at Pompeo after his speeches. Moreover, official propaganda made no personal attacks on Blinken, as compared to wave after wave of ad hominem articles published about “public enemy of humanity” (人類公敵) Pompeo.
It is possible that the lack of CCP vitriol towards Blinken and the Biden administration, and even small displays of approval by some propagandists, was due to the latter mostly adhering to the CCP’s “red lines” on sensitive topics. We previously noted that PRC foreign minister Wang Yi had warned Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in Tianjin in July 2021 that the U.S. must not “challenge, slander, or even attempt to subvert the path and system of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” must not “attempt to obstruct or interrupt China’s development process,” and must not “infringe upon China’s sovereignty” or “undermine China’s territorial integrity.”
2. Xi Jinping is responsible for the PRC’s increased repression at home and aggression abroad, to paraphrase Secretary Blinken. As we previously explained, however, “Xi is a symptom, and not an aberration, of the Party system … Xi’s successors, far from ‘reforming’ the Party, could ultimately prove to be just as willing—if not politically obliged—to continue in the same pernicious cycle of expanding regime power and human rights abuse.” To reiterate, the effort to single out Xi, and not the CCP, “is a serious misstep and a great disservice to the Chinese people and the world.” The “China challenge” at its root is a CCP problem, not merely a Xi problem.
In calling out the “ruling Chinese Communist Party … under President Xi,” the Biden administration is wading into “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” territory. This potentially lays the groundwork for Washington to get rhetorically tougher on Xi even as it becomes less confrontational towards the PRC. For instance, if the Biden administration assesses that Xi is having serious struggles at home politically and is in a particularly vulnerable spot, it could find opportunities to prominently call out “Xi’s China” or “Xi’s CCP” over human rights issues, the “zero-COVID” situation in China, China’s deteriorating economy, and other issues that Xi’s foreign and domestic enemies are blaming him for. Concurrently, the administration could proceed to remove the Trump China tariffs and take other measures to improve U.S.-China ties, possibly under the guise of helping the U.S. domestic situation (inflation, etc.) and make a show of goodwill to the Chinese people.
The ability of public discourse to shape elite politics in the PRC should not be underestimated. The CCP elite have long leveraged public discourse to gain an advantage in their power plays. Mao Zedong used propaganda to shape the public discourse and launch the Cultural Revolution, which led to the demise of Liu Shaoqi and others who marginalized Mao after the Great Leap Forward. Deng Xiaoping used the publicity surrounding his “Southern Tour” to force Jiang Zemin to stick to “reform and opening up.” Hu Jintao took advantage of anti-Jiang sentiment at home and abroad to move in on the Jiang faction after reports of Jiang Zemin’s alleged death and people celebrating it were widely reported in overseas Chinese media in July 2011; Hu’s moves led to the “Wang Lijun Incident” and the series of events that resulted in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. And a constant stream of negative press about the “untouchable” former security czar Zhou Yongkang from 2013 paved the way for an official investigation into him in 2014.
Xi may seem to be politically “untouchable” and destined to extend his tenure at the 20th Party Congress. As we noted earlier, however, Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) is mostly built on propaganda, he lacks tangible political “achievements,” and his failures are mounting with the perpetuation of the “political epidemic” in China and as the Chinese economy heads toward a recession. Prominent efforts (Soros, Rudd, the U.S. government, etc.) to fault Xi for all of China’s and the CCP’s ills overseas will eventually reverberate on the mainland, further disillusioning officials and Chinese citizens who are already affected by the Xi leadership’s policies. Growing “anti-Xi” sentiment in the public discourse could eventually trigger serious social or political crises, which Xi’s factional rivals will seek to leverage in attempts to marginalize or oust him. Escalating factional struggle in the CCP elite could produce political Black Swans, including those that the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” crowd may not want.
SinoInsight 2
Student protests
During the week of May 23, students from several universities in China protested the strict application of “zero-COVID” in their schools. The students demanded that their respective schools clarify how and when they will have to take their final examinations, as well as allow them to return home instead of being locked down in their dormitories.
