SinoInsight 1
With the CCP strengthening its “comprehensive governance” over Hong Kong, the people of Hong Kong are finding their freedoms rapidly diminish and are growing more desperate. Large numbers of Hongkongers are choosing to leave the city, while individuals are resorting to extreme violence in despair.
June 28
1. The Hong Kong government announced that it would ban all flights from the United Kingdom from July 1 as a “circuit breaker” to curb the spread of the Delta variant of COVID-19. Concurrently, the government also classified the U.K. as a very high risk area (Group A1) and prohibited passengers who spent more than two hours in the country from boarding flights to Hong Kong from June 28.
That day, British Airways announced a temporary suspension of flights from London to Hong Kong, but not the reverse trip (until July 1). Following British Airways’ announcement, many Hong Kong netizens left comments thanking the airline on its official Facebook page, with some describing its decision to allow Hong Kong to London flights as “Hong Kong’s Operation Dunkirk.”
According to Hong Kong media reports, the Hong Kong government’s decision troubled local residents who were looking to migrate to the U.K., causing some to pay a premium for air tickets. On June 30, there were long check-in queues for flights to the U.K at the Hong Kong International Airport, but flights to other destinations were deserted.
2. “Hongkongers in Britain,” a U.K.-based Hong Kong expatriate association, released a survey showing that 80,000 Hongkongers had applied for a special visa to the U.K. thus far, of which 18,000 have been approved, according to a Sankei Shimbun report. The expatriate association estimated that about 100,000 British National (Overseas) passport holders and their families have already emigrated to the U.K. since the end of June 2020. The Sankei Shimbun report notes that as many as 800,000 Hongkongers are expected to migrate to Britain within the next five years.
July 1
1. A person threw a firebomb into the Hong Kong Chief Executive’s residence early in the morning of July 1. The following day, the Hong Kong police arrested a 24-year-old man in connection with the incident.
2. A 50-year-old man stabbed a police officer and himself outside the SOGO shopping mall in Hong Kong’s Causeway Bay at around 10 p.m. Hong Kong time. The officer was left in serious condition, while the man was pronounced dead when he was taken to a hospital.
Hong Kong media identify the man as Leung Kin-fai, purchasing director at soy milk producer Vitasoy in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong police described the incident as a “lone wolf terror attack.” The man left a suicide note that cited his unhappiness with the police for harboring criminals as a reason for his attack.
The following day, a handful of people went to the crime scene to lay whites flowers and mourn the death of the attacker. The police later prevented people from gathering or loitering at the scene, and would stop and search passers-by carrying white flowers or clad in black before handing them a “gathering restriction” ticket. Plainclothes police later took away the flowers left at the scene, according to Hong Kong media.
Also on July 2, Hong Kong’s new Secretary for Security Chris Tang condemned the stabbing incident. He added that himself, the Hong Kong police commissioners, the Chief Secretary for Administration, and other officials would have to be cautious of local terror attacks going forward. Tang believes that the incident was the result of people “advocating violence, inciting hatred, inciting hatred of society, and inciting hatred of the country [PRC],” as well as the glorification of such attacks. He also said that all government departments will do their best to deal with local terrorist activities.
Hong Kong’s Vitasoy issued an internal memo on July 2 notifying its staff “with a heavy heart” about the death of Leung Kin-fai and extending “deepest condolences” to his family. The memo was later leaked online, leading to pushback and calls for boycotts from nationalistic “little pinks” (小粉紅), as well as minor mainland actors celebrities withdrawing their endorsement of Vitasoy. On July 3, Vitasoy issued a public statement claiming that the leaked memo was written without permission by a staff member, and that the “wording in the file circulating online was extremely inappropriate.” Vitasoy added that it was “investigating the incident and reserve the right to take legal action against the related employee.”
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Chinese language mainland media was virtually silent about the Hong Kong stabbing incident, at least at the time of writing. Mainland news portals only republished posts about the incident from self-media commentators with verified social media accounts. Pro-Beijing Hong Kong media Phoenix Television issued a report on the incident, but later deleted it. The English language edition of Global Times did report on the incident, but only two days after it occurred (July 3).
