SinoInsight 1
On Oct. 24, Channel News Asia (CNA) released footage of what happened about a minute or so before former CCP general secretary Hu Jintao’s unexpected exit from the 20th Party Congress closing ceremony. According to CNA, the footage was captured soon after “local and foreign media were allowed to enter the auditorium to cover proceedings around 11:15 a.m. [Beijing time],” and shortly after PRC state media announced that “delegates had elected a new Central Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.” After Hu left, delegates voted on other items on the 20th Party Congress agenda, including amendments to the Party constitution.
From CNA’s video, Hu was initially holding on to some papers, but National People’s Congress head Li Zhanshu (seated on Hu’s left) took them from his hand and placed them underneath a red folder that seemed identical to the one that all delegates had. Li was saying something to Hu while he shifted the papers under the folder, and Hu looked somewhat dazed. Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning, who was seated beside Li, also gestured and appeared to say something to Hu and Li.
Xi Jinping, who was seated on Hu’s right, noted the exchange between Hu and Li and appeared to signal for someone to come over. Kong Shaoxun, head of the CCP secretariat, approached Xi before leaving. Xi then looked over at Hu and Li, seemed like he wanted to say something but stopped himself, and continued looking on with an expression that suggested he was concerned or troubled.
Shortly afterward, a person who appeared to be a steward walked behind Hu’s chair and had some words with Xi, who gestured at the documents in front of him. What happened next was the scene of Hu showing reluctance about exiting before finally leaving with the steward and another official, as well as his documents, that was earlier released on Oct. 22.
OUR TAKE
1. CNA’s footage would appear to confirm a popular theory about the Hu Jintao incident circulating in Chinese-language China-watching circles. The “two lists” theory holds that Xi Jinping had deceived Hu about the CCP leadership reshuffle by providing him with a “false” list before voting took place at the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, and Hu got upset when he finally saw the “real” list and the removal of his allies (Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, etc.) from top posts. When Xi noted Hu’s “displeasure,” he had Hu taken away in case the latter decided to “challenge” him on the spot during the voting for other agenda items.
However, we believe that the “two lists” theory is highly flawed and runs counter to factional struggle logic and CCP operations. In expanding on what we had written in the Oct. 24, 2022 newsletter, there is an extremely low probability that Hu Jintao did not know the composition of the 20th Central Committee, as well as its Politburo and Standing Committee, before voting took place on Oct. 22. Based on our understanding of practices in elite CCP politics, the Party elites likely finalized personnel arrangements at Beidaihe in mid-August and before the 7th Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in mid-October at the latest. This is affirmed by an Oct. 22 Xinhua report that revealed that the Politburo reviewed and approved the list of candidates for the 20th Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on Sept. 29. This is also indirectly affirmed by the fact that name lists of the confirmed 20th Politburo Standing Committee were already circulating on Chinese social media after the 7th Plenum while The Wall Street Journal published an article on Oct. 17 citing “people close to Party leaders” that correctly identified six out of seven of the Politburo Standing Committee. Given the leaks and Xinhua’s reporting, it is virtually impossible that Hu had absolutely no idea what the final outcome of the 20th Party Congress personnel reshuffle was until Oct. 22.
Proponents of the “two lists” theory are also hard-pressed to explain how Xi could have hidden the “real” list from Hu right up till the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress. The only way that Xi could have done so is by placing Hu under extremely strict control from Beidaihe until Oct. 22, denying the latter any chance to communicate with fellow CCP elites or any access to information from the outside world. But news (if only rumors) that Hu was being placed under de facto house arrest would have spread early and quickly if this were indeed the case, especially seeing how the development would benefit the “anti-Xi coalition” and their efforts to shape the external information environment against Xi. The idea of Hu being placed under control by Xi also runs counter to displays of friendliness between the two during the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress.
