Party secretaries laud Xi during local Party Congresses; People’s Daily promotes Xi’s ‘accomplishments’ in governing the Party with regulations

     SinoInsight  1     

April 25 to June 28
Seventeen Chinese provinces and direct-administered municipalities (see table below) held local Party Congresses between late April to late June. During those key political conclaves, the aforementioned provincial Party Committees, with the exception of Beijing municipality, announced members of the new local Party Committees.

According to publicly available information, 16 of the 17 provinces and direct-administered municipalities released the full text of their local Party Congress report, while there are only official media reports on the Beijing Party Congress. All Party secretaries of those 17 provinces and direct-administered municipalities lavished adulations on Xi Jinping in their respective report, with Zhejiang (58 times) and Sichuan (13 times) coming in first and last respectively in the number of mentions of Xi’s name. Xi’s name was brought up an average of 34 times in the full text of Party Congress reports issued by 16 provinces and direct-administered municipalities, while media reports on the Beijing Party Congress mentioned Xi 15 times (actual frequency of keywords could be higher in the full text). Other words repeatedly frequently to emphasize their importance include “core” (核心), “leader” (領袖), and “zero-COVID” (清零).

Six of the 17 provincial Party secretaries used the word “leader” in their Party Congress report:

1. Li Hongzhong, Tianjin municipal Party secretary, mentioned “leader” seven times, including in the phrases, “remember the leader’s teachings” (牢記領袖教導), “the people’s leader” (人民領袖), “leadership style” (領袖風範), and “wise and outstanding leader” (英明卓越領袖).
2. Liang Yanshun, Ningxia Party secretary, said “remember the leader’s entrustments” (牢記領袖囑託) three times.
3. Wang Xiaohui, Sichuan Party secretary, spoke about “the leader’s deep concerns” (領袖的深切關懷), “the leader’s earnest entrustments” (領袖的殷殷囑託), and “the leader’s strategic plan” (領袖的戰略擘畫).
4. Chen Yiqin, Guizhou Party secretary, mentioned “remember the leader’s entrustments” two times.
5. Yin Hong, Gansu Party secretary, said “remember the leader’s entrustments” and “the leader guides the way” (領袖指引航向).
6. Li Xi, Guangdong Party secretary, mentioned “the leader’s teachings” (領袖的教導).

June 25
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) held a mobilization and deployment meeting to launch a 100-day rectification campaign during the summer. Wang Xiaohong, MPS Party secretary and public security minister, presided over the meeting and gave a speech.

The meeting called for “A Hundred Days of Action” (百日行動) to combat “prominent violations and crimes,” “vigorously rectify security issues in society,” and “resolve various security” risks so as to “victoriously welcome the 20th Party Congress.”

The meeting emphasized the need to strengthen political security measures. Public security forces are to severely crack down on “all kinds of infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by hostile forces,” as well as “resolutely safeguard the security of the state authorities, institutional security, and ideological security.” Public security forces are also to take “special action” to “strictly combat riots and terrorism” and “prevent the occurrence of violence and terrorist cases and incidents.”

The meeting also called for strengthening stability maintenance and crime fighting capabilities. Public security forces should adhere to and develop the “Fengqiao Experience” in the new era. They should also “promote the deepening development of the normalization of the fight against gangs and triad elements (掃黑除惡), resolutely eradicate gangs and triad forces and groups, and strictly punish ‘protective umbrellas’ of gangs and triads.”

The meeting further stressed the need to strengthen social control. Mechanisms like public security and armed police joint services, armed patrols, and rapid response should be implemented.

OUR TAKE
1. Provincial Party secretaries praising Xi Jinping in the recent Party Congress reports and official media reporting of Party Congress meetings help the Xi leadership in its effort to use propaganda to boost Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and “spin tragedy into victory” (喪事當喜事報) ahead of the 20th Party Congress. The reports attribute local political “achievements” to the leadership of the Xi “core” and the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought

The use and repetition of keywords in recent Party Congress reports and official media reporting of Party Congress meetings offer some insight into the career prospects and situation of the Party secretaries who delivered the reports:

• From the frequency of keywords used, the Party secretaries of Zhejiang, Jilin, Guangdong, Shaanxi, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Ningxia were very enthusiastic in touting Xi Jinping. Their higher-than-average use of keywords appears to be linked with their respective bids for further career advancement. For example, Li Xi from Guangdong and Chen Min’er from Chongqing stand a chance of joining the Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress. Liang Yanshun from Ningxia appears to be angling to join the 20th Central Committee as a full or alternate member. Meanwhile, Yuan Jiajun from Zhejiang would be looking for a transfer to a direct-administered municipality to secure a spot in the Politburo.
• Tianjin Party secretary Li Hongzhong offered the most brazen and mushy praises of Xi Jinping, including mentioning the word “leader” seven times. Li, who is about to retire, likely went overboard with his praise for Xi due to personal political security reasons. Li used to be a Jiang faction official, but switched allegiances quickly after Xi took office. In early 2016, Li earned political “merit” by taking the lead in hailing Xi as the “core” (習核心) before the latter assumed the mantle of “core leader” at the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress later that year. Li Hongzhong would likely be hoping that his consistent displays of loyalty to Xi over the years and before his retirement would help him avoid being purged and even secure a “safe landing” at sinecure posts in the National People’s Congress or the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
• Officials who mentioned “Xi Jinping” less frequently than average appear to have mediocre careers and are not overly concerned about further career progression. Some like Xu Qin from Heilongjiang and Wang Menghui from Hubei used the word “core” about as frequently as “Xi Jinping,” with zero mentions of “leader.” Meanwhile, Chen Yiqin at Guizhou, the only female provincial Party secretary, sits about average with keyword usage, likely because she is almost certainly locked in to replace Sun Chunlan (the only female Politburo member) as vice premier.
• The bulk of Party secretaries (12 out of 17) did not use the word “leader” in their reports. This indicates that the promotion of “leader” is very likely not a central government-directed propaganda initiative and Xi Jinping is not trying to take on the title of “people’s leader” as some commentators have been claiming. Party secretaries who mentioned “leader” appear to be either making a bid for higher office (Li Xi, Liang Yanshun, Wang Xiaohui, Yin Hong) or are looking for a “safe landing” post-retirement (Li Hongzhong).

As for “zero-COVID” mentions, it is unsurprising that the Party Congress report of Jilin, which was subjected to a province-wide lockdown earlier this year, came in first with eight mentions. Other provinces barely mentioned “zero-COVID” and three provinces did not bring up the policy at all. It is possible that local officials realized after Beijing began focusing more on economic rescue than epidemic prevention and control from late April that it is presently not very politically correct to promote “zero-COVID” at this time so that Xi Jinping can be spared the blushes of his failed policy.

Not all provincial Party secretaries, however, appear to be so politically astute. Xi ally Cai Qi called for another five years of “zero-COVID” in the official media report of the Beijing municipal Party Congress, sparking public backlash. Later, the words “next five years” were subsequently scrubbed from reports of the Beijing municipal Party Congress and official media claimed that they had misquoted Cai. This is not the first time that Cai Qi bumbled in attempting to be “politically correct”; in 2017, Cai oversaw controversial efforts to mass evict migrant workers and demolish their homes, tear down signboards, and ban the burning of coal for heating even though gas heating was not widely available.

Next, the remaining 14 provinces will hold their respective local Party Congress and reshuffle their leadership ranks. Those Party secretaries can also be expected to praise Xi to varying degrees. In considering only the political perspective, Xi can be expected to successfully take a third term at the 20th Party Congress as long as he makes astute reshuffles in the provinces, ensures that the top provincial leadership is loyal to him, and stays on top of factional struggle in the Party elite. Xi, however, may not find things going smoothly for him on the political front should economic, social, and possibly even geopolitical problems take a turn for the worse in the second half of 2022.

2. New public security minister Wang Xiaohong looks to be laying down the law early with the “Hundred Days of Action” campaign.

Aside from its stated purpose, efforts to crack down on gangs and triad elements, as well as their “protective umbrellas,” could be used to further the Xi leadership’s rectification of the public security system and continue the work of the recently concluded political and legal affairs apparatus education and rectification campaign. Wang’s call to strengthen political security would also put Party elites on notice ahead of the Beidhaihe meeting, which the duration of the “Hundred Days of Action” campaign just so happens to cover.

Meanwhile, calls to strengthen “stability maintenance” and social control, including the implementation of public security and armed police coordination, suggest that Xi and the CCP are very wary of chaos breaking out in society as the Chinese economy continues to deteriorate. The “Hundred Days of Action” campaign would allow the public security system to be better prepared to handle crises, as well as strengthen the Party’s grip on the regime.

     SinoInsight  2     

• 221 Party Central regulations;
• 170 intra-ministerial Party regulations formulated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and relevant Party Central departments;
• 3,327 local intra-Party regulations formulated by Party Committees of provinces, autonomous regions, and direct-administered municipalities.

OUR TAKE
Xi Jinping’s effort to “strictly govern the Party” and “govern the Party in accordance with regulations” is aimed at making the CCP more disciplined, maintaining intra-Party stability, consolidating power, and reining in factional rivals.

Xi does not derive real power and “quan wei” solely from titles (as many observers incorrectly presume), but through constant factional struggle, “rectification” campaigns, and strengthening Party discipline. All three factors are covered in the Xi leadership’s imposition of regulations and “governing the Party in accordance with regulations.”

Notably, Xi rolled out the December 2016 opinion on strengthening the construction of intra-Party regulations and systems after his status as Party “core” leader was confirmed at the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee. Having secured a crucial title, Xi needed a way to consolidate his position, constrain the power of other Party elites, and find reasons to crackdown on factional rivals who threaten his rule. Through “strictly governing the Party” and “governing the Party in accordance with regulations,” Xi was able to subtly marginalize the “collective leadership” system, amend the Party and state constitutions, and remove obstacles to extending his leadership tenure at the 20th Party Congress.

