Analyzing speculation of Wang Yang as Xi’s ‘successor’; Zhou Jiangyong & factional politics in Hangzhou

     SinoInsight  1     

• The recent Beidaihe meeting did not go well for Xi Jinping.
• Xi prefers Wang Yang over Li Keqiang to succeed him because he has disagreements with the latter.
• Xi has exhausted all his options in countering an America that loathes Xi and is getting tough on China across the board, including investigating the origins of the coronavirus. Thus, Xi deliberately released disinformation about Wang Yang succeeding him in order to “appease” or “confuse” the U.S., with the logic being that the “softer” character of Wang would “persuade” Washington to weaken its stance on China.

OUR TAKE
Making sense of rumors and information about the CCP and factional struggle is always challenging. Unofficial information is usually vague and often contains a mix of part-truths and falsehoods; this is unavoidable given the difficulties of getting sensitive information out from a totalitarian environment and compounded by communication in Chinese culture being oftentimes indirect. But analysts can still have a good idea of what is noise and what is signal by juxtaposing unofficial information with official information, and having a working understanding of CCP characteristics, operations, and factional struggle.

The idea that Xi Jinping would put out disinformation about a potential successor to throw the U.S. off his case may seem logical at first glance, given the Party’s characteristics. Deceit is second nature to the CCP and the regime is preoccupied with survival and domination.

However, the CCP’s recent rhetoric on America’s withdrawal on Afghanistan (a signal of U.S. decline and global hegemony; intimidating Taiwan and U.S. allies, etc.) and renewed efforts at rehashing disinformation about the origins of the coronavirus (“it came from Fort Derrick”) indicates that it is doubling down, not letting up, on its “wolf warrior” approach. If anything, the CCP appears to have recently gotten concessions from the U.S.; an Aug. 25 Reuters report noted that “the U.S. has granted licenses authorizing suppliers to sell chips to Huawei for such vehicle components as video screens and sensors” in “recent weeks and months,” citing people familiar with the matter.

The Biden-Harris administration’s botched Afghanistan pullout would convince Beijing even more that it is absolutely correct in promoting its narrative of a rising East and declining West (東升西降). Hence, it does not make sense for Xi to be spreading unreliable disinformation about his stepping aside in the hopes of somehow duping a “dominant” U.S. (a review of the Biden-Harris administration’s approach to the CCP indicates that it is adulterating Trump’s “China challenge”) into relaxing its stance on China. Indeed, Beijing has no use for parlor tricks when the current White House is inviting doubts about its competency in handling Afghanistan and as the CCP is busy undermining America (influence operations, financial strategy, fentanyl shipments, espionage, etc.) and setting itself up as the new global hegemon.

Wang Yang’s seemingly unusual public appearances are actually in line with Party protocol. Wang has attended Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meetings when the meeting topic concerns his political advisory/united front work portfolio (many prominent businessmen, executives, and celebrities are CPPCC members), and the recent meeting is no exception. And Wang was likely handed a greater role in the meeting about promoting “common prosperity” because CPPCC work is essential for “maintaining stability” and preventing financial risks when the CCP starts extracting wealth from the rich and redistributing it to the middle and lower classes. Put another way, Wang Yang had an “elevated” presence at the tenth meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission due to his work portfolio, and not because of some change in his political status.

Wang Yang’s CPPCC portfolio is also almost certainly the main reason why he was selected to go to Tibet to commemorate the 70th anniversary of CCP control over the region as Xi’s representative. The argument that Wang is being prepared to be Xi’s successor because Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping attended the 50th and 60th Tibet control anniversary events respectively does not hold water as the political rules of the game during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012) changed substantially after Xi took office. For instance, Xi broke political norms by purging an “untouchable” former Politburo Standing Committee member (Zhou Yongkang) in his first term, and took a series of controversial moves (abolish presidential term limits; not designating a successor; appointing a non-Politburo member [Wang Qishan] as PRC vice president) early into his second term to consolidate power and prolong his leadership tenure.

