SinoInsight 1
Meanwhile, the seeming failure of milder or bespoke epidemic prevention and control measures to curb the spread of the virus in Shanghai appears to have led to the marginalization of the authoritative scientific voices advocating targeted measures, with the authorities instead pushing hardline “zero-COVID” policies.
Shanghai epidemic situation
Lei Zhenglong, deputy director of the PRC National Health Commission’s Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention, said during an April 1 press conference that COVID-19 is spreading rapidly in China, with 103,965 cases in 29 provinces reported in the month of March. He added that Jilin (44,000 cases) and Shanghai (36,000 cases) accounted for 90 percent of total cases. Lei described the epidemic in Shanghai as “rapidly rising.” On April 3, the PLA Daily announced that over 2,000 medical personnel from the army, navy, and joint logistics support force had been dispatched to Shanghai to aid with medical treatment and nucleic acid testing.
Information circulated by local residents and other Chinese netizens online suggests that the authorities are accurately describing the situation, even if official numbers are on the low side. Such reports also indicate heightened stability maintenance measures, a sign that the local authorities are afraid that the epidemic situation could spiral out of control and trigger unrest.
According to a since-scrubbed video that was circulating on Chinese social media in the week of March 28, a Shanghai policeman trying to placate a crowd of protesters said, “We’ve taken away 400 people today and 1,000 people yesterday; there aren’t that many cars and [quarantine] apartments for them.” Images circulating on Weibo during the week also show personnel in protective clothing with the characters “Yangpu Militia” and “Hongkou Militia” on their backs patrolling the streets.
Shanghai netizens also unearthed a local government internal meeting memo dated March 30 that revealed desperation on the part of the authorities. Key points in the memo include:
- The results of preliminary testing in Pudong District are “not good,” and Shanghai is in “last stand” (背水一戰) territory. Hence, all Party members and cadres should stop being “extremely ignorant,” and treat all orders like military orders. They should do their job well, with promotion as a reward; underperformers will be fired. Party members from all institutions and agencies should also report to their local residential committee to serve as volunteers.
- The scheduled lockdown of Puxi District on March 31 makes that day “crucial.” Public security officials are to station themselves outside large supermarkets and markets to prevent 26 million local residents from panic buying.
- The Shanghai hospital system is on the verge of collapse. All medical schools and school students in Shanghai, as well as retired doctors and nurses, are to be mobilized into the medical system. Schools are to be converted into isolation cabins.
- Those in the courier business are now a high-risk group and need to be quarantined. All Party members and volunteers will handle food delivery and courier service.
During the call, the Shanghai CDC section chief revealed that the local authorities did not follow professional medical advice on dealing with the epidemic, and indicated indirectly that the city’s previous achievements in epidemic prevention and control were ruined. She also noted that Shanghai’s medical resources are on the verge of exhaustion because the “zero-COVID” policy required the quarantining of an infected person’s (including asymptomatic and mild cases) close contacts, and that this development is causing serious secondary injuries. In going back and forth with the Shanghai resident on how COVID cases are being handled, she indirectly exposed a lack of coordination between the various medical departments and a generally chaotic situation.
The section chief said that residents should regard Omicron as the flu and advised asymptomatic and mild cases not to check themselves into and even refuse to be transported to makeshift hospitals, where conditions are rough and medical resources are lacking.
The Shanghai CDC section chief later said that medical personnel are being “driven mad” by the situation because the local authorities are not listening to what medical professionals have to say about dealing with the epidemic. Instead, “all of them have turned the disease political. Wasting so much manpower and financial resources … to guard against the flu. Which country do you see guarding against the flu like this?”
When she was informed that the call was recorded, the section chief indicated that she did not mind if the recording went public so that the authorities could pay attention to the situation. On April 2, the Pudong New Area Health Committee issued a statement acknowledging the call and the resident’s complaint. The statement added that the authorities are attaching “great importance” to the situation and will investigate the matter. Xinhua and other official media republished the statement.
Shanghai shuts down tighter
March 30
The Shanghai municipal government held a conference of leading cadres to discuss the implementation of epidemic prevention and control work. Li Qiang, Shanghai Party Secretary and the city’s epidemic work leading group, called for the adoption of “comprehensive prevention and control measures” such as city-wide “static management,” nucleic acid testing, contact tracing, and cleaning and disinfection. He also called for at-risk groups to be placed under control and the achieving of “zero-COVID” in society as soon as possible.
