SinoInsight 1
After the conclusion of Beidaihe around mid-August, China watchers, and primarily those in the Chinese-speaking sphere, have been hotly discussing the possibility of Hu Chunhua joining the CCP Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress and replacing Li Keqiang as PRC premier at the 2023 Two Sessions. Hu is currently a member of the Politburo and the third-rank vice premier.
China watchers cite the following reasons for why they believe that Hu is bound for higher office:
- On July 27, Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published an article by Hu Chunhua where he lavished praise on Xi Jinping’s leadership in agricultural policy. Hu mentioned Xi’s name more than 50 times in the article, a clear display of loyalty.
- Hu was very “active” after Beidaihe, attending four national conferences on service and trade, grain, foreign trade, and employment between Aug. 16 to Aug. 19, according to state media reports.
- Hu Chunhua was previously tipped as a possible intergenerational successor (隔代接班人) to Hu Jintao (no relation to Hu Chunhua). Hu Chunhua also has a wealth of governing experience (vice premier and former Party secretary of Guangdong Province) and has a significant age advantage (59) over Wang Yang (67) and Li Keqiang (67).
- Li Keqiang confirmed in a press conference at the closing of the National People’s Congress annual session that “this is the last year [he] will be premier.” This means that someone will replace Li in 2023 even if he stays on in the Politburo Standing Committee.
- PRC premiers from the Deng era onwards are usually selected from those who previously served as vice premier. Three of the four current vice premiers—Han Zheng (68), Liu He (70), and Sun Chunlan (72)—face retirement at the 2023 Two Sessions should the Xi leadership stick to the “(sixty-) seven up, (sixty-) eight down” (七上八下) retirement norm established during the Jiang era without making exceptions. Only Hu Chunhua is young enough to take over as premier if CCP personnel reshuffle norms are observed.
- Should Hu join the Politburo Standing Committee but not serve as premier, then he could succeed Wang Yang as chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, or replace Han Zheng as first-rank vice premier.
- Hu Chunhua could join the Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress and succeed Xi Jinping as Party boss in 2027.
OUR TAKE
1. The post-Beidaihe buzz about Hu Chunhua possibly joining the Politburo Standing Committee and serving as the next premier is understandable as the 20th Party Congress draws closer and with key personnel due to be reshuffled. Some senior officials have either already said that they are stepping down from their current post (Li Keqiang) or will be at retirement age per the “seven up, eight down” norm (Li Zhanshu and Han Zheng). This means that younger officials like Hu Chunhua (59), CCP General Office director Ding Xuexiang (60 in September), Chongqing Party secretary Chen Min’er (62 in September), and Shanghai Party secretary Li Qiang (63) have a chance to replace the outgoing senior officials, and hence will receive more scrutiny by China watchers in the weeks leading up to the Party Congress.
The current attention on Hu Chunhua’s political prospects, however, is less warranted in considering standard CCP operations and factional struggle dynamics.
For one, Hu’s recent flurry of “public appearances” (see above) is completely in line with his current portfolio as third-rank vice premier (agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation, commerce and trade). State media gave coverage to the national conferences that Hu attended because the CCP is urgently prioritizing issues like service and trade, grain, foreign trade, and employment to revive the economy and stabilize society, and not because Hu’s political prospects suddenly improved after Beidaihe.
If anything, Hu’s July 27 People’s Daily article is a sign that he is concerned about his personal and political security. Hu is what Chinese commentators refer to as an “overlooked heir” (廢太子), a term used to describe officials who are “designated” by a Party boss as his preferred successor candidates and intergenerational successor candidates, but ultimately never make the cut for various reasons. Prior to the 17th Party in 2007, Hu Jintao is believed to have preferred a “double Li” (Li Yuanchao and Li Keqiang) arrangement to succeed him and Wen Jiabao, with former Chongqing boss Sun Zhengcai or Hu Chunhua slated to take over as Party leader after one of the Lis had served that post for two terms. Factional struggle between the Hu camp and the Jiang faction, however, led instead to the selection of Xi Jinping as a compromise candidate to succeed Hu Jintao.
