US and allies play the Taiwan card against Xi

A White House representative later walked back Biden’s remarks to the media. “The U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act. We will uphold our commitment under the act, we will continue to support Taiwan’s self-defense, and we will continue to oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo. The president was not announcing any change in our policy and there is no change in our policy,” the White House representative said.

2. The European Parliament voted 580 to 26 to request the European Commission to “urgently begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement” with Taiwan. Lawmakers also called on the EU’s trade office in Taipei to be renamed the European Union office in Taiwan, a move that would upgrade the mission.

In response, PRC foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said, “The EU parliament should immediately stop words and actions that undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Oct. 22
1. High-level representatives from the American Institute in Taiwan, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, the U.S. Department of State, and the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated in a virtual forum on expanding Taiwan’s participation at the United Nations and in other international fora, according to a State Department statement.

2. A Taiwanese delegation in Europe signed seven memoranda of understanding with Slovak officials and scientists, according to Taiwan’s National Development Council. The MOUs will see both countries bolster bilateral ties in areas like trade, supply chains, research and development, investment, tourism, and smart cities. Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science Park will also work with the Slovak authorities to promote science parks in Slovakia.

3. At the 18th CSIS/Nikkei Symposium, Japanese defense minister Nobuo Kishi cited Russia’s annexation of Crimea in an oblique reference to the PRC’s recent aggressive maneuvers towards Taiwan and in noting how an invasion can begin without troop deployment.

Oct. 26
1. Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu traveled to Europe to speak at an international conference in Slovakia and meet with the president of the Czech Republic Senate. Politico Magazine reported on Oct. 27 that Wu would also make an undisclosed trip to Brussels while in Europe.

2. Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a statement supporting Taiwan’s participation in the UN system.

“Taiwan’s exclusion undermines the important work of the UN and its related bodies, all of which stand to benefit greatly from its contributions … That is why we encourage all UN Member States to join us in supporting Taiwan’s robust, meaningful participation throughout the UN system and in the international community,” Blinken said.

Oct. 27
The South China Morning Post reported that a delegation from the European Parliament will be in Taiwan in the week of Nov. 1. The small party will be led by French MEP Raphael Glucksmann, who was sanctioned by the PRC in March.

SCMP notes that “parliamentary staff have been sworn to secrecy about the details because of ‘security risks,’ even receiving emails asking them not to discuss the trip until after it has taken place.”

Oct. 28
1. In an exclusive interview with CNN, Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen said that Taiwan is a beacon of democracy that needs to be defended. “When authoritarian regimes demonstrate expansionist tendencies, democratic countries should come together to stand against them. Taiwan is on the front lines,” she said.

Tsai noted that the PRC has become “more ambitious, more expansionist. And therefore things that were acceptable to them, may not be acceptable to them now.”

Tsai also acknowledged that there are U.S. troops in Taiwan for training purposes, but added that they are “not as many as people thought.” She said, “we have a wide range of cooperation with the US aiming at increasing our defense capability.”

2. Taiwan defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng clarified to the Taiwanese legislature that while there were military exchanges between the U.S. and the ROC, no American troops were ever stationed in Taiwan beyond the period of the exchanges.

3. Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) reported a senior Taiwanese general as saying that the “U.S. has assisted in training the [Taiwanese] army for at least 20 years,” but the ROC defense ministry has always issued an ambiguous statement (“the ministry does not express views on military exchanges”) when asked about it due to political reasons. The general added that disclosing the information without approval from the U.S. side could cause “political events,” and declined to disclose training details because they are classified.

The CNA report added that there are frequent military exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwanese special forces. An unnamed Taiwanese major colonel and lieutenant colonel also disclosed that ROC-U.S. military exchanges also include U.S. military personnel traveling to Taiwan to advise on bunker, maintenance, and other engineering matters pertaining to the M1A2T tanks that Taiwan is purchasing from America.

4. PRC defense ministry spokesman Tan Kefei said that the PRC “strongly opposes” military exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan, or moves seeking “Taiwan Independence.” Tan added, “if the U.S. continues to stubbornly cling to the illusion of using Taiwan to contain China… China will resolutely counter and fight back.”

Tan noted that Xi Jinping had “pointed the way forward” for PRC-ROC relations in his speech commemorating the 110th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution. He concluded, “The PLA will strengthen its mission and maintain a high level of readiness to ensure that when the Party and the people require it, it will be ready to meet [challenges], fight, and win.”

5. Global Times published an editorial (社評：美軍不得駐台，這是不可逾越的紅線)condemning the U.S.-ROC military exchanges revealed by Tsai Ing-wen.