March 31
The Shanghai municipal government placed the western Puxi District (16 million people, 12 districts) under lockdown as part of a staggered shutdown of the city to curb the spread of COVID-19. A day earlier, the government extended an existing lockdown of the eastern Pudong District, saying that it would lift the lockdown in stages. The Shanghai local government has thus far not stuck to announced lockdown end dates.
Growing unrest in Shanghai
We gave an overview in our March 31 newsletter of the many “zero-COVID” policy-related social issues that have cropped up in Shanghai since the latest outbreak. Some of the issues, including food shortages, chaotic healthcare arrangements (overworked hospital staff, separating children under five from their parents and isolating them, quarantining infected and healthy people together, etc.) and the lockdowns in general, have led local residents to carry out protests and strikes.
In one notable episode, residents of Haitangyuan Community in Shanghai’s Pudong District tried to mass order and have affordable food delivered from outside the community. However, the community’s public security officials barred the food delivery staff from entering, sparking a protest at the community gate in the evening of March 29. More than 100 residents attended the protest, with some shouting through loudspeakers, “The police are practicing inaction” and “We want affordable food!” The community police arrested some of the residents, prompting chants of “let them go.” Later, the police reportedly dispatched a number of police vehicles to the scene to take away the protest leaders, but were unsuccessful in the face of strong resident opposition. According to Radio Free Asia, dozens of community residents again took to the streets to protest on the evening of March 30, ignoring COVID restrictions and warnings.
In a March 31 report, The Wall Street Journal cited six replacement orderlies at Shanghai’s Donghai Elderly Care Hospital as saying that many of the hospital’s patients had died in recent days. The orderlies note that at least 100 patients had tested positive for COVID-19 and they had seen or heard about the removal of several bodies from the hospital. The Journal cited people familiar with the matter as saying that the hospital had hired about four dozen replacement orderlies over a two-day span to replace quarantined caretakers, and one orderly “helped remove the bodies of dead patients from the hospital for three days in a row before he himself tested positive and was taken away to quarantine.” Also, replacement orderlies were “required to sleep in the same room as Covid-positive patients in dirty conditions that attracted mice,” while some have since gone on strike.
Official data suggests that social unrest is on the rise in general across China since the latest outbreaks. A March 31 Xinhua report noted that procuratorial organs at all levels across China have been strictly fighting the “epidemic” per the rule of law and vigorously maintaining epidemic prevention and control order. As of February 2022, procuratorial organs had approved the arrest of 9,377 people in 7,047 epidemic-related cases (2,528 people in 1,584 cases were ultimately not arrested) and approved the prosecution of 15,666 people in 11,340 cases (2,393 people in 1,437 cases were not prosecuted).
Zhang Wenhong ‘marginalized’?
Zhang Wenhong, the director of the Department of Infectious Diseases at Huashan Hospital in Shanghai and head of the Shanghai COVID-19 Medical Treatment Experts Team (上海市新冠肺炎醫療救治專家組組長), was an authoritative scientific voice on epidemic prevent and control in Shanghai and the mainland more broadly since the 2020 outbreaks.
Zhang favored “precise epidemic prevention” measures in dealing with outbreaks, and indicated as such in a Sina Weibo blog post on March 24 titled, “The Coronavirus is Not Scary, But is Difficult to Fight” (新冠沒有那麼嚇人, 但是仗很難打). He argued that sustaining normal living is just as important as implementing “dynamic zero-COVID” and the mindset of “fighting the virus regardless of cost” should be abandoned. Zhang acknowledged the difficulties of fighting the Omicron strain in Shanghai, but insisted that the city would not adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to tackling the virus. Xinhua and other mainland media outlets later republished Zhang’s blog post.
Zhang Wenhong would attend the Shanghai Municipal Health Commission’s epidemic press conferences on March 24 and March 25 in the capacity of Shanghai COVID-19 Medical Treatment Experts Group Leader. However, Zhang was absent from the March 28 press conference when Wu Jinglei, director of the Shanghai Municipal Health Commission and former pediatric cardiac intensive care specialist, was introduced with the new title of Shanghai Epidemic Prevention and Control Leading Group Medical Treatment Team Leader (上海市疫情防控領導小組醫療救治組組長). Wu Jinglei was accompanied at the press conference by Gu Jun (head of the material security team of the Shanghai Epidemic Prevention and Control Leading Group, and director of the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce) and Wu Fan (member of the Shanghai Epidemic Prevention and Control Leading Group and vice president of the Shanghai Medical College of Fudan University).
