SinoInsight 1
The CCP’s 19th Central Committee has slated its fifth plenary session from Oct. 26 to Oct. 29. State media reports say that the Fifth Plenum will focus on the CCP’s 14th Five-Year Plan revolving around a so-called “dual circulation” model (“domestic circulation” as the “main body,” with “international circulation” in support). The Fifth Plenum will also discuss the regime’s 2035 goals.
Some China observers speculate that Xi Jinping could reshuffle personnel at the Fifth Plenum. From the list of names discussed, it appears that observers expect Xi to replace PRC vice president Wang Qishan, appoint a successor, reshuffle the propaganda leadership, and even replace “lackluster” allies like Beijing municipal Party secretary Cai Qi.
OUR TAKE
1. Beijing has been telegraphing the “dual circulation” model since mid-year, so it is no surprise it will feature in the 14th Five-Year Plan. We have already analyzed why the CCP’s “dual circulation” model (really “domestic circulation”) will not take off (see here and here).
Here are some additional topics that could be discussed under the Five-Year Plan:
- Technological self-sufficiency, including semiconductor development.
- Further liberalization of China’s financial markets.
- Plans and rules for the building of so-called “new infrastructure” (5G, data centers, artificial intelligence, Internet of things, etc.).
- Development of the pharmaceutical industry, including vaccines.
- New rural poverty alleviation plans.
- Food security, i.e. addressing food shortages in China.
- Tackling unemployment, including work for fresh graduates.
2. Past Fifth Plenums were usually focused on the CCP’s Five-Year Plan. Post-Cultural Revolution, there were personnel reshuffles at only five sessions of the Fifth Plenum (1980, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2010). Of the five reshuffles, four were carried out under special circumstances (1980: Huo Guofeng and his allies were replaced and purged officials were “rehabilitated”; 1985: Marshal Ye Jianying and a batch of Party elders retired and were replaced; 1989: Post-Tiananmen Square incident reshuffle; 1995: Jiang Zemin purged rival Chen Xitong and replaced him with allies).
Based on publicly available information, there are no overt signs Xi Jinping’s rivals are seriously moving to challenge him. This is partly due to Xi’s effort since the middle of the year to bolster his “quan wei” (see past newsletters) and consolidating power by altering Party rules. With his position strengthened, the “anti-Xi coalition” in China are likely struggling to create trouble for Xi in the lead up to the Fifth Plenum, as compared to the Fourth Plenum (Xi’s rivals troubled him enough to delay that political conclave for over a year). Absence of evidence, however, is not evidence of absence. Opponents of Xi overseas have been making full use of freedom of speech abroad to criticize Xi and the CCP regime, as well as spread disinformation targeted at playing up “splits” between Xi and his political allies.
Given how things stand, we do not believe that Xi Jinping will make personnel changes at the Fifth Plenum. Indeed, recent official activity suggests that Xi’s position and those of his close allies are secure for the moment. On Oct. 24, Wang Qishan delivered a speech on economic self-reliance and financial risks at the 2020 Shanghai Bund Summit. Given that Wang is speaking in Xi’s capacity as vice president, his rare solo appearance before the Fifth Plenum is likely aimed at debunking widespread speculation of a “Xi-Wang split.”
If Xi does reshuffle key personnel, political Black Swans have emerged in the regime.
SinoInsight 2
On Oct. 21, White House National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien published an essay addressing the CCP’s ideological agenda, “How China Threatens American Democracy,” in Foreign Affairs magazine. Highlights of the piece include:
- O’Brien subtly draws a parallel between the CCP regime and the Nazi regime. “For decades, conventional wisdom in the United States held that it was only a matter of time before China would become more liberal, first economically and then politically. We could not have been more wrong—a miscalculation that stands as the greatest failure of U.S. foreign policy since the 1930s,” he wrote.
- O’Brien wrote that it would be a “grave mistake” to believe that the CCP’s ideology “matters only within China.” The CCP’s ideological agenda “extends far beyond the country’s borders and represents a threat to the idea of democracy itself, including in the United States,” he wrote.
- “The United States, accordingly, cannot simply ignore the CCP’s ideological objectives. Washington must understand that the fight against Chinese aggression first requires recognizing it and defending ourselves against it here at home, before it is too late.”