The constant formulation of intra-Party regulations and requiring Party members to obey them also serves the purpose of maintaining stability within the CCP. In theory, Party members will have little to no time to consider issues related to the political system and create trouble for the CCP leadership if they are forced to attend study sessions, submit ideological reports, share learning experiences, carry out formal propaganda work, and other actions mandated by regulations on a regular basis.

On the flipside, the fact that the CCP needs thousands of intra-Party regulations to govern the behavior of its members is a reflection of serious systemic deficiencies, and not “systemic advantages” as the CCP likes to brag. Party members are also known to develop countermeasures to deal with Party Central’s policies (上有政策, 下有對策), and would go along with study sessions and other actions required by regulations for the sake of following formalities and pleasing their superiors for political gains. With most Party members engaging in political kabuki and very few true believers in the CCP system, the regime is in danger of collapse once crises escalate beyond the state’s ability to keep them under control.

     SinoInsight  3     

OUR TAKE
The Central Organization Department’s figures show an increase in CCP membership and seem to reflect continued “support” for the Party. However, a closer analysis of official data hints that not all is well.

1. The Central Organization Department did not release data for Party members for only 2020, but instead released data from 2020 up till June 5, 2021 on June 30, 2021. Yet the CCP released data for the whole of 2021 in its June 29, 2022 communiqué. This curious practice means that it is unclear what the actual state of the Party was at the end of 2020. We have reason to believe that the CCP could be looking to cover up the extent at which COVID-19 impacted China in 2020; last year, the CCP also had problems issuing its 2020 census data.

Table 1 (Source: Central Organization Department)

As seen in Table 1, the increase in the number of Party members in 2021 is very abnormal. From 2012 to 2017, the CCP has been gaining members at a slowing rate, with just 117,000 new Party members in 2017. Several factors account for this, including mass migration over Xi Jinping’s policies to tighten control over the regime like his effort to “strictly govern the Party” (launched end October 2014), anti-corruption efforts in the financial sector and restriction of capital outflows (launched 2017), and China’s deteriorating economy.

A combination of domestic and external factors likely accounted for why Party membership climbed from 2018 onwards. For one, the CCP was beginning to tighten immigration controls over Party members, including confiscating or denying passports to prevent migration. Also, the years 2018 to 2021 saw growing job instability and business failures in China due to China’s worsening economy, the Sino-U.S. trade war, the real estate sector debt crisis, Xi’s crackdown on technology and education companies as part of a campaign to curb the “disorderly expansion of capital,” the outbreak of COVID-19 and the introduction of “zero-COVID,” and other factors. Moreover, China was gaining an ever increasing number of fresh graduates during that period (8.21 million in 2018; 8.34 million in 2019; 8.74 million in 2020; 9.09 million in 2021), a phenomenon that put strain on the job market. As a result, a growing number of young people and those searching for an “iron rice bowl” during troubled times took to joining the Party and the PRC civil service or public institution out of sheer necessity; whether they joined because they truly support the CCP is highly questionable given that Xi’s strict control over the Party has only ramped up since 2017.

Table 2 (Source: Central Organization Department)

As seen from Table 2, there were 3.54 million new Party members under age 35 in 2021, or 80.8 percent of total new Party members. About half of those new Party members (1.77 million) are students.

Also in 2021, there were 1.355 million new Party members who are management and technical personnel in Party and government institutions, enterprises, and social organizations. This represents an increase of nearly double from 2019 (703, 000). A sizable portion of those new Party members is likely to be young people given that those under age 35 make up the bulk of total new Party members. This data indirectly shows that young people are joining the CCP because they seek a stable career in Party and government jobs amid troubled times.

2. The Central Organization Department’s data for Party members who “joined the Party before 2012” (2012年前入黨) appears to reflect the death of nearly 2 million mostly older Party members over the past two years.

Table 3 (Source: Central Organization Department)

Since 2013 (with the exception of 2017 and 2020), the Central Organization Department has been releasing data for Party members who “joined the Party before 2012.” Decreases in the data occur when members quit the Party owing to various reasons, including migration and death. Table 3 shows the number of Party members who “joined the Party before 2012” in 2019 was 893,000 less than in 2018, and sharply increased to 1.84 million less in 2021 when compared to 2019 for an average of 920,500 less per year. The bulk of the decrease between 2019 to 2021 is concentrated in the group of Party members who “joined the Party between 1949 to 1978,” or those who are 60 and older.

Party members are typically members for life because the CCP makes it very difficult to formally quit the Party. It is also highly unlikely that 1.84 million Party members emigrated over the past two years due to the CCP’s very strict COVID restrictions. That leaves death as a probable cause for the sudden decline in Party members, and especially among elderly comrades. Incidentally, 2020 and 2021 coincided with COVID-19 outbreaks in China, and older people belong in the high-risk group for the disease.