Proponents of the “two lists” theory could argue that Xi hid the “real” list from everyone until the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress. However, no one apart from Hu looked like they wanted to “challenge” Xi that day, not even Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong or the 105-year-old Song Ping. It makes no sense why officials with greater “quan wei” (authority and prestige) than Hu and legitimate reasons to “challenge” Xi over personnel arrangements did nothing after discovering that they had been “deceived” over the “two lists,” but the usually meek Hu suddenly found the courage within him to “stand up” to Xi. Arguments that only Hu could “challenge” Xi because he was more “upright” or “cleaner” also do not hold water in considering that no CCP official is truly “clean” and Xi could easily find dirt on Hu if he wanted to.
Finally, proponents of the “two lists” theory must account for why Xi willingly risked a massive scandal at the 20th Party Congress by “hiding” the “real” list from Hu until the last minute. If Xi’s true goal was sidelining Hu all along, he could have done so in multiple ways that preserve the image of the CCP and himself while intimidating the Party elite at the same time. Xi definitely did not need to make what seemed like a spur-of-the-moment decision to have Hu removed in a public setting, a move that damages his and the CCP’s reputation even more and harms their collective interests. Moreover, Xi did not need to dig a hole for himself by calling on the Party to adhere to Hu’s political theory (“scientific outlook on development”) alongside those of the other leaders in his 20th Party Congress work report during the opening ceremony, only to publicly “humiliate” and “oust” the latter during the closing ceremony.
2. The theory that Hu Jintao was displeased by something he saw in the documents handed out to delegates during the closing ceremony seems plausible. But it is hard to imagine what could have unsettled him.
As we explained in the above point, Hu almost certainly knew the result of the personnel reshuffle beforehand, and is unlikely to have suddenly found reason to be upset with Xi over the reshuffle.
Another document that Hu could possibly be unhappy about is the amendments to the Party constitution. However, Hu also knew well beforehand what those amendments were because they were based on Xi’s “historical resolution,” political slogans, and revised histories. It is very unlikely that Hu suddenly found something in the amendments that he objected to.
There is a possibility that Hu had a problem with documents in the red folder that were not the personnel reshuffle list and the amendments to the constitution. However, it is unclear what else might have been in those documents that could have troubled Hu but not the other Party elites and elders attending the closing ceremony, who did not act unusually during the event.
3. From the publicly available information available at the time of writing, we believe that our original hypothesis is still the more plausible reason why Hu Jintao exited the closing ceremony early. To reiterate, we are skeptical that Hu’s exit had anything to do with factional struggle and that he was likely suffering from poor health of some sort.
The CNA footage limits the possible ailments that Hu could have been suffering from, if he was indeed in poor health. Hu was escorted out after appearing to have problems with the documents and on what seemed to be Xi’s real-time directions. Age-related mental problems like senility or Alzheimer’s disease could explain why Hu suddenly found trouble with the documents, looked somewhat dazed throughout the incident, and was reluctant to leave the premises. If Hu has age-related mental problems that affect his memory, then the “two lists” theory could actually be possible, but just not in the manner that pundits believe.
4. The Jiang faction could find itself in hot water in the near future regardless of whether factional struggle was a factor in the Hu Jintao incident.
If Hu’s early exit was indeed the result of factional struggle, then this suggests that Xi has decided to eliminate all opposition and potential opposition to his rule to better navigate the CCP regime through “great challenges unseen in a century.” Having set the precedent of “removing” a predecessor, Xi will have no qualms about going after Jiang Zemin next.
In the scenario where Hu’s exit was not related to factional struggle (our hypothesis), Xi could still suspect the Jiang faction of having a hand in shaping public perception of the incident and move to hold his chief rivals accountable. For one, the Xi leadership would want to shift the public’s attention away from a perceived split in the Xi-Hu alliance (including the “Xi is on the decline, Li [Keqiang] is on the rise” theory) and refocus the narrative on the “Xi-Jiang” struggle, which curiously dropped out of mainstream discussions in the months leading up to the 20th Party Congress and after. In going after the Jiang faction, Xi could move to “scrape poison from bone” in “self-revolution” and purge the remaining Jiang faction officials and elders. Xi would also have less reservations about going after Jiang Zemin himself seeing how the public is now no longer shocked by the idea that Xi could openly move against a predecessor.
