SinoInsight 1
In recent weeks, the Biden-Harris administration has signaled publicly that it prefers to engage with senior CCP officials close to Xi Jinping rather than those outside his inner circle.
May 21
Unnamed U.S. officials told mainstream media outlets that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has made multiple unsuccessful attempts to speak with Central Military Commission vice chairman Xu Qiliang.
According to Reuters, the Biden-Harris administration debated whether Austin should speak with PRC defense minister Wei Fenghe or Xu, with the latter being “seen as having more power and influence with Chinese President Xi Jinping.”
The Financial Times reported that Austin “opted against a meeting” with Wei “in favor of pushing for a call with Xu, who outranks Wei in the Chinese political and military system.” FT cited U.S. official as saying, “We believe the appropriate counterpart [for Secretary Austin] is the vice-chair of the Central Military Commission.”
May 26
Speaking about U.S.-China relations at the 2021 Oksenberg Conference, National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell said that the CCP elite “basically selects a leader that accepts and supports collective leadership,” and Xi Jinping was “almost unanimously” selected to succeed Hu Jintao at the time with the “support of the Shanghai delegation and other groups directly.” However, Xi “acted in ways that no one anticipated” and “almost completely and utterly disassembled 40 years of careful, intricate mechanism designed for collective leadership.”
Campbell added that PRC foreign minister Wang Yi and Politburo member Yang Jiechi, whom National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and himself met in Alaska, are “nowhere near within a hundred miles of the inner circle of President Xi.”
“The closest people that he works with, we never interact with,” Campbell said. “We believe that much of the analysis that’s presented to him is deeply ideological, it’s kind of presented in this context of American domestic struggle.”
June 8
Kurt Campbell said at an annual conference by the think-tank Center for a New American Security, “Increasingly, President Xi is the leader of China as opposed to being part of a collegium or part of a coherent team of leaders as part of the Standing Committee [of the CCP Politburo].”
He added, “We believe increasingly that what President Xi has done is take steps to put himself as the central leadership figure in China that makes almost all the decisions. It is clear to say that there is a smaller and smaller group of people that work with President Xi on that decision making, and it’s always a question about whether you’re able to affect the inputs that President Xi is receiving as China makes its calibrations about the best approach to global politics.”
OUR TAKE
1. On one level, the Biden-Harris administration’s desire to connect with members of Xi Jinping’s inner circle does not seem out of place. It is unhealthy for the Sino-U.S. relationship (and all bilateral relations in general) if one side believes that they do not have direct lines to the top leadership of the other side and hence cannot have candid exchanges. For example, senior PRC officials who are not Xi’s confidants will be inclined to self-censor exchanges with Washington and fail to accurately pass on messages from the Biden-Harris administration if they deem doing so to be beneficial for their personal political survival.
Washington has reason to be concerned that it cannot get through to Xi Jinping, the top decision maker in the PRC, in the event of crises and emergencies (military accidents, disasters, pandemics, etc.), or when negotiating issues of critical interest to the administration (such as climate change). PRC officials outside Xi’s inner circle and those lower down the ranks are not necessarily in sync with the decisions coming out of Beijing.
An example from the Trump era proves instructive. In an interview with state mouthpiece Xinhua on May 19, 2018, Xi confidant and PRC vice premier Liu He said that the U.S. and China had agreed to “strengthen their cooperation in mutual investment and intellectual property protection.” Liu’s remarks about “intellectual property protection” was widely understood as an oblique admission by the CCP that it had engaged in intellectual property theft and forced technology transfers. A little over a week later, however, then-PRC ambassador to the World Trade Organization Zhang Xiangchen insisted that “there is no forced technology transfer in China” after his U.S. counterpart at the time said that that was the case as part of a lawsuit. Zhang’s remarks directly contradicted those made by Liu and strained Sino-U.S. ties at a critical juncture.
