What Pelosi’s Taiwan trip means for Xi; Xi holds political mobilization seminar during Beidaihe period

     SinoInsight  1     

On Aug. 2, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi made an unscheduled trip to Taiwan while on tour in Asia. She spent the night in Taipei, where she met with ROC leader Tsai Ing-wen and local legislators. “Our delegation came to Taiwan to make unequivocally clear that we will not abandon Taiwan,” Pelosi told Tsai.

On the morning of Aug. 3, Pelosi met with Taiwan’s legislature vice president Tsai Chi-chang and appeared to refer to the ROC as a country when she said that the U.S. could learn from Taiwan in “how you address the COVID crisis, how we advance respect for all of the people in our countries as we go forward.” During her 19-hour trip, Pelosi also met with 1989 Tiananmen Square protest leader Wu’er Kaixi, former Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing-kee, and Taiwanese pro-democracy activist Lee Ming-che.

Pelosi is the highest ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan in over two decades. In an Aug. 2 op-ed in the Washington Post, Pelosi wrote, “In the face of the Chinese Communist Party’s accelerating aggression, our congressional delegation’s visit should be seen as an unequivocal statement that America stands with Taiwan, our democratic partner, as it defends itself and its freedom.”

PRC vice foreign Xie Feng summoned U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns at night to protest, noting that Pelosi’s trip was “extremely vicious and the consequence is very grave,” according to state media reports. Xie added that the U.S. “must pay the price for its own mistake” and the PRC “will take necessary and resolute countermeasures and we mean what we say.”

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Pelosi’s visit, “in whatever form and for whatever reason, is a major political provocation to upgrade U.S. official exchanges with Taiwan.” The ministry claimed that the move was part of America’s support for Taiwan’s “independence agenda,” and those moves, “like playing with fire, are extremely dangerous. Those who play with fire will perish by it.” Further, the PRC “will definitely take all necessary measures to resolutely safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity in response to the U.S. Speaker’s visit. All the consequences arising therefrom must be borne by the U.S. side and the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.” The PRC defense ministry, Taiwan Affairs Office, and foreign affairs committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference also issued statements criticizing Pelosi’s trip.

On Aug. 3, the Zhejiang authorities announced the arrest of a Taiwanese man under the PRC national security law. The man, Yang Chih-yuen, was accused of engaging in “separatist” activities and supporting “Taiwan independence,” including founding the pro-independence Taiwan National Party that aims to “promote Taiwan to join the United Nations as a sovereign and independent country.”

Pelosi’s Taiwan trip was first reported by the Financial Times (FT) on July 19. The CCP subsequently issued strong warnings against the trip and suspended imports of Taiwanese products. Notable examples include:

• July 19: Foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a press conference that “China will take strong and resolute measures to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity” if Pelosi visited Taiwan.
• July 23: FT reported that the PRC issued “stark private warnings” to the Biden administration over Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. The warnings were “significantly stronger than the threats that Beijing has made in the past when it was unhappy with U.S. actions or policy on Taiwan,” six people familiar with the matter told FT.
• July 28: In a telephone conversation with President Joe Biden, Xi Jinping warned that with regard to the Taiwan question, “Those who play with fire will perish by it. It is hoped that the U.S. will be clear-eyed about this.”
• July 29: Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of the nationalistic Party media Global Times, tweeted: “If U.S. fighter jets escort Pelosi’s plane into Taiwan, it is invasion. The PLA has the right to forcibly dispel Pelosi’s plane and the U.S. fighter jets, including firing warning shots and making tactical movement of obstruction. If ineffective, then shoot them down.” Twitter subsequently blocked Hu’s account over violating the platform’s rules, and he deleted the tweet to regain access.
• July 29: The official Weibo account of the 80th Group Army of the People’s Liberation Army posted, “Prepare for war!” (備戰!)
• Aug. 1: Zhao Lijian said at a press conference that Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan would “constitute a gross interference in China’s internal affairs, seriously undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, wantonly trample on the one-China principle, greatly threaten peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, severely undermine China-US relations and lead to a very serious situation and grave consequences.”
• Aug. 2: PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said at a press conference that with regard to Pelosi’s trip, if “the U.S. continues down the wrong path, we will take strong and resolute measures to protect our sovereignty and security interests.”
• Aug. 2: The PRC suspended imports from 35 Taiwanese exporters of biscuits and pastries before Pelosi arrived in Taipei.
• Aug. 3: The PRC suspended imports of citrus fruits, chilled white striped hairtail, and frozen horse mackerel from Taiwan. The PRC also suspended the export of natural sand to Taiwan.