Meanwhile, Leung’s relatives and friends took to social media to deny speculation that he stabbed the police officer over “mood sickness,” “mental problems,” or because he was “incited by others.” Leung’s relatives and friends claim that he was a diligent worker, had very good relationships with his colleagues, and possessed a gentle and kind temperament. They add that while he was not good at socializing and was not talkative, he was a helpful person and was generally regarded as a good person by his friends. Leung’s relatives and friends add that he can be considered to be from the middle class, had no mortgage pressures, had healthy parents, got along well with others, and was stable and happy in his job. They noted that Leung supported democracy and freedom in Hong Kong, and believed that he was a “true martyr” who sacrificed his life for freedom.
3. The Hong Kong police arrested 19 men and women in multiple districts on charges of “possessing imitation firearms,” “distributing seditious publications,” and “insulting the national flag,” according to Hong Kong media reports. Of the 19, three were from the local political organization “Student Politicism,” including convenor Wong Yat-chin. The police also issued tickets to another 19 men and women for breaking gathering restrictions or mask orders.
4. In his CCP centennial anniversary speech, Xi Jinping said that the CCP will “ensure that the central government exercises overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong and Macao, and implement the legal systems and enforcement mechanisms for the two special administrative regions to safeguard national security.”
July 2
The RTHK Programme Staff Union published a social media post noting that at least 10 RTHK programs have been suspended or had their host suddenly replaced over the past fortnight. The post, titled “The Cause of Death is Suspicious” (死因有可疑), also listed programs that were affected by the aforementioned developments.
The union noted that RTHK’s management has repeatedly halted programs, announced last-minute program rescheduling arrangements, or sometimes failed to announce rescheduling arrangements since Patrick Li took over as Director of Broadcasting in Hong Kong in March. The union then demanded an explanation from the RTHK management.
OUR TAKE
1. The recent stabbing incident and mass migration from Hong Kong reflects the massive dissatisfaction of Hongkongers towards the CCP regime and its encroaching tyranny. It is also becoming clearer to the world that the CCP’s governance of Hong Kong is utterly failing and also endangering the regime.
As the Party tightens its control over Hong Kong, erodes the city’s freedoms, and destroys “rule of law” in the territory, Hong Kong’s value as an international hub will plummet and eventually would be lost.
2. There are several likely reasons why Chinese language mainland media largely refrained from reporting on the police stabbing incident.
First, the stabbing coincided with the CCP’s centennial anniversary. Party propagandists would not want to shatter the regime’s carefully crafted “all’s well” (一片形勢大好) impression by reporting on an incident that tarnishes the CCP’s “great, glorious, correct” (偉光正) image. After all, Beijing is supposed to have brought the situation under control in Hong Kong with the imposition of a National Security Law over the territory last year, while a wild knife attack reflects rising societal instability.
Second, the CCP likely did not expect that Hongkongers would resort to violent, life-endangering protests against its tyranny. Hongkongers are generally perceived as being more cultured, mostly concerned with accumulating personal wealth, and until recently, being relatively apolitical. Hongkongers are also renowned for holding massive, non-violent pro-democracy protests. And while the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests saw many violent incidents, the bulk of the violence was carried out by police or triad members towards protesters, or the minority “brave martial clique” (勇武派) engaging in vandalism and some revenge beatings. Life-endangering violence in 2019 took the form of protester suicides, or incidents that the authorities later claimed to be suicide (被自殺; see the case of Alex Chow Tsz-lok). Thus, the CCP appears to have been caught completely off-guard by the recent stabbing incident; local reports and available clips of the police attack suggest that it was spontaneous and less likely to be a set-up or false flag operation meant to discredit the pro-democracy movement and anti-CCP groups in Hong Kong (this does not mean that the CCP will not later attempt to leverage the incident to its advantage; see point 4). The incident will likely trouble the CCP greatly because it indicates that Hongkongers have reached the point where some are determined enough to resist its rule with martyrdom, and hints at future escalation of tensions in the territory.
