SinoInsight 1
The Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee was convened in Beijing.
Nov. 8
1. State mouthpiece Xinhua published an article titled, “Irreversible Historical Process—Realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation from the Transformative Practices in the New Era Led by Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the Core” (不可逆轉的歷史進程—從以習近平同志為核心的黨中央引領新時代變革性實踐看實現中華民族偉大復興).
The article introduced Xi Jinping’s “political achievements” since 2012 and described what he has done in office as a “great undertaking” in the CCP’s “100-year epic [poem]” and “nine years intersecting the two ‘one-hundred years’ goals.” Also, “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” led “the whole Party and people of all ethnicities in the whole country” to “advance the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics to a new historical stage,” as well as provided “a more comprehensive system guarantee, a more solid material foundation, and more active spiritual force” in realizing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The article added that a “resolution on the major achievements and historical experience of the Party’s century-long struggle” will be unveiled at the Sixth Plenum. The resolution would recap the “spectacular (豹尾) completion of the hundred-year Party’s history of revolution, construction, and reform” on the one hand, and “open the ‘faucet’ (龍頭) for the comprehensive construction of a modern socialist country” on the other hand. Xi Jinping, the “navigator of China’s New Era,” “proclaims to the world and to the future with unprecedented courage and boldness: The Chinese nation has gone from standing up, to getting rich, to getting strong, and the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical process!”
The article then touts Xi’s role in reviving Party Central’s “leadership prowess,” strictly governing the Party, establishing “quan wei” through fighting corruption; how he has “reconstructed a new pattern of economic development”; how he has led the “rule of China” (中國之治) model and strengthened the “socialism with Chinese characteristics system”; how he strengthened CCP ideology and so-called “New Era spirit”; and how he has conducted “great power diplomacy” and proposed the China solution to various countries, including the “community with a shared future for mankind” and the “common value of all mankind” (全人類共同價值 ).
In concluding, the article emphasized that “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” has the important historical mission and responsibility of “carrying on the past and opening up the future,” and repeated that “the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical process, and no force can halt the advance of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. “On the new journey, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s proclamation has become all the more resolute and bold: ‘With the strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the close unity of people of all ethnicities, the goal of building a modern and strong socialist country in all aspects will definitely be achieved, and the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will definitely be realized.”
2. Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published two commentary pieces on Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. The first was titled, “Steadfastly Rectifying, Disciplining, and Curbing Corruption (Key Choices in the New Era—A Review of the Promotion of Clean Government, Integrity Construction, and the Anti-corruption struggle Under Party Central With Comrade Xi Jinping at the Core” (堅定不移正風肅紀反腐 [新時代的關鍵抉擇]—以習近平同志為核心的黨中央推進黨風廉政建設和反腐敗鬥爭述評) and the second piece, “The Party Becomes Stronger in Revolutionary Forging” (黨在革命性鍛造中更堅強).
The articles point out that there was severe corruption in the regime when Xi took office (“very nasty in nature, with extremely bad and alarming political implications”), and praised Xi’s anti-corruption effort as a “political decision that saved the day” and “solved many difficult problems that had long needed addressing but were not revolved.” Xi’s actions “eliminated serious hidden dangers within the Party and the state.”
The articles also added that “under the rule of law, no one can get lucky, no one can expect extrajudicial benefits, there are no exonerating ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ cards (丹書鐵券), and nobody can become an ‘iron-cap prince’ (鐵帽子王).” Also, the anti-corruption campaign is “the people’s wish.”
Nov. 9
People’s Daily published a lead article titled, “The People Gave Us Power, We Must Therefore Pledge Ourselves to the Party and the Country, Serve the Party and the Country, Do What Should be Done, And Offend the People We Must Offend” (人民把權力交給我們，我們就必須以身許黨許國、報黨報國，該做的事就要做，該得罪的人就得得罪).
The article cites speeches and remarks by Xi Jinping on anti-corruption to explain why Xi is targeting corruption and his resolution to resolve the issue. Key statements include:
- “Reams of facts tell us that the greater the corruption problem grows, the Party and the country will inevitably be destroyed! We must be vigilant!”
