SinoInsight 1
Coronavirus cases are rising in China. From Nov. 7 to Nov. 28, there were 228 new cases, of which 203 were “imported,” with no new deaths, according to data provided by the PRC National Health Commission.
Mainland media reported some notable cases:
Nov. 11: A COVID asymptomatic case was “discovered” in Hubei’s Qianjiang City. The next day, Luotian County in Hubei’s Huanggang City announced “wartime conditions” to cope with coronavirus spread.
Nov. 14: A 26-year-old Nigerian guest at Jinjiang Hotel in Sichuan’s Chengdu City tested positive for COVID but was asymptomatic. Media reports say the man was previously quarantined in Guangzhou City in Guangdong Province upon arrival in China on Oct. 31 for 14 days, but tested positive in Chengdu. Jinjiang Hotel was placed under lockdown after the news broke, and hotel guests were quarantined on-site.
Nov. 18: Tianjin City announced a fifth asymptomatic case in the area. The person tested positive during quarantine and was the neighbor of Tianjin’s third official asymptomatic case “discovered” on Oct. 8.
Nov. 19: Tianjin TEDA Hospital and surrounding roads were locked down after a patient tested positive for COVID. The Lanyuan Eco-city community office of Tianjin posted an emergency notice on its official WeChat account calling on residents who visited TEDA Hospital after Nov. 12 to self-report to local authorities as soon as possible.
Nov. 20: The 1,900-strong community of Kanhaixuan in Tianjin reported five local COVID cases, three of which were asymptomatic. Kanhaixuan was subsequently designated a “high-risk area” and subjected to strict coronavirus control measures.
Meanwhile, the CCP has been “discovering” coronavirus on the packaging of frozen food imports on a regular basis. From Nov. 11 to Nov. 16, 10 areas (Henan’s Zhengzhou; Shandong’s Jinan, Liangshan, and Sishui; Hubei’s Wuhan; Shaanxi’s Xi’an; Fujian’s Quanzhou and Xiamen; Gansu’s Lanzhou; and Tianjin) reported cases of “imported” coronavirus. On Nov. 27, a spokesperson from the PRC Ministry of Transport issued a notice that forbids frozen food logistics personnel from opening cargo boxes “without authorization” before coronavirus control measures are implemented.
Mainland media reports of coronavirus on imported frozen food packaging also coincide with the CCP’s latest propaganda push to cover up the origins of the coronavirus. During a regular foreign ministry press briefing on Nov. 27, controversial MFA spokesman Zhao Lijian said, “Although China was the first to report cases, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the virus originated in China … Origin tracing is an ongoing process that may involve multiple countries and regions.” However, Michael Ryan, director of the health emergencies programme at the World Health Organization, said on the same day as Zhao that it is “highly speculative for us to say that the disease did not emerge in China” and it is “clear from a public health perspective that you start your investigations where the human cases first emerged.”
OUR TAKE
1. To date, only the PRC is actively “discovering” coronavirus on the packaging of frozen food imports. Other countries and researchers have found no evidence of spread for SARS-CoV-2 virus through food packaging or food consumption.
It is highly likely the CCP’s “frozen food transmission” narrative is propaganda intended to obfuscate the Wuhan origins of the coronavirus and hide a fresh wave of outbreaks on the mainland.
2. The PRC and several other countries are seeing a spike in coronavirus cases. It is unclear if the cases belong to the tail end of the first wave as lockdowns are gradually lifted, or if this is the start of a genuine second wave of the coronavirus. Regardless, the CCP will aggressively suppress information about the actual epidemic situation on the mainland while promoting China as a “safe haven” that has the coronavirus “under control.” The circumstances on the mainland will be very grave when the CCP publicly “acknowledges” cases in the thousands and upwards; during crises, the reality is usually far more egregious than what the Party openly concedes.
Businesses, investors, and governments are advised to maintain a healthy dose of skepticism regarding Beijing’s coronavirus claims and take travel precautions.
SinoInsight 2
On Nov. 24, state mouthpiece Xinhua published a 7,000 character article titled, “Promoting Military Training in the New Era Under the Leadership of President Xi Jinping.” The article noted Xi’s role in “setting the direction” for People’s Liberation Army training and stressed that the “army can fight and win wars.” The article also promoted the PLA’s ongoing reforms.
On Nov. 25, the CCP Central Military Commission held a conference on military training in Beijing, and Xi Jinping, chairman of the CMC, delivered remarks. “There have been changes happening in China in national security, military struggles, missions, modern warfare patterns, as well as in the goals of defense and military modernization,” he said. Therefore, military training must see “holistic change, enhance danger awareness, and comprehensively strengthen actual combat ability.”
On Nov. 26, PRC defense ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang gave an overview of the PLA’s noncombat recruitment efforts and plan this year. Ren said that so far, over 396,000 people signed up to contend for the 27,000-plus available noncombat positions. Of those who took entrance examinations for the noncombat posts, 28 percent held a master’s degree or higher, 69 percent held a bachelor’s degree, and 35 percent graduated from prestigious local colleges or foreign universities. Ren added that job applicants with a doctorate were exempt from written tests and proceeded straight to the interview phase. Recruitment for noncombat positions will close by the end of November.
OUR TAKE
1. We believe that Xi Jinping’s recent high-profile emphasis on military training is part of an ongoing effort to accumulate political “achievements” to boost his personal “quan wei” and strengthen his authority over the CCP amid a “perfect storm” of domestic and external woes. Other “achievements” recently claimed by Xi include “pacifying” Xinjiang, overseeing “bumper harvests,” and bringing the coronavirus “under control.”
Based on our research, since 2015, Xi either delivers public remarks about or oversees military training and parades whenever factional struggle tensions are high, and he needs to highlight his authority to consolidate power. Demonstrating control over the PLA, which Mao Zedong referred to as the Party’s gun (“qiang gan zi,” 槍桿子), allows Xi to rally the Party during a time of crisis and caution factional rivals against challenging his leadership. However, the fact that Xi needs to constantly “flaunt” his grip on the Party’s gun shows he is in a far more precarious position politically than appearances indicate.
2. What defense spokesman Ren Guoqiang revealed about overwhelming applications for noncombat positions offers insight into the state of unemployment in China today.
The PLA has been stepping up recruitment of college graduates for noncombat positions, ever since Xi Jinping ordered military reforms in late 2015. However, the military is traditionally not a preferred career choice for Chinese graduates, especially when times are good. The fact that the PLA is inundated with applications from college graduates is indicative of poor economic conditions in China.
China’s rapid economic deterioration in recent years has resulted in graduates, even those from prestigious universities, flock to so-called “iron rice bowl” civil service jobs. This is evident from the composition of higher education applicants for noncombat jobs as shared by Ren Guoqiang.
Mainland media reports published in August offer more stark examples of the employment and economic landscape in China. According to one report, nearly 300 graduates of the distinguished Tsinghua University uncharacteristically “chose” civil service jobs at the lowest level of local government (basic level, 基層). Another report noted that the local government of Zhejiang’s Yuhang District (third-tier local government) announced in 2018 that its latest recruits were master’s or doctoral students from Tsinghua or Peking University. The announcement noted that of the eight new hires for subdistrict positions (fourth-tier local government), two held doctorates (one geophysics, one biology) while the rest held master’s degrees. The recruitment notice sparked widespread discussion about the “underutilization” of talent at the lower rungs of local government.
According to a recent mainland news report, China’s civil service exams are scheduled for Nov. 29, and will see a record 1.576 million applicants vie for 25,700 government positions.
