SinoInsight 1
Several regions in the central Chinese province of Henan started seeing heavy precipitation from July 17, including Zhengzhou, Luohe, Kaifeng, Xinxiang, Hebi, and Anyang.
Zhengzhou City was the worst hit of the regions, recording 201.9 millimeters (7.95 inches) of rain between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on July 20. The local Meteorological Bureau claimed that the hourly rainfall in Zhengzhou broke the record in China; historic data, however, recorded 252 millimeters of hourly rainfall in Shaanxi’s Dashicao region in June 1981, and 401 millimeters of hourly rainfall in Inner Mongolia’s Shangdi region in July 1975. The Zhengzhou Meteorological Bureau also noted that 19 weather stations recorded very high daily rainfall, with the weather station in Erqi District logging 696.9 millimeters of rain over 24 hours, or more than the total annual average rainfall in Zhengzhou (about 640 millimeters).
The very heavy rainfall and floods in Zhengzhou turned roads into rivers, disrupted power and communications, and flooded the subway system to deadly effect. At least 25 people were killed in subway cars and stations, according to mainland and international news outlets. On July 23, the CCP authorities claimed that the Zhengzhou floods had resulted in just 56 deaths and five missing people, while nearly 400,000 people had to be resettled. The authorities also claimed that over 44,000 hectares of agricultural land had been affected, with direct economic losses totaling 65.5 billion yuan.
Mainland media, however, gave scant coverage to the floods and unfolding tragedy, preferring instead to report on flooding in Germany and other events. Yet Chinese social media posts about the flood—including dangerous flooding of subway cars, government action to seal off flooded tunnels with road vehicles still inside, the flooding of underground garages and shopping malls, people being suddenly swept away by rushing waters, people asking about missing relatives, etc.—hinted at a far larger overall death toll and a greater tragedy than officially claimed.
The PRC authorities blamed the natural disaster for the tragedy in Zhengzhou, framing it as an unavoidable “once in a thousand years” event. Yet a review of government data and other information suggests that some of the deaths, particularly those involving the subway cars and vehicle tunnels, could have been lowered or even avoided had the local government had done its job.
The Zhengzhou Meteorological Observatory first issued a “red warning” for heavy rain at 2159 hours on July 19. On July 20, the Zhengzhou Meteorological Bureau issued six “red warnings” for “first class/particularly severe” heavy rain at 0108 hours, 0602 hours, 0908 hours, 1150 hours, 1601 hours, and 2132 hours. According to official regulations, the local government should suspend school and businesses following the “red warning,” as well as step up emergency and rescue work preparations. However, the Zhengzhou authorities issued no suspensions and local residents went about their routine as usual on July 20.
The local authorities’ mishandling of overflowing rivers and reservoirs around Zhengzhou also appeared to have exacerbated the tragedy:
- In the evening of July 20, the Henan Provincial People’s Armed Police headquarters reported a breach in the Fengle Farm section of the Kuhe Tributary of the Yellow River, with at least 15 small gaps appearing, according to mainland media. The next day, the mainland media reported that “dangerous situations” had emerged at the reservoirs and rivers near Zhengzhou.
- At 1:00 p.m. on July 21, the official Weibo account of the Zhengzhou Municipal Propaganda Department published a post announcing that the “dangerous situation” at the local Changzhuang Reservoir had been brought under control. The Weibo post disclosed that a “piping hazard” discovered at 10:30 a.m. on July 20 led to water discharges from the reservoir for most of the day. By 9:34 p.m., the reservoir’s water level had dropped 70 centimeters from its peak that day, but was still 3.05 meters higher than the reservoir’s maximum water level.
- Changzhuang Reservoir discharges flow into the Jialu River around Zhengzhou, and the Jialu River has a tributary running through the city. Local official media only reported about the Changzhuang Reservoir discharge in the evening of July 20, and most Zhengzhou residents were unaware of the development.
===
From mainland media reports and Chinese social media, the bulk of the flood deaths occurred at Zhengzhou Metro Line 5 and the Jingguang North Road Tunnel.
