SinoInsight 1
1. State mouthpiece Xinhua reported that senior officials in the CCP leadership had submitted written briefs to Party Central and General Secretary Xi Jinping. The officials include members of the Politburo, the secretary of the Secretariat, members of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, members of the State Council, members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, and the Party secretaries of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
The Xinhua report added that Xi reviewed the written briefs and made several requirements, including:
- The senior officials should fully implement the spirit of the 19th Party Congress and the plenary sessions of the 19th Central Committee, strengthen the “four consciousnesses,” be steadfast in the “four self-confidences,” and achieve the “two safeguards”;
- Always maintain a high degree of consistency with Party Central in ideology, politics, and action;
- Fulfill the main responsibility of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party, and carry forward the spirit of self-revolution;
- Carry forward the spirit of historical initiative, dare to struggle, be good at struggling, etc.
Xinhua noted that the main contents of the written briefs by senior officials include:
- Ensure a high degree of consistency with Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core in terms of political stance, political direction, political principles, and political path;
- Take the lead in studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Solidly carry out study and education of Party history;
- Resolutely implement the decisions and arrangements of Party Central and General Secretary’s important instructions and the spirit of the instructions, and conscientiously complete the duties and tasks assigned by Party Central;
- Conscientiously fulfill the main responsibility of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party and strictly implement the request and report system;
- Strictly implement the Party Central’s eight-point regulations and the spirit of its rules, resolutely oppose the idea of special privilege, strictly educate and manage relatives and staff, and actively accept supervision from all sides.
The “ten strict prohibitions” are:
- It is strictly prohibited to engage in two-faced factions and be a two-faced person (the explainer specified the prohibition of cliques and factions);
- It is strictly prohibited to not follow orders and not abide by prohibitions;
- It is strictly prohibited to allow wrong thoughts to have erosive influence (over officials);
- It is strictly prohibited to improperly interact and interfere with law enforcement and justice;
- It is strictly prohibited to neglect duty and bend the law for personal gain;
- It is strictly prohibited to participate in profit-making activities in violation of regulations;
- It is strictly prohibited to harbor and connive with evil forces;
- It is strictly prohibited to abuse law enforcement and judicial power;
- It is strictly prohibited to partake in inaction (不作爲) and disorderly action (亂作爲), and play special privileges and throw one’s weight around (耍特權抖威風);
- It is strictly prohibited to break Party and regime confidentiality and leak secrets (跑風漏氣、失密洩密).
March 1
1. Wang Dawei (56 years old), the deputy governor and provincial public security director of Liaoning Province, was investigated.
Wang rose through the ranks of the political and legal affairs apparatus during the Jiang Zemin faction’s era of dominance. Like the disgraced security czar Zhou Yongkang, Wang had no prior political and legal affairs experience when he was elevated to secretary of the Harbin Municipal Political and Legal Affairs Commission in 2007 (January 2007 to August 2009) from his previous position of Harbin deputy mayor. Later, Wang moved up to serve as deputy Party secretary and deputy director of the Heilongjiang provincial public security bureau (August 2009 to March 2013), before becoming Party secretary and director of the Liaoning provincial public security bureau (March 2013 to March 2022).
China’s northeastern provinces and the political and legal affairs apparatus have long been Jiang faction strongholds.
2. Hui Congbing, former deputy secretary of the Shandong provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission and former deputy director of the Shandong provincial “610 Office,” was sentenced to seven years in prison for accepting bribes.
The authorities previously announced on May 14, 2021 that Hui was suspected of serious violations of discipline and the law, had voluntarily turned himself in, and was placed under investigation.
OUR TAKE
1. By making senior CCP officials submit written briefs to him, Xi Jinping is leveraging his consolidation of power over the Party, the government, and the military to step up dominance, control, and surveillance over them. In doing so, Xi is moving the regime further away from “collective leadership” rule and towards a strongman dictatorship.
The senior cadres have outwardly stated their political stance by complying with and maintaining Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige). This is part of Xi’s political mobilization effort in the lead up to the 20th Party Congress where he is making a bid for a norm-breaking third term in office.