Meanwhile, Xi’s own struggle with the Jiang faction, his need to consolidate power, and his need to avoid becoming a “lame duck” leader during his second term resulted in Xi removing presidential term limits and not bothering to designate anyone to succeed him. Xi’s political necessities also saw him take precautions against potentially dangerous “overlooked heirs” whom his enemies and even allies could rally around to replace him. Thus, Sun Zhengcai was purged before the 19th Party Congress, while Li Yuanchao did not join the Politburo Standing Committee but headed for early retirement. Hu Chunhua did get a spot on the Politburo and the post of third-rank vice premier at the 19th Party Congress, but appears to have since been put on notice by the Xi leadership through 20-year “retroactive investigations” of the Inner Mongolia officialdom (Hu was a former Party secretary of the province) that commenced in early 2020. With “retroactive investigations” in Inner Mongolia dangling like a sword of Damocles over his head, Hu would naturally go above and beyond in demonstrating fealty to Xi in his People’s Daily piece by adulating Xi’s agriculture policy and mentioning Xi’s name over 50 times.
Finally, Hu Chunhua getting picked as premier ahead of higher-ranked officials is not in line with modern CCP political operations. Seniority and qualifications place Wang Yang ahead of Hu as the more likely candidate to replace Li Keqiang as premier when the latter steps down at the 2023 Two Sessions. After all, Wang is already a Politburo Standing Committee member, previously served as vice premier, and was also once the Party boss of Guangdong and Chongqing. At 67 years of age, Wang is young enough to stay on for another term at the 20th Party Congress. Moreover, there is no indication at present that Hu has the political power or backing to leapfrog Wang for the premiership at the 20th Party Congress.
2. Hu Chunhua’s political prospects are linked with the level of Xi Jinping’s political strength and “quan wei” (authority and prestige) at the 20th Party Congress. We currently see the following possible scenarios:
a) Hu’s “best case” scenario could see him join the Politburo Standing Committee and replace Han Zheng as first-rank vice premier. For this to happen, Xi needs to be either politically very stable and very much in control (i.e. Xi is powerful enough to restore the position of Party Chairman and break other major political norms; completely abolish the “collective leadership” system; and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee pose no threat to Xi’s grip on power), or is so politically weak that he can barely stay on as CCP General Secretary and must compromise with other Party elites on key personnel appointments.
There is currently a very low probability of Hu’s “best case” scenario playing out. Xi does not appear to be strong enough at present to become Party Chairman and break major political norms beyond extending his tenure. And even if Xi were powerful enough, he would rather have his ally Li Qiang join the Politburo Standing Committee and serve as first-rank vice premier than have Hu Chunhua take up those posts. Further, Hu’s “overlooked heir” status makes it very challenging for Xi to install him in posts that will have observers speculating endlessly about whether Hu is being groomed as Xi’s successor.
b) Hu could be promoted in name but demoted in status (明昇暗降) by replacing Wang Qishan as PRC vice president and not joining the Politburo Standing Committee. Where Hu will be after the next five years depends on the degree to which Xi has consolidated power.
c) Hu could be appointed as a vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress but not join the Politburo Standing Committee, and see his political status elevated slightly. However, Chen Quanguo, the former provincial Party secretary of Xinjiang, is looking like a strong contender for this position.
d) Hu could remain as third-rank vice premier at the 20th Party Congress. This is not an ideal outcome for him because it signals political limbo and possible investigations in the future.
e) Hu’s “worst case” scenario sees him being purged before the 20th Party Congress as Xi decides that he is too much of a threat given his “elevated” profile in China watching circles. Notably, Sun Zhengcai’s stock in the China watching community also rose before the 19th Party Congress before he was suddenly purged in July 2017.
SinoInsight 2
Following the conclusion of this year’s Beidaihe meeting, Hong Kong online news portal HK01 also started a column about Xi’s decade in charge. Titled “Ten Years Special Feature” (十年特稿), the articles featured in the column obliquely point out the flaws and failures of Xi’s tenure under the guise of carrying out an appraisal.
There are six articles in HK01’s “Ten Years Special” column at the time of writing:
Aug. 16
Title: “CCP Leadership System Changes From ‘Nine Dragons Regulating Floods’ to ‘Paramount Authority’” (從九龍治水到定於一尊中共領導體制之變)
Summary: The article criticized the CCP’s “collective leadership” system (“nine dragons regulating floods”) for weakening central leadership and breeding corruption, but alluded to political regression through the ending of “collective leadership and the establishment of autocratic dictatorship under Xi Jinping. The article described Xi as the third “core” leader after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (Jiang Zemin, whom Deng designated a “core” leadership, is curiously overlooked), and noted his moves to consolidate power by coming up with “Xi Jinping Thought” and removing term limits for the PRC presidency. The article concluded by raising concerns that the Xi dictatorship could repeat the mistakes of Mao’s later years.