- “The CCP is a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist organization, and Xi, as the Party’s top general, sees himself as Stalin’s successor. Marxism-Leninism is a totalitarian worldview that maintains that all important aspects of life should be controlled by the state, and the CCP’s intent to dominate political thought is stated openly and pursued aggressively.”
- “Nearly every Chinese-language news outlet in the United States is owned by the CCP or follows its editorial line.”
- “The Trump administration has spoken with candor and shone the spotlight of transparency on the CCP’s true character and will continue to so—what Confucius called a ‘rectification of names,’ making words correspond to reality.”
- “Washington must also continue to impose costs on Beijing in order to compel it to cease or reduce actions harmful to the United States’ vital national interests and those of our allies and partners. The United States can no longer let the CCP grow stronger at our expense or with our assistance. The days of American passivity and naivety are over, and we will continue to speak about and respond to the CCP as it is, not as former U.S. policymakers had wished it to be. The 2017 National Security Strategy calls this approach ‘principled realism.’”
- “The United States is the strongest country on earth, and it must speak out, fight back, and above all, stay true to its principles—especially freedom of speech—which stand in stark contrast to the Marxist-Leninist ideology embraced by the CCP.”
On Oct. 23, Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger delivered a speech in Mandarin titled, “The Importance of Being Candid,” during a video conference hosted by Policy Exchange in London. Highlights of the speech include:
- “No regime has more riding on its ability to influence the perceptions, policies and priorities of foreign populations than the Chinese Communist Party.”
- “The Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese civil war owed less to its combat prowess against superior Nationalist forces than to its ability to infiltrate and manipulate the language, thinking, and actions of its adversaries. This is why the current Party leadership is redoubling its emphasis on ‘United Front’ work.”
- “The Party’s goal, in short, is to co-opt or bully people—and even nations—into a particular frame of mind that’s conducive to Beijing’s grand ambitions. It’s a paradoxical mindset—a state of cognitive dissonance that is at once credulous and fearful, complacent and defeatist. It’s a mindset that on Monday says ‘It’s too early to say whether Beijing poses a threat,’ and by Friday says ‘They’re a threat, all right, but it’s too late to do anything about it now.’ To be coaxed into such a mindset is to be seduced into submission—like taking the ‘blue pill’ in The Matrix.”
- “The Party’s overseas propaganda has two consistent themes: ‘We own the future, so make your adjustments now.’ And: ‘We’re just like you, so try not to worry.’ Together, these assertions form the elaborate con at the heart of all Leninist movements.”
- “President Trump has ingrained two principles worth sharing here, because they’re designed to preserve our sovereignty, promote stability, and reduce miscalculation. They are reciprocity and candor. Reciprocity is the straightforward idea that when a country injures your interests, you return the favor … Candor is the idea that democracies are safest when we speak honestly and publicly about and to our friends, our adversaries, and ourselves.”
- “Some will argue that confrontational rhetoric turns countries into enemies. This old chestnut of the U.S. diplomatic corps masquerades as humble policy, but is in fact quite arrogant because it presumes nations act primarily in reaction to whatever the United States says or does. Clever adversaries use such thinking against us. By portraying truth-telling as an act of belligerence, autocrats try to badger democracies into silence—and often succeed.”
- “So it is in a spirit of friendship, reflection, and, yes, candor, that I ask friends in China to research the truth about your government’s policies toward the Uyghur people and other religious minorities … There is no credible justification I can find in Chinese philosophy, religion, or moral law for the concentration camps inside your borders.”
- “As my friend Tony Dolan told me: ‘The great paradox of institutionalized evil is that it can be enormously powerful but also enormously fragile. Thus, it is compulsively aggressive and ultimately self-destructive. It senses its own moral absurdity. It knows it is a raft on a sea of ontological good. What evil fears most is the publicly spoken truth.’”
OUR TAKE
1. The recent counter-ideological thrust of America’s foremost national security officials affirm our previous analyses. In August 2018, we noted a coming ideological turn in U.S. policy towards China. In October 2018, we said that the world is trapped in the CCP’s “Red Matrix.” And in July 2019, we wrote that the current Sino-U.S. conflict is “not just a trade war or a tech war, but a critical battle of ideology, value systems, and morality.”