Wu Jinglei, Wu Fan, and Zhang Wenhong did not attend the Shanghai Municipal Health Commission epidemic press conferences on March 29 and March 30. Instead, other officials like Ruan Qing, deputy director of the Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commission, and Wu Ganyu, first-level inspector of the Shanghai Municipal Health Commission, made appearances.
Zhang Wenhong’s no-show in recent Shanghai epidemic press conferences led observers to speculate about his possible “marginalization” and the impact of the latest outbreak on political affairs in Shanghai.
Hardening official rhetoric
March 29
“China Comment” (Ban Yue Tan, 半月談), a CCP mouthpiece publication under Xinhua, published an op-ed titled, “Continuously Conduct Mass Nucleic Acid Testing When There’s No Epidemic? Anti-epidemic Resources Cannot Be Wasted Like This” (沒有疫情也連續搞大規模核酸檢測？抗疫資源不能如此浪費).
The op-ed argued that “relevant decisions” pertaining to the epidemic should be made “scientifically and prudently,” and proceeded to make the case against wantonly conducting mass nucleic acid testing. Mass testing done at random and at high frequency will “disrupt some social operations, occupy a large number of government cadres and industry personnel to maintain order, will undoubtedly waste a lot of valuable funds and medical resources, affect the normal operation of society, easily induce public speculation, add unnecessary panic, and has a negative impact that should not be underestimated.”
March 30
Xinhua published a 4,300-character review article titled, “Persevere in and Do Not Relax in ‘Dynamic Zero-COVID’” (新华述评: 坚持“动态清零”不放松).
The article was divided into five sections:
- “What is ‘dynamic zero-COVID’?”;
- “Why continue insisting on ‘dynamic zero-COVID’?”;
- “Does China have the ability to achieve ‘dynamic zero-COVID’?”;
- “What is China’s confidence in realizing ‘dynamic zero-COVID’?”;
- “How can China achieve ‘double victories’ in epidemic prevention and control, and economic and social development?”
April 1
Wu Zunyou, chief epidemiologist with the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, said at a State Council press conference that China must adhere to the “dynamic zero-COVID” approach.
Wu said that the Omicron BA.2 sub-variant spreads rapidly and will infect many people in a short period, causing “severe perils to a country or a region.” Meanwhile, the PRC’s epidemic prevention and control practice has shown that “dynamic zero-COVID” remains the “most economical and effective strategy for COVID-19 control,” Wu added.
OUR TAKE
1. The COVID-19 situation in Shanghai appears to be developing beyond the local authorities’ control. Concurrently, Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID”/“dynamic zero-COVID” in Shanghai is affecting both the local and national economies, as well as stirring social unrest and anger towards his leadership and the Party. However, Xi has no choice but to double down on his notorious epidemic prevention and control approach because it has become a prominent part of his political legacy and political “achievements.”
Chinese officials, with their “prefer left rather than right” and “one-size-fits-all” approaches to policy implementation, will not dare to carry out “zero-COVID” in a “dynamic” (flexible, creative, taking local conditions into account, etc.) manner. Instead, local officials are apt to go for the more hardline, draconian, and chaotic approach to executing “zero-COVID,” and prioritize the securing of political “achievements” (i.e. reducing cases and deaths) over safeguarding the people’s lives per Beijing’s growing exhortations.
The continuation of “zero-COVID” will perpetuate a vicious cycle where Xi engenders greater political problems for himself through his policy worsening the economic and social situation in Shanghai and elsewhere. Any “victory” secured through “zero-COVID” will end up being pyrrhic. Yet Xi cannot jettison the policy now without suffering an immediate and massive blow to his “quan wei.”
The Xi leadership has likely assessed that it is preferable to “delay and wait for change” (以拖待變) on the COVID policy front in the hopes that the epidemic will blow out soon, allowing the various economic and social issues to naturally resolve themselves before the 20th Party Congress. In the interim, Xi Jinping’s enemies will likely do their best to highlight his failures and trip him up.
