SinoInsight 1
The General Office of the Central Military Commission issued interim regulations guaranteeing medical treatment for soldiers and military-related personnel (軍人及軍隊相關人員醫療待遇保障暫行規定).
The interim regulations:
- Clarify the medical treatment that military and military-related personnel are eligible for;
- Defines the specific circumstances in which military personnel can receive medical treatment across service branches;
- Opens up channels for military personnel and their family members to seek treatment in external medical institutions when they are located a distance away from military medical institutions;
- Free medical treatment for military spouses and preferential medical treatment for the parents and spouses of officers and noncommissioned officers;
- Continues the previous policy of providing free medical treatment to military personnel and their children who are still minors.
Nov. 1
The People’s Liberation Army Daily published an article titled, “Examining the Military Leadership System Through the ‘Rule of China’ — How to Strengthen the Confidence of the Socialist Military System With Chinese Characteristics” (透過“中國之治”看領軍之—怎麼看堅定中國特色社會主義軍事制度自信)
The article opened by touting Xi Jinping’s “success” in curbing the coronavirus epidemic and crediting said “success” to his “vivid interpretation of ‘Rule of China’” (“中國之治” 的生动诠释). Xi’s “success” demonstrates “the significant advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics,” with “the Party’s absolute leadership over the military being an important pillar.”
The article noted that the CCP’s “system of absolute Party leadership over the military” had “fundamentally eradicated the political soil of warlord chaos [during the years of Republican China]” and “effectively prevented ambitious and conspiratorial people from succeeding in their attempts to usurp military power.” The article added, “as long as the system of absolute Party leadership over the military is guaranteed, the Party and country will not be ‘chaotic,’ the troops will not be ‘scattered,’ and conspirators cannot ‘rebel.’”
The article said that “upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over the military” gives the troops an advantage in battle. “The high degree of consistency of the Party’s military, the people’s military, and the military of the socialist state is ultimately determined by the inherent consistency of the Party and the people’s nature,” the article continued. Also, the CCP’s “system of absolute Party leadership over the military” explains “why we cannot copy the Western model of military governance.”
OUR TAKE
Xi pushed through military reforms during his first term in a bid to wrestle control over the Party’s “gun” (槍桿子) from the Jiang faction. Despite the enacting of military reforms in 2016 and mass personnel reshuffles (including promoting a new guard of senior officers), the recent messaging in official media suggests that Xi is still struggling to put his stamp on the PLA.
If Xi believes that he is lacking in “quan wei” and that his grip over the military now is more tenuous than external appearances suggest, then he would naturally want to stay in China during this crucial period to personally oversee matters; observers have noticed that Xi has not traveled abroad since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic nearly two years ago. Xi will also certainly factor in the military’s loyalty to him in weighing the sort of military maneuvers that Beijing can “allow” in intimidating Taiwan and how risky it will be to consider an invasion even under favorable circumstances.
2. The PLA previously ran several articles on the themes of “absolute Party leadership over the military” and how that is necessary to ensure that “the Party and country will not be ‘chaotic,’ the troops will not be ‘scattered,’ and conspirators cannot ‘rebel.’” Of those articles, two stand out for making more direct allusions to factional struggle problems in the CCP elite.
In October 2015, the PLA Daily published a piece titled, “Adhere to the Party’s Absolute Leadership Over the Military, Conspirators Cannot Rebel” (堅持黨對軍隊絕對領導 陰謀家就“反不了”). The article noted that “some people, especially particular leading cadres, are lacking in faith, spiritually focused, are duplicitous, comply publicly but defy privately (陽奉陰違), do not resolutely implement orders and instructions, and have countermeasures to [central government] policies (上有政策下有對策). [The resolution of] These issues must be given high priority.” In 2015, Jiang faction member and former Central Military Commission vice chairman Guo Boxiong was officially investigated and charged with corruption and selling offices.
On Oct. 11, 2017 (before the 19th Party Congress), then People’s Armed Police commander Wang Ning published an article titled “Resolutely Maintain and Implement the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System” (堅決維護和貫徹軍委主席負責制) in the CCP Central Party School publication Study Times. The article stressed the necessity of “resolutely maintaining and implementing the CMC Chairman Responsibility System” so that “the institutional system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military is fully implemented” and “the Party and country will not be ‘chaotic,’ the troops will not be ‘scattered,’ and conspirators cannot ‘rebel.’” The article added that former CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou had weakened the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” and “seriously violated the political bottom line.” Also, Xi investigated Guo and Xu to “save the Party and the military at a crucial time.” In the three month period before Wang Ning’s piece was published, Xi purged Politburo member Sun Zhengcai, PLA chief of joint staff Fang Fenghui, and CMC Political Work Department director Zhang Yang.
