SinoInsight 1
The CCP issued a series of provocative moves and official statements once the Biden-Harris administration took office on Jan. 20, seemingly with an eye on setting the tone of the Sino-U.S. relationship:
Jan. 20
The CCP sanctioned outgoing 28 Trump administration officials and their immediate family members, including former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, and former White House trade adviser Peter Navarro. The sanctioned individuals are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, while companies and institutions associated with them are restricted from doing business with the PRC.
Jan. 23 – Jan. 24
The PLA flew 12 bombers and fighters into the southwestern corner of Taiwan’s air defence zone on Jan. 23. The following day, 15 aircraft breached the same area. According to a Jan. 29 Financial Times report, the bombers and some of the fighters involved were “conducting an exercise that used the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group.” People familiar with intelligence told FT that the “pilots of H-6 bombers could be heard in cockpit conversations confirming orders for the simulated targeting and release of anti-ship missiles against the carrier.”
Jan. 28
PRC vice foreign minister Le Yucheng spoke about the future of Sino-U.S. relations in a virtual Vision China event.
Notable points of Le’s speech include:
- Le said that “the real enemy of the United States is COVID-19, not China.”
- Le said that the U.S. and the PRC “should treat each other as partners rather than adversaries, help rather than fight each other, and lead with the power of example rather than the example of power, in face of such common challenges for mankind as COVID-19.”
- Le claimed that the PRC has “no intention to challenge or replace the United States,” and that the U.S. should “respect the development path we have chosen, respect our legitimate interests, and respect our pursuit for a better life, and to quit its obsession with changing or splitting China.”
- Le called for a “reversal,” or “restoring order from chaos” (撥亂反正) in the Sino-U.S. relationship. He said that it is “imperative to reverse the wrong course,” and “agrees with American friends’ suggestion that both sides take small steps first to create conditions for improving the relationship.”
- Le said that the PRC and America should “renew” their relations as “our shared interests and needs for cooperation far outweigh our differences.”
- Finally, Le claimed that “anything is possible when China and the United States choose to cooperate.”
Jan. 29
1. PRC vice president Wang Qishan spoke to unidentified U.S. business leaders and former officials during a virtual event. Wang said that the U.S. and the PRC have “more common interests than differences,” and have had “more cooperation than conflicts.” He added both sides should “uphold the spirit of non-conflict and non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation,” and that “focusing on cooperation and managing differences are the keys to promoting the healthy and stable development of Sino-US relations.”
2. Foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian announced that the PRC would no longer recognize the British National Overseas passport for travel or identification. The United Kingdom was set to accept visa applications from BNO passport holders on Jan. 31 in a new system that would create a path to citizenship for the estimated 5.4 million BNOs in Hong Kong.
Fed. 2
Yang Jiechi, director of the PRC Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office and a member of the CCP Politburo, spoke to the National Committee on US-China Relations via teleconference.
Key takeaways from Yang’s speech include:
- The Trump administration “plunged the Sino-U.S. relationship into its most difficult period since the establishment of diplomatic ties,” but the PRC is now prepared to “work with the United States to move the relationship forward along the track of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation for the well-being of both countries and peoples.
- Yang said that the PRC should be “seen as it is,” and claimed that “1.4 billion Chinese people wholeheartedly support the leadership of the Communist Party of China.” He added, “No force could stop China’s continuous development or the noble cause of global peace and development.”
- Yang called for “normal interactions” to be restored. “Our two sides have to work in the same direction,” he said, and called on the Biden-Harris administration to “remove the stumbling blocks to people-to-people exchanges, like harassing Chinese students, restricting Chinese media outlets, shutting down Confucius Institutes and suppressing Chinese companies.”
- Yang also called for a “proper management of differences” so that “they do not stand in the way of our overall relations.” Both sides need to “respect each other’s core interests and major concerns, and respect each other’s choices of political system and development path.” Yang said that the U.S. should “strictly abide by the One China principle” and “stop interference in the affairs of Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, which all matter to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and stop attempts to hold back China’s development by meddling in China’s internal affairs.”
- Finally, Yang called on the U.S. and the PRC to broaden “mutually beneficial cooperation” in the areas of “COVID response, economic recovery and climate change, among others.”
OUR TAKE
1. The central theme running through the speeches of senior PRC officials on Sino-U.S. relations is clear: The PRC and the U.S. both benefited from cooperation instead of confrontation in the past, and the latter should avoid challenging the CCP regime if America wishes the Sino-U.S. relationship to revert to “peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.”
Xi Jinping and the CCP are interested in restoring relations with America to attract foreign funds, rescue the Chinese economy, and shore up regime security. The regime’s push to use so-called “domestic circulation” to absorb exports and drive the economy is a delusion, especially with the coronavirus pandemic and deteriorating economic conditions in recent years cutting sharply into the Chinese people’s savings and spending power. This means that the “external” half of Xi’s “dual circulation” policy will remain very crucial for the Chinese economy and the survival of the regime, which faces a “perfect storm” of problems (debt crisis, resurging epidemic, food shortages, hostile international environment, etc.). Under present circumstances, Xi and the CCP cannot afford to deal with an adversarial America.
Beijing is relying on an old playbook to rebuild relations with the United States. On the one hand, senior PRC officials remind the U.S. of mutual “shared interests” and promise a return to the good times of “cooperation” before the Trump era. On the other hand, PRC officials delineate Beijing’s redlines—no criticizing the CCP or attempting regime change, particularly through “interference in the affairs of Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang”—and send military jets into Taiwan’s airspace to test the Biden-Harris administration’s willingness to confront the PRC.