If the U.S. continues on its current trajectory in countering the CCP’s ideology and speaking truth to power, Washington is just steps away from labeling Beijing’s serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang as a “genocide.” Nor will Washington stop at strongly condemning the CCP’s persecution of Uyghur Muslims; U.S. lawmakers are calling for “taking further specific actions to respond to the full range of CCP human rights violations, from religious freedom violations to forced organ harvesting.” Prominent U.S. actions on human rights issues, particularly issues concerning the political legacy of Party bosses like Xinjiang and Falun Gong, will in turn trigger a showdown in the factional struggle in the CCP elite.
2. The top national security officials in the Trump administration make it clear that the U.S. ideological thrust against the CCP is defensive in nature and aimed at protecting “sovereignty, promot(ing) stability, and reduc(ing) miscalculation.” However, in waging ideological battle with Beijing, Washington is laying the groundwork (knowingly or unknowingly) for regime collapse. Like the so-called “demon revealing mirror” (照妖鏡) in famous Chinese tales like “Journey to the West,” U.S. efforts to speak plainly about the CCP, its propaganda, its global ambitions, and its rights abuses expose the Party’s true colors to the world. Once the world sees the CCP clearly for what it is—a techno-totalitarian regime that engages in gross human rights violations and strives for global hegemony—countries will move to isolate the regime, with dire consequences for the Party.
We previously explained why the CCP fears ideological battle with the U.S. and how defending its ideology could lead to existential crisis for Communist China.
3. The CCP has largely avoided criticizing Robert O’Brien and Matt Pottinger in a high profile manner, instead choosing to hit back quietly with template rebuttal slogans (“strong ideological bias and the Cold War mentality”) and accusations (“anti-China united front”). In other words, the CCP is reacting to ideological confrontation exactly as we have predicted.
In August, we wrote, “when the CCP is seriously endangered by U.S. ideological confrontation, it will double down on the ‘racism’ card that it has thus far remained content to play subtly.” To counter the CCP’s “racism” charge, the U.S. can consider bolstering the “culture” component of its strategic approach to the PRC.
SinoInsight 3
Since early September, the CCP has been boasting about “beating the coronavirus.” Recent developments, however, suggest that Beijing has been dishonest with the world about its COVID recovery.
On Oct. 12, the government of Qingdao City in eastern China announced it was testing the entire population of about 11 million people within “five days” for COVID after discovering a local outbreak. On Oct. 16, the Qingdao authorities claimed that it had conducted nearly 11 million tests and “all returned negative.” The results drew skepticism from observers. Chen Shih-chung, Taiwan’s minister for health and welfare, was incredulous that Qingdao carried out such a large quantity of tests and found not one asymptomatic case. “The feat [of doing so many tests] is remarkable, but the results are impossible,” Chen said.
On Oct. 17, the Qingdao authorities claimed that it had found “living samples” of the virus on frozen cod “imported from elsewhere.” In a statement, Qingdao’s CDC said, “It is the first time in the world that living novel coronavirus has been isolated from the outer packaging of cold-chain food.”
On Oct. 24, Chinese netizens widely circulated information that the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang Province had been placed under lockdown due to a coronavirus outbreak. Flights from Kashgar Airport were also grounded that day. That afternoon, the Kashgar Public Security Bureau website issued a notice ordering all residents to wear masks, pay attention to safety, and “don’t spread rumors that cause unnecessary panic.” Also, “only information from government notices are accurate.” However, the notice was subsequently taken down from the bureau’s website.
On Oct. 25, the Kashgar authorities said it had detected “137 new asymptomatic coronavirus cases” linked to a local garment factory. The authorities claimed to have launched a testing program covering the city’s 4.75 million people on Oct. 24, and that it aimed to complete testing by Oct. 27. Also, the city had closed all schools except colleges until Oct. 30, but allowed shopping malls and supermarkets to remain open.
OUR TAKE
We warned the CCP was covering up the coronavirus outbreak back in January, and would continue to conceal the extent of its public health crisis. The CCP’s refusal to allow an investigation into the origins of the virus and recent outbreaks suggest the regime is still hiding the true damage the coronavirus epidemic has wrought inside China.
If the CCP has not controlled the virus per its claims, there is sufficient reason to suspect China is still struggling with its first wave of infections. China could yet see a second wave near the end of the year to early 2021 as cold weather facilitates virus transmissibility. Faulty vaccines could also increase the probability of a second wave of COVID or other infectious diseases.
