SinoInsight 1
April 13
1. In a speech to the Atlantic Council think-tank, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned China that it would have to either help end Russia’s war in Ukraine or face economic consequences.
Yellen said, “China has recently affirmed a special relationship with Russia. I fervently hope that China will make something positive of this relationship and help to end this war. Going forward, it will be increasingly difficult to separate economic issues from broader considerations of national interest, including national security. The world’s attitude towards China and its willingness to embrace further economic integration may well be affected by China’s reaction to our call for resolute action on Russia.”
2. Politico’s West Wing Playbook newsletter spotlighted White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s so-called “nest of China hawks.”
The newsletter said that Biden administration officials “really don’t like China” and claims that Sullivan’s NSC, “one of the most influential offices inside the Biden White House,” is staffed with officials that have “consistently advocated for a confrontational approach” to China. Also, the NSC’s “unambiguous hostility towards China’s ruling Communist Party has caused internal tensions.”
The newsletter said that Sullivan has argued that “foreign policy must be intertwined with domestic policy,” or “foreign policy for the middle class.” This has resulted in “other parts of the White House and the administration sometimes try(ing) to frame proposals as pushing back against China so that they can get them through the NSC more quickly.” Also, “some administration officials say that Capitol Hill is just as hawkish, if not more, than the NSC team and are adding pressure to the administration.”
3. The Sinocism newsletter wrote that Secretary of State Antony Blinken will “soon” deliver the Biden administration’s China strategy speech as part of its National Security Strategy rollout.
April 14
1. During the Q&A session after a virtual lecture on 21st-century diplomacy and global challenges at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, Secretary Blinken said that with regard to the Russia-Ukraine war, “we have an aggressor, we have a victim, and this is not about siding with the United States. It’s about siding with right versus wrong; it’s about siding with the basic principles of the international system or for chaos and conflict. And ultimately, China has to choose.”
Blinken also said that China received a “lengthy earful from Europe about the concerns that Europe has about the aggression by Russia in Ukraine and what China is doing or not doing to stand and speak against that aggression” during a recent PRC-EU meeting.
2. In a speech at the Georgia Institute of Technology, CIA Director William Burns said that the agency has to deal with the “immediate threat posed by renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine” and the “longer term problem posed by China’s ambitious leadership,” describing the latter as the “single most important geopolitical challenge” of the 21st century.
Burns said, “a silent partner in Putin’s aggression, Xi Jinping’s China is our greatest challenge, in many ways the most profound test the CIA has ever faced,” adding that the PRC is a “formidable competitor lacking in neither ambition nor capability.”
3. In a discussion at The Economic Club of Washington, D.C., Jake Sullivan said that the “situation with Ukraine and the situation with Taiwan are not the same.”
Sullivan added that the Biden administration had said in consultations with allies and partners that “this kind of thing [Russia invasion of Ukraine], this kind of thing can also happen in the Indo-Pacific. And it is incumbent upon responsible countries in the world to send a clear message that any type of aggression is unacceptable wherever it happens.”
When asked if it was official U.S. government policy to defend Taiwan, Sullivan replied that the White House’s policy is that “we’re going to take every step we possibly can to ensure that never happens.”
Sullivan also said that the U.S. has not yet seen “a systematic effort to undermine, weaken or defy sanctions” pertaining to Russia on the part of China.
4. In an article in Foreign Policy magazine titled, “What Exactly Is America’s China Policy?”, Columbia University political science professor and longtime China watcher Andrew J. Nathan argued that “Biden’s China policy is based on a less alarmist assessment of the China threat than Trump’s—but is being pursued with a seriousness and strategic depth that makes it a much more formidable challenge to China.”
Nathan wrote, “Success for Biden’s strategy should not be measured in terms of containing China in its current position or negotiating a grand bargain in Asia. Rather, it should be counted a success if the United States prevents the forcible takeover of Taiwan, keeps a robust military presence in Asia, maintains its alliance system, leads in key 21st-century technologies, and exercises more influence than other countries in global institutions.”