May 23
Students from the China University of Political Science and Law issued a poster calling on their fellow students to “stand up” (法大人站起來) that night in front of the school’s main building and play “Do You Hear the People Sing” (from Les Misérables) on their phones.
At night, some students showed up at the protest location as planned and demanded that students be allowed to return home and take virtual classes. They argued that the school’s decision to keep students on campus despite the scrapping of in-person classes means that there are still COVID-19 transmission risks because people were still gathered together. The next day, the China University of Political Science and Law notified students that they are allowed to return home.
May 24
In the afternoon of May 24, students from Beijing Normal University posted anonymously on the school’s QQ chat group a poster (titled, “#BNU Let Me Go Home, BNUers Unite”) calling for a protest at night. The poster made four demands to the school administration: Clarify the methods and timings used for the final exams; clarify the school holiday period and when students can go home; respond positively to student demands; and no backlash or investigations of those responsible for organizing the protest (不追責, 不約談).
That night, a student who was yelling something was taken away by school teachers. This led hundreds of students gathered in the protest area to rush to negotiate and confront the other school teachers who were on scene. The students later dispersed after the teachers promised that they would seek clarification on the school’s policies on students returning home and the final exams. The next day, the school cafeteria resumed offering dine-in meals, the school library allowed students to enter, and the school released its policy on the final exams and students returning home.
May 25
Li Yi, deputy Party secretary of the Beijing Municipal Education Commission, said during a press conference on epidemic prevention and control that universities in Beijing can “flexibly arrange the next stage of final work” (“final work” refers to examinations) and allow students to return home.
May 26
The Tianjin authorities issued a notice announcing a new round of mass nucleic acid testing. The notice said that screening should be done as comprehensively as possible “so that no one is missed.”
That night, hundreds of students from Tianjin University gathered in the school’s Peiyang Square to protest extreme epidemic prevention policies. In videos circulating on Chinese social media, some male students were heard yelling, “Down with formalism, down with bureaucratism,” a slogan that nearby students repeated.
Tianjin University students also made online appeals about the soaring prices on campus, the school using offline final exams to prevent students from going home, the school’s chaotic epidemic prevention management, how the school’s faculty and their family members were not restricted from entering or exiting the school, and other subjects.
Student protests also broke out at Nankai University, which is situated just beside Tianjin University. Nankai students made online appeals for help and launched various protest activities on campus. Photos circulating on the internet showed students hanging large banners with slogans mocking Nankai University’s “self-isolation from society.” Some students sprayed, “I want to be a free college student” on the walls of the campus, while others posted flyers expressing opposition to the school’s continued lockdown.
Many universities in Tianjin entered a state of “closed management” after an outbreak on Jan. 8. Students were barred from leaving campus, and many schools remain in lockdown at the time of writing.
Conflicted bureaucracy
May 26
According to Bloomberg News, local officials are caught in a dilemma between implementing Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID” policy and Li Keqiang’s economic rescue measures. Four senior officials told Bloomberg that Li’s May 25 State Council meeting “did little to change their view that controlling the COVID outbreak still took priority,” while one official noted that “from a personal career perspective, a cadre’s hard work means nothing if they fail to contain an outbreak, while the upside for kicking off economic projects was limited.”
One of Bloomberg’s sources also noted that many municipal Party secretaries did not attend Li’s May 25 meeting “because they had to focus on ensuring COVID control,” adding that it showed that “pandemic work still trumped the economy.” However, Bloomberg also noted that attending Li’s meeting was not compulsory for Party bosses.
OUR TAKE
1. Local officials tend to put their self-interests ahead of the central government’s and their constituencies when implementing Beijing’s orders. Thus, many university administrators had no qualms in imposing draconian lockdowns in their schools following outbreaks to ensure that their political performance is not affected.
