SinoInsight 1
Xi boosts ‘quan wei’
Dec. 27 – Dec. 28
The Politburo held a special “democratic life” meeting on the topic of Party history study and education, according to state mouthpiece Xinhua. Xi Jinping presided over the meeting and delivered a speech.
The meeting opened with touting Xi’s 2021 “achievements,” noting that it was a “milestone year in the history of the Party and the nation.” Xinhua’s report added that the Politburo members unanimously concurred that “the Party established Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of Party Central and the whole Party, and established that the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era reflects the common aspiration of the whole Party, whole military, the whole nation, and people of all ethnic groups, as well as is of decisive significance for the development of the Party and the nation in the new era and for advancing the historical process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The meeting added that crises faced by the regime since the 18th Party Congress are “rare in the world and in history,” and claimed that Xi’s “courageousness as a Marxist statesman and strategist” enabled the regime to “solve many long-standing problems that have not been solved, and accomplished many great things that we wanted to do in the past but failed to accomplish.”
Xi also cautioned officials, “This year and the next is a time of [leadership] transition. Leading comrades should strictly abide by political discipline and political rules, and strictly abide by organizational discipline and transition discipline. It is necessary to educate and guide leading cadres to view the organization correctly, view themselves correctly, obey the overall situation, obey the organization, and obey arrangements.”
Dec. 31
Xi Jinping issued his New Year’s address for 2022. In comparison with previous speeches since 2014, the 2022 address clearly emphasized Xi’s personal achievements, his concerns about regime security, and his bond with the people. Examples include:
- “The sixth plenary session of the 19th CCP Central Committee has adopted the Party’s third resolution on historical issues. The CCP’s 100-year achievements provide a source of motivation and its 100-year experience a wellspring of inspiration. I have referred to Chairman Mao’s conversation with Mr. Huang Yanpei at his cave-dwelling in Yan’an, and the importance of carrying out bold self-revolution so as to gain the historical initiative.”
- “Through my field trips to different places, I have seen and heard a lot of things which I find very inspiring and rewarding. Every time I visit people in their homes, I would ask if they have any more difficulties, and I would remember everything my folks have to share with me.”
- “The concerns of the people are what I always care about, and the aspirations of the people are what I always strive for. Having worked in the countryside myself, I know precisely what poverty feels like.”
- “A Yellow River well harnessed is a millennia-long aspiration of the Chinese people. Over the past few years, I have visited all nine provinces or autonomous regions on the upper, middle and lower streams of the Yellow River.”
- “In my phone calls and virtual meetings with foreign leaders and heads of international organizations, I have heard many times plaudits for China’s fight against COVID-19 and contribution to the global COVID response.”
The conversation between Mao Zedong and Huang Yanpei that Xi referenced in his 2022 New Year’s address is the famous so-called “cycle” conversation (窯洞對) in July 1945 between Huang and pro-democracy activists and Mao and the communists in Mao’s cave dwelling in Yan’an. At the time, Mao and the CCP were busy courting political parties and intellectuals in China, as well as Western journalists, to legitimize their rogue regime and make the case for why they, and not the Kuomintang, should rule China.
To gauge Mao’s commitment to democracy and intentions for China, Huang posed to him the “problem” of dynastic cycles (週期律). Mao proceeded to give Huang what he wanted to hear by replying, “We have already found a new path; we can escape from this cycle. This new path is democracy. The only way for the government to not slack off is for the people to oversee the government. If everyone is responsible, then the ‘end of political power from the death of the leader’ can be avoided.”
In bringing up the “cycle” conversation in his “historical resolution” and New Year’s address, Xi, like Mao, is not advocating democracy, but reaffirming his commitment to do whatever it takes to ensure that the regime survives and thrives. Xi is also emphasizing the importance of his “achievements” in maintaining the regime while playing up the significance of his taking a third term to the regime’s success and survival.
Jan. 6
Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee and reviewed work reports by the National People Congress Standing Committee, the State Council, the National Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Central Secretariat.