April 15
1. Six U.S. lawmakers flew to Taipei on a U.S. Air Force Boeing C-40C to meet with Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen, defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng, and other senior officials.
“We are going to start making China pay a greater price for what they are doing all over the world. The support for Putin must come with a price,” Senator Lindsey Graham told Tsai during their meeting. “To abandon Taiwan would be to abandon democracy and freedom. There’s a backlash growing in the world to thuggery, to the bad guys.”
Later, the People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command announced that it sent frigates, bombers, and fighter planes to the East China Sea and the area around Taiwan. “This operation is in response to the recent frequent release of wrong signals by the United States on the Taiwan issue,” it said. The Eastern Theater Command added, “the U.S. bad actions and tricks are completely futile and very dangerous. Those who play with fire will burn themselves.”
In a separate statement, the PRC defense ministry said that the U.S. visit was “deliberately provocative” and that it had “led to further escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait.”
2. In a piece analyzing Sino-EU relations, The New York Times wrote, “In the longer term, Europe’s new focus on geopolitical risks and its closer ties to the United States could evolve into a more antagonistic stance toward Mr. Xi’s government, especially if Beijing stays close to Russia and shields it from economic sanctions.”
OUR TAKE
1. We see several additional possible reasons beyond Washington’s official line (i.e. not supporting a war aggressor and walking in lockstep with the international order on Russia) as to why the Biden administration is making menacing gestures towards China at this juncture.
First, Washington is genuinely concerned that Beijing could support Moscow militarily down the line. This could further complicate the Ukrainian resistance and undermine efforts by the U.S. and its allies to back Ukraine. At the time of writing, Russia is wrapping up its siege of the southern port city of Mariupol and is regrouping to launch an offensive to take eastern Ukraine. The Biden administration does not want another Afghanistan debacle on its hands should Russia succeed in seizing the Donbas region, capturing Mariupol, and even taking Ukraine’s other major coastal areas in the south, cutting off the country completely from the sea. Hence, Washington would find it imperative to keep pressure on Beijing and ensure that it dares not assist in Moscow’s war effort.
Second, the Biden administration is looking to boost its flagging domestic support. An April 13 Quinnipiac University poll found that just 33 percent of Americans approve of how President Joe Biden is handling his job. Sky-high inflation numbers, growing public attention to the impact of the administration’s economic, equity, and cultural agenda, increasing public scrutiny of Hunter Biden and the Biden family’s finances and foreign business dealings, and the impact of prolonged conflict in Ukraine on the economy, energy, food, commodities, etc., will likely further erode support for the administration and the Democratic Party heading into the midterms in November.
Getting tough on China could potentially kill two birds with one stone for the Biden administration. A March 4, 2021 Pew Research Center poll found that 89 percent of adult Americans “consider China a competitor or enemy, rather than a partner,” and “many also support taking a firmer approach to the bilateral relationship.” More recently, a Feb. 10 Politico newsletter noted that being “tough on China” has become a “new electoral purity test” for Congressional candidates. Getting confrontational with China in a “foreign policy for the middle class” could translate into much-needed support for the administration and the Democrats before the midterms (on a related note, we observed in May 2021 that the Biden administration would “use foreign issues and crises like China to advance its domestic agenda where applicable”). Adopting a more combative approach to China could also help President Biden “rehabilitate” his image of being too friendly with Beijing (“Beijing Biden”) and alleviate public concerns that he is compromised through his family’s business with the PRC.
Third, Washington has likely realized that Xi Jinping and the CCP are in a particularly vulnerable position and are looking to press the advantage in “strategic competition” with China. As we have been tracking in the newsletter, Xi and the Party are struggling to handle a “perfect storm” of internal, external, and sometimes self-inflicted problems, including coronavirus outbreaks and the “zero-COVID” policy, a rapidly deteriorating economy, a real estate sector debt crisis and financial contagion, food shortages, and growing criticism and pushback against China by the international community. At the individual level, Xi faces mounting and more united opposition from within the Party elite, as well as rank-and-file officials “lying flat” or carrying out “passive resistance.” Efforts to single out the Xi leadership (“Xi Jinping,” “Xi’s China,” “Xi’s government,” etc.) for censure could result in escalated factional struggle and ramp up political risks for Xi.
