SinoInsight 1
May 12
1. According to The Wall Street Journal, Beijing is considering reshuffling fourth ranking PRC vice premier Liu He with third-rank vice premier Hu Chunhua for the top PRC economic envoy to Washington position. However, “(n)o final personnel decisions have been made, said the officials [informing the Journal], who added that there are also reasons to keep Mr. Liu in this role.” The potential key personnel reshuffle deliberation is “part of a wider personnel shuffle as China recalibrates its approach to the new U.S. administration.”
The Journal notes that Hu has “little experience in U.S.-China relations” and cite their sources as saying that Liu “would still have significant responsibility” even if he is replaced, “including oversight of China’s financial sector at a time of heightened debt and default risk.”
The Journal also writes that Hu is “viewed in Beijing as a candidate for the Politburo Standing Committee, the pinnacle of power within the Communist Party.”
2. Xi Jinping went on an inspection tour of Nanyang City in Henan Province. In Nanyang, Xi visited a memorial dedicated to “medical sage” Zhang Zhongjing, a Chinese physician of the Eastern Han Dynasty. At the memorial, Xi promoted traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), including its use in treating COVID-19, as well as the state of TCM inheritance and innovation. Xi later visited local companies producing Chinese rose and mugwort.
Official photos of Xi’s visit to Nanyang City show him accompanied by Hu Chunhua and Henan leaders. Liu He and CCP Organization Department head Chen Xi, who often accompany Xi on his inspection tours, did not appear to have followed Xi this time.
3. State mouthpiece Xinhua published an article titled, “Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Strong Army, We Are Reporting From a Combat Position | People’s Armed Police Beijing Corps: Forging a Loyal Elite Division” (「在习近平强军思想指引下·我们在战位报告｜武警北京总队：锻造忠诚的精锐之师」). The article opens with vivid descriptions of the PAP Beijing Corps’ realistic combat training, and contains lines like:
- “Training hard skills and forging loyal elites”;
- “Responding to Commander [Xi Jinping’s] earnest entrustment”;
- “Strive to assemble a modern armed police force that obeys the Party’s command, can win battles, and has first-rate behavior.”
May 13
1. Xi Jinping inspected the South–North Water Transfer Project in Henan. According to Xinhua, Xi learned about resettlement issues stemming from the project, development of local industries, increasing income for migrants, etc.
Official photos of Xi’s inspection of the Henan South–North Water Transfer Project showed him being accompanied by Hu Chunhua, CCP General Office director Ding Xuexiang, and other Henan leaders.
2. When asked about The Wall Street Journal’s report about Liu He being replaced with Hu Chunhua during a regular press conference, PRC Ministry of Commerce spokesperson Gao Feng said, “The Wall Street Journal’s report is untrue.”
3. The CCP Central Party School held an opening ceremony for the second batch of officials signed up for advanced courses during the spring semester.
In a speech, Central Party School president Chen Xi stressed that leading cadres should combine the study and education of Party history to strengthen “innovative theory learning,” deeply comprehend the “mighty force” of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” and be more self-conscious in using Xi Jinping Thought to “arm the mind, guide practice, and push work forward.”
- Analysis: Liu He and Chen Xi frequently accompany Xi Jinping on his inspection tours. Chen’s Central Party School duties explains his absence at Xi’s side in Henan.
May 14
1. Xi Jinping presided over and spoke at a symposium on promoting high-quality development in a follow-up project to the South–North Water Transfer Project in Henan Province.
According to Xinhua, the following officials spoke after Xi in the respective order: Politburo Standing Committee member Han Zheng; Minister of Water Resources Li Guoying; National Development and Reform Commission director He Lifeng; Jiangsu Party secretary Lou Qinjian; Henan Party secretary Wang Guosheng; Tianjin Party secretary Li Hongzhong; Beijing Municipal Party secretary Cai Qi, and vice premier Hu Chunhua.
2. The PRC Ministry of Commerce, State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, and seven other department jointly issued a “Notice on Several Measures Supporting the High-quality Development of National Traditional Chinese Medicine Service Export Bases” (关于支持国家中医药服务出口基地高质量发展若干措施的通知). The Notice calls for “vigorously developing” TCM service and exports to promote TCM services to the world.
- Analysis: The CCP is promoting TCM as it searches for new economic growth and innovation areas. Simultaneously, the CCP could be turning to TCM “innovation” to make up for the low efficiency of its vaccines and ease the PRC’s dependence on Western medicine.
OUR TAKE
1. The Wall Street Journal’s report of Hu Chunhua potentially replacing Liu He as Xi Jinping’s economic envoy to the U.S. seems to indicate that Hu is on the rise and possibly being considered for higher positions while Liu is on the way out. And at a glance, the fact that Hu “replaced” Liu at Xi’s side in Henan appears to affirm the Journal’s report and the general impression of Hu being elevated at the expense of Liu.