According to state media reports, the meeting noted, “to govern well our large Party with 95 million members and large country with a population of over 1.4 billion, we must adhere to the overall leadership of the Party, and especially the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central.” The meeting also stressed that Party Central listens to work reports from the aforementioned organs each year, and the practice “plays an exemplary role in upholding the Party’s overall leadership, maintaining Party Central’s ‘quan wei’ and centralizing and unified leadership.” Therefore, the practice “must persist for a long time.”
Jan. 11
The Central Party School (Chinese Academy of Governance) held a seminar on the study and implementation of the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress for leading cadres. Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the seminar’s opening ceremony, which was presided over by Li Keqiang. State media reports and footage of the opening ceremony showed that all the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee—Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, Han Zheng—and PRC vice president Wang Qishan were in attendance.
In his speech, Xi repeated the central thesis of his “historical resolution” and highlighted the importance of the resolution to the regime. He called on senior cadres to “study the Sixth Plenum resolution as it is, study and understand the historical significance and experience of the Party’s century-long struggle, as well as study and understand the important requirement of taking history as a mirror for creating the future.”
Political mobilization
Dec. 24
Study Times, the official newspaper of the Central Party School, published a piece titled, “Cadres Who Refuse Promotion Are Not Abiding by Political Rules” (幹部拒絕提拔是不守政治規矩).
The article pointed out that some CCP officials “refused to be promoted” because they were enriching themselves at certain positions (為了留任斂財) and were afraid that their corruption would be exposed after leaving those positions. The article criticized those officials for lacking “strong political awareness” and refusing to “listen to Party’s orders and arrangements by the organization.” This represents a “challenge to the Party’s organizational discipline and wrecks the principle of ‘the Party governs the cadres.”
The article added that the phenomenon of cadres refusing promotion “must be taken seriously and dealt with seriously,” while Party members who refuse promotion, “especially leading cadres, must be held accountable.”
Jan. 1
1. Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published Xi Jinping’s Sixth Plenum speech on Nov. 11 under the title, “Taking History as a Mirror, Creating the Future, Working Hard, and Bravely Moving Forward” (以史為鑑、開創未來 埋頭苦幹、勇毅前行).
2. Qiushi published a lengthy article by Central Party History and Documentation Research Institute dean Qu Qingshan titled, “Deeply Understand the Historic Achievements and Historical Changes of the New Era” (深入領會新時代的歷史性成就和歷史性變革). The article appears to be part of a largely collective of articles that serve to propagate the spirit of the Sixth Plenum.
Qu’s article claims that Xi Jinping is the “Party core that is desired and deserved by all.” The article then cites the history of Mao Zedong and the importance of establishing the Party core and ideology.
The article concludes that the “fundamental reason for the Party and the nation’s historic achievements and historical changes since the 18th Party Congress” is Xi Jinping, the “core of Party Central, the whole Party’s core taking the helm,” and the “scientific guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Qu added, “This is the conclusion drawn by history, this is the answer given by practice, and this is the judgement made by the people.”
Jan. 4
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published on page nine of its print edition a lengthy article by Central Policy Research Office deputy director Tian Peiyan titled, “The Historical Contribution of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era” (學習貫徹六中全會精神丨新時代中國特色社會主義的歷史貢獻). Tian’s article is part of a series of post-Sixth Plenum articles promoting Xi’s “historical resolution,” i.e. touting Xi’s “achievements” and their role and centrality in resolving regime crises, as well as calling on officials to strengthen and safeguard the Party’s “centralized and unified leadership.”
The article praised the Xi leadership for “stopping some unhealthy trends that were thought to be impossible to stop in the past, and rectifying some stubborn maladies that were not eliminated for many years.” The Xi leadership is also credited with “establishing the correct orientation for personnel and resolutely correcting major deviations and injustices in the selection and deployment of personnel.” Further, the Xi leadership is said to have “used fierce medicine to treat disease; the determination to cure the chaos by scrapping poison from bone; the resolve and bravery to resolutely ‘strike tigers,’ ‘swat flies,’ and ‘hunt foxes,’” resulting in “overwhelming victory and comprehensive consolidation of the anti-corruption struggle, and the elimination of serious hidden dangers within the Party, the state and the military.”