5. Developments in the near future will determine what the Hu Jintao incident at the 20th Party Congress really was about.
If the incident was indeed a manifestation of factional struggle between Xi and Hu as many observers seem to believe, then Xi would next mop up Hu’s allies and sideline Hu’s son Hu Haifeng. Xi would also methodically remove official references to Hu, including his “scientific outlook on development.”
If the incident was not factional struggle, then Hu and his allies will continue to make public appearances and will not come to harm. Meanwhile, Xi can be expected to step up his struggle against the Jiang faction.
SinoInsight 2
State mouthpiece Xinhua published a long article (高舉偉大旗幟 譜寫嶄新篇章——新一屆中共中央委員會和中共中央紀律檢查委員會誕生記) on how the new leadership that emerged from the 20th Party Congress was selected.The article opened by justifying why the personnel reshuffle turned out the way it did by quoting previous remarks by Xi Jinping. The article noted first that the CCP needed to “sit firmly in the fishing boat as the wind and waves rise” (任憑風浪起，穩坐釣魚船) in the face of “complex situations and arduous tasks,” as well as fully grasp the “strategic overall situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as the world undergoes “great changes unseen in a century.” Hence, a “strong central leadership group” was needed to help the CCP regime “achieve new victories for socialism with Chinese characteristics” as the regime faces new crises “on the road to taking the test.”
The article said that Xi personally “planned and deployed, as well as guided and checked” the personnel preparation work for the “two committees” (Central Committee and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) that emerged from the 20th Party Congress. The article then disclosed some key timelines of the personnel preparation work:
- Xi began “overall planning” for the personnel preparation work at the end of 2020.
- In March 2021, the Politburo and its Standing Committee decided to establish a leading group for the inspection of cadres attending the 20th Party Congress (henceforth referred to as the “personnel inspection leading group”), with Xi as the group leader.
- In June 2021, the Politburo and its Standing Committee reviewed and approved an opinion on “earnestly preparing personnel” for the reshuffle of the “two committees” (關於認真做好二十屆“兩委”人事準備工作的意見).
- In July 2021, the personnel inspection leading group reviewed and approved an “overall plan” for inspecting the candidates for the “two committees.”
- Starting from the end of July 2021, Party Central dispatched 45 inspection teams to China’s 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities; 124 central and state organs; central financial enterprises; and central enterprises in Beijing to carry out inspection work. The Central Military Commission also sent eight inspection teams to 25 military departments and large work units.
- On Sept. 7, 2022, the Politburo Standing Committee proposed a nomination plan for candidates of the “two committees” to emerge from the 20th Party Congress. On Sept. 29, the Politburo reviewed and approved the list of candidates for the “two committees” and submitted the list to the 20th Party Congress for “election.”
- The “group of politicians” must adhere to Party theory and achieve the “Two Safeguards” (safeguard the core position of Xi Jinping in Party Central and the core position of the Party, and safeguard Party Central’s “quan wei” and centralized and unified leadership).
- The “group of politicians” must dare to struggle, be good at struggling, and have the trust and support of the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups in the country.
- The “group of politicians” must manage complex situations, deal with various risks and challenges, and be good at governing the Party, the country, and the military.
- Take the lead in adhering to the ideology and theories of the Party and Party leaders, including the “lofty ideals” of communism and the “common ideal” of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
- Take the lead in enhancing the “four consciousnesses,” strengthening the “four self-confidences.” and achieving the “Two Safeguards.” Members and alternate members should withstand the test of “wind and waves” at critical moments and major events, and resolutely maintain a high degree of consistency with “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” in ideology, politics, and actions.
- Take the lead in implementing the major decisions and deployments of Party Central, coordinate development and security, solve difficult problems in the challenge of reform, and deal with various risks and challenges.
- Take the lead in adhering to principles, dare to take responsibility, have a strong struggle spirit, dare to struggle, and be good at struggling.