Aug. 18
Title: “A Different ‘Party-state’: Party-government Integration Becomes a New Attempt at National Governance” (黨政合一成為國家治理新嘗試)
Summary: The article said that Xi Jinping used “governance by leading group” (小組治國) to bypass the collective leadership system, comprehensively strengthen “Party leadership,” as well as reformed the military, political and legal affairs, and disciplinary systems. The article added that Xi “brought order out of chaos” by redefining the “separation of the Party and the government” from the Deng era to “division of labor between the Party and the government.” The article also claimed that Xi returned “Party-government integration” to something akin to the “Party-state” system of the Mao era, albeit with “more contemporary features and practical needs.”
Aug. 20
Title: “Beyond the Most Striking Report Card, Normalization of Anti-corruption is Not the Same as Institutionalization” (最醒目成績單之外反腐敗常態化不等於制度化)
Summary: The article said that Xi has “normalized” the combating of corruption in the regime, but obliquely suggests that Xi is merely carrying out a political campaign to consolidate power (hence no “institutionalization” of anti-corruption). The article also observed that the anti-corruption campaign has caused officials to become passive and inactive (“do less, less mistakes; do nothing, no mistakes” “少做少錯，不做不錯”)
The article added that while Xi has established a “main framework” (四梁八柱) for anti-corruption, there is still a long way to go before officials achieve the ideal of “not daring to be corrupt, not able to be corrupt, and not considering being corrupt.”
Aug. 22
Title: “Ideological Struggle is the Biggest Shortcoming in the Governance of Public Discourse Control” (意識形態鬥爭硝煙瀰漫輿論管控成治理最大短板)
Summary: The article said that Xi has attempted a second “reform and opening up” since coming to power to resolve the problems left over from “reform and opening up” in the Deng era. This second “reform and opening up” manifests mainly as ideological struggle, and the CCP faces fierce ideological struggle at home and abroad.
The article added that the CCP’s strict control of public discourse as it wages ideological struggle has become its greatest obstacle to governance modernization.
Aug. 24
Title: “The China Economic Perception Illusion: High Expectations and a Feeling of Small Gains” (中國經濟感知的錯覺: 高預期與低獲得感)
Summary: The article opened by stating that China’s economic data since the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic can be described as “excellent” when compared to other countries. However, the people feel that they are getting poorer and poorer over the past 10 years despite China’s economic data showing good growth, and “consumption is not moving” in the market of 1.4 billion people.
The article added that the CCP government’s economic policies have been unable to “address the root cause” of China’s economic issues. For instance, the government encourages people to make investments to resolve supply side issues (in education, healthcare, housing, etc.), but then orders “de-capitalization” once problems caused by investments get exposed. Sharp policy U-turns have greatly impacted the Chinese economy.
The article noted that the CCP government is investing heavily in infrastructure to stabilize growth in the wake of the economy stalling after COVID-19 outbreaks (and the implementation of “zero-COVID”) this year. The article, however, expresses doubt that the government’s economic policies can turn around people’s “expectations,” drive up consumption and investment, and revive the economy. The article anticipated that the road ahead for the CCP regime may become “narrower and narrower” if it does not overcome hidden dangers.
Aug. 26
Title: “From ‘New Four Great Inventions’ to Preventing the Disorderly Expansion of Capital; ‘Jack Mas’ Are Trembling” (新四大發明到防止資本無序擴張「馬雲們」在顫抖)
Summary: The article observed that China experienced a “technological revolution” in the past decade and Chinese internet giants have developed into self-contained platforms where they “call the shots” (呼風喚雨). Internet giants have also become a “third hand” (第三隻手) alongside the government and the market, or another pillar of power in the regime. This led the CCP authorities to crackdown on the disorderly expansion of capital and anti-monopoly measures, which in turn backfired on the regime as tech giants began layoff staff and consumer power declined in China.
HK01 also published a series of articles commemorating Deng Xiaoping’s 118th birthday anniversary that indirectly criticizes Xi Jinping’s “deepening reform and opening up” effort as a rejection of Deng’s “reform and opening up.”
There are three articles in the “Deng 118th birthday” series at the time of writing:
Aug. 22
Title: “Continuing Reform and Opening Up is the Best Way to Commemorate Deng” (繼續改革開放是對鄧公最好的紀念)
Summary: The article praised Deng for being “the greatest commoner” for having “played a hand of bad cards wonderfully, allowing countless commoners to have enough to eat and live a good life.” The article further lauded Deng’s “pragmatism,” noting that it was his “most distinctive political style” and that he “did not like rhetoric and did not indulge in grand narratives.” Deng is also said to be “uncompromising domestically and has strategies for foreign (parties)” (對內不折騰, 對外有謀略).