The recent “wavering” of some local officials in allowing university students to return home and the easing of lockdowns on campus has more to do with officials being pragmatic in preserving their interests rather than them having a sudden change of heart about “zero-COVID” or caving to student protests. Officials are undoubtedly aware that the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protest on June 4 is just around the corner, and do not want a situation where they are held responsible for triggering serious social instability around a sensitive period for the CCP.
The Party’s repressive tendencies will lead officials to eventually settle scores (秋後算賬) with the students. Action could be taken during a less sensitive period and after students return to campus after the summer break. In particular, protest organizers will very likely be targeted and punished.
2. College campus protests are not the only thing about university students that is troubling the CCP and affecting social stability. The poor job market in the “zero-COVID” era and the expansion of college enrollment means that China has a problem with many graduates struggling to find employment after graduation.
Mainland media have indirectly highlighted the graduate employment problem in recent weeks. Around mid-April, mainland media reported that 985 candidates who sat for the 2022 Chaoyang District public service examinations, or more than 95 percent of all candidates, hold either a Master’s degree or a Ph.D. Many of those candidates are also graduates of prestigious schools at home and abroad. The report added that it is “standard” for applicants seeking a position in a grassroots Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau (the notorious “chengguan”) to own a Master’s degree, and added that there is a female “chengguan” in Jiuxianqiao Street of Beijing’s Chaoyang District who has a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Peking University.
Semi-official mainland media The Paper reported on May 4 that college graduates with known post-graduation whereabouts (i.e. a job, further studies, etc.) was just 23.61 percent as of April 17, 2022. The Paper noted that China will produce 10.76 million college graduates in 2022, up 1.67 million from a year ago and a record high. However, with layoffs in the tech sector and the tuition industry, as well as a general shrinking demand for fresh hires, the graduating cohort of 2022 is set to be the “most misfortune in history.”
Mainland media also gave several examples of several new energy vehicle companies breaking their job contracts with new graduates this year after a brief hiring wave in 2021. For instance, XPeng Motors in Guangzhou City ended up paying over 20 graduates 5,000 yuan each in compensation after the company ended their contracts, citing “business adjustments” as a reason.
3. Bloomberg framed the “paralysis” of local officials implementing Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID” or Li Keqiang’s economic rescue measures as an outcome of a “Xi-Li discord,” but the article offered no evidence to support the framing. We previously debunked recent speculation and rumors of a “Xi-Li split.”
Rather than an outcome of factional fighting, the “paralysis” described by local officials corresponds with our analysis of local officials being unable to properly implement Beijing’s orders and efforts at moderating policy due to Party nature. As we wrote earlier, “officials tend to default to ‘prefer left rather than right,’ ‘one-size-fits-all,’ and ‘campaign-style’ approaches to policy implementation, and do not handle complications well.” Given the choice between implementing the more straightforward “zero-COVID” policy or the trickier (and with limited upside) economic rescue policies, officials will more often than not neglect the latter and prioritize the former.
Local officials will also account for how and who is promoting Beijing’s policies in weighing which ones to focus on. Officials would notice that regime propaganda continually and heavily promotes Xi’s “zero-COVID” policy, while Li’s May 25 economic rescue meeting was being pushed less prominently (only smaller official media mentioned that Li’s meeting had “100,000 participants”). Officials would also determine that Xi’s policy is more important because he is the Party boss while Li’s is less urgent because he is only the premier.
From the perspective of elite politics, it is understandable that Xi does not personally promote economic policy even though it is probably more important than epidemic policy at this juncture. Xi likely does not want to become the public face of his leadership’s economic policy when the Chinese economy is in very bad shape and will likely deteriorate further. Letting Li (who is rightfully in charge of economic work as PRC premier by official protocol) front the Xi leadership’s economic rescue gives Xi someone to “hold accountable” later when things take a turn for the worse, while minimizing the impact to his personal “quan wei.” Ironically, Xi is self-sabotaging his leadership’s economic rescue efforts by not personally promoting them (this would certainly change the calculations—albeit not the efficacy—of local officials in their policy implementation) and continuing to uphold “zero-COVID” at all costs.