2. However, we have reason to suspect that the Biden-Harris administration is not solely looking to establish direct channels with Zhongnanhai. In considering Kurt Campbell’s remarks above and how Washington has approached China to date, we believe that the administration is influenced by, or is currently enacting, the Atlantic Council’s “Longer Telegram” landmark China strategy paper. In our analysis of “Longer Telegram,” we noted that it is ultimately “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP.”
Campbell’s recent remarks dovetails neatly with the central focus of the “Longer Telegram.” The report states that “Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic and foreign-policy trajectory.” Hence, “U.S. strategy must remain laser-focused on Xi, his inner circle and the Chinese political context in which they rule … All U.S. policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual.” The central observations about Xi in the “Longer Telegram” are essentially the same as those made by Campbell.
The “Longer Telegram” also calls on Washington to differentiate “between the government and the party elite, as well as between the party elite in general and Xi Jinping personally.” The U.S. must avoid attacking the CCP as a whole or call for the “overthrow of the Communist Party” so that Xi cannot “circle the wagons, this time in defense of all party members’ interest in guaranteeing their collective survival.” Rather, the “public language and operational focus must be ‘Xi’s Communist Party’” because this “goes to the heart of the active fault lines within current Chinese politics,” the report argues. Again, Campbell adheres to the above in his recent remarks; he distinguishes between Xi and the Party elite who support collective leadership, suggests implicitly that things operate differently in “China under Xi Jinping” (Western establishment media and intelligentsia also make this distinction), and never criticizes the CCP as a whole.
Campbell demonstrates a working knowledge of the ongoing Xi-Jiang factional struggle in bringing up the “Shanghai delegation” and the role it played in installing Xi as General Secretary prior to the 18th Party Congress. Those familiar with CCP elite politics will gather that Campbell is referring to the “Shanghai Gang” clique of the Jiang Zemin faction and Jiang’s role in selecting Xi as a “compromise candidate” together with then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao. Also to be pondered is why Campbell publicly discussed CCP elite politics and internal deliberations, as such highly sensitive topics that Western establishment elites tend to avoid mentioning prominently given their associations with regime change. Further, Campbell’s description of Xi as a sort of rogue element for the CCP establishment (“acted in ways that no one anticipated”) suggests that the Biden-Harris administration is taking the side of the “moderate collective leadership” against the incumbent General Secretary. All in all, Washington appears to be leveraging splits in the Party elite, just as advocated in the “Longer Telegram.”
Other moves by the Biden-Harris administration also suggest that Washington is invested in the strategy of leadership change outlined in the “Longer Telegram.” These include:
- The Biden-Harris administration has radically shifted the essence of ideological confrontation against the CCP.
- The Biden-Harris administration has focused its most critical censure of China to areas that are directly connected with Xi’s political legacy (Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the coronavirus origins, etc.), while eschewing condemnation of the CCP and its Marxist-Leninist ideology in general (this is precisely what the “Longer Telegram” calls for).
- While appearing “tough on China” and Xi, the Biden-Harris administration has also issued “uncharacteristically” weak China measures ahead of the CCP’s centennial celebrations in July, including the planned withdrawal of the the USS Ronald Reagan from Asia-Pacific in the summer (leaving the region with no carrier support for the first time in about two decades), giving the U.S. intelligence community a 90-day period to investigate the origins of COVID-19 and refusing to comment until after ninety days (an arbitrary deadline that conveniently falls after the CCP centennial), and cancelling the Trump administration’s executive orders banning Tik-Tok and WeChat. The Biden-Harris administration may have its internal reasons for taking the aforementioned actions, but to outsiders, the actions look like a “face saving” favor for the CCP as a whole while maintaining pressure on Xi Jinping.