Third, the assailant Leung Kin-fai does not conveniently fit the CCP’s mould of “troublemaking” Hongkongers. CCP propaganda likes to claim that only so-called “useless youths” (廢青) and those from poor economic background or who are lacking in “distinguishing” ability (i.e. those who are not pro-CCP) are the sort who will stir up a ruckus in Hong Kong. In contrast, Leung was in his 50s, worked for a reputable multinational in a senior position, and, from the accounts of his relatives and friends, was a respectable member of society with no record of troublemaking.
Finally, the CCP does not want to inspire copycat incidents on the mainland by calling attention to the Hong Kong stabbing incident in the Chinese-language mainland press. As it is, there are already enough cases in China of depressed and desperate individuals carrying out so-called “revenge on society” attacks, and Beijing would likely want to avoid creating more problems for itself by blowing up the Hong Kong stabbing incident—which could introduce a dangerous political dimension to these attacks. Historically, the CCP has consistently covered up or downplayed cases of anti-authority violence by civilians and soldiers on the mainland (see the 1994 Tian Mingjian incident in Beijing and the 2008 Yang Jia incident in Shanghai); the Party is afraid of creating martyrs, triggering similar incidents, and demoralizing mainland police officers and “stability maintenance” personnel. English language propaganda outlets like Global Times, however, are “allowed” to cover the incident, likely because the CCP is less concerned with what the international community thinks so long as mainlanders are mostly kept in the dark.
3. The CCP’s failure to report on the so-called “lone wolf terror attack” in Hong Kong contrasts sharply with its efforts to equate the anti-extradition bill movement in 2019 with terrorism. Notably, the PRC’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office warned that “signs of terrorism are beginning to appear” in Hong Kong in an Aug. 12, 2019 press conference on the anti-extradition bill protests. The CCP has also not hesitated to label persecuted groups like the Uyghur Muslims and Falun Gong practitioners as “terrorists” to facilitate further suppression of those groups, and has almost certainly considered staging “terror” attacks in Hong Kong to find an excuse for suppressing the city’s pro-democracy movement. So it is very uncharacteristic for the CCP to stay largely silent about the Hong Kong stabbing incident, even after the Hong Kong police’s “terror” attack designation.
The CCP’s immediate reaction and careful media handling of the Hong Kong stabbing incident suggests that it is very wary of its implications. The CCP’s wary approach in turn indicates that the stabbing was something outside its control, or that it was assessed to be something that could negatively impact the regime.
4. The CCP and pro-Beijing elements in Hong Kong could next seek to take advantage of the “lone wolf terror attack” to double down on its suppression of Hong Kong. For instance, the Hong Kong Legislative Council could speed up the process of passing local national security legislation (Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law), while national security forces could ramp up investigations and arrests.
The CCP could also claim that Leung Kin-fai had mental or spiritual problems, or was “incited” to carry out the attack after reading material from anti-CCP news outlets and websites. The Party will then use its disinformation as a pretext to clamp down on the remaining anti-CCP media outlets in the city.
As we wrote in our China 2021 Outlook: “The CCP will keep using the Hong Kong National Security Law to suppress freedom of speech in the city. Media outlets who dare to speak out will be targeted to intimidate the rest. The CCP’s intention is to go after media outlets associated with Falun Gong when few Hong Kong media are willing to speak truth to power, but it may not succeed in bringing its plans to fruition depending on how 2021 unfolds.”
SinoInsight 2
Cai Xia, a CCP princeling and former Central Party School professor, recently wrote a 28-page paper critical of the Party and the U.S. policy of engagement. The paper, titled “China-US Relations in the Eyes of the Chinese Communist Party: An Insider’s Perspective,” was published by Hoover Institution on June 29, or just before the CCP centennial.