- “Corruption is the most damaging problem to the Party.” Fail to rectify the problem and prevent it from eroding the Party’s body, and “we lose the hearts and minds of the people, and are at risk of losing power.”
- “Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Sun Zhengcai, and Ling Jihua…… in the ‘no restricted area, full coverage, zero tolerance’ [無禁區, 全覆蓋, 零容忍] anti-corruption struggle, no one has exonerating ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ cards, and nobody can become an ‘iron-cap prince.’” The article notes that Xi once said, “is there any person who is untouchable?”
- “The people gave us power, and therefore we must pledge ourselves to the Party and the country, serve the Party and the country, do what should be done, and offend the people we must offend.”
OUR TAKE
2. The Nov. 8 Xinhua piece underscores even more clearly Xi Jinping’s third term ambitions and determination. The phrase “realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is repeated throughout the piece ad nauseam, and Xi’s “political achievements” and contributions to the Party’s “century of struggle” were emphasized.
The Nov. 6 Xi profile indirectly reveals his lack of “quan wei,” and so does the Nov. 8 Xinhua article. Xi is cast as a “navigator of China’s New Era” in a nod to Mao Zedong’s “helmsman” moniker and importance in the CCP’s history. The part about “the Chinese nation [going] from standing up, to getting rich, to getting strong” is another nod to Mao in what seems like an effort by Party propagandists to rub some of the Chairman’s “quan wei” and glow onto Xi.
Finally, the Nov. 8 Xinhua piece makes a pointed effort at recognizing only some of Xi’s predecessors while marginalizing others. “Xi Jinping” is mentioned 77 times, “Mao Zedong” six times, “Deng Xiaoping” twice, and zero mentions of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The mentions indicate that Xi recognizes that Mao was crucial to the CCP’s establishment of political power in the early days of the regime and Deng was instrumental in building the regime’s economic power through “reform and opening up.” But the Jiang-Hu era (also the Jiang faction’s era of dominance) was a disaster that saw the weakening of Party Central’s “quan wei” and the breeding of serious corruption, which left the CCP regime that Xi inherited to overcome perils that threatened “destruction of the Party and the country” (亡黨亡國). The propaganda narrative then has Xi stepping up to the task to save the Party and the regime with his anti-corruption campaign to carry out “the people’s wish,” as well as restoring Party Central’s leadership with his power consolidation and strengthening of Party control.
The collective leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao under the rule of Hu Jintao weakened the authority of the central government and bred serious corruption, which made the CCP face the threat of “destruction of the party and the country”, while Xi Jinping reinforced the CCP’s rule.
3. The People’s Daily pieces on the anti-corruption campaign are likely intended to play up Xi’s only substantial political achievement in his nine years in office, emphasize that the campaign has popular support (“the people’s wish”) and is not merely Xi’s whim, and place Xi’s factional rivals on notice during a crucial political period (the Sixth Plenum).
Notably, the People’ Daily pieces explicitly names prominent members of the Jiang faction who were previously purged (Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, etc.) while hinting at Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong with the “iron-cap prince” references (we previously explained the connection between Zeng and “iron-cap prince here and here). Xi is likely warning the Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi coalition” against interfering with his effort to take a third term lest he is forced to “offend the people we must offend” and purge “untouchable” officials like Zeng, Jiang Zemin, and their high-ranking cronies.
SinoInsight 2
The communiqué then began touting Xi Jinping’s “political achievements” this year. It claimed that despite the external environment having “grown increasingly complex and grave over the past year under the combined impact of worldwide changes of a scale unseen in a century and the global coronavirus pandemic,” the Politburo “followed the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” In doing so, the Party and state saw “new and significant achievements in various undertakings” and “officially announced the comprehensive construction of a moderately prosperous society.”
- Analysis: The communiqué frames Xi’s “political achievements” as the product of CCP ideological development over the past century. The inclusion of Mao, Deng, and Xi’s name before their respective political thought places Xi on equal footing with the first two CCP paramount leaders, while the exclusion of Jiang and Hu’s name from their political thought diminishes their importance in Party history.