Fourth, the Biden administration’s China strategy will be issued imminently, and senior officials, scholars, and the media are currently laying the groundwork for its favorable reception.
2. Washington’s increasingly confrontational attitude towards the PRC happens to follow visible signs of Party elite pushback against Xi Jinping and the growing prevalence of “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” rhetoric in the public discourse. The Biden administration’s current messaging also suggests that its forthcoming China strategy could contain “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” elements.
We previously explained why targeting Xi, but not the CCP, is a serious misstep and a great disservice to the Chinese people and the world. As an addendum, Xi is a symptom, and not an aberration, of the Party system. Because the CCP’s cutthroat political culture does not lend itself to change, Xi’s successors, far from “reforming” the Party, could ultimately prove to be just as willing—if not politically obliged—to continue in the same pernicious cycle of expanding regime power and human rights abuse.
In a scenario where Xi is ousted, his successors could indeed move to align the PRC more closely with the international order. Washington and the world, however, should not celebrate their victory of having “solved” the “China challenge” by dethroning a dictator. As we earlier explained, the CCP’s “survival-dominance” dynamic means that it will say or do anything to achieve its objectives. By reverting to the approach of “hiding strength, biding time” (韜光養晦), the Party would gain breathing space to rebuild its strength, weather the storm of internal and external pressure, and throw the international community off its scent while it continues to advance its global domination agenda.
The U.S. and its allies would do well to call out the CCP along with Xi when they confront the PRC to resolve the “China challenge” at its root. Getting rid of “Xi Jinping’s China,” but not the Party and its Marxist-Leninist ideology, will merely drag out the “single most important geopolitical challenge” of this century and could sow the seeds of the free world’s demise.
3. Growing U.S. pressure on China will translate into greater political pressure for Xi Jinping ahead of the informal Beidaihe meeting in July and the 20th Party Congress at the year’s end. In particular, Xi has no good way of responding to the repeated crossing of the CCP’s “red line” on Taiwan by America and its allies without worsening the situation and exposing his leadership as a paper tiger.
Xi’s factional rivals will no doubt seize upon escalating geopolitical pressures on the PRC to argue that they were right to harshly criticize Xi and his policies. The “anti-Xi coalition” could even look to goad Xi into invading Taiwan or pressure him into dangerous military provocations with China’s neighbors and the West as they demand that he demonstrate the “leadership capabilities” required to extend his tenure as Party boss. Future developments in the Sino-U.S. relationship could open windows of opportunities for Xi’s political enemies to move against him or attempt to decisively shut down his third term bid.
Xi would likely respond to factional struggle challenges by stepping up the anti-corruption campaign and arresting “big tigers.” Mounting political contradictions in the Party elite could eventually lead to a “Berlin Wall moment” for the CCP and see Black Swans emerging in China.
SinoInsight 2
Factional struggle
April 12
Duowei News, the Beijing-based overseas Chinese language media, published an op-ed titled, “Shanghai Epidemic | Precision Epidemic Prevention Is Not Wrong” (上海疫情｜“精準防疫”沒有錯).
The article called attention to various problems caused by “dynamic zero-COVID.” The article added that there is no shortage of supplies in Shanghai and elsewhere, but the problem lies in supply deployment and distribution chains. The article also noted that grassroots-level governments will adopt “prefer left rather than right” and “one-size-fits-all” approaches when the pressure on them is great.