However, an examination of Hu’s portfolio as third-rank vice premier and the purpose of Xi’s Henan trip shows that there is nothing special at all about him accompanying the General Secretary instead of Liu at Nanyang City. In the days around Xi’s Henan trip, Xinhua ran a series of reports on the South–North Water Transfer Project. Inspecting the South–North Water Transfer Project in Henan and announcing follow-up projects were also key agenda items during Xi’s Henan inspection tour. The South–North Water Transfer Project concerns Hu Chunhua indirectly because agriculture, water conservancy, and poverty alleviation (South–North Water Transfer Project resettlements touch on poverty issues) are part of the third-rank vice premier’s portfolio, and hence his presence is necessary in Henan. And with one vice premier (Hu Chunhua) in tow at Henan, Xi Jinping has no particular need to bring along another one (Liu He).
If anything, one detail about Xi and Hu’s trip to Henan could signal that the latter may not be in strong standing with the former. During the South–North Water Transfer Project follow-up symposium, Hu was dead last in the list of high-ranking officials who spoke after Xi. From an operations perspective, Hu would not be the first speaker after Xi regardless because Han Zheng, the first-rank vice premier and Politburo Standing Member, was the second highest-ranked official attending the symposium. It is also understandable that the water resources minister and National Development and Reform Commission director spoke before Hu given the theme of the symposium being the South–North Water Transfer Project. However, Hu should at least have spoken before all the provincial leaders present (Lou Qinjian, Li Hongzhong, Cai Qi) given that he outranks them and is also a senior official overseeing Project-related work. In the CCP regime where who gets to speak first in meetings is a signal of political status, it is somewhat odd that Hu would accompany Xi to Henan over work portfolio reasons but end up speaking last during a work-related symposium.
Of course there is the mundane possibility that Hu Chunhua was the final speaker simply because he was tasked with summarizing (總結) the symposium. But whether or not this was the case is unclear from mainland media reporting.
2. The PRC officials who spoke to The Wall Street Journal about the possible Hu Chunhua-Liu He personnel movement would be aware of Xi Jinping’s itinerary and accompanying entourage well in advance and likely timed their “leak” to come just before Xi’s Henan visit. In other words, those officials wanted the world to draw the conclusion which we laid out in the first point (Hu being on the rise), especially after the list of officials accompanying Xi at Henan was revealed.
From the perspective of the Xi camp, it does not make sense to “promote” a speculated potential General Secretary (Hu Chunhua) while “sidelining” an ally so prominently (news in a major U.S. media outlet) at a time when Xi Jinping is pushing for a norm-breaking third term. Doing so merely undermines Xi’s “quan wei” while signaling to the world the possibility of a split in the Xi camp between Xi Jinping and his confidant Liu He.
From the perspective of the Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi coalition,” however, the CCP elite politics information reported by The Wall Street Journal largely suits their agenda. Xi’s rivals will latch on to the world’s impression that Xi Jinping could be designating a successor at the 20th Party Congress to challenge and sabotage his bid for a third term during internal discussions about key personnel reshuffles at the major political conclave. Also, if Hu Chunhua is in danger of being sidelined (see our analysis of retroactive investigations in Inner Mongolia here and here), “promoting” the idea that Xi is favoring Hu makes it harder (but not impossible) for Xi to eliminate Hu should the need arise. Finally, spreading the idea of Xi possibly sidelining Liu signals to the world a “rift” in the Xi camp, and solidifies the notion of Xi becoming increasingly “alienated” and “alone” the more he consolidates power.
The Journal’s May 12 report is most definitely not a good thing for Hu Chunhua. Hu would know from the purge of Sun Zhengcai before the 19th Party Congress that being talked up by foreign media can be a huge political liability. And with 20-year retroactive investigations currently underway in Inner Mongolia where he formerly served as Party secretary, Hu has good reason to lie low and not boost his profile. Investigations in Inner Mongolia have stepped up recently: At the beginning of April, the fourth supervision group of the national political and legal affairs education and rectification campaign embedded itself in Inner Mongolia for a three-month round of inspections. As of April 29, 436 officials from the Hohhot Municipal political and legal affairs apparatus have either “taken the initiative” to confess their crimes or were investigated and punished; 376 officials made “self-confessions,” while 60 were investigated and dealt with.
3.We previously analyzed how the CCP elite tend to “leak” damaging information about their opponents to the mainstream media to gain leverage over each other (see here and here). The May 12 Wall Street Journal report could be another such instance.
However, that is not to say that the Journal’s information is unreliable. It is natural for Hu Chunhua to be considered for the job of top economic envoy to Washington because he currently oversees the Ministry of Commerce. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping could indeed be considering the possibility of having Hu relieve Liu He, but with the intent of ridding his political ally of the toxic Sino-U.S. trade political baggage and saddling a potential rival with it. That way, Liu can retire safely after the 20th Party Congress while Hu faces a potential minefield if U.S.-China trade relations remain rocky under the Biden-Harris administration. Indeed, the Ministry of Commerce’s denial of information in the Journal report suggests that Liu He’s political status is unaffected.