However, the fact that Xi needs to publicly demand statements of dutiful loyalty from senior cadres, as well as continually rely on propaganda and political mobilization, shows that his grip on power is presently unstable and his “quan wei” is skin-deep.
2. The Xi leadership had previously issued several “prohibitions” on the political and legal affairs apparatus, only to see them fall into formalism. The latest “strict prohibitions” are intended to redress the longstanding issue of an ill-disciplined official corps in the political and legal affairs apparatus, as well as resolve political and legal affairs officials’ lack of “loyalty” towards Xi.
Xi Jinping’s concern with the allegiance of political and legal affairs officials is due to factionalism in the CCP. At the top, Xi faces threats from “two-faced” senior officials, including previously from Sun Lijun and Fu Zhenghua, two members of the Jiang faction that seeks Xi’s ouster. Central-level senior officials like Sun also have their factional associations in the provinces that have caused headaches for Beijing, including the so-called “judicial mafia” in Jiangsu Province headed by Luo Wenjin and associated with former Jiangsu Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary Wang Like. Factionalism is also rife at the bottom rungs of government; the “Xuzhou chained woman” incident is an example of officials disregarding Party Central’s “prohibitions” and colluding with criminal elements to create societal problems for Zhongnanhai.
Xi is likely aware of the consequences of not getting a handle on wayward political and legal affairs officials before the 20th Party Congress. Officials could conspire with Party elites to be lax on “stability maintenance” and other relevant work; this could result in incidents like 10,000 veterans surrounding the Central Military Commission headquarters in October 2016. Officials could also go to the other extreme by getting heavy-handed with policing and incompetently covering up controversial scandals; this could lead to another Lei Yang incident (see here and here) or the “Xuzhou chained woman” incident. Societal chaos could break out as a result of political and legal affairs officials not complying properly with Zhongnanhai’s orders, allowing Xi’s factional rivals an opening to carry out more political mobilization against him and justify their criticism of his incompetent rule.
Xi could look to put on notice his political enemies and officials who opt to “lay flat” by purging some “tigers” or other high-profile figures around the Two Sessions period. However, instead of killing the chickens to scare the monkey, Xi’s actions could inspire even more disobedience in the ranks and resistance to his rule.
SinoInsight 2
Sanctions against Russia—targeted at banks, bank transfers, international payments (certain banks banned from SWIFT), businesses, monetary exchanges, exports and imports, and individuals—appeared to be aimed at crippling the Russian economy. The sanctions saw the value of the ruble fall to a record low and the Russian central bank double interest rates to 20 percent. On March 2, analysts at JPMorgan and elsewhere warned of significantly increased odds of Russia defaulting on its U.S. dollar and other international market government debt.
Western sanctions in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have observers talking about an all-out economic and financial war against Russia, the breaking out of a “new Cold War,” and even “World War III.”
The PRC refrained from condemning Russia but has not openly sided with Moscow either. One day after the invasion, PRC foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said at a regular press conference, “we recognize that the Ukraine issue has a complex and special historical context and understand Russia’s legitimate concerns on security issues.” Also on Feb. 25, PRC foreign minister Wang Yi told senior European officials that China “firmly advocates respecting and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries […] equally applying to Ukraine.” Meanwhile, PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying refused to describe Russia’s attack as an invasion when asked by reporters and instead blamed the U.S. for “fueling the flame, fanning up the flame.”
The PRC abstained on a Feb. 25 U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On the same day, Xi Jinping told Vladimir Putin in a phone call that he supported “Russia and Ukraine resolving this problem through dialogue.” Foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said on March 2 that the PRC will “continue to play a constructive role in easing the tension over Ukraine” and hopes that Ukraine and Russia will “continue the process of dialogue and negotiation and seek a political solution that accommodates the legitimate security concerns of both sides.”