- Take the lead in respecting and implementing the Party constitution.
- Take the lead in strictly abiding by the Party’s discipline and rules, and have high prestige both inside and outside the Party.
- Be politically firm, loyal to the Party, resolute in upholding the Party constitution and other intra-Party regulations, and resolute in struggling against all kinds of violations of the Party constitution, regulations, discipline, and corruption.
- Be responsible for supervising discipline enforcement and accountability, as well as the handling of Party discipline cases.
- Take the lead in safeguarding the “quan wei” of Party Central and the “centralized and unified leadership.”
- Take the lead in strictly abiding by the Party’s discipline and rules, and have high prestige both inside and outside the Party.
- Each inspection team that went to the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities did interviews with more than 1,400 people. Inspection teams tasked with reviewing cadres from the central and state organs and other work units conducted nearly 10,000 interviews.
- Xi Jinping stressed that “political standard” was the priority in “selecting and deploying people.” Candidates for the “two committees” cannot be selected based on “matching numbers to seats, taking things for granted, and following the usual practice” (不能對號入座、想當然、依慣例).
- Inspection teams focused on the candidates’ political position, attitude, consciousness, judgment, comprehension, and execution. The candidates’ understanding of the “Two Establishes,” whether or not they strengthened the “four consciousnesses,” adhered to the “four self-confidences,” achieved the “Two Safeguards,” and maintained a high degree of consistency with Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core in ideology, politics, and action were also examined. Further, the candidates were examined for whether they “resolutely implemented” the decisions and deployments of Party Central, strictly abided by the Party’s political discipline and political rules, and were “aware and honest people politically.”
- Inspection teams focused on how well candidates in the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities carried out Party Central’s policies (poverty alleviation, implementing regional coordinated development strategies, strengthening ecological environmental protection, etc.).
- Inspection teams focused on whether candidates in the central departments “have the courage and ability to struggle” against U.S. and Western sanctions and safeguard national security. Candidates were also assessed on whether they are up to the challenge of “forging ahead in promoting scientific and technological innovations” and overcoming “strangleholds” (卡脖子) on key core technologies.
- When inspecting state-owned enterprises (SOEs), inspection teams focused on whether candidates “always adhered to the Party’s leadership” over SOEs and whether they “responsibly implemented Party Central’s policies” (building a new development pattern, promoting high-quality development, improving the level of modernization of industrial and supply chains, serving the national economy and people’s livelihood, etc.).
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published a commentary piece on its front page titled, “A Strong Leading Group Leads the New Era, New Journey, and New Glory — Documenting the Emergence of the Party’s New Central Leading Organization” (領航新時代新征程新輝煌的堅強領導集體 — 黨的新一屆中央領導機構產生紀實).The article said that the 20th Politburo consists of 24 officials who are drawn from different parts of the regime (localities, Party and state organs, the military), are “familiar with various aspects and fields of work,” and have “higher education and expertise.” The Politburo’s structure is also “more reasonable.” Of the 24 officials, 11 were “re-elected” from the 19th Central Committee, 11 were newly “elected,” and two were “nominated for transfer (to other duties).”
The article said that many officials said in their interview survey that “the leadership of the Party and the country is not an ‘iron chair’; those who meet age requirements will not necessarily be nominated [to the ‘two committees’].” Also, “it is necessary to adhere to the cause, the needs of the work, the conditions of candidates, candidates’ integrity, image, and reputation,” in selecting personnel. Officials should be able to “remain [in their post] or get transferred and stay on or leave [their post]” (能留能轉、能上能下) so that “a clear employment orientation is established in the new era.”
The article also noted that “during the consultation and preparation period for the new central leadership, some Party and state leaders gave priority to the interest of the Party and the people,” and with a “highly responsible spirit to the development and rejuvenation of the country, they voluntarily asked to step down so that younger cadres could step up.” This showed their “broad-mindedness, as well as the noble character and sterling integrity of a Communist Party member.”