Analysis: Reading between the lines, the article appears to be “borrowing from the past to comment on the present” (借古喻今) by touting Deng and having readers juxtapose him with Xi, who seems to be the opposite of Deng and is courting both internal and external trouble for the CCP regime.
Aug. 22
Title: “How to Play a Bad Hand Wonderfully?” (如何將一手爛牌打得無比精彩?)
Analysis: The article is a reprint of a post on the “Sino-American Scholars Think Tank” (中美學者智庫) official WeChat account from August 2020 to mark the 116th anniversary of Deng’s birthday. Originally titled, “China’s History is Full of Tears, But Only Deng Xiaoping Successfully Reformed China” (中國歷史翻來翻去, 都是淚水, 只有鄧小平一個人, 成功改革中國), the article reminisced about Deng’s “reform and opening up” achievements as a backhanded way of criticizing the Xi leadership for its poor handling of the pandemic in China and for courting international pushback over its efforts to take advantage of the pandemic to advance the regime’s global hegemonic ambitions (以疫謀霸).
Aug. 23
Title: “Deng Xiaoping’s Most Profound Change in China: Underlying Political Logic, Underlying Values, and Public Sentiment” (鄧小平對中國最深刻改變: 政治底層邏輯、底層價值和民情)
Summary: The article is an introduction to a WeChat article by a public account (“Fu cheng men liu hao yuan,” 阜成門六號院) titled, “Thinking of Xiaoping Every Day Today” (每逢今日思小平).
The WeChat article argued that Deng’s “greatest contribution to China’s development” can be found in his “four fundamental changes to the underlying political logic and values” in the CCP regime.
The first is changing the standard for measuring “political correctness” by making economic development” the “greatest politics.”
The second is “completely changing China’s understanding of the outside world.”
The third is “breaking the theological shackles of ideology, breaking the superstition of the Soviet model, and opening the door to the modernization of institutional civilization.”
The fourth is “changing the rules of politics, making politics more civilized, and creating a more tolerant and stable social order.”
Analysis: This article, like the two other articles on Deng, is praising the latter’s “contributions” to regime development as a way of criticizing Xi for doing the opposite today.
OUR TAKE
The HK01 articles mentioned above that are obliquely critical of Xi and his policies are reminiscent of those previously published by the since-defunct Beijing-based overseas Chinese language media Duowei News. This is perhaps not surprising given that it was reported in April that some Duowei staff would be transferred to HK01 following the closure of the media outlet. Duowei’s owner Yu Pun-hoi also owns HK01. We previously analyzed in greater detail why Duowei was suddenly shut down this year.
As we have observed on numerous occasions, Duowei was known to carry messaging from various factions in the CCP elite and frequently carried articles that were very critical of Xi and his policies. There is a possibility that HK01 has lately come to “inherit” Duowei’s function as a channel for Party elites who are opposed to Xi to air their grievances and mobilize politically.
HK01’s articles under its “Ten Years Special” column appear to “affirm” Xi’s political “achievements” on the surface, but simultaneously cast shade on them by “objectively” pointing out the Xi leadership’s governance issues and various intractable problems facing the CCP regime. For examples, the articles effectively dismiss Xi’s anti-corruption effort as a lawless political campaign aimed at eliminating political enemies; argue that Xi’s “deepening reform and opening up” is the negation of Deng’s “reform and opening up”; and point out that Xi’s domestic and foreign policies have landed the regime into an unprecedented predicament. The vagueness of the criticisms and the veneer of praise for Xi’s “accomplishments” in those articles makes it very awkward for the Xi leadership to use the Hong Kong National Security Law to deal with HK01.
Meanwhile, the series of articles commemorating Deng’s 118th birthday anniversary are aimed at condemning the Xi leadership by praising Deng Xiaoping’s legacy. Readers of those articles would naturally start juxtaposing the performances of Deng and Xi, look back on the Deng era with nostalgia, and determine that Xi is the more detestable and inferior Party boss. In January, Duowei also took shots at the Xi leadership through a series of articles commemorating the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour.
All in all, the HK01 articles above reflect the views of those who benefited from Deng’s “reform and opening up” but saw their interests harmed under Xi. Their publication close to the 20th Party Congress period suggests that political mobilization against the Xi leadership is still ongoing, albeit in quieter ways. Those articles also indirectly affirm our earlier observation that Xi’s “quan wei” is built mostly on propaganda because he lacks tangible achievements and results.