Some highlights of Cai’s piece include:
1. “… looking at it objectively, the Chinese Communist Party’s fundamental interests and its basic mentality of using the US while remaining hostile to it have not changed over the past seventy years.”
2. “The CCP is determined to reframe the existing international order and norms and lead the world in the opposite direction of liberal democracy.”
3. “Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he has continued the diplomatic strategy toward the US established by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—namely, to take advantage of the engagement policy to gain time to achieve the CCP’s goals.”
4. “From the very beginning, the CCP’s senior leaders have made it clear that the ultimate purpose of accepting and using the American engagement policy was to restore China’s economy in order to strengthen the CCP regime.”
5. Cai noted that while Deng Xiaoping talked about political reform, he “remained highly vigilant about any negative effects that might be caused by introducing Western liberal and democratic ideas into China, and he would never allow political changes to go beyond the CCP’s control.” This led to the suppression of several pro-democracy movements in the 1980s and “paved the way for the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989.”
6. “The big fallacy of the engagement policy was in assuming that the CCP could be transformed to share power and accept democracy, and therefore it erred in engaging heavily with China’s elites rather than its people.”
7. “With the collapse of the CCP’s ideological pillar, the CCP is increasingly relying on material temptation and high-pressure punishment to hold the party together.”
8. “It is precisely because the CCP has seen through the American capitalists’ strong desire for the Chinese market that it knew that big business would willingly pressure the US government to make concessions. Therefore, the CCP couldn’t care less about criticisms of its human rights violations, and it has become increasingly repressive domestically.”
9. “The Chinese Communist Party teaches the people to hate the United States. It has regarded the US as an enemy for more than seventy years and has consistently, from 1949 to this day, promoted anti-American sentiment.”
10. “The CCP’s penetration of the United States and other countries, especially ideological penetration, began at the start of the twenty-first century … As China’s economic strength increases, its ambition to expand internationally and even to dominate the world has grown larger, and its infiltration and influence activities have become more and more pervasive and invasive.”
11. Cai noted that the CCP used the COVID-19 pandemic to “seek hegemony.”
12. “China-US relations have finally moved toward a Cold War confrontation. The sad ending of the engagement policy is an inevitable outcome.”
13. “The CCP regards the United States as a hostile adversary, even an enemy (敌人), while the US regards the CCP as its ‘competitor’ … An adversary or enemy poses a relationship of life and death, but competitors only seek to gain advantage in a perpetual contest.”
14. Cai noted that “the CCP regime has always been a totalitarian, one-party dictatorship,” but political parties in the U.S. are unclear as to whether it is authoritarian or totalitarian. “When Mao, Nixon, and Deng began China-US contacts, the CCP only loosened its foreign policy, but never loosened its domestic rule. After the 1980s, the CCP loosened its economic system, but never loosened its monopoly over power, over ideological discourse, and over economic and institutional resources,” she wrote. “As long as China’s totalitarian system does not change, China-US relations are destined to enter a period of fundamental confrontation.”
15. “I characterize the CCP as a new type of totalitarian system because it uses information technology, big data, and artificial intelligence (AI) to monitor the people twenty-four hours a day.”
16. “… the CCP is not monolithic … In my more than thirty years of contact with middle- and high level CCP officials, I can say that at least 60–70 percent of the CCP’s high-level officials understand the trend of progress of the modern world. They understand that only a democratic constitutional government can ensure long-term stability in China and protect human rights, personal dignity, and personal safety for oneself.”
17. “The US should continue to support China’s civil society, which has gone underground, and at the same time foster and support liberal elements within the party to return to the path of political reform, so as to realize the benign and peaceful transformation of Chinese society.”
18. “Finally, while it is difficult to imagine, I recommend that the US be fully prepared for the possible sudden disintegration of the CCP … There are many factors that may lead to unexpected changes in the situation and even possibly the collapse of the regime. They include the unsustainable economic model and high levels of debt; the inherent and insurmountable contradiction between exaggerated ideological propaganda and social reality; the incompatible dual-track ownership system between the market and the state; the increasing social disparity between rich and poor; continuing corruption; and the fierce infighting for succession to supreme power.”