The article defended Shanghai’s previous “precise epidemic prevention” policy, speculating that the latest outbreak was the fault of epidemic prevention work in March being “too loose” and lacking in “precision,” but the policy on the whole was not to blame. The article added that a “one-size-fits-all” approach will not work to rein in highly transmissible variants like Omicron and Omicron XE. “Precise epidemic prevention is the inevitable choice, and is also the core of dynamic zero-COVID,” the op-ed said.
Analysis: Duowei, which is known to carry messaging from various CCP elite factions, blames Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID” policy for the disastrous situation in Shanghai while seemingly defending Li Qiang’s “precise epidemic prevention.” Such messaging reads like the work of Xi’s factional rivals, who would want to drive a wedge in the Xi camp between Xi and Li. Attacking Xi’s political legacy also erodes his “quan wei” (authority and prestige), which in turn affects his political ally Li.
April 15
An article insinuating that PRC vice premier Sun Chunlan and Shanghai Party secretary Li Qiang are waging a “series of fierce battles” with each other as they look to shirk responsibility for the fiasco in Shanghai recently started circulating in Chinese language circles, according to a Radio Free Asia report.
The article refers to Sun Chunlan as “Granny Sun” and Li Qiang as “Big Strong Guy” (“Qiang” in Li Qiang’s name is the Chinese character for “strong”). The article claimed that Sun’s fight against the epidemic over the past two years involved her scolding local officials and making demands of them before leaving the area. In this arrangement, Sun gets the credit for good work while local officials are saddled with the responsibility of doing the actual work.
The article claims that it was Sun Chunlan who shifted Shanghai’s epidemic prevention policy from “precise epidemic prevention” to “zero-COVID.” Sun is also reportedly responsible for reshuffling Shanghai’s COVID-19 expert team. The article claims that Sun threatened Shanghai officials, “You’ll answer to Party Central if COVID-19 doesn’t fall to zero; you’ll answer to the people if they have nothing to eat, … etc.” However, directions from the Joint Epidemic Prevention and Control Mechanism (under Sun’s oversight) failed to control the outbreak but instead ended up “trapping” itself with a policy that is “full of loopholes.” Popular anger towards the “zero-COVID” regiment eventually led Sun to propose a relaxation of the policy.
The article claims that Li Qiang heard reports on April 11 and reckoned that Shanghai’s economy is suffering serious damage while the people’s lives are being severely impacted. Believing that his chances of being promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee would be affected by poor epidemic prevention results, Li rejected Sun’s call to loosen “zero-COVID” and instead doubled down on the policy through so-called “upgraded management” (升格管理).
The article believes, “This is a farce of a political struggle. Shanghai is the stage, and the city’s 26 million residents are the props.” Also, “Granny Sun will not and is unwilling to admit defeat, and Big Strong Guy is unwilling to take responsibility for the consequences.”
Analysis: The article reads like something from the pro-Li Qiang camp. Sun Chunlan, a member of the Jiang Zemin faction, is clearly being faulted by the article for the Shanghai government’s “zero-COVID” failures, while Li is being defended from blame.
The article’s claim that Sun is responsible for the shift in Shanghai’s epidemic prevention policy is plausible. At a glance, Sun did not appear to have a hand in the policy shift because she only visited Shanghai on April 2, or a little over a week after the city government decided on a staggered shut down of Shanghai from March 26. However, Sun does not need to physically be in Shanghai to order the switch to “zero-COVID” from “precise epidemic prevention,” which the city’s COVID experts were still promoting as of March 24. It is possible that Sun gave the order for the lockdown on March 26 or earlier, then traveled to Shanghai on April 2 to inspect the results.
That being said, Li Qiang would not need prompting from Sun Chunlan to enact “zero-COVID” on his own if he felt in late March that “precise epidemic prevention” was not working to curb the outbreak and he needed to hew more closely to Party Central’s policy to salvage his career prospects. Li’s decision to prioritize his career over actual epidemic prevention would also lead him to disregard Sun’s later order to loosen restrictions as the article claims; Li would weigh that it is better to be absolutely “politically correct” on epidemic prevention than follow the instructions of a factional rival and lose loyalty points.