3. It is unclear why Xi is not granting the Biden-Harris administration ready access to himself or his inner circle, at least at the moment. There is a possibility that Xi already suspects Washington and Western establishment elites of implementing a leadership change strategy, but has weighed that the external threat is less critical for the moment and there is not much he can do to resolve the issue regardless (Xi recently initiated what is likely to be a futile effort to make the CCP “lovable”). At present, Xi’s best option is to mostly “ignore” his external enemies, derail his domestic rivals’ efforts to sideline him (by carrying out purges, “rectification” campaigns, financial deleveraging, etc.), and hyping his “accomplishments” (such as by repackaging Party history) to secure a norm-breaking third office term as General Secretary at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. A review of Beijing’s policies, political campaigns, and other measures this year reveals a heavy focus on resolving domestic challenges to Xi’s rule.
Of course, Xi’s external enemies may create so much trouble for him that it spills over into domestic affairs and forces Xi to confront the issue. Depending on how Xi decides to take on the international and domestic “anti-Xi coalition,” political Black Swans could emerge and Beijing may see its “Berlin Wall moment.”
SinoInsight 2
June 12
Xie Feng, a PRC vice minister of foreign affairs, invited over 40 diplomatic representatives from 28 countries in North America, Oceania, Latin America, and the Carribean to the Diaoyutai Guesthouse in Beijing for a Dragon Boat Festival banquet.
During a banquet speech, Xie took the opportunity of the upcoming CCP centennial to promote Party history, repeat propaganda narratives, and play up Xi Jinping’s “achievements.” Highlights include:
- Xie made remarks revolving around Party propaganda narratives like the “Century of Humiliation” and how the CCP is the “choice of history and the people.”
- Xie attributed the CCP’s “three big miracles” (rapid economic growth, long-term social stability, peaceful rise) to the “success” of Chinese socialism (the CCP represents the interests of the Chinese people; has successfully “sinicized” Marxism; and has persisted in self-revolution).
- Xie boasted that “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” has entered a “new era,” and that by the CCP’s second centennial (which would be in 2121), “how the CCP has led the Chinese people to build a strong, prosperous, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful modern socialist state will become a classic topic of research in the world. This will be the CCP’s historic contribution to the development of mankind.”
- On the topic of the CCP’s “sinicization” of Marxism, Xie said, “The CCP is not just different from the bourgeois parties of the world, it is also different from the other communist parties in the world. The CCP is not another Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).”
Analysis: Xie Feng appears to be attempting to put into practice Xi Jinping’s May 31 speech to the Politburo on “strengthening and constructing China’s international communication capabilities” (see here for analysis of Xi’s speech). Xie certainly nailed the part about widely promoting a “community of shared future for mankind” and advocating the view that “China’s development is itself the world’s greatest contribution.” However, Xie’s speech reveals the contradictions of Xi’s request for officials to “have a good grasp of tone; reflect openness and confidence yet convey modesty and humility; and strive to create a trustworthy, lovable and respectable” image for the PRC. Chinese officials simply cannot play up Xi’s “accomplishments” while sounding “modest” and showing “humility” at the same time. Also exposed in Xie’s speech are the contradictions of the CCP’s “survival-dominance” dynamic; the regime’s tyranny is incongruous with being “lovable,” while its ambition and duplicitousness makes it untrustworthy regardless of propaganda packaging.
It is noteworthy that Xie Feng tried to sell the idea of the CCP being a “different” and almost unique political entity. In reading between the lines, the CCP fears being linked with the CPSU, its former “mentor,” and the short-lived nature of the USSR. Further, Xie’s talk of the CCP celebrating its second centennial belies the Party’s existential concerns amid mounting domestic and foreign pressures.
June 15
1. The CCP Central Committee and State Council issued its eighth five-year plan for the promotion of “rule of law” education by the propaganda ministry and the justice ministry (中央宣傳部、司法部關於開展法治宣傳教育的第八個五年規劃 [2021－2025年]). The plan calls on Chinese society and the PRC government to “study in-depth, propagate, and implement Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law,” and popularize legal education (普法). Popularizing legal education involves prominently studying and propagating “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law,” the PRC constitution, the civil code, as well as the laws and regulations that are closely related with the promotion of high-quality development and internal Party regulations (disciplinary regulations, accountability regulations, political and legal affairs work regulations, etc.).