As we have repeatedly pointed out, the CCP is a Marxist-Leninist organization with world domination as its endgame. The CCP has never forgotten that it is locked in a zero-sum struggle with the U.S. and the West over who is the global hegemon, and will tap all of its cunning and opportunities to win the great power competition. Talk of “peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation” with America is thus purely a strategic gesture on Beijing’s part to charm Washington, disarm it on the “China challenge,” and return to its good books. Believing that the CCP is genuine about restoring the Sino-U.S. relationship would be a massive failing on America’s part.
The Xi leadership is likely very aware that there is strong bipartisan antagonism in the U.S. towards the PRC. This means that Beijing will continue to adopt a realist posture in dealing with the Biden-Harris administration, even though early signs indicate that the new administration could be less confrontational than the Trump administration.
2. Based on our assessment (see here and here), the Biden-Harris administration’s China policy will likely be “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP.” The emergence of “The Longer Telegram” and wide coverage of the report in the overseas Chinese press (particularly by U.S. government-funded Chinese language media) would likely lead Beijing to a similar assessment. The hard edge in the recent remarks on Sino-U.S. relations by senior PRC officials could be aimed at warning the Biden-Harris administration not to challenge the Xi leadership, or else.
We would not be surprised to see the Biden-Harris administration strongly pressure the PRC across the board further down the road. The new administration could hold Xi Jinping personally responsible for Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the coronavirus pandemic, and impose costs aimed at undercutting Xi’s legitimacy in the Party. Increased external pressure on Xi would embolden his factional rivals and the “anti-Xi coalition” in the CCP elite to force a showdown in the ongoing factional struggle. Sharp escalation in the CCP factional struggle would hasten the arrival of Communist China’s “Berlin Wall” moment this year.
SinoInsight 2
The CCP carried out large-scale personnel reshuffles in its Hong Kong and Macau apparatus recently.
According to a Jan. 28 article in the Hong Kong-based Chinese language media HK01, the Hong Kong Liaison Office’s propaganda director Li Haitang was replaced last November by Zheng Lin, a former deputy director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Meanwhile, approximately 240 staff in the Liaison Office were recently reshuffled, or about half of the 480-strong organization. The Liaison Office also added an additional 100 staff members in 2020 (part of the current 480) to “strengthen supervision over Hong Kong.” Beijing very rarely moves personnel on this scale.
HK01’s news was corroborated by a Jan. 29 piece by the South China Morning Post. According to the Post’s report, 200 new cadres were transferred to the Liaison Office last year, resulting in a net increase of 100 staff. Sources told the Post that the additional staff was necessary as Beijing had entrusted the Liaison Office with additional responsibilities, including ensuring that “Hong Kong was being ‘ruled by patriots, helping the city contain the coronavirus, trying to build bridges with young people, and identifying long-term governance challenges.” Further, the new cadres had attended briefings in Shenzhen on “disciplinary issues” before arriving in Hong Kong, a sign that “following [Communist Party discipline] is a top priority” for the Liaison Office.
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping’s shake-up of the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus (see here, here, here), and imposition of draconian “national security” measures (see here and here) are partly aimed at tightening the CCP regime’s grip over Hong Kong and preventing the city from falling in the hands of “counter-revolutionary forces,” or the pro-democracy camp. Xi’s moves are also intended to dislodge Hong Kong from the sway of the Jiang Zemin faction and deny the “anti-Xi coalition” opportunities to undermine his leadership by exploiting trouble in Hong Kong as in previous years (since 2012).
2. Xi’s sweeping efforts to rectify the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus could also be motivated by concerns that his factional rivals are colluding with establishment elites in the West to advance an “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy. As part of the strategy, Xi’s domestic and external enemies could apply focused pressure by targeting his political legacy, which includes acts like imposing the National Security Law on Hong Kong and arresting pro-democracy activists, as well as extending the persecution of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. To stymie his powerful opponents, Xi has to clamp down even harder on them in mainland China and strengthen Beijing’s control over Hong Kong.
Xi could even be preparing to target his main factional rival’s political legacy should he be forced into a showdown. We have observed that the PRC’s national security forces in Hong Kong have not come down hard on media associated with Falun Gong in the city even when they are attacking other major pro-democracy news outlets and activists. Also, while Falun Gong practitioners and booths in Hong Kong have been attacked by thugs in recent weeks, they have not been harassed by PRC’s national security forces or the Hong Kong authorities on national security grounds, while a major anti-Falun Gong CCP-backed organization was officially disbanded. These developments are highly peculiar because Falun Gong adherents and the media outlets in Hong Kong should naturally be high-priority targets for persecution under the National Security Law, seeing as how they openly promote a “Quit the CCP” movement (Tuidang) and display banners saying, “Heaven will destroy the CCP” (天滅中共). In weighing the balance of factors, there is a distinct possibility that Beijing’s lack of action against Falun Gong in Hong Kong is due to Xi Jinping keeping the “Falun Gong card” in play against the Jiang faction, who owns the crime of forced organ harvesting and the Falun Gong persecution campaign.
3. If the Biden-Harris administration adopts the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy in the “Longer Telegram,” we expect to see even more contradictory developments in Hong Kong and in the Sino-U.S. relationship as Xi Jinping deals with factional struggle fallout. For instance, Western companies on the mainland could face intimidation while Beijing declares that “China is opening up more,” and national security forces in Hong Kong could step-up arrests, yet continue to leave Falun Gong untouched. Businesses, investors, and governments must account for rising political risks in China.