Official epidemic discourse
State media outlets published several commentary articles urging adherence to “zero-COVID”/“dynamic zero-COVID”:
April 12
- Xinhua published four “zero-COVID”-related commentaries with the following titles:
- “Xinhua Current Affairs Review: Short-term ‘Pain’ Cannot Shake China’s Economic Fundamentals” (新華時評: 短期“陣痛”動搖不了中國經濟基本盤);
- “Xinhua Current Affairs Review: ‘Laying Flat’ Is No Way Out, Only Perseverance Leads to Victory” (新華時評: “躺平”沒有出路，堅持才能勝利);
- “Study in Progress | Xi Jinping Always Puts This Idea First in Fighting the Epidemic” (學習進行時丨抗疫，習近平放在第一位的始終是這一理念)
- “Xinhua Commentary: Adhere to ‘Dynamic Zero-COVID’ to Win the Hard Battle Against the Epidemic” (新華述評: 堅持“動態清零” 打贏抗疫硬仗).
Xinhua published the article, “Xinhua Commentary: Experiences and Significance of China’s Fight Against the Epidemic Over the Past Two Years” (新華述評: 兩年多來中國抗疫的經驗和意義).
April 14
Xinhua published the article, “Xinhua Commentary: Make Concerted Efforts to Implement ‘Dynamic Zero-COVID” (新華時評: 齊心協力把“動態清零”落到實處)
April 15
Xinhua published the article, “Xinhua Commentary: Victory Is Certain When Top and Bottom Are United —— Cadres and People in Many Places Talk About Unswervingly Adhering to Dynamic Zero-COVID” (新華述評: 上下同心 定能勝利——多地干部群眾談堅持動態清零不動搖).
China Central Television published the article, “CCTV Quick Commentary: Adhere to ‘Dynamic Zero-COVID’ and Strengthen the Confidence to Win!” (央視快評丨堅持“動態清零” 堅定必勝信心!)
Western pressure
April 11
Reuters reported that the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China sent a letter dated April 8 addressed to the PRC State Council and vice premier Hu Chunhua.
The letter, signed by the Chamber’s president Jorg Wuttke, said that the “old toolbox of mass testing and isolation” is not able to surmount the challenges posed by Omicron. “Current measures taken to try and contain the recent COVID-19 outbreak in China are causing significant disruptions, extending from logistics and production all the way along the supply chain within China,” the letter said.
The letter added a flash survey by the German Chamber of Commerce in China showing that 51 percent of German companies’ logistics and warehousing and 46 percent of German companies’ supply chains were “completely disrupted or severely impacted by the current COVID-19 situation in China.”
April 14
1. The New York Times cited Nomura as estimating that 373 million people in 45 Chinese cities (or more than a quarter of the population), are under some form of lockdown. The 45 cities account for around $7.2 trillion in annual gross domestic product (or about 40 percent of China’s total economic output).
Nomura chief China economist Ting Lu has made “zero-COVID” a priority. “The problem is that when you set this kind of policy target, local governments will compete with each other,” he said, resulting in an escalation in local epidemic controls. “If all local governments are doing it this way, then the whole economy would be in trouble. The whole system will amplify this zero-COVID strategy,” Lu said.
2. Nikkei Asia published an analysis piece speculating about Li Qiang’s political future as Shanghai struggles to control the COVID outbreak. “If Li Qiang fails to bring the COVID outbreak under control at an early date, his career will take a significant hit. Someone will have to take political responsibility for the disaster in China’s commercial hub,” the article wrote.
The article also noted that “political forces not close to Xi see an opportunity to block Li Qiang’s promotion to Beijing.” Further, “Shanghai … has had its share of backroom political battles. The ‘Shanghai faction,’ led by former President Jiang Zemin, once wielded enormous influence there.”