The CCP also carried out military maneuvers around near Taiwan around the period in which Pelosi was in Taipei:

• July 30: Xinhua announced that the PLA was carrying out live-fire exercises near the Pingtan islands off Fujian Province.
• Aug. 2: The China Maritime Safety Administration announced military training exercises in some waters of the South China Sea from Aug. 2 to Aug. 5, and prohibited entry to those areas.
• Aug. 2: Various state and Party-run media reported that the PLA would carry out training and live-fire drills in six regions around Taiwan from Aug. 4 to Aug. 7.
• Aug. 2: Official state media claimed that PLA Su-35 jets had crossed the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese defense ministry, however, said that the PRC claim was false.
• Aug. 3: PLA drones were spotted flying over Taiwan’s Kinmen offshore island. The Taiwan defense ministry also said that 22 PLA warplanes crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait.
• Aug. 4: Taiwan’s defense ministry said that the PRC had fired 11 Dongfeng ballistic missiles in the waters around Taiwan. PLA navy ships and military aircraft also briefly crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait several times before the live firing drills began. State media also claimed that more than 10 warships and up to 100 fighter planes and bombers were deployed near Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the website of Taiwan’s presidential office was subjected to an overseas cyber attack and malfunctioned at one point. Other Taiwanese government websites were also hit by cyber attacks, including those of the ROC Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the website of Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport.

Nancy Pelosi’s trip also appeared to crash Weibo. The top 10 trending topics in the evening of Aug. 2 Beijing time were all about Pelosi visiting Taiwan, and a hashtag about the House Speaker arriving at 10:00 p.m. local time had almost 1.3 billion views. Many Weibo users reported difficulties in opening the site after 10:00 p.m. local time.

Politicians from other Western countries could too visit Taiwan in the near future. The Guardian reported on Aug. 1 that Britain’s House of Commons foreign affairs committee is planning a Taiwan trip in November or early December. In Taiwan, Pelosi said she “certainly hope(s)” that her trip leads to politicians from other countries making similar visits. “I just hope that it’s really clear that while China has stood in the way of Taiwan participating and going to certain meetings, that they understand that they will not stand in the way of people coming to Taiwan,” she said.

On Aug. 3, the foreign ministers of G7 countries and the EU High Representative issued a statement expressing concern about the “recent and announced threatening actions by the People’s Republic of China, particularly live-fire exercises and economic coercion, which risk unnecessary escalation.” The statement added that “there is no change in the respective one China policies, where applicable, and basic positions on Taiwan of the G7 members.”

OUR TAKE
We previously analyzed that Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) is mostly propped up on propaganda given his lack of tangible achievements and results during his decade in office. With the exception of his anti-corruption campaign, virtually all of Xi’s political “achievements” or policies to date are either of dubious utility (“ending extreme poverty,” “common prosperity,” etc.), or end up worsening the regime’s situation instead of delivering rewards (risky “Belt and Road” loans, global backlash to Beijing’s “great power diplomacy,” property sector crisis after the “houses are for living in, not speculation” drive, overall tighter regulations, and the like).

Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan has put a dent in Xi’s propaganda-sustained “quan wei.” Despite strong PRC cautions, including a personal warning from Xi for the U.S. to not “play with fire” lest they “perish by it,” Pelosi’s plane arrived and left Taipei without incident. In the Xi leadership’s ideal scenario, Pelosi and the Biden administration should have been too intimidated by the CCP’s threats to even attempt the trip. Worse, the Chinese people appear to have been closely tracking Pelosi’s Taiwan visit and are aware of Washington’s decision to “disrespect” Xi on the Taiwan issue.