2. Zhang Wenhong appears to be a victim of “political correctness” as Omicron spreads through Shanghai and the Xi leadership clings to “zero-COVID.” The trotting out of different COVID experts during Shanghai’s epidemic press conferences from March 28 suggest that Zhang is longer allowed to be the face of the city’s COVID response, and his more humane “precise epidemic prevention” is being discarded in favor of a harsher form of “dynamic zero-COVID.” The “marginalization” of Zhang and his preferred approach to epidemic prevention and control occurred around the same time that the official line on “zero-COVID” noticeably hardened, suggesting that those in the regime who prefer a more rigid interpretation of Xi’s pandemic policy currently hold sway.
Zhang’s situation also calls attention to Shanghai boss Li Qiang. Li, an ally of Xi, had visited Zhang at his lab in 2021, a move which many interpreted as Li Qiang showing support for Zhang Wenhong and his “precise epidemic prevention.” Had Omicron not arrived in Shanghai, Li would be on track to deliver both good COVID and economic results relative to the rest of the country ahead of the 20th Party Congress. Those hypothetical political “achievements” would allow Xi Jinping to justify elevating him to the Politburo Standing Committee and possibly even have him replace the retiring Li Keqiang as premier.
With the COVID outbreak in Shanghai and debilitating lockdowns, however, Li Qiang’s political situation has become precarious. His performance also reflects poorly on Xi, who installed him in Shanghai. Li’s pivot to a tougher interpretation of “zero-COVID” is likely an attempt to adhere more closely to Beijing and possibly salvage his personal political fortunes. But just like Xi, Li is worsening his political situation (and by extension, that of his political patron) by doubling down on a hardline approach “zero-COVID” instead of sticking to Zhang Wenhong’s more moderate methods.
SinoInsight 2
March 27
Zhuge Yujie (age 49), secretary-general of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, was promoted to Shanghai deputy Party secretary.
Analysis: Zhuge Yujie’s age and promotion suggest that he is being groomed for higher office. Barring accidents, he will likely become an alternate member or full member of the Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress and could become Shanghai mayor by no later than March 2023.
Gong Zheng (62), the current mayor of Shanghai, does have promotion prospects and could be transferred to another province to serve as provincial Party secretary. Gong can only become Shanghai Party secretary if Xi Jinping rates him well.
March 28
Jin Xiangjun (58), secretary-general of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee, was promoted to Tianjin deputy Party secretary.
Analysis: Jin Xiangjun’s career prospects appear to be similar to those of Zhuge Yujie’s, i.e. become an alternate member or full member of the Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress and mayor of Tianjin.
Incumbent Tianjin mayor Liao Guoxun (59) could later take over the Tianjin Party secretary post or be transferred to another province to serve as provincial Party secretary.
Li Hongzhong (66), the current Tianjin Party boss and a Jiang faction associate, is unlikely to see further career advancement. Xi, however, could have him serve as a vice chairman in either the National People’s Congress or the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference to “reward” Jiang faction members who became leading Xi supporters and possibly encourage more factional “defections.”
March 29
1. Wang Jiayi (57), head of the Gansu provincial propaganda department, was promoted to deputy Party secretary of Gansu.
Analysis: Wang Jiayi will likely become an alternate member of the Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress and could later become Gansu governor.
Ren Zhenhe (58), the current Gansu governor, appears to be on track to become an alternate member of the Central Committee and Gansu Party secretary. Yin Hong (59), the incumbent Gansu Party secretary, could be transferred to another province and become a full member of the Central Committee.
2. Wang Menghui (62), Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, replaced Ying Yong (65) as Hubei Party secretary.
Analysis: Ying Yong, a Xi ally, looks set for higher office. There is a good chance that Ying could go on to serve as president of the Supreme People’s Court, replacing Jiang faction member Zhou Qiang (62). In the interim, Ying could be made a vice chairman in either the NPC or the National Committee of the CPPCC to be elevated to the sub-national leader rank.