- Analysis: This segment in the communiqué makes transparent Xi’s political intent during the Sixth Plenum, that is, further binding Xi with the Party’s past and future “successes” to prop up Xi’s “quan wei” and provide formal justification for him to take a third term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
The communiqué added that the period from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao saw the Party “develop a theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and achieve a new leap in the Sinicization of Marxism.” After Xi Jinping took office, “socialism with Chinese characteristics entered a New Era” and the regime “realized the First Centenary Goal and embarked on a new journey toward the Second Centenary Goal.”
- Analysis: Xi Jinping is again tapping into CCP orthodoxy to consolidate power. However, Xi still dares not repudiate the “achievements” of his predecessors, including those of Jiang Zemin. Unlike Mao and Deng, Xi has not gained a decisive victory or arrived at a resolution in factional struggle at the time of issuing his “historical resolution,” and the latter lacks “quan wei” to criticize Jiang and the faction named after him. Then there is the concern that criticism of Xi’s predecessors would undermine Party legitimacy, hurt the Party’s “great, glorious, correct” image, and produce “historical nihilism.” Xi’s workaround to distinguish himself from his predecessors and build “quan wei” sees him credited with “realizing” the First Centenary Goal, and more importantly, laying the theoretical foundation for ushering the regime “toward the Second Centenary Goal.” Meanwhile, his predecessors are credited with helping advance the “Sinicization of Marxism.”
In concluding, the communiqué again highlighted the CCP’s contribution to the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” in its first centennial, called for intra-Party unity, and to be “absolutely certain that we make no catastrophic mistakes on fundamental issues.” The entire communiqué urged the “entire Party, the military, and all Chinese people to rally more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, to fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and to champion the great founding spirit of the Party” so as to “realize the Second Centenary Goal and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.”
OUR TAKE
1. The Sixth Plenum communiqué indicates that the political conclave unfolded exactly as we had earlier analyzed. Xi Jinping used ideological work and CCP history to make the case for why he deserves to serve another five years when his current term ends per modern Party norms at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. With the Party elite secluded away for the plenum and kept under the watchful eye of the Xi leadership, the successful passage of Xi’s “historical resolution” was a no-brainer; however, whether the Party elite are truly in “unison” behind Xi and whether Xi resolved the longstanding issue of his orders not traveling beyond the gates of Zhongnanhai (政令不出中南海) remain to be seen.
The passage of Xi’s “historical resolution” and fierce propaganda work propping him up during the Sixth Plenum period would at least give Xi’s “quan wei” a surface boost. However, Xi’s political position, “quan wei,” and influence in the CCP are not automatically at the level of Mao and Deng regardless of the widely-held perception by international media and commentators; “quan wei” derived from propaganda and not genuine political accomplishments is fleeting and insubstantial. Moreover, the Sixth Plenum communiqué did not name a successor for Xi, contrary to the predictions of some Chinese commentators.
2. The Sixth Plenum can be considered to be an effort by Xi Jinping to openly mobilize and recruit supporters amid the ongoing factional struggle in the CCP elite. The communiqué and the passage of the “historical resolution” also underscores Xi’s lack of “quan wei” and the Party’s overall sense of political danger as the regime faces a “perfect storm” of internal and external threats.
Xi is now under pressure to upkeep the “great, glorious, correct” propaganda image projected by the Sixth Plenum communiqué and his “historical resolution.” To that end, Xi could be forced to take drastic measures and possibly backtrack in some policies to avert crises and preserve his “quan wei” ahead of the 20th Party Congress. This could mean an easing up on financial “red lines” to ensure that floundering property developers can secure loans to paper over their debt and liquidity woes. Concurrently, Xi would also have no qualms in cracking down on officials and institutions that seek to undermine his rule even if it means sacrificing economic gains and the Chinese people’s interests. In other words, Xi’s “quan wei” is now more brittle than it was in previous years, and both he and the Party are becoming even more vulnerable to Black Swan events and other risks.