Xi’s need to salvage his “quan wei” and deter other politicians from countries allied with the U.S. from supporting Taiwan in a similar manner as Pelosi could see him escalate cross-strait and geopolitical tensions. The CCP could ramp up military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, send more warplanes into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, and even have naval vessels and military aircraft cross the median line in the Taiwan Strait. State and Party media outlets, as well as Party-linked media personalities like Hu Xijin, will also step up aggressive rhetoric against America and other countries perceived to be backing “Taiwan independence.” The CCP could also look to impose various sanctions and trade bans on Taiwan, the U.S., and other countries that take actions to support Taiwan.

Barring highly unusual circumstances, however, we do not believe that Beijing will make overly aggressive moves towards Taiwan like launching an invasion or seizing the ROC’s offshore islands. Xi’s overriding priority this year is “successfully welcoming the 20th Party Congress” and extending his tenure. An invasion of Taiwan at this time is far too risky for Xi’s political prospects because the PLA is unlikely to be able to carry out a successful invasion on short notice (Xi’s frequent reshuffle and promotion of generals in the PLA in recent years does not help matters). A Taiwan invasion would likely also exacerbate the several regime-endangering problems (property sector debt crisis, rapidly deteriorating economy, rising social instability, etc.) in the PRC, further threatening Xi’s bid for a norm-breaking third term and even retaining power. We previously gave a more thorough overview of Xi’s political considerations and the risk of a cross-strait crisis this year in January.

Xi’s factional rivals and the “anti-Xi coalition” will likely look to latch onto Pelosi’s Taiwan trip to pressure Xi Jinping into invading Taiwan or making extremely provocative moves towards Taiwan and the United States. Early rumblings have begun. On Aug. 3, Hong Kong online news portal HK01 published a commentary piece with the headline, “Pelosi Plays Hole Card, How Will China Next Play Its Cards” (佩洛西已經出完底牌　接下來看中國怎麼出牌了). The article argued that Pelosi had “achieved her political objective” with her Taiwan trip, and warned that the PRC’s “red line will face severe challenges in the future” unless the U.S. and Pelosi in particular receive “precise and effective severe retaliation from mainland China.” The article added that there is reason to believe that the PRC will not “sit back and watch” with regard to the situation, and CCP officials will more likely “show their principled attitude on this issue and their ability to safeguard national sovereignty and dignity.” In concluding, the article noted that Pelosi’s plane was not shot down despite Hu Xijin’s threat, before suggesting that people anxious for action should wait a bit, “let bullets fly a little longer” (i.e. the article is waiting to see the results of the Xi leadership’s actions against Taiwan), and see if “maybe something unexpected will happen.”

Reading between the lines, the HK01 piece is suggesting that the Xi leadership has been a paper tiger so far in handling Pelosi’s Taiwan trip, and is goading Beijing to push back aggressively against Taiwan, the U.S., and Pelosi in the name of defending “national sovereignty and dignity.” This is consistent with the stance of Party elites who oppose Xi like former People’s Liberation Army Air Force general Liu Yazhou, who appeared to have been detained last year in part because he had been saying at princeling gatherings that Xi lacks the ability to lead the CCP to victory in a “decisive battle” over Taiwan and requested “a change of commander-in-chief.” We earlier noted that HK01’s owner Yu Pun-hoi used to own the now defunct Duowei News, a Beijing-based overseas Chinese language media outlet that carried articles that were very critical of Xi Jinping and his policies and reflected the views of Xi’s factional rivals like the Jiang faction.

As we previously analyzed, Party elites who oppose Xi could demand that he show “worthiness” on the Taiwan issue before they back his bid for another term. The Chinese people, many of whom appeared to have closely followed the news of Pelosi’s trip, will likely also be closely watching how Beijing responds as they re-evaluate the CCP’s political legitimacy in light of various crises. Faced pressure from the Party and the people, Xi could look to target his chief political foes (purge senior Jiang faction officials, openly criticize Jiang Zemin and his “incorrect political line,” etc.) to intimidate the rest into backing off on the Taiwan issue and going along with his 20th Party Congress agenda.