Analysis: The promotion of “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” through the so-called “popularization of legal education” is designed to elevate Xi’s political theory (“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era), boost his “quan wei,” and strengthen Beijing’s control over society. In particular, the effort to push internal Party regulations is meant to help Beijing “strictly govern the Party” (從嚴治黨) and strengthen Xi’s control of the CCP.
2. The Central Cyberspace Administration of China launched a two-month long special campaign to rectify “chaotic” celebrity fan groups (“清朗·‘飯圈’亂象整治”). The campaign will focus on cleaning up problematic behavior associated with fan groups like confrontational abuse, slanderous attacks, and “malicious marketing.” Fan groups that carry out illegal activities and persist in trollish behavior will be dissolved.
Analysis: Bickering celebrity fan groups may seem like a trivial matter to free societies, but they are concerning to totalitarian regimes seeking to fully control societal discourse as a means of preserving regime security. This holds doubly true for the CCP, which is determined not to go the route of the Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc.
The CCP is very concerned that celebrities with massive fan bases could one day turn those masses against the regime when they become disgruntled with how things are in China. The “perfect storm” of internal and external problems facing the regime could worsen severely as inflation rises globally and the PRC fails to handle the coronavirus pandemic (lower quality Chinese vaccines make China’s population vaccination rate dubious) amid fresh outbreaks. It is not difficult to envisage a scenario where unhappy celebrities take to social media with their complaints about deteriorating quality of life and indirectly inspire their fans to lash out against the Party’s leadership.
Worst-case scenarios aside, the CCP is concerned with things as they are now with celebrity fan groups worsening social stability through vicious smear campaigns and illegal business operations. The last thing Beijing wants is widespread social unrest over non-incidents before the Party’s centennial celebrations in July.
June 16
Qiushi, the ideological journal of the CCP Central Committee, published an essay based on Xi Jinping’s speeches from March 2013 to March 2021 on strengthening Party history study and education (“Take History as a Mirror, Use History to Show One’s Will, Know History to Love the Party and the Nation”; “以史為鏡、以史明志，知史愛黨、知史愛國”).
Analysis: On one level, the Qiushi essay is an effort in boosting the confidence of Party members and the Chinese people in the PRC’s socialist system and safeguarding the CCP’s “quan wei.”
In considering the Xi angle, the essay further establishes his “quan wei” via the promotion of his revised Party history that glorifies his “accomplishments,” as well as sets as “orthodoxy” Xi’s role in Chinese socialism as laid out in the “Manifesto” published by Xinhua on June 6 (see here for the full analysis). The essay is also likely part of Xi’s effort to build up theoretical justification for his serving a norm-breaking third-term in office in 2022.
OUR TAKE
1. The developments above show that Xi and the CCP have been busy with consolidating their authority and control over Chinese society. The fact that Beijing cannot tolerate instability brewing from seemingly trivial quarters (celebrity fan groups), however, reveals the seriousness of the crisis facing the regime and the brittleness of its self-touted “strength.”
The Party may find that its efforts to more tightly clamp down on the government and society could produce a “pressure cooker” effect—tensions boil faster and erupt more explosively in a heavily pressurized environment with no escape valve.
2. The CCP’s struggles with adhering to Xi’s call to be “lovable” while implementing “great power diplomacy” will become more obvious when the regime’s domestic and international pressures mount.
On June 17, PRC ambassador to France Lu Shaye said that Communist China had shifted its focus from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide strength, bide time” (韜光養晦) and must “do something” in the public discourse battle. “The West has launched a public opinion war against us. How can we not fight back? China’s image would be tarnished as they desire if we don’t strike back,” he said. We expect more PRC “wolf warriors” to bear their fangs when the going gets tough.