The editorial noted that the stationing of U.S. troops in Taiwan crosses a “red line” and that the U.S. and the ROC are “clear on this.” Thus, “the stationing of U.S. troops in Taiwan breaks the bottom line and is one of the most dangerous indicators for the triggering of war in the Taiwan Strait.”

However, the editorial noted in concluding that the “mainland public must fully understand the overall situation in the Taiwan Strait and should not be led by the nose by Taiwan and the United States’ short-term performance.” Also, “we do not have to ask ourselves why we are not yet doing anything or if the red lines need to be redrawn.” Instead, “we must trust the country’s strategic coordination and control, and see that the country-splitting DPP authorities are like a fish in the net.”

Oct. 29
1. American Institute in Taiwan director Sandra Oudkirk said that “the United States has a commitment to help Taiwan provide for its self-defense,” and “the value of our partnership and our support for Taiwan is rock solid.”

Oudkirk also said, “I am not getting into details on specific operations and engagements, or training. I can say we have robust, ongoing defense and security relationships and discussions. They are grounded in a commitment that we have made to help support Taiwan’s self-defense in the Taiwan Relations Act.”

2. Duowei News published an article with the headline, “Tsai Ing-wen Confirms U.S. Military Presence in Taiwan, PLA General Says it is a Public ‘Slap to the Face’.”

The article reports that former Nanjing Military Region deputy commander Wang Hongguang said in a piece on “Jinri Toutiao” that Tsai’s acknowledgment of a U.S. troop presence in Taiwan is a “key step on the road to Taiwan independence,” and a “slap to the face” for the mainland. “How can this be tolerated, and if this can be tolerated, where will it end?” he said.

Background: Wang Hongguang, a PLA lieutenant general who retired in December 2012, is known for making hawkish remarks regarding an “armed reunification” of Taiwan. During a major public event in December 2016, Wang claimed that the PRC would attack Taiwan by around 2020 and would conquer the island “within 100 hours.” His remarks at the event subsequently made waves at home and abroad.

Oct. 30
PRC foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin warned Lithuania and European officials over recent diplomatic outreach to Taiwan.

“We urge the Lithuanian government to abide by the solemn political commitments made when establishing diplomatic relations with China and not to make irreversible wrong decisions,” Wang said in a statement. “The European side should adopt a correct position and prevent interference with the healthy development of China-EU relations.”

Lithuania announced on Oct. 27 that its representative office in Taiwan, which would be called the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, is scheduled to open in early 2022.

On Oct. 28, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel said in a statement that the PRC’s punitive campaign against Lithuania is “unjustified” and “disproportionate,” and added that the EU will pushback against “threats, political pressure and coercive measures” against members of the bloc. Von der Leyen and Michel also said that Lithuania’s naming of its representative office does not breach the “one China policy” (the PRC earlier objected to use of “Taiwan” instead of “Taipei”) and that the EU and its members have the right to deepen relations and cooperation with Taiwan.

Oct. 31
1. When asked by CNN’s Dana Bash to clarify during an interview whether the U.S. had committed directly to the Taiwanese government that it will come to Taiwan’s defense if the PRC invades, Secretary Blinken said that “there is no change in our policy.” Blinken added that the U.S. has a “longstanding commitment pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act to make sure that Taiwan has the means to defend itself.”

Bash then noted that Blinken was giving “very, very perfect diplo-speak,” and asked him to say yes or no, as well as clarify President Biden’s specific remarks on Taiwan during the Oct. 21 CNN town hall. Blinken replied with a version of what he had said earlier.

2. According to media reports, Secretary Blinken made “crystal clear” to PRC foreign minister Wang Yi during their meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rome that “Washington opposes any unilateral changes by Beijing to the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, according to a senior State Department official.

The official also said that the Blinken-Wang meeting would help lay the groundwork for a Biden-Xi virtual meeting at the end of the year.

There are several likely reasons for why countries are becoming more vocal about Taiwan during this period.

First, the PRC’s recent belligerence towards Taiwan has roused countries to the possibility that the threat of a PLA invasion of the ROC is more real and imminent under Xi Jinping. After all, the CCP has been carrying out “wolf warrior” diplomacy, implementing military reforms and building a “strong military,” projecting greater ambition and confidence, and talking up the idea of “reunification” with the ROC. Taiwan’s neighbors and democratic countries also have greater incentive to preserve Taiwan lest they are targeted next should the ROC fall. Then there is the trade and supply chain aspect, with Taiwan being an important source of advanced semiconductors.