Jan. 7
People’s Daily published a long article by Qu Qingshan titled “Deeply Understand the Historical Experience of the Party’s Century-long Struggle” (深入領會黨百年奮鬥的歷史經驗). The article serves to propagate the spirit of the Sixth Plenum.
Qu’s article elaborates on the Party’s 10 historical experiences laid out in Xi’s “historical resolution.” The article notes that the historical experiences are the “careful summary of opinions and suggestions from all quarters” obtained “under the strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core and with the collective wisdom of the whole Party.”
The historical experiences, “a coherent, interconnected, organic, and unified whole,” represent “scientific leadership for winning the future in the new era.”
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping’s bid for a norm-breaking third term at the 20th Party Congress is not guaranteed despite his paramount position in the CCP. Thus, Xi needs to keep harping on the “spirit of the Sixth Plenum” and his “historical resolution” to hammer home his “significance” to the Party’s history and future, boost his “quan wei,” and improve his third term chances.
Party propaganda outlets can be expected to promote Xi’s “historical resolution” and the “spirit of the Sixth Plenum” ad nauseam in the lead-up to the 20th Party Congress.
2. The Study Times article on officials who refuse promotion and the touting of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in official media reveal Xi’s ongoing problems with corruption and foreshadow his future corruption-related actions.
We previously noted that the Xi leadership tends to move officials it intends to purge away from their base of operations (調虎離山) so as to better investigate them and deliver punishment. Otherwise, those officials would have leveraged their authority and networks in their former positions to block investigation efforts and cover up evidence of corruption. The downfall of many officials after they were moved from their post likely inspired some to play bureaucratic games with Beijing and resist efforts by the Organization Department to reshuffle them. For instance, officials could petition more influential superiors or political patrons to reject their promotion using various pretexts; dole out bribes; or get their subordinates to file joint petitions on their behalf requesting that they remain where they are because they are “indispensable at the job” or other pretexts.
Middle- and lower-ranking officials have greater agency to refuse promotions and other Organization Department arrangements than higher ranking officials because organizational control and discipline is looser at the mid-to-low ranks. Some village-level cadres wield tremendous power in their localities and operate akin to a mafia, as seen in the case of Wu clan in Huaxi Village.
Xi could be intent on clearing out recalcitrant mid-to-low ranking officials and replacing them with loyal cadres who will “listen to the Party’s orders and arrangements by the organization.” By installing obedient officials throughout the regime, the Xi leadership is looking to both get a leg up in factional struggle against entrenched political networks and overcome the regime-endangering problem of Beijing’s orders “not leaving the gates of Zhongnanhai” (政令不出中南海).
Meanwhile, Xi will likely purge some “big tigers” before the 20th Party Congress to “kill the chickens to scare the monkey” (殺鷄儆猴) and deter factional rivals from challenging his third-term bid and key personnel arrangements. As we wrote in our China 2022 Outlook, “Officials in the political and legal affairs apparatus and financial system will be high-risk targets in Xi’s ‘rectification’ campaigns. Current or retired Party or national-level leaders may even be investigated.”
3. Qu Qingshan’s recent articles extolling Xi Jinping and embellishing the importance of his “achievements” affirm our Dec. 16 analysis.
To briefly recap, we debunked the popular analysis that an article by Qu that did not mention Xi at all was a sign of intra-Party dissatisfaction towards Xi, but rather just Qu expanding on what had already been laid out in Xi’s “historical resolution.” Meanwhile, Xi is distancing himself from the “reform and opening up” political legacy of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao while playing up his own so as to make his “achievements” stand out. More recently, Qu article on the Party’s 10 historical experiences fails to mention “reform and opening up.”
4. Li Zhanshu’s public appearance on Jan. 11 affirms our previous analysis that his not showing up for a New Year’s Day tea party attended by all other members of the Politburo Standing Committee and Wang Qishan was not a sign that he was in trouble, as some China watchers inferred.
We noted that it was more likely that Li’s no-show was due to health reasons, including a possible quarantine after coming into contact with COVID-positive individuals. The period of time between his second-to-last public appearance on Dec. 24 and his most recent public appearance on Jan. 11 would accommodate a 14-day quarantine.
