SinoInsight 1
Personnel reshuffles in the Chinese regime have proceeded nonstop since the big reshuffle at the Two Sessions meeting in March.
- Since July, Organization Department chiefs in six provinces (Hubei, Shanghai, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangxi) have been replaced.
- Since the start of 2018, several Party secretaries of provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commissions (PLAC) and United Front Work Departments (UFWD) have been reshuffled; in some instances, the head of the provincial PLAC became the new provincial UFWD chief, and vice versa.
- At least seven provincial PLACs (Hainan, Ningxia, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Guizhou) have been seen leadership changes this year. Two provinces gained a new PLAC chief, while five provinces are currently without a PLAC head.
- At least eight provinces (Hainan, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Guangxi, Guangdong, Shanghai, Sichuan) have replaced their UFWD head.
- Since the start of the year, at least 15 deputy provincial governors concurrently held the appointment of provincial Public Security Bureau (PSB) chief. Eight of the 15 deputy provincial governors were the PSB head of their province before being promoted; six were transferred in from other provinces; and one was dispatched from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).
- In August, the MPS added a new deputy minister, political department director, and a ministry assistant. With these personnel movements, Xi Jinping has swapped out virtually all MPS staff since taking office.
- On Aug. 28, the central government sent overseers to inspect nine “sweeping black” groups that were tasked with clamping down on organized crime in the provinces.
OUR TAKE
Xi Jinping’s personnel reshuffling appears to be aimed at cutting off officials from their established power networks. The domestic security and legal apparatus (PLAC, MPS, PSB, etc.) has been most affected by the reshuffling. We believe that the domestic security and legal apparatus personnel “clean out” is a continuation of Xi’s efforts to wrestle control over the apparatus from the Jiang Zemin faction.
Xi managed to install trusted officials into key domestic security positions and begin to consolidate fuller control over internal security matters at the 19th Party Congress last year. The anti-organized crime campaign launched at the start of 2018 is aimed at tackling the control problem at the grassroots by purging security and legal affairs officials who serve as “protective umbrellas” for local mafia.
SinoInsight 2
On Aug. 28, Hong Kong media reported that Southern Theater Command political commissar Wei Liang and Central Military Commission Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Xu Fenlin were demoted and made to retire from the military. Wei and Xu were members of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but were not part of the 19th Central Committee. Wei Liang was absent from a high-level military meeting in August.
Recently, Hong Kong media also speculated that two other senior commanders, Yang Hui (Eastern Theatre Command deputy commander and chief of staff) and Liu Xiaowu (Western Theater Command deputy commander), were being investigated.
OUR TAKE
1. The rumors, if proven to be accurate, would corroborate our analysis that Xi Jinping may be technically in control of the military, but he still faces much internal opposition from the People’s Liberation Army. Hence Xi has to continually purge the ranks; Xi’s remark that “the anti-corruption struggle in the military won’t change direction” at a meeting of the CMC from Aug. 18 to Aug. 19 is revealing of Xi’s intentions.
2. Based on our research, Xu Fenlin and Liu Xiaowu both served in the Guangzhou Military Region before Xi Jinping launched a sweeping military reform in 2015. Zhang Yang, the former CMC Political Department head who committed suicide in November 2017, had previously served with Xu and Liu in the Guangzhou Military Region (Political Department director and political commissar) before he was transferred to the CMC in October 2012.
Wei Liang succeeded Zhang Yang as Guangzhou Military Region political commissar. At the time, the Jiang faction oversaw the promotion of senior commanders and generals.
3. After President Donald Trump announced tariffs against China on June 15, we analyzed that Xi Jinping would face stiff opposition from inside the Party. Thus, it is inevitable that Xi would move to strengthen his control over the military, society, and the CCP.