OUR TAKE
1. Longtime Sinoinsider readers will find Cai Xia’s points familiar. We previously made similar, if not identical, assessments. However, we also differ from Cai in crucial areas.
In July 2018, we noted that “the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been gradually hijacking the post-WWII global system since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was admitted to the UN in 1971.” (Compare with the second quote from Cai Xia above.)
In July 2019, we noted that the CCP is not monolithic, is focused on survival and domination, is subverting the international order, and adopts a zero-sum mentality towards America. We also advised the U.S. against simply supporting reform-minded CCP elements, and recommended instead that Washington “create(s) an environment that allows reform-minded leaders to abandon the Communist Party without jeopardizing their authority.” Further, we argued that the “engagement strategy has not shifted CCP behavior over the past four decades towards a more liberal direction,” and that it is “unclear how continuing to accommodate the CCP will help the U.S. and the world deal with an authoritarian regime that has global domination on its agenda.” (Compare with quotes 2 through 18.)
In February 2020, we warned that the CCP was using the pandemic to advance its global domination agenda. (Compare with quote 11.)
In August 2020, we noted that “the CCP has established a techno-totalitarian regime with sophisticated internet controls, mass surveillance, and a dystopian social credit score system,” as well as perpetuated gross human rights abuses. We also point out the ideological nature of the CCP regime and how it contrasts with authentic Chinese heritage. “Chinese culture, as preserved in Taiwan and Hong Kong, is based on a rich heritage of moral thought, and is compatible with freedom, democracy, and the rule of law,” we wrote. (Compare with quote 15 and Cai Xia’s disparaging remarks about Chinese culture in her paper.)
In January 2021, we wrote, “The notion that there are ‘moderates’ or ‘reformers’ in the CCP elite is a misnomer since Party leaders differ only in their chosen approach to actualizing the Marxist-Leninist regime’s ultimate goal of world domination, as well as in their personal circumstances in the factional struggle. So-called ‘liberal’ and ‘moderate’ Party leaders like Deng and Jiang never untethered themselves from communist ideology and also worked to advance the Party’s domination agenda, albeit through the strategy of “hiding strength, biding time” (韜光養晦).” (Compare with quotes 3, 5, 10, and 17.)
Finally, we have been consistently tracking factional fighting developments in the CCP elite, pointing out the “perfect storm” of domestic and external problems facing the regime, warning about the “Berlin Wall” moment threatening the Party, and noting that political Black Swans will bring tremendous change to China. (Compare with quote 18.)
2. From her paper, Cai Xia’s views on the CCP and its leaders appear to have evolved since she started giving media interviews in the fall of 2020. Back then, we noted that she expressed some nostalgia for the “liberal” Deng and Jiang eras while clearly disdaining the more “authoritarian” Hu and Xi eras. However, she makes clear in her “Insider’s Perspective” paper that the CCP on the whole is the central problem and even “liberal” leaders like Deng were repressive. She also notes that the CCP’s shift from Deng’s “hiding strength, biding time” to showing naked ambition and aggressiveness predates Xi Jinping (“2009–2010 seemed to be a turning point in China’s external assertiveness”). Again, we previously made very similar points to those Cai Xia is espousing now.
It is not unusual for Cai to have shifted her views—some in a fundamental way—seeing how she has been living in America for some time. Despite the popular view in China watching and investing circles that one must reside on the mainland and have “lived experiences” to “know” the “real China,” those outside China very often have far better access to information about consequential topics like CCP elite politics and the nature of the regime.
3. Cai Xia lists as one of the possible factors for a sudden disintegration of the CCP as “fierce infighting for succession to supreme power,” a topic we are tracking closely. Businesses, investors, and governments must also keep up with developments in CCP elite politics and factional struggle, and prepare contingencies to avoid being blindsided by the regime’s “Berlin Wall moment” and subsequent collapse.
