SinoInsight 1
On June 20, PRC state media published details of the National People’s Congress’s proposed national security law for Hong Kong.
Key details of the law include:
- The Standing Committee of the NPC has the power of interpretation with regard to the national security law. This means the CCP has the final say on national security issues in Hong Kong.
- The PRC central government will establish a national security office in Hong Kong to “monitor, supervise, coordinate and support” the Hong Kong government in maintaining national security. The office will make security assessments, handle national security-related crimes in a “very small number” of cases, as well as collect and analyze intelligence.
- Hong Kong will set up a local national security council headed by the chief executive to enforce the national security law. A PRC advisor will also sit on the council.
- New Hong Kong police and prosecution units will be established to implement the national security law. Local law enforcement and prosecution units will be backed by PRC security and intelligence officers.
- Hong Kong’s chief executive will appoint judges to hear cases pertaining to national security, a move that undermines judicial independence in Hong Kong.
On June 21, state media announced that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will meet again from June 28 to June 30. The meeting agenda provided by state media did not include the Hong Kong national security law. Meanwhile, Global Times cited “observers” as saying that the NPC could enact the national security law by July 1. July 1 is the anniversary of the Hong Kong handover, and pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong have held rallies on that day every year.
OUR TAKE
1. In analyzing the CCP’s Hong Kong strategy last year, we noted that the Party prefers to “delay and wait for change” (以拖待變) when “faced with overwhelming difficulties or problems that it cannot resolve in one swoop.” Thus far, the CCP’s approach to enacting the Hong Kong national security law is in line with its “delay and wait for change” strategy.
To date, the CCP’s actions with regard to the national security situation in Hong Kong also correspond with what we analyzed on May 21.
2. With the Sino-U.S. “new cold war” escalating and the PRC facing serious domestic problems from the coronavirus outbreak and a rapidly worsening economy, the CCP needs to ensure that it has some form of national security legislation in Hong Kong (the NPC law or Article 23) to “maintain stability” (quell protests, arrest pro-democracy activists, etc.), tighten its control over the former British colony, and stop the “revolutionary fervor” in Hong Kong from spreading to the mainland. The CCP, however, is also wary of significant pushback from the U.S. and the international community if it rams through the highly contentious NPC national security legislation for Hong Kong.
The CCP’s actions suggest that it is still looking to intimidate and pressure Hong Kong into enacting the local national security law (Article 23), a development with better optics for the PRC because the people of Hong Kong, and not the PRC, would be responsible for passing national security legislation in the city. The CCP will likely pass the NPC law only as a last resort, i.e. the Hong Kong pro-democracy camp wins enough seats in the upcoming elections for the city’s legislature to block the passage of Article 23. That being said, the CCP will have far fewer reservations about implementing the NPC law if the international community does not strongly challenge the PRC over Hong Kong.
3. The international community has continually called out the PRC over the Hong Kong issue since the Trump administration announced that it would take strong action (sanctioning PRC and Hong Kong officials, ending Hong Kong’s privileges, etc.) against the PRC over the proposed Hong Kong national security law on May 29.
Recent highlights include:
- On June 7, foreign ministers of G7 countries issued a statement expressing “grave concern” over the PRC’s decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong and “strongly urge the Government of China to reconsider this decision.”
- On June 19, the European Union voted 565 in favor to 34 against taking the PRC to the International Court of Justice in The Hague if it enacts a national security law on Hong Kong. The European parliament’s Hong Kong resolution also calls on the EU to explore possible sanctions on the PRC over the Hong Kong issue, and calls on the EU to “use its economic leverage to challenge China’s crackdown on human rights by economic means.”
- During a Q&A session after delivering his “Europe and the China Challenge” speech at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit on June 19, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “Hong Kong will be treated as any other Chinese city, it will be to the extent that the Chinese choose to treat it that way … President Trump has made very, very clear to the extent that the Chinese Communist Party treats Hong Kong as it does Shenzhen and Shanghai, we will treat them the same.”
The CCP is continually testing and gauging international reaction to its handling of Hong Kong to determine the most cost-effective way to rein in the city. The implementation of national security legislation in Hong Kong, however, can become the proverbial “tiger” that the CCP will struggle to descend from (騎虎難下) if the international community keeps challenging the PRC on the issue. Strong international pushback (both in words and deeds) will make the CCP hesitant about enacting the NPC national security law and force it to delay implementation for as long as possible.
SinoInsight 2
This month, the U.S. has issued proposals and passed policies that involve sanctioning PRC officials over human rights abuses and other pernicious behavior:
- On June 10, the Republican Study Committee’s National Security & Foreign Affairs Task Force issued a national security strategy that recommended sanctions be imposed on senior CCP officials, including Politburo Standing Committee members Han Zheng and Wang Yang.
- On June 18, President Donald Trump signed into law the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, which calls on him to sanction Xinjiang boss Chen Quanguo and other senior PRC officials for human rights abuses under the Global Magnitsky Act.
- On June 19, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit that the U.S. has a “responsibility to hold accountable those inside of China who fail to live up” to agreements between the U.S. and Hong Kong. He added that the Trump administration is “working our way through a decision-making process to determine who those decision-makers were and what the appropriate mechanism is to hold them accountable.”
Last week, Hong Kong media reported damaging information about Han Zheng and suggested that the U.S. could move swiftly to sanction Han and others.
OUR TAKE
1. The U.S. has been gradually paving the way for all-out “strategic competition” against the PRC since the release of the 2017 National Security Strategy. The passing of legislation and proposals to sanction individual PRC officials is a logical development as the U.S. seeks out tools to gain leverage over the CCP in the Sino-U.S. “new cold war.” We believe that the U.S. will find sanctions effective as many PRC officials have assets or kin in North America and elsewhere. Sanctioning senior PRC officials could also impact the factional struggle in the CCP elite and trigger political Black Swans in China.
2. Xi Jinping could take advantage of U.S. sanctions against senior PRC officials to move against political opponents that he otherwise would find difficult to touch under normal circumstances. When the anti-extradition bill protests broke out in Hong Kong last year, we noted that Xi’s rivals, and particularly the Jiang Zemin faction, would exploit the chaos in Hong Kong to undermine the Xi leadership. Developments in the Hong Kong situation suggest that the Jiang faction were successful in creating conditions that forced Xi to step up suppression in the city and invite U.S. and international condemnation and pushback.
As Party boss, Xi will not want to shoulder the blame for Hong Kong, particularly if the situation deteriorates for the CCP with increased international attention over the PRC’s proposed national security law on Hong Kong. When the U.S. decides to come down hard on the CCP over Hong Kong, Xi will likely look to pass the buck to Han Zheng, Politburo Standing Committee member with the Jiang faction who oversees Hong Kong and Macau affairs.