Popular fury and ‘stability maintenance’
April 11
A video circulating on Chinese social media shows Li Qiang inspecting a community in Shanghai’s Jing’an District. In the video, Li appeared to have mistakenly wandered into an area with residents who were affected by supply issues instead of vetted residents or actors hired by grassroots officials. Those residents complained that they only received limited supplies twice during the lockdown, and said that “everyone is starving.”
One woman even chastised Li and his accompanying officials, “You’ve sinned against your country, against your martyrs, and against heaven and earth!”
April 13
A video of prominent Shanghai-based infectious diseases expert Zhang Wenhong circulated online. Zhang said in the video that “if the hospitals do not reopen, the number of deaths from other diseases will be far higher than the number of deaths from the coronavirus.”
April 14
1. Miao Xiaohui, the retired vice president of the Changzheng Hospital (affiliated to the PLA Second Military Medical University in Shanghai), lamented the COVID situation in Shanghai in a post on Chinese social media.
Miao wrote that he was growing more anxious each day, noting that he was seeing an ever-increasing volume of information about non-COVID, “additional” (likely epidemic prevention policy-related) deaths. He believed that the collateral damage from epidemic prevention has far exceeded the damage caused by Omicron, and called for an adjustment of strategy.
Miao also slammed Wu Zunyou and Liang Wannian, two COVID experts known for promoting “zero-COVID” and “seizing massive discourse power” in his post. “If you two achieve ‘zero-COVID,’ I’ll apologize and slit my wrists in front of 1.4 billion people,” he wrote. Miao added, “Omicron is still here. Even if it’s gone, Youcron and Niancron will come around. Please don’t continue misleading 1.4 billion people.”
In an April 8 article titled, “Seven Suggestions for Epidemic Prevention and Control, Urgently Pay Attention To and Solve the Problem of Additional Deaths,” Miao Xiaohui estimated that the fatality rate of people infected with Omicron is less than 1 in 1,000, a very low rate. He cited official data at the time of there being less than 10 deaths despite cumulative cases exceeding 120,000, and noted that the COVID death toll is far less than the estimated deaths of 2,141 diabetic patients who could not receive treatment during the lockdown period.
2. A video circulating on Chinese social media showed Shanghai policemen forcefully dragging residents to makeshift hospitals. In trying to calm the struggling residents, a policeman yelled, “The only thing you have to do is keep calm. I told you that we police didn’t cause (the pandemic); this was caused by the international situation. If you keep making trouble like this, China has no hope, and we’re going to fight the United States, don’t you know?”
3. A video circulating on Chinese social media showed the Shanghai authorities forcibly confiscating apartments, expelling tenants, and setting up makeshift quarantine quarters. The action triggered collective protests from residents and was met with violent repression by the police.
4. The public WeChat account “Mrs. Maya” (摩耶夫人) published an article titled “The Patience of the Shanghai People Has Reached Its Limit” (上海人的忍耐已經到了極限) made the rounds on the internet. The article detailed many of the absurdities that have occurred as a result of the Shanghai lockdown; made estimates for how many people would die in the city this year due to a lack of food and medical treatment; and questioned the effectiveness of endless nucleic acid testing. The article also said that grassroots officials are being overloaded by the crisis and “every day brings new events that refresh the bottom line” of absurdities.
The article received more than 20 million views on WeChat before it was censored, and was regarded as the most-read article on a WeChat public account in history. The article was later restored, though for unknown reasons.
5. Hu Xueyang, a film director and member of the Chinese Sixth Generation filmmakers, described the “zero-COVID” policy as “a mutated viral cultural revolution” in an article titled, “Spring Loves You So Much” (春天對你如此厚愛).
Hu’s article listed seven areas in which “zero-COVID” resembles the Cultural Revolution:
- Local governments at all levels abuse their power, and the Party and the masses are in opposition;
- Contradictory policies, policies lack scientific basis, low policy-making ability;
- Provoking the masses against the masses, while gangs are a prevalent scourge in the country;
- Absurd and despicable incidents emerge in an endless stream, causing widespread harm. All levels of society are full of grievances, and tragedies abound;
- The economy is in decline and people’s lives are difficult and impoverished;
- Politics is infinitely in command, and common sense is extinct;
- Campaign-style disposal of people and things, sweeping away all doubts and objections.