Zhengzhou Metro Line 5
According to several accounts, flood waters broke through the subway retaining walls and entered Metro Line 5 at about 6:00 p.m. on July 20. The flood brought trains in the tunnels of Tantansijie Station and Shakou Road Station to a halt and trapped hundreds of commuters. The subway line was only closed 40 minutes after the Zhengzhou Meteorological Bureau issued its fifth heavy rain “red warning” (1601 hours; see above).
Videos circulating on social media show people standing on train seats with the water reaching up to neck level. Some came down with hypoxia, hypoglycemia, or hypothermia. One video shows a gruesome sight of bodies strewn on the floor of a subway platform.
Despite the carnage, the Zhengzhou Propaganda Department issued a WeChat post at 8:00 p.m. on July 20 claiming that subway passengers “have been evacuated safely” and that it was “a daunting experience without mishap” (有驚無險). However, social media posts circulating at the time showed passengers trapped in flooded subway cars making appeals for help. Some passengers smashed the window of a subway car to extricate themselves, according to eyewitness accounts. At one subway station, a local resident pushed his way past subway staff who were blockading the area in an attempt to rescue his trapped wife, according to overseas Chinese language media reports.
In the morning of July 21, the local authorities announced that over 500 people had been evacuated from the submerged subway system, with five injured and a dozen dead despite rescue efforts. However, Chinese social media was flooded with videos of people asking about their missing relatives and claiming that their family members were not on the official death list. In one case, a man found the body of his wife at a local hospital morgue, but her death was not included in the government’s list.
According to a widely circulated Chinese social media post on July 21, a person claiming to be a Zhengzhou subway system staff member blamed superior subway system officials for the subway tragedy, claiming that their decision to continue operations and avoid getting in trouble with even higher-ups “led to an irreversible situation.” The person added that there were many opportunities to evacuate passengers when the flood was breaking, but precious time was wasted due to bureaucratic red tape. “Everybody followed the rules obediently and dared not cross the redline. The peaceful [working environment] turned out to be murder!” the person continued.
Jingguang North Road Tunnel
Jingguang North Road Tunnel, located at the intersection of Jingguang Road and Longhai Road in Zhengzhou City, was one of the worst-hit areas during the flood. The six-lane thoroughfare (both directions) stretched for 1,835 meters, of which 1,360 meters is underground. According to semi-official mainland media The Paper, the tunnel was flooded for five minutes on the evening of July 20.
According to eyewitness accounts and videos posted on social media, Jingguang North Road Tunnel was full of cars when the flood waters poured in. Only those near the exits of either end of the tunnel were able to evacuate. Tunnel staff had earlier placed retaining walls to keep out flood waters at the tunnel’s exit, but not the entrance. Also, nothing appeared to have been done to prevent vehicles from entering the tunnel despite flood warnings.
Assuming the tunnel was packed with vehicles, then there could be an estimated 960 vehicles (4 meters average vehicle length, 4.5 meters average vehicle space, six lanes) and at least 1,440 people (1.5 people per vehicle) at the time of the flood. The number of people trapped in vehicles could be double or greater if there were public buses or coaches in the tunnel. The accounts of local eyewitnesses and circumstantial evidence suggest that the number of flood victims in the tunnel is on the high side.
In the afternoon of July 21, the local authorities began pumping water out from the tunnel and dispatched the police to blockade the scene and drive away those who were filming. A local resident living near the tunnel who watched the rescue effort estimated that over 100 corpses were recovered as of 3:00 a.m. on July 22.
In the morning of July 23, the police forcibly drove away onlookers, resulting in some clashes. That day, the Zhengzhou government issued a document stating that 5,290 paramilitary and military troops were participating in disaster relief and reconstruction efforts, including cleaning the silt in tunnels and subways.
Also on July 23, a tow truck driver who was involved in the tunnel rescue effort revealed that over 6,300 corpses had been recovered, but rescue and recovery efforts were still on-going. On the same day, an overseas Chinese association in the United States stated in a fundraiser for Zhengzhou that over 26,000 people had died from the flood in Henan Province; the death figure cited by the association could have come from united work front figures or organizations, including PRC consulates in the United States.