Zhou Qiang, like former justice minister Fu Zhenghua, appears to be a target for “rectification” in Xi Jinping’s cleanup of the political and legal affairs apparatus. As in Fu’s case, an official investigation of Zhou is bound to come sooner or later depending on Xi’s political needs and the strength of the Jiang faction. If the Jiang faction is still capable of putting up substantial resistance, then Xi could even elevate Zhou to higher office first, such as secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission or vice chairman in either the NPC or the National Committee of the CPPCC. If the Jiang faction cannot put up a fight and Xi has sufficient “quan wei” (authority and prestige), then Zhou Qiang could be purged before the 20th Party Congress.
3. Xin Changxing (59), governor of Qinghai Province, was promoted to Qinghai Party secretary.
Analysis: Xin Changxing is likely to become a full member of the Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress.
Wang Jianjun (64), the outgoing Qinghai Party boss and longtime Qinghai official, looks to be headed either for retirement or a committee member position in the NPC or the National Committee of the CPPCC.
4. Liang Yanshun (60), deputy secretary of the Party and state organs working committee overseeing daily work (minister level rank), was transferred to the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to serve as Party secretary.
Analysis: Liang Yanshun previously served in the Central Party School from 1992 to 2016. When Xi Jinping was Central Party School principal (2007 to 2012), Liang was director of the school’s research office and research department and subordinated to Xi. Xi’s familiarity with Liang was likely a factor in the latter’s transfer to Gansu and promotion (provincial propaganda department chief) after the former brought the military more fully under his sway in 2016. After gaining experience in local government, Liang was brought back to the central government and promoted.
Liang Yanshun will likely become a Central Committee alternate member at the 20th Party Congress. Meanwhile, Chen Run’er (65), the former Ningxia Party secretary, looks set to retire, or serve as a vice chairman or committee member in the NPC or the National Committee of the CPPCC.
April 1
Wu Xiaojun (56), Qinghai deputy Party secretary, was promoted to deputy governor and acting governor of Qinghai Province.
Analysis: Barring unforeseen circumstances, Wu Xiaojun will eventually become Qinghai governor. Wu will also likely join the Central Committee as an alternate member at the 20th Party Congress.
April 2
Wang Zhijun (57), vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, was appointed as deputy Party secretary of Heilongjiang Province.
Analysis: Wang Zhijun’s career marks him as a technocrat, and his current appointment lines him up to become Heilongjiang governor.
Hu Changsheng (59), the current governor of Heilongjiang, could later move up to become provincial Party secretary, while the incumbent Party secretary Xu Qin could be transferred to other important provinces or cities to serve as Party secretary.
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping is looking to lock in his grip on power with the recent raft of personnel reshuffles. Intra-Party negotiations and horse-trading for top positions will take place at the informal Beidaihe meeting in the fall, and be more or less confirmed by the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Central Committee before the 20th Party Congress. However, the 200-plus full members of the Central Committee are the ones officially responsible for “electing” members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Xi therefore needs to put in place loyal Central Committee members (leading provincial cadres) now to ensure that the rubber stamp votes go his way later, and eliminate the possibility of things going awry at the crucial moment.
In addition to the personnel changes listed above, another 10 provincial governors or autonomous region chairpersons were reshuffled this year. Also, Li Rongcan (56), head of the Hubei provincial Organization Department, was promoted to Hubei deputy Party secretary on March 7 and is preparing to take over as provincial governor.
2. By the 20th Party Congress, Xi would have reshuffled the bulk of provincial and ministerial-level officials who climbed the ranks during the Jiang-Hu era, as well as a good portion of local officials at the sub-provincial and sub-ministerial level.
Xi’s personnel reshuffles over the past decade have more or less followed these “rules”:
- Purge Jiang faction officials;
- Elevate former colleagues whom he is familiar with like Ying Yong and Liang Yanshun;
- Elevate officials who moved up the ranks slowly during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012);
- Use officials with some understanding of the economy;
- Frequently rotate provincial Party secretaries to guard against the formation of factional and interest networks, and line up provincial governors to replace provincial Party secretaries.
Xi, however, has a deficit of reliable and capable officials to call upon to replace Jiang faction officials, and this has impacted effective governance. Further, while frequent reshuffles serve the purpose of weeding out disloyal elements and preventing the establishment of local interest and factional networks, it also hampers Xi’s ability to have his policies implemented properly. Xi has thus somewhat “solved” one problem (factional struggle) only to create another one (ineffective governance) for himself. Xi’s governing woes will continue to plague him and affect his political machinations for the 20th Party Congress.