1. The two articles above are the Xi leadership’s attempt to explain and justify the membership of the CCP’s top leadership at the 20th Party Congress.Xi Jinping wants the Party to know that the “strong central leadership group” (Politburo and its Standing Committee) packed mostly with his allies, trusted officials, and technocrats who are loyal to him is necessary because the CCP regime faces tremendous internal and external crises. Given the severity of the problems posed by the “great changes unseen in a century,” there is no room for “intra-Party democracy” in the selection of the 20th Central Committee. Instead, top personnel have to maintain a high degree of consistency with “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” in ideology, politics, and actions, and “take the lead in implementing the major decisions and deployments of Party Central, coordinating development and security, solving difficult problems in the challenge of reform, and dealing with various risks and challenges” if the CCP is to survive the “new road to taking the test.” Also, those in the “strong central leadership group” must have the “courage and ability to struggle against U.S. and Western sanctions and safeguard national security.”
The Xi leadership’s selection criteria for those in the top leadership and the composition of the 20th Central Committee (including the Politburo and its Standing Committee) reveal several nuggets of information about Xi Jinping’s political strength, as well as his and the regime’s pressing concerns:
- The high turnover rate of officials in the Politburo and its Standing Committee, as well as the elevation of many inexperienced but loyal officials to top office, indicate that Xi was nowhere near being absolutely in control and dominant in the regime during his first two terms as many mainstream China watchers have assessed. The retention of two Politburo Standing Committee members (Wang Huning and Zhao Leji) with factional ties to Xi’s chief rival (the Jiang faction) further suggests that Xi has not totally dominated the top leadership in his third term, either (see point two). However, Xi is the most in control of the CCP regime as he has ever been over the past decade, and the “Xi era” can now be said to have truly begun.
- Xi is very concerned with the longtime problem of Beijing’s orders failing to leave the gates of Zhongnanhai (政令不出中南海), and has sought to better rectify that problem through personally overseeing leadership selection.
- The domestic and external problems facing the CCP regime are so troubling and potentially existential (Xi mentioned “security” 91 times in his 20th Party Congress work report) that Xi believes that he has no choice but to sacrifice old allies (see point two) and stack the leadership deck with his loyalists. By minimizing “checks and balances” on his rule, Xi probably believes that he can more decisively ramp through measures that he thinks are best to ensure the regime’s continued survival and dominance. Whether or not Xi will succeed with the current arrangement is another story; we have constantly pointed out that deficiencies of the CCP’s totalitarian dictatorship will end up dragging down or dooming most of its endeavors.
- Xi and the CCP are wary of escalating “great power competition” with the U.S. and its allies. Beijing could be concerned that Washington will provoke tensions and conflicts with the PRC (including over Taiwan) to “contain China,” bring about “regime change,” and instigate intra-Party struggle that would lead to Xi’s ouster. Hence, the Xi leadership has prioritized “political standard” (i.e. loyalty to Xi) in leadership selection, and wants officials who “dare to struggle,” are “good at struggling,” are not afraid of being sanctioned by the West (an example is CMC Equipment Development Department director Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2018 and is now a new member of the CMC and likely defense minister), and can find ways to get around the West’s efforts to restrict the export of critical technologies to China.
Tuanpai officials also suffer from an “image” problem that makes them more of a hindrance than a help to the Xi leadership and its agenda going forward. Many observers view Tuanpai officials as “reformers” and often cast them as “challengers” to the “Mao-like” Xi (whether or not this is the case is a separate issue). Meanwhile, Xi negatively appraised the Deng-Jiang-Hu era in his “historical resolution” and the 20th Party Congress work report; in particular, the work report noted that “a number of prominent issues and problems — some of which had been building for years and others which were just emerging” occurred under his predecessors and required his “urgent action” to address. Xi’s less than flattering appraisal of the rule of his predecessors added to the Tuanpai’s “image” problem; not only are they potential “challengers” to Xi’s rule, they are also responsible by association with the severe corruption and political decadence of the Deng-Jiang-Hu period. Given the Tuanpai’s “image” problem, Tuanpai officials like Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua that could either “stay or leave” (能上能下) the senior leadership were conveniently eased out at the 20th Party Congress.