3. The interim regulations guaranteeing medical treatment for military personnel and their kin follows an effort by the Xi leadership to boost benefits for PLA forces. In January, the South China Morning Post reported that PRC servicemen and women would receive a 40 percent pay raise in 2021, while commissioned and non-commissioned officers stationed in border areas like Tibet, Xinjiang, and the East and South China Seas will receive a higher rate.
Xi Jinping appears to be looking to boost the morale of rank-and-file military personnel as the PRC faces greater economic difficulties and the Chinese people see more hardship. Xi could also be looking to guarantee the loyalty of the troops amid his concerns over the military’s loyalty to him.
SinoInsight 2
Peng, 35, claimed in a Weibo post that Zhang forced her into sex about three years ago, and that they previously had an on-off consensual relationship. Peng’s post was scrubbed from the internet around 20 minutes to half-an-hour after it was published, and the authorities have since been heavily censoring content related to the Peng Shuai-Zhang Gaoli scandal, including searches, images, memes, and even a 2013 Korean television drama titled, “Prime Minister and I” (총리와 나, 總理與我). Still, Chinese netizens and commentators continue to hotly discuss and spread word about the scandal through various censor-evading methods, such as sending messages in a jumble of Chinese characters, English words, and English acronyms. Chinese netizens are also circulating an old picture of former vice premier Xi Zhongxun discussing military strategy with Marshal Peng Dehuai to signal that “Peng Shuai met [had relations] with vice premier [Zhang Gaoli]”; “Marshal Peng” [彭帥] in Chinese is a homophone for Peng Shuai and contains the exact same characters as the tennis star’s name, while the presence of Xi Jinping’s father in the picture makes it “politically incorrect” to censor the image.
Peng Shuai’s accusation of Zhang Gaoli is widely regarded as a high-level “#MeToo” scandal in China and by international media. It is unclear whether Peng views it as a “#MeToo” incident, but her Weibo post reflects opportunism, an element of rivalry with Zhang’s wife, and vindictiveness towards Zhang as a jilted lover. Peng wrote in opening her post, “I know I’m being hypocritical, and I admit that I’m not a good girl, [in fact I’m] a very, very bad girl.” In concluding, Peng wrote, “I know that for someone of your seniority, vice premier Zhang Gaoli, you’ve said that you’re not afraid. But even if I’m inviting self-destruction like an egg striking a stone, or a moth flying into the flames, I’ll tell the truth about you … Can you face your mother after all that you’ve done in this life?”
Peng’s accusation also comes a week before the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee (Nov. 8 to Nov. 11) commences in Beijing. Xi Jinping is expected to unveil a “historical resolution” during the important political conclave.
OUR TAKE
1. It is highly risky for a professional tennis star to be accusing a former Politburo Standing Committee member of sexual assault regardless of the veracity of the allegation. Preserving the “great, glorious, correct” image of senior officials is paramount in the CCP regime, and what Peng Shuai had done could lead to the authorities “disappearing” her like countless of Chinese dissidents rather than the arrest of the accused.
Then there is the mystery of how Peng was even able to send out her post in the first place. PRC censors keep a close eye on a list of “sensitive” terms, which almost certainly include the names of former high-ranking officials. Chinese social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat even prevent users from sending out messages if they contain words that have been flagged by the censors. Thus, it is highly unusual that Weibo and its finely-tuned censorship algorithm “allowed” Peng’s post, which definitely contains “sensitive” words and broaches a strictly taboo topic, to be published at all and stay up for around half-an-hour before it was pulled.
From currently available public information, we see three possible explanations for why Peng Shuai called out Zhang Gaoli at this time.
First, Peng could be hoping to ride the global “#MeToo” wave to escape trouble from the authorities while putting Zhang in a tough spot with her sexual assault accusation. This is the least likely explanation unless Peng is incredibly naïve and has no grasp of the concept of “political correctness” in the CCP regime (the publication of her Weibo post during a politically sensitive period suggests otherwise). Weibo’s “sensitive” word filters would also have to serendipitously malfunction when she was posting. If this is indeed the case, however, then Peng will almost certainly be “disappeared” by the authorities for seriously transgressing political taboo before an important political conclave.
Second, Peng could be working with Party elites who are against Zhang Gaoli and the Jiang Zemin faction to which he belongs. Peng seems to be savvy enough to realize that she is posting on an extremely sensitive political matter during a politically sensitive period (before the Sixth Plenum), and attacking a high-ranking member of a once-very powerful political faction that still retains influence in the regime. Given the circumstances, Peng would likely only dare to go ahead if she is assured some form of immunity (she could still be temporarily “disappeared” if there is a need to keep up pretenses) and benefits from political forces who rival or exceed the Jiang faction in strength. The Xi Jinping camp fits this bill, and it also has the authority and means to see to it that Weibo “accidentally” allowed Peng’s post to get published despite its sensitive content and stay on the internet long enough for people to notice and start talking.