Meanwhile, the recent Xinhua article about the People’s Armed Police expressing loyalty to Xi reads like a warning to his rivals, especially when taken together with an essay in this month’s edition of Qiushi alluding to “another Party Central” in Xi’s regime. In previous factional struggles, terms like “another Party Central” or “cliques and factions” are thrown out in the public discourse as a precursor to the removal of prominent officials or factions. During the interim, CCP officials are encouraged to be “politically in-the-know” (政治明白人) and stay loyal lest they be purged.
SinoInsight 2
May 13
While in Henan Province on an inspection tour, Xi Jinping visited Zouzhuang Village in Jiuchong Town, Xichuan County to survey a resettlement and poverty alleviation project that was undertaken as part of the South–North Water Transfer Project.
In a speech, Xi made the following observations:
- “This year marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. A hundred years ago, the Party was established precisely for the purpose of allowing the people to lead a good life, and not self-benefit. Our Party’s hundred-year struggle is the history of us seeking happiness for the people.”
- “The people are the country [江山]. Our Party fights and defends the country for the people’s happinesses and to safeguard the people’s hearts.”
May 16
Qiushi, the ideological journal of the CCP Central Committee, ran an article titled, “Make Good Use of Red Resources, Inherit the Red Gene, Pass on the Red Nation From Generation to Generation” (用好紅色資源，傳承好紅色基因，把紅色江山世世代代傳下去). The article, which pulls quotes from Xi Jinping’s past speeches, calls for the use of “red resources” such as revolutionary museums, memorial halls, Party history museums, and “martyrs cemeteries” to strengthen CCP-style education (brainwashing and indoctrination) and better preserve the communist regime (“guarantee that the red nation won’t change color”). The article also called on Party members and cadres to make resolute their ideals and beliefs through “red resources,” as well as strengthen their adherence to the “Four Consciousnesses” (四個意識), “Four Matters of Confidence” (四個自信), and the “Two Safeguards” (兩個維護 ).
OUR TAKE
1.Xi Jinping’s speech at Zouzhuang Village and the recent Qiushi piece echo a concern that the CCP has been harping on in recent weeks, namely, a deep paranoia about Xi and the regime’s legitimacy and security amid mounting domestic and international pressures.
Two earlier developments underscore the CCP’s paranoia:
- Zheng Yongnian, acting dean of the School of Advanced Institute of Global and Contemporary China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, laid out America’s so-called “four separations” and “four integrations” U.S. policy towards China during an April 22 academic salon on Sino-U.S. challenges hosted by the PRC-backed National Institute for South China Sea Studies. “Four separations” include separating the CCP from the Chinese people, the CCP from its leadership, the Han people from ethnic minorities, and mainlanders from non-mainlanders (e.g. Hong Kong) to divide China from within. “Four integrations” include integrating America’s whole government, whole society, whole markets, and the whole world to contain China. Zheng is sometimes referred to as Xi’s “overseas royal tutor” (海外國師) by Chinese-language media.
- In an article commemorating the 50th anniversary of U.S.-China ping-pong diplomacy carried by state and Party propaganda outlets on April 29, top PRC diplomat Yang Jiechi wrote, “The Chinese people will never concede to anyone attempting to challenge the Chinese Communist Party, China’s political system, or its structure of leadership. China will firmly defend its own sovereignty, security and development interests.”
As we have observed on a number of occasions, things that CCP propaganda “obsess” about are usually things that the Party is having serious problems with. The fact that Beijing is obsessed with preserving the “red gene” and cautioning the U.S. against splitting the Party from the Chinese people suggests that the “red nation” is unstable and that the people are losing faith in the CCP as it nears its 100th year in charge. Also, in talking about how the Party was not founded “for self-benefit,” Xi is obliquely acknowledging the seriousness of the CCP’s corruption and how this culture must change if the “red nation” is to endure.
On a personal level, Xi Jinping is concerned about efforts to “separate the CCP from its leadership,” and how this will hurt him and help his factional rivals. In a previous newsletter, we analyzed Xi’s problems with “another Party Central” as revealed in an earlier Qiushi essay. We also earlier examined an “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” U.S. strategy against China that emerged shortly after President Joe Biden took office. In the face of internal and external threats, Xi needs to keep hammering home to Party members and cadre that their loyalty lies with him, including demanding their observance of the so-called “Four Consciousnesses,” “Four Matters of Confidence,” and “Two Safeguards.”
2.We previously explained why differentiating between the CCP and the Chinese people is “arguably the most important distinction to make concerning U.S. policy on China.” The CCP has been on the defensive ever since the Trump administration started driving home the “CCP is not China” point from October 2019 because it knows that ideological warfare along those lines ultimately challenges its legitimacy and dangerously allows the Chinese people to envision a China not under techno-totalitarian communist rule. Such is the Achilles Heel of totalitarian dictatorships; political parties in democracies are far more robust to public criticism and attacks because they do not claim to be the country.
The existential danger of the statement “the CCP is not China” means that the Party must vigorously and continuously refute such thinking even though this particular Trump-era China policy has not survived the Biden-Harris administration.