How the U.S. and its allies follow up to Pelosi’s Taiwan visit could play a crucial role in influencing the direction of CCP elite politics in the coming months. Easing pressure on the PRC, such as Washington subsequently making prominent concessions like removing the Trump administration’s China tariffs, will embolden Beijing to push the limits of how fiercely it will retaliate against Taiwan and the U.S. over the Pelosi trip. If Xi finds sufficiently strong “countermeasures” and is allowed by Washington and other governments to get away with it, his political opponents will have no choice but to grudgingly back his 20th Party Congress agenda.

But if the U.S. and its allies keep up and even increase pressure on the PRC, then factional struggle in the Party elite will likely intensify correspondingly. Growing efforts to distinguish between China and the CCP similar to Pelosi did in her Washington Post op-ed, coupled with the CCP’s growing unpopularity among the Chinese people, could compel Xi Jinping and the Party elites into considering actions that lead to a post-communist China in the course of self-preservation in “you die, I live” (你死我活) factional struggle.

     SinoInsight  2     

OUR TAKE
1. From state broadcaster CCTV footage, the two-day seminar for leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial levels appeared to have been held in the military-run Jingxi Hotel in Beijing. The CCP elite usually hold plenary sessions and meetings of urgent importance or sensitivity at the Jingxi Hotel. The July 26-July 27 seminar is clearly a meeting of the latter sort as CCTV footage shows that the officials do not have pen and paper in front of them to jot down details.

Another indication that the seminar was at least partly meant to relay urgent or sensitive important matters is that it was attended by Xi Jinping and other senior officials who should have been in Beidaihe at this time for their annual working vacation. This suggests that Xi and the others either postponed their Beidaihe trip, held the seminar first before traveling to the resort town, or shuttled back to Beijing from Beidaihe just to hold the seminar.

There were a number of urgent or sensitive matters of importance around the time the seminar was held, with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan leading the list. Other matters include growing mortgage boycotts of unfinished housing projects, the property sector debt crisis in general, spreading financial contagion in the banking sector, worsening economic conditions, new COVID-19 outbreaks in a number of places, and rising social instability. Xi and other senior officials could have touched on some or all of those topics and how Beijing was planning to handle them during the seminar.

2. The parts of the seminar that was reported on in state media indicates that it was partly a political mobilization meeting by Xi Jinping to get senior officials to fully support his 20th Party Congress agenda, which includes taking a third term and getting his preferred candidates appointed to top positions.

In his speech at the seminar, Xi emphasized that the CCP is facing unprecedented difficulties before repeating propaganda about how only he can lead the regime through the various crises and preserve the Party. Xi made the case for taking a norm-breaking third term by noting that he needs to stay in power a little longer to “start off” the “strategic plan” laid out at the 19th Party Congress to “build a modern socialist power” by mid-century.

To avoid accusations that his reforms so far have deviated from Party orthodoxy, Xi described the “great changes” during his 10 years in charge as a “milestone” for the CCP and the regime. And to dispel fears that he is looking to establish a dictatorship like the one under Mao Zedong or turn to Western-style democracy, Xi said that his expansion of “socialist modernization” is “neither taking the old road of closure and rigidity, nor taking the pernicious path of changing the flag.”

3. The state media propaganda push to promote Xi’s 20th Party Congress agenda after his speech at the seminar is exactly the sort of result that he would have been aiming for with recent key reshuffles in the propaganda apparatus (Li Shulei as propaganda executive vice minister plus changing the president and editor-in-chief of Xinhua; see here and here).

Regardless, Xi is still heavily reliant on propaganda and political study sessions to prop up his “quan wei.” The limits of propaganda as a power-preserving tool for Xi Jinping will be tested as “huge risks and challenges” bear down harder at home and the international situation becomes even more “severe and complex.”