Xi Jinping has the incentive to place the Jiang faction on notice before the Sixth Plenum and force them to reconsider efforts to undermine his leadership and foil his “quan wei”-building agenda during this crucial political period. Xi has been very focused this year on purging factional rivals and ‘rectifying’ the Jiang faction-influenced financial sector and the political and legal affairs security apparatus as he looks to ensure a successful bid for a third term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
The third explanation is a mix of the first and second explanations. Peng Shuai is genuinely looking to air a “#MeToo” case and is not working with any Party faction. However, Xi camp associates found out about Peng’s case and decided to take advantage of her Weibo post to gain leverage in factional struggle.
Zhang Gaoli will not run into trouble in the first scenario outlined above. He may or may not be in immediate danger in the second and third scenarios depending on his personal actions and attitudes toward the Xi leadership and Xi Jinping’s political requirements; Xi will not want to rock the political boat unless absolutely necessary during the Sixth Plenum period. But political risks for the Jiang faction and its supporters are steadily rising on the whole, and the Xi leadership will almost certainly continue purging Jiang faction officials, including some senior cadres, in the lead up to the 20th Party Congress.
2. The CCP historically seeks to shape public discourse and turn it against those it intends to struggle against before taking action. During Mao and Deng’s time, struggle targets would be labeled “capitalist roaders” and “rightists,” while the publication of ancient allegories and critiques of modern literary works often signal the impending downfall of individuals or groups.
CCP factions employ similar struggle tactics in targeting each other, including leaking scandals about officials to the public before they are taken out. For instance, news that famous PLA singer Tang Can had sexual relations with Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, and other Jiang faction members began to circulate near the end of 2011 following an escalation in the factional struggle between Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Tang and all the aforementioned officials were subsequently investigated and purged.
Multiple scandals involving Zhou Yongkang were disclosed in the months preceding his arrest. From 2013, news of Zhou’s family corruption emerged in the media, as well as a sex scandal between Zhou and a CCTV hostess. In March 2014, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Lü Xinhua replied “you know what I mean” (你懂的) in response to a reporter’s question about whether Zhou Yongkang was under investigation. About four months later, the anti-corruption authorities made official their probe into Zhou.
Peng Shuai’s recent accusation of Zhang Gaoli has the markings of an effort to turn public discourse against him and the Jiang faction. The Peng-Zhang scandal could conceivably metastasize and lead to further disclosures of Zhang, the Jiang Zemin clan, and the Jiang faction’s corruption.
3. Zhang Gaoli started out in the Guangdong Maoming state petroleum system. He transitioned into government in 1985 when he was appointed deputy Party secretary of Maoming City while concurrently serving as a manager in Sinopec’s Maoming refinery. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Zhang was serving as Guangdong’s deputy Party secretary (1998 to 2001) and Party secretary of Shenzhen (1997 to 2001).
Jiang Zemin made several trips to Shenzhen when Zhang Gaoli was the city’s Party boss and the former was CCP leader. Official inspections aside, Jiang could have ulterior motives for frequenting Shenzhen; it is widely rumored that Huang Liman, then Shenzhen deputy Party secretary and former Jiang subordinate at the old Ministry of Electronics Industry, was one of Jiang’s lovers at the time. In February 2000, Jiang introduced his “Three Representatives” political theory while touring Zhang’s former stomping ground in Maoming, a move that underscored his ties with Zhang Gaoli.
Zhang was transferred to Shandong to serve as governor in November 2001, and later become Shandong Party secretary and a Central Committee member at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. In Shandong, Zhang continued to show great deference to his political patron Jiang Zemin even after the latter was no longer General Secretary or CMC chairman. According to Hong Kong media reports, Zhang closed off Mount Tai to the public for two whole days during the Labor Day holiday (a peak tourism period) because Jiang fancied a jaunt of the mountain. Zhang got local leading cadres and officials to stand in line to welcome Jiang upon his arrival and hail him as the “most beloved leader of the whole Party, the whole military, and the whole nation.” Later, Zhang arranged for Jiang to be carried up the mountain in a sedan chair (a treatment enjoyed by Chinese emperors) while he tagged closely behind (see red arrow in the picture).
In March 2007, Zhang Gaoli was appointed Tianjin Party secretary, a crucial personnel arrangement that later led to him joining the Politburo while revealing that he was deeply trusted by Jiang Zemin and the faction named after him. While in Tianjin, Zhang duly carried out the Jiang faction agenda, including actively implementing Jiang Zemin’s Falun Gong persecution campaign. The persecution began in Tianjin and the city has long been an area where the persecution of Falun Gong was especially severe. This is particularly damning in consideration of research showing that Tianjin First Central Hospital’s Oriental Organ Transplant Center carried out an extraordinarily large number of organ transplants, and have connected the phenomenon with the CCP’s forced organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners of conscience (see here, here, here, and here).