The PRC also did not join in sanctions on Russia. On March 2, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission chairman Guo Shuqing said, “As far as financial sanctions are concerned, we do not approve of these, especially the unilaterally launched sanctions because they do not work well and have no legal grounds.” He added, “We will not participate in such sanctions. We will continue to maintain normal economic and trade exchanges with relevant parties.” Guo further noted that “the impact from the sanctions on China’s economy and financial sector is so far not too significant,” and “overall they will not have much impact (on the PRC) even in the future.”
Beijing did appear to have foreknowledge of a possible Russian invasion. According to a Feb. 25 New York Times report, senior officials from the Biden-Harris administration “held half a dozen urgent meetings with top Chinese officials” over three months “in which the Americans presented intelligence showing Russia’s troop buildup around Ukraine and beseeched the Chinese to tell Russia not to invade.” The PRC officials “rebuffed the Americans, saying they did not think an invasion was in the works” and the Americans later learned that “Beijing had shared the information with Moscow, telling the Russians that the United States was trying to sow discord—and that China would not try to impede Russian plans and actions.”
Cross-straits tensions also rose after the Russian invasion. On Feb. 24, Taiwan reported that nine People’s Liberation Army Air Force warplanes entered its air defense identification zone, followed by another four planes the next day. On Feb. 26, the USS Ralph Johnson guided-missile destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait, a move which the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command condemned as a “provocative act.”
On March 1, a delegation of former top U.S. military and security officials arrived in Taiwan on a military plan for a 30-hour visit. The delegation included former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen, former undersecretary of defense for policy Michèle Flournoy, former White House deputy national security advisor Meghan O’Sullivan, and Michael Green and Evan Medeiros, both former special assistants to the president and senior directors for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also visited Taiwan from March 2 to March 5. A March 3 Xinhua op-ed accused U.S. politicians of playing the “Taiwan card.”
OUR TAKE
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is ongoing at the time of writing, with real time developments hazy due to the fog of war and a complex media environment. The impact of the invasion on geopolitics and the global economy, however, is much clearer, and leaves Xi Jinping and the CCP in an uncomfortable position regardless of the outcome of the invasion.
The Russian invasion, regardless of its success or failure, spells trouble for the CCP’s economy and global domination agenda. The Belt and Road Initiative, which runs through Russia and Ukraine in the overland segment connecting China to Eastern Europe, would likely be massively impacted by Western sanctions on Russia. European countries along the Belt and Road’s overland route could start to boycott China over the CCP’s support of Russia, endangering the investments of PRC companies over the years. The PRC’s weapons industry and its development, which has looked to Ukraine in recent years (see here and here), would also be affected. Meanwhile, Beijing’s need to navigate Western sanctions and keep up relations with Moscow would also prove disruptive to Xi’s “Great Power Diplomacy” (大國外交) plans.
The Russian invasion also threatens the PRC’s commodities supply security. Ukraine is one of China’s major suppliers of corn, barley, and sunflower oil; according to General Administration of Customs data, the PRC imported 8.2 million tons of corn (29 percent of total corn imports) and $3.2 billion worth of grain from Ukraine in 2021. PRC government agencies were recently instructed to “scour markets for materials including oil and gas, iron ore, barley and corn to fill any potential gaps brought on by the conflict,” according to a Bloomberg News report, citing people familiar with the matter. The people added that “ensuring supplies is of high priority for (the PRC), with officials worried about the impact surging global costs of commodities will have on the Chinese economy.”
China’s consumption and exports would be hit by the conflict in Ukraine, rising energy prices, and the impact of sanctions and counter-sanctions. This would in turn further weaken the PRC’s already rapidly deteriorating economy, with various political and social ramifications for the regime. While Russia would likely become even more economically reliant on and align itself closer to the PRC, increased Russian demand and dependency alone will not give Beijing what it needs to offset the global economic impact of the invasion. Chinese banks and financial institutions would also be wary of lending to or investing in Russia; the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China and the Bank of China restricted financing for Russian commodity purchases on Feb. 25, likely in anticipation of Western sanctions.