On July 24, a video circulating on social media showed a bus being towed out from Jingguang North Road Tunnel in the day with black cloth covering its windows. At night, a long truck filled with white-colored, human-length bags was filmed driving out of the tunnel. Many netizens believe that the vehicles were carrying corpses.
===
The floods in Zhengzhou and Henan Province in general damaged critical infrastructure, disrupted manufacturing industries, and affected transportation. For instance, coal from Inner Mongolia and Shanxi is transported via Zhengzhou to the central and eastern regions of China. Depending on how quickly the flood rescue effort is carried out, certain parts of the mainland could see reduced electricity supply in the coming days.
Factories in Zhengzhou had to cease operations as they were without power or water supplies, and with many workplaces flooded. According to the South China Morning Post, Foxconn workers in Zhengzhou’s Zhongmu County and the Zhengzhou Export Processing Zone were told to take off due to the flood. Foxconn has over 90 production lines in Zhengzhou and about 350,000 workers; more than half of Apple’s iPhones are manufactured in Zhengzhou. Meanwhile, SAIC Motor, China’s largest automaker, warned that its Zhengzhou logistics would be affected in the short-term. Nissan’s production in Zhengzhou was also halted.
The Zhengzhou flood is also set to give headaches to local auto insurance companies. Mainland media estimated that auto insurance companies are expected to receive between 30,000 to 80,000 insurance claims for vehicle damage. Assuming 80,000 claims are filed, local auto insurance companies will have to pay out at least 1 billion yuan to clients. Zhengzhou has over 4 million vehicles, the sixth-highest among Chinese cities.
China’s food supply will be affected by the floods in Zhengzhou and Henan. Henan is a part of China’s breadbasket area, and peanut farms in the province (including Zhengzhou) account for a quarter of total peanut production in the country. Peanuts are either consumed directly or used to manufacture vegetable oils. Henan is also one of the largest pork producing areas in China.
===
The flooding in Zhengzhou came under scrutiny because it was one of 30 “sponge cities” in China. “Sponge cities” are cities that are retrofitted with special infrastructure to make them “flood-proof.” According to publicly available information, Zhengzhou invested 53.48 billion yuan to build its “sponge city” project in 2020.
===
From July 21 to July 23, Xi Jinping visited Tibet in what was likely an occasion to mark the 70th anniversary of the CCP’s “peaceful liberation” of the region. Xi was accompanied by close associates like CCP General Office director Ding Xuexiang, PRC vice premier Liu He, National Supervisory Commission director Yang Xiaodu, Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia, CCP Organization Department head Chen Xi, and National Development and Reform Commission He Lifeng.
Local officials arranged for Tibetans to welcome Xi and his entourage with song and dance at the airport. Xi was presented with a white khata (a traditional ceremonial scarf with symbolic meaning in Tibetan Buddhism) and offered Tibetan New Year food and a traditional beverage for good luck. State media showed Tibetans wiping away tears upon meeting Xi. Videos uploaded on social media showed that Xi was feted with enthusiastic celebration during his Tibet trip, which included visits to important cultural and religious sites like the Drepung Monastery. On the last day of his visit, Xi met with representatives of PLA troops stationed in Tibet.
According to a July 23 Xinhua report on the Tibet inspection tour, Xi “immediately gave important instructions after learning that Henan was experiencing extremely heavy rainfall.”
OUR TAKE
1. The Zhengzhou local government’s lackluster response to the massive flood is both symptomatic of CCP rule and the regime under Xi Jinping.
As we spotlighted in a recent newsletter, Xi is having problems with officials lacking initiative. Officials are reluctant to act independently under the disciplinarian Xi leadership for fear of making mistakes, which results in punishment and ruined career prospects. Instead, officials believe that it is safer to wait for instructions from their superiors or Beijing before acting. Also, officials prefer to implement orders using the “prefer left rather than right” (寧左勿右) approach so as to stay as “politically correct” as possible and avoid accountability.
The way PRC officials approach governance is bad enough for day-to-day operations, and catastrophic when disasters strike. As seen from the information above, the scale of the Zhengzhou flooding tragedy could be much smaller if the local government had been more proactive and their subordinates had not defaulted to autopilot out of fear of offending their superiors. Thus, a natural disaster in China doubles as a man-made one.