Suicides and non-COVID deaths
April 11
1. Prominent Chinese economist Lang Hsien Ping wrote in a Weibo post that his 98-year-old mother in Shanghai had died after the city’s COVID restrictions caused her medical treatment for a kidney disease to be delayed.
“According to the past diagnosis, she just needed one injection to be fine,” Lang wrote. However, after “four hours of waiting at the door of the hospital emergency room” for a nucleic acid test result, “my mother left me forever,” he added.
Lang noted that he spent a lot of time negotiating with the relevant department to allow him to visit his mother at the hospital. When he finally made it out to the road, he was unable to hail a ride using Didi. “The tragedy could have been avoided,” Lang wrote.
Lang Hsien Ping previously praised the CCP authorities’ draconian policies. “Today, Shanghai has 25 million people, one person one (nucleic acid) test, everyone is being tested, help is coming from all over the country, everything is being coordinated by the central government, this is China’s strength,” he said. “Panic about the epidemic is more dangerous than the epidemic. Change your mentality and wait for lockdowns to be lifted.”
April 12
Well-known Beijing lawyer Zhang Xinnian posted on Weibo that the Shanghai-based Netcom Securities vice president Wei Guiguo passed away at home due to a cerebral hemorrhage. Zhang said that Wei had attempted unsuccessfully to reach out for help during the lockdown.
Wei Guiguo previously wrote on WeChat Moments on April 4, “I agree with the strategy of adhering to dynamic zero-COVID, and the implementation of tactics and management measures to optimize it. Difficulties will eventually pass, but there will be big gains: When bringing Taiwan home [reference to the “reunification” of Taiwan], the national mobilization will be similar, and the Beautiful Country [reference to America] can only stare in disbelief. Looking back from that moment, the difficulties and costs now are the lowest.”
April 13
According to rumors circulating on the Chinese internet, Qian Wenxiong, the director of Shanghai Hongkou District’s Health Commission Information Center, had committed suicide in his office on April 12. The rumors claim that Qian was already heavily burdened in his mind after learning that his wife had cancer, and was tipped over the edge by the huge workload during the lockdown. On April 14, the Shanghai authorities confirmed that Qian Wenxiong had committed suicide.
Qian’s wife also reportedly took her life, although the rumor remains unverified at the time of writing. In the evening of April 14, the Weibo topic, “The police refuted internet rumors that Qian Wenxiong’s wife committed suicide” attracted over 100 million views and thousands of comments.
April 14
An article by a WeChat public account titled, “Shanghai Dead” was scrubbed after receiving millions of views. The article listed more than a dozen stories of prominent non-COVID death incidents from March 23 to April 12, including the tragic case of a Shanghai East Hospital nurse Zhou Shengni (refused treatment by her own hospital) and Shanghai official Qian Wenxiong (committed suicide).
Some netizens managed to save the death list using blockchain technology and uploaded an updated version of the list on April 15 that included more than 130 people.
April 15
The suicide story of Chen Shunping, a 71-year-old violinist living in Shanghai, made the rounds on Chinese social media. Chen suffered abdominal pain in the evening of April 13 but was unable to access medical treatment due to the epidemic prevention policy. After suffering a night of pain and despair, Chen leapt to his death from the top floor of his apartment building. Chen’s sister later questioned “who is to blame” for her brother’s death in a social media group chat.
Shifting situation?
April 15
1. The PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology said in a statement that it would work with 666 companies producing semiconductors, automobiles, and the medical sector on a “one company, one case” (一企一案) policy to return to work.
The statement also said that “front-end working groups” have been sent to Shanghai to work with relevant local departments to ensure the supply of medical supplies, promote stable production, and the resumption of work at key industrial companies.