The PRC’s support of Russia would also make European countries reassess their relations with China. In 2021, the PRC’s trade surplus with the 27 EU countries was $208.4 billion, a year-on-year increase of 57.4 percent. Exports to the EU, China’s second-largest trading partner, rose 32.6 percent to $518.3 billion, while imports grew 19.8 percent to $309.9 billion. The healthy PRC-EU trade relationship, which grew during the Sino-U.S. trade war years as Beijing sought to counter Washington’s sanctions, could be in jeopardy moving forward.
The impact to China’s economy and Xi’s “Great Power Diplomacy” stemming from the Russian invasion would give Xi Jinping headaches in the lead up to the 20th Party Congress. Xi increasingly has little to show for in terms of political achievements (save the anti-corruption campaign), and the worsening international economic and geopolitical conditions look set to leave Xi high and dry when he badly needs more accomplishments to boost his “quan wei” and secure a third term in office. Worse for Xi, a successful Russian invasion would embolden hawks and Xi’s rivals in the Party elite to put even more pressure on him to invade Taiwan sooner rather than later. An embattled Xi would be more inclined to lash out against his factional enemies, raising political risks for himself and the CCP regime.
Xi and the CCP face similar problems to those listed above in the event of a victory for Ukraine and the Western allies. Ukraine could be less inclined to do business with China and support PRC projects like the Belt and Road, while the Western allies would remember China’s unwillingness to censure Russia and could consider settling scores in the future through various ways. While a crippled Russia would still be more dependent on the PRC, Beijing will have to live with the uncertainty of being subjected to international sanctions related to Russia if the international community keeps them in place, as well as the prospect of reduced global investments over the PRC’s failure to censure Moscow at crunch time.
Xi also faces personal danger over not joining the West in being tough on Russia and Putin. At the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics on Feb. 4, Xi met with Putin and issued a joint statement declaring “no limits” between the friendship of China and Russia and “no forbidden areas of cooperation.” Should the Western allies later choose to view Xi and the CCP’s actions as showing support for the Russian invasion, they could conceivably apply targeted sanctions at Xi and his allies while advancing more broadly an “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy.
Fears of possible sanctions by the U.S. and its allies could have inspired the prominent PRC state media Guangming Daily to run an op-ed celebrating the 50th anniversary of President Richard Nixon’s visit to China with the glowing headline, “The Trend of Win-win Cooperation in Sino-US Relations is Irreversible” (中美關係合作共贏的大勢不可逆轉). A March 3 Wall Street Journal report also cited PRC officials and foreign-policy advisers as saying that Xi and Putin’s “no limits” statement was “less a declaration China would stand by Russia in case of war than a strong message to the U.S. about the resolve the two have in confronting what they see as increased American threat.” Xi’s concerns about Western sanctions and “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” maneuvers could see him hasten the pace of eliminating domestic rivals to mitigate personal political risks.
Xi Jinping does have one silver lining in the scenario where Russia’s invasion is unsuccessful. He can point to the plight of Putin and Russia over military action in Ukraine to make the case against invading Taiwan prematurely to PRC hawks and elites. Xi can compare the Ukrainians’ ability to resist the Russian army with the aid of advanced weapons from the West with a similar situation facing the People’s Liberation Army (the bulk of Chinese weaponry is Russian-made or copied/derived from Russian designs) should it invade Taiwan and run up against a populace using U.S. military weapons and equipment. Xi can also note that the Russians are having trouble invading Ukraine by land from three sides, while the PLA has the far harder task of crossing over 100 miles of usually rough waters to get to Taiwan (an argument that holds some water even in the event of Russian victory).
However, Xi will still have to deal with economic trouble, setbacks to his pet diplomatic projects, and societal problems inspired by economic and diplomatic issues pertaining to the Russian invasion (including the PRC’s “neutrality” on the topic), which will in turn weaken his hand as he makes a bid for a norm-breaking third term at the 20th Party Congress. If economic trouble from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is particularly severe and the West is looking to punish the PRC for backing Putin, then the CCP regime could potentially see political Black Swans in 2022.