Poor governance, however, is endemic to the CCP regardless of the leader in charge. In our first factional struggle special report, we looked at how factional fighting in the CCP elite and local government ineptitude affected the Sichuan earthquake rescue effort. Then premier Wen Jiabao could not do much even though he went down to Sichuan in the early post-earthquake period to personally oversee the effort. Likewise, it is hard to imagine current premier Li Keqiang being able to inspire the Zhengzhou local government to improve their disaster rescue effort even if he were to rush down after the heavy rains in Henan had receded.
Of course, there is also the possibility that Li did not dare to take initiative and travel to Zhengzhou without the blessing of Party “core” leader Xi Jinping, who was otherwise engaged in Tibet around the time of the flooding.
2. The Changzhuang Reservoir water discharge amid the flooding is an example par excellence of CCP officials practicing so-called “bureaucratism” and defaulting to the “just following orders” mindset even if it meant worsening a developing crisis.
Local officials have been known to quietly discharge water from overflowing reservoirs in the dead of the night to avoid scrutiny. Should the sudden discharge result in the destruction of downstream settlements, farmland, life stock, or businesses, those officials will claim a “natural disaster” and not pay compensation to victims of man-made floods. It is thus unsurprising that Zhengzhou officials approved discharges from the Changzhuang Reservoir without promptly notifying residents even though there was already flooding going on; officials can later claim that everything was a “natural disaster” and dodge all accountability for arguably worsening an already perilous situation.
Another instance of rigid “bureaucratism” on display during the Zhengzhou floods includes the local government’s failure to suspend classes and business operations despite the local meteorological bureau having issued several “red warnings.”
Rigid “bureaucratism” in the PRC sometimes results in the tragic-comic. According to a social media clip that made the rounds after the Zhengzhou flood, a road-cleaning sprinkler truck was seen operating despite flooded roads. While it is unclear if the footage was from the recent post-flood scene in Zhengzhou, the phenomenon of sprinkler trucks operating in the rain and other conditions where they are redundant is a common one in China judging from mainland media reports on the topic.
3. Xi Jinping’s inspection tour to Tibet was likely planned ages ago and it was highly unlikely that he could simply adjourn the trip to travel to Zhengzhou instead. However, the artificial, lavish “celebration” of Xi and the CCP in Tibet stands in sharp contrast with the natural/man-made disaster and tragedy in Zhengzhou.
It remains to be seen if Xi, in the tradition of past CCP leaders, will visit Zhengzhou to show support for victims of the disaster. Regardless, his unpopularity in the regime will increase when the Chinese people juxtapose his Tibet inspection tour with the Zhengzhou tragedy.
Meanwhile, Xi’s factional rivals have yet more ammunition with which to pressure him with the Zhengzhou floods. Several senior members of the Zhengzhou government were from the Zhejiang officialdom and are regarded as Xi’s cronies. This includes Party secretary Xu Liyi, who won rapid promotion in Zhejiang Province after Xi took power and was appointed to his current position in June 2019. The massive failure of Zhengzhou officials who are Xi’s cronies after enjoying “rocket promotions” makes Xi look bad, and affords his rivals another example to make the case for denying him a norm-breaking third term in 2022.
4. China has been experiencing frequent natural and man-made disasters in recent years, including the coronavirus pandemic and nationwide floods in 2020. A deteriorating economy and the CCP government’s fiscal shortages mean that the Party cannot do much to support disaster relief efforts or disaster-related developments; in a previous newsletter, we looked at how the CCP’s farm subsidies for pandemic-related inflation amount to a drop in the bucket for Chinese farmers. The CCP’s struggles with funding has even led Party propaganda outlets to drastically cut back on reporting on government disaster relief efforts.
As the CCP’s “perfect storm” of domestic and foreign problems continues to mount, it has greater incentive to get Chinese society under control to ensure regime stability. However, the outbreak of disasters and inept disaster relief, poor economic conditions, and the slashing of civil servant pay will heighten social grievances and give the regime even more unwanted pressure during a crucial period. Continued mismanagement will bring the CCP closer to its “Berlin Wall moment.”