Finally, Xi Jinping has zero incentive from a factional struggle perspective to be putting out disinformation about a successor. CCP factional struggle is a brutal, “you die, I live” affair, and Xi can ill-afford to step aside now, with his control over the regime more tenuous than appearances suggest, and with many enemies waiting to extract retribution the moment he relinquishes power. If anything, Xi’s ambitions about staying in power are made abundantly clear in the Aug. 15 Qiushi article that called on Party members to be loyal to Party Central (“with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core”) and warned against factional activity against his leadership. The fact that Xi’s foreign enemies felt the need to put him on notice around the conclusion of the Beidaihe meeting hints at a stalemate rather than Xi being “defeated” and being forced to designate a successor.

The origins of the “Wang Yang successor” rumors may be less mysterious than appearances suggest. While Xi’s enemies are naturally suspect, the vagueness of the rumors and their prior warnings to Xi Jinping means that Xi’s rivals were either engaging in an extremely feeble attempt to undermine the latter or they were not the source of the rumors. Rather, the rumors appear to be derived from the speculation of overseas Chinese commentators and media outlets who read too much into recent elite personnel activity; like a game of telephone, the information/speculation changes after it is circulated numerous times. With the Wang Yang rumors getting “laundered” in the overseas Chinese press, however, Xi’s rivals now have opportunities to weaponize the misreporting against him.

     SinoInsight  2    

OUR TAKE
1. A review of Zhou Jiangyong’s official career indicates that he is not a close associate of Xi Jinping.

When Xi was in Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007, Zhou was just a Party secretary of Zhejiang’s Xiangshan County (division-level), meaning that Zhou would find it difficult to have opportunities to establish relations with Xi. By the time Xi took office at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Zhou was still a deputy bureau-level in Zhejiang. Zhou only climbed the ranks by “default” over the next several years as the CCP sought to fill up vacancies in the wake of Xi’s vigorous purge of Jiang faction officials and other disloyal elements.

Meanwhile, China watchers are somewhat putting the cart before the horse by referring to a “New Zhejiang Army.” The term implies that Xi Jinping had already formed a faction while serving in Zhejiang in preparation for his power consolidation and strongman rule today. However, Xi ended up choosing former colleagues, and not just those from Zhejiang, to staff key positions precisely because he did not have a faction. Reductive understandings of factional politics (such as the assumption that all officials who served in Zhejiang must be part of Xi’s faction) can lead to contradictory and confusing analyzes and conclusions about the PRC regime and its actions.

Just like in the “Wang Yang successor” case (see SinoInsight 1), Xi’s rivals can leverage popular interpretations of factional politics against Xi Jinping. For instance, Xi’s rivals can now spread disinformation about how Xi is betraying his own allies by targeting “New Zhejiang Army” member Zhou Jiangyong. Such disinformation could sow confusion in the officialdom about the actual state of the Xi-Jiang faction struggle, demoralize officials, and inspire more “passive resistance” (不作爲) from the officialdom as officials decide to sit on the sidelines and wait for the factional struggle to become clearer before throwing their lot in with side that appears to be winning.

2. Corruption aside, the purge of Zhou Jiangyong is likely related to Xi Jinping’s effort to rein in Ant Group and target the powerful Party elite and interests behind Jack Ma. Making an example out of Zhou (殺雞儆猴) also serves to intimidate the local officialdom and get them to be loyal to Party Central rather than to influential businessmen and elites.

Official-business relations emerge naturally in the localities due to intersecting interests. On the one hand, wealthy and powerful large companies need official influence to gain an edge over the competition and thrive in an environment where the “Party rules everything.” On the other hand, local officials have an incentive to curry favors with large influential companies (including tech giants like Alibaba, Tencent, etc.) to get benefits (shares in what was to be a very profitable IPO, as in the Zhou Jiangyong case) and pad their political achievements to secure future promotion (local companies doing well means better local GDP figures and a better annual performance evaluation for local leading officials). Local officials may also be interested in winning over the political backers of large companies, most of whom are either Party elite or linked with the Party elite.