The Tuanpai’s “image” problem, however, does not necessarily mean they will be purged by the Xi leadership. As long as those officials keep a low profile, maintain Party discipline, and remain loyal to Xi Jinping, Xi will have no reason to target his old allies. In fact, Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua could have been among the Party and state leaders whom People’s Daily praised for “voluntarily asking to step down”; their leaving on their own initiative, however, may have less to do with “broadmindedness” and more to do with preserving their skin in the “new era.”
The same cannot be said about Jiang faction members and associates with regard to purges. Xi has been “rectifying” the regime of Jiang faction influence since the start of his tenure, and will almost certainly continue “turning the knife inward” in “self-revolution” against the Jiang faction until the latter loses its lingering influence. Indeed, the retention of Wang Huning and Zhao Leji—two officials with Jiang faction backgrounds—in the Politburo Standing Committee is a sign that the Jiang faction still has a meaningful amount of political strength left despite being continuously hit with anti-corruption investigations and prison sentences. While Wang and Zhao were bumped up the ranks, Xi also took the opportunity to wrestle away from the Jiang faction control over the anti-corruption and propaganda apparatuses. Wang and Zhao may have “stayed” instead of “left” as part of Xi’s compromise with the Jiang faction, but their positions are by no means secure if they are subsequently found wanting of Xi’s “political standard.”
3. The key timelines of Xi’s personnel preparation as revealed in the Oct. 22 Xinhua article indirectly confirms the series of factional struggle moves made by Xi to secure political leverage against his rivals ahead of the 20th Party Congress that we earlier identified.
Here are some key points in the timeline:
- June 24, 2022: Wang Xiaohong is officially appointed minister of public security and Xi finally has the Party’s “knife handle” (刀把子) firmly under his control.
- July 1, 2022: John Lee becomes Hong Kong’s chief executive and Hong Kong’s Security Bureau later closes its Article 23 webpage.
- July 4, 2022: Tomorrow Group’s Xiao Jianhua, a “white glove” of the Jiang faction and other Party elites, appears in court for trial.
- Mid-July to mid-August 2022: The Beidaihe meeting, where various factions carry out horsetrading over 20th Party Congress personnel and finalize personnel arrangements, is held.
- Aug. 19, 2022: Xiao Jianhua received a lenient prison sentence (13 years) and was fined 6.5 million yuan by a court in Shanghai.
- Aug. 30, 2022: The Politburo announced the dates of the Seventh Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee and the 20th Party Congress.
- Sept. 2, 2022: The trial of Suncity Group’s Alvin Chau begins in Macau. Chau is a Jiang faction associate, a “white glove” for the CCP elites, and provided a channel for elites to launder money and transfer assets overseas.
- Sept. 7, 2022: The Politburo Standing Committee proposed a nomination plan for candidates of the “two committees” that would be “elected” at the 20th Party Congress.
- Sept. 21 to Sept. 23, 2022: Beijing sentenced six out of seven members of the “Sun Lijin political gang,” which is associated with the Jiang faction. Three of the six received suspended death sentences that would be commuted to life imprisonment after two years.
- Sept. 29, 2022: The Politburo reviewed and approved the list of candidates for the “two committees.” This meant that all members of the Party elite know the final composition of the 20th Central Committee, and Li Keqiang and Wang Yang know that they will be leaving office.
- Oct. 9, 2022: The 19th Central Committee held its Seventh Plenum.
- Oct. 11, 2022: The Hong Kong government removed a bill on “safeguarding national security” from a list of draft legislation to be deliberated and passed in the current legislative session. This delayed the enacting of Article 23 in Hong Kong.
- Oct. 16, 2022: The 20th Party Congress is held. Around this period, a nearly-complete list of Politburo Standing Committee members that matches the final list was circulated on the internet and was cited by some “self-media” commentators and media outlets. None of the lists or rumors about the composition of the incoming Politburo Standing Committee that was circulated earlier were accurate.