2. In the evening, the Shanghai Municipal Economic and Information Technology Commission issued guidelines for epidemic prevention and control for resuming work and production in the city (上海市工業企業復工復產疫情防控指引). The guidelines said that closed-loop management would be implemented at companies resuming work and production to ensure the safety and stability of supply chains.
April 17
Reuters reported that Shanghai is targeting a halt to the spread of COVID-19 outside quarantined areas by April 20 in a move that would “allow the city to further ease its lockdown and start returning to normal life as public frustrations grow.”
Reuters cited an undisclosed speech by Baoshan District Party secretary Chen Jie on April 16 as noting that the order came about because Shanghai had reached a “critical moment” with mounting public anxiety and food supply pressures.
“The State Council Working Group, the municipal party committee and municipal government have asked that the turning point of the epidemic should appear on the 17th and that zero-COVID status should be reached on the 20th,” Chen said. “This is a military order, there is no room for bargaining, we can only grit our teeth and fight for victory. It can also be said this is a total attack, a last-ditch battle to reverse the trend of the epidemic.”
Reuters also reported that Tesla is preparing to reopen its Gigafactory Shanghai on April 18, while SAIC Motor Corp (Chinese partner of Volkswagen) and General Motors are looking to resume production with “stress tests” on the same day.
OUR TAKE
1. The CCP’s own COVID numbers indicate that the Shanghai lockdown is failing to control the spread of Omicron and “zero-COVID” is failing on multiple fronts. The policy’s unscientific nature and disastrous impact on human lives and the economy in Shanghai and elsewhere is also driving infectious diseases experts, local residents, and foreigners to increasingly speak out about the issue. Anecdotal evidence suggests that non-COVID deaths caused by the policy will end up being substantially higher than actual COVID deaths (the CCP’s official data indicating zero deaths is almost certainly false), and the collateral damage caused by “zero-COVID” could be incalculable.
While politics remains in command, certain realities are forcing the Xi leadership to ease up on restrictions. Looming economic recession, as well as pressure from foreign companies and chambers of commerce, have led Beijing to subtly move away from rigid “zero-COVID” and adopt the so-called “one company, one case” policy (essentially a form of “precise epidemic prevention”) to get firms back to work. This is reminiscent of Beijing switching from a “one-size-fits-all” approach to housing policy in 2016 to a “one city, one policy” (一城一策) differentiated approach.
Xi and the CCP could be concerned about the impact of prolonged lockdowns without reprieve on social stability and the Party’s political legitimacy. Popular resentment in Shanghai looks to be on the brink of erupting into something uncontrollable as non-COVID, lockdown-related deaths and other tragedies pile up.
The Shanghai government and Beijing could even gradually move towards declaring “victory” over the virus and the success of “zero-COVID” in propaganda and official numbers even if it does not reflect the situation on the ground. Propaganda outlets could also attempt to spin policy flip-flops as the authorities merely being “dynamic” and “more scientific” in adapting to the virus. Having suffered through the lockdown, local officials and residents are not likely to complain too much about the Potemkin situation or the spiking of cases following the easing of restrictions. However, the Chinese people would be further convinced that they were subjected to a “political epidemic,” and lose more confidence in the CCP.
2. Li Qiang’s political troubles are growing clearer by the day, and these troubles will in turn impact Xi Jinping. The reported bureaucratic problems between Li and Sun Chunlan are also a sign of intensifying factional struggle.
Li appears to have decided that sticking to Party Central’s (i.e. Xi’s) policies regardless of the consequences for Shanghai, including achieving “zero-COVID” in numbers and propaganda, is presently the safest option to ensure his political survival. At present, the odds of Li being promoted at the 20th Party Congress are still good because Xi does not have many trusted allies and the latter needs all hands on deck to resolve his political problems. Xi’s factional rivals, however, will certainly point to the Shanghai fiasco when lobbying against Li Qiang’s appointment to higher and more important office.