Second, the Biden-Harris administration may be scrambling to reverse the impression that it is weakening its stance towards Beijing (see here, here, and here) and is less willing to uphold its commitments to Taiwan as a result. Recent confused messaging from the administration on Taiwan (Biden affirming America’s willingness to defend Taiwan from a PRC attack on CNN followed by a quick back-track from the White House) has added to the growing perception that U.S. support of Taiwan is less “rock-solid” than Washington indicates. The Biden-Harris administration has since released less ambiguous statements about Taiwan and appears to be working to strengthen bilateral ties. However, the perception that the administration is wobbly on Taiwan will likely linger if statements backing the ROC are not backed by tangible action and deliverables.

Third, the U.S. and the West could be visibly showing support for Taiwan and “stepping” on the CCP’s “red line” to pressure Xi Jinping into being more amenable to negotiation. Politicians, government officials, think tanks, and mainstream newspapers have complained that the PRC is not doing more to fight climate change per its new climate pledge released ahead of the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference. There is also growing recognition that Xi’s domestic political problems are inhibiting his ability to “do more” on climate and leave the country to partake in personal diplomacy (see here and here). Meanwhile, the Biden-Harris administration could be having trouble confirming Xi’s participation in the virtual meeting with Biden by the end of the year that it announced in early October; the PRC has yet to publicly acknowledge that a Xi-Biden meeting will take place.

The U.S. and the West do gain some leverage over Xi in playing the Taiwan card. As we previously analyzed, Xi is very unlikely to resort to kinetic “reunification” of Taiwan before the 20th Party Congress in 2022 (barring very unusual circumstances) given that his top priority is eliminating political risks in the regime (“rectification” of the political and legal affairs apparatus, cracking down on factional rival strongholds in finance, tech, entertainment, etc.) and securing a third office term. A military invasion of Taiwan significantly raises political risks for Xi, and Xi also cannot be too aggressive in intimidating Taiwan through military means lest unintended cross-strait “accidents” (擦槍走火) break out. Meanwhile, PRC defense ministry spokesman Tan Kefei’s reference to Xi’s recent Xinhai Revolution speech while criticizing Tsai Ing-wen’s CNN interview indicates that Xi is still committed to “peaceful reunification.” In other words, Xi’s hands are tied to a degree in how he can get the CCP to respond to the U.S. and other countries over their “stepping” on the Taiwan “red line.” Yet Xi must find some way to respond to not show weakness and lose “quan wei” over the Taiwan issue; this could mean more “wolf warrior” diplomacy and propaganda, and even sanctions against a handful of foreign lawmakers, politicians, scholars, and think-tanks.

2. Tsai Ing-wen’s “revelation” to CNN that there were U.S. military trainers in Taiwan is not as hard-hitting as it would seem given that the information was “leaked” during the Trump administration and has been an open secret for some years. However, Tsai’s very public acknowledgment of the fact does represent a challenge to the CCP by the U.S. and the West, and as some hawkish PRC pundits have described, a “slap to the face” for Beijing. The awkward Oct. 28 Global Times editorial on the issue of ROC-U.S. military exchanges is reflective of Xi Jinping’s current dilemma in how to respond to the challenge from the U.S. and its allies without coming across as weak and losing “quan wei.”

Xi’s factional rivals could take advantage of the U.S. playing the Taiwan card and growing international support for ROC to heap pressure on Xi and compel him to make compromises (like the unveiling of a less impressive “historical resolution” at the Sixth Plenum, not purging high-ranking factional enemies, etc.).

Meanwhile, the global “anti-Xi coalition’s” recognition that Xi’s lack of international travel is connected with his domestic political problems and lack of “quan wei” could also lead to an escalation of “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” tactics. The global “anti-Xi coalition” could look to exploit the window of opportunity from now until the 20th Party Congress to aid Xi’s domestic rivals in sidelining the latter (including forcing Xi to designate a successor).

Xi would likely anticipate pushback from his rivals over Taiwan and would want to stamp his dominance. With his hands somewhat tied in what he can do to punish Taiwan and other countries (see point one), and with his “quan wei” at stake, Xi could instead be forced to step up purges and crackdowns to address his domestic political pressures at the root. Xi’s actions, or lack thereof, would in turn quicken the pace at which the CCP factional struggle moves to a showdown.

3. Growing international support for Taiwan is heartening. As we noted in the Oct. 11 edition of this newsletter: “Countries must speak up for Taiwan and stand up to the CCP where possible to check Beijing’s ambitions under the present geopolitical climate. The CCP fears countries that stand by their values and cannot be bought by the PRC doling out more economic incentives and other interests. If a critical mass of countries are willing to support Taiwan, the CCP cannot seriously consider invasion to achieve its ‘reunification’ goal.”

Growing U.S. and international pressure over Taiwan and other “red line” issues as deemed by the CCP will worsen Xi Jinping’s domestic political problems. Businesses, investors, and governments must make contingencies for political Black Swans this year and in the lead up to the 20th Party Congress.