SinoInsight 1
On Sept. 10, PRC foreign minister Wang Yi and Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar convened in Moscow for two hours on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting. According to news reports, both sides reached a five-point consensus to de-escalate tensions at the Sino-Indian border and restore “peace and tranquility.”
A PRC foreign ministry statement said that Wang told Jaishankar the “imperative is to immediately stop provocations such as firing and other dangerous actions that violate the commitments made by the two sides.” Wang also told Jaishankar to move all personnel and equipment that trespasses the Sino-Indian border. Meanwhile, Jaishankar warned Wang that “provocative behavior of Chinese frontline troops at numerous incidents of friction along the LAC also showed disregard for bilateral agreements and protocols,” and noted that the PRC “has not provided a credible explanation for this deployment.”
The latest Sino-Indian border disengagement statement comes amid signs of the CCP preparation for further belligerence.
- On Sept. 9, PRC state broadcaster CCTV reported that a PLA special operations brigade from the Tibet Military Area Command and an army aviation brigade recently conducted a joint parachute training exercise involving 300 troops “in an unfamiliar area which is over 4,000 meters above sea level.” CCTV said the training was successful and would expand to over 1,000 troops to build on armed parachuting and multi-parachute training in high-altitude regions.
- On Sept. 10, Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of People’s Daily-run Global Times, tweeted, “If Indian troops don’t withdraw from the southern bank of Pangong Tso Lake, the PLA will confront them all winter long. Indian troops’ logistics are poor, many Indian soldiers will die of freezing temperature or COVID-19. If a war breaks out, Indian army will be defeated quickly.”
- Also on Sept. 10, Indian newspaper The Economic Times cited Indian officials saying China has “amassed about 50,000 troops, surface-to-air missiles, a large section of rocket forces and close to 150 fighter aircraft within striking distance of [the Line of Actual Control], the largest buildup of troops in the region.” Six days earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a radio interview that the CCP has moved more troops to the Sino-Indian border than “any time since the early 1960s.”
OUR TAKE
1. The CCP’s perpetual need to survive and dominate drives its foreign policy and much of what it does. The Sino-Indian border clashes, which were provoked by the Chinese side, appear to be part of the CCP’s broader plan to preserve regime survival amid multiple crises.
The PRC’s domestic woes include:
- The Wuhan coronavirus epidemic.
- A COVID-wrecked economy in swift decline.
- Local government fiscal problems.
- A mounting debt crisis and other systemic financial troubles.
- A property bubble about to burst.
- Drastically inflating food prices and food shortages.
- Historic floods and typhoons ruining harvests in China’s breadbasket.
The PRC’s geopolitical problems include:
- A new cold war with the U.S. highlighting the CCP’s weaknesses in trade, technology, ideology, and human rights.
- Growing global negative sentiment towards the CCP regime over issues such as: The CCP’s pandemic opportunism (“wolf warrior” diplomacy, “mask diplomacy,” “vaccine diplomacy,” regional militarism, etc.); the national security law imposed over Hong Kong; the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang; the bullying of smaller countries who stand up to the CCP (Australia, Czech Republic, Taiwan, etc.).
- The formation and strengthening of regional alliances with a focus on the CCP threat (the Quad, “Six Eyes,” etc.).
- Countries strengthening ties with Taiwan and the rise of Taiwan’s international profile.
The CCP’s priority during crises is to maintain domestic stability. One tactic to maintain stability is to manufacture external crises (like the recent Sino-Indian border clashes) to keep the Chinese populace distracted from problems at home. Meanwhile, the CCP is also likely hoping to distract the world with minor crises to put off being held accountable for major crises, such as causing a global pandemic. Further, successful foreign militarism could serve to intimidate weaker neighboring countries, making them more susceptible to Beijing pressure and manipulation.
Intensified tensions along the Sino-Indian border also serve Xi Jinping’s personal need to survive and dominate the factional struggle in the elite echelons of the Party. The “perfect storm” of domestic and foreign problems plaguing the PRC offers his factional rivals ample ammunition to put Xi under serious fire. Xi badly needs a foreign policy “victory” of some sort to justify his broader policy agenda for the CCP regime, aggressive power consolidation, and push for a third term in office at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Successful skirmishes against India and the grabbing of disputed territory can help Xi boost his flagging “quan wei” and maintain his grip over the CCP.
On the flipside, Xi and the CCP will lose prestige and political legitimacy if China proves continually unsuccessful with its Sino-Indian border provocations. India may not have to score a military victory over China to thwart the CCP’s hopes of reaping the benefits of a manufactured external crisis. A clear publicity victory by India and her allies, such as the release of concrete evidence that the PRC fired first on Indian positions, could transform Xi and the CCP’s border opportunism into serious political risk.
Given the stakes, Xi and the CCP have effectively “locked” the PRC in a vicious cycle of escalating conflict at the Sino-Indian border. Xi and the CCP cannot afford to disengage without first gaining tangible victory of some sort, and India will not allow China to succeed. The Sept. 10 de-escalation consensus is unlikely to create a prolonged period of “peace and tranquility” at the Sino-Indian border. We expect to see further PRC border provocations ahead, including minor armed skirmishes.
2. The hostile conditions Hu Xijin prescribed Indian soldiers in his Sept. 10 tweet apply to PLA troops as well. The Chinese side arguably faces greater difficulties in supplying its troops and acclimatizing them to the Himalayan region than India. Additionally, the PLA are unwelcome among the ethnic Tibetans who comprise the local population given the CCP’s history of persecuting Tibetans.
Hu is known for his bombastic and hawkish style, but his threats should not be entirely discounted. In particular, Hu’s statement about Indian soldiers dying of COVID-19 hints at the potential intention of conducting biological warfare at the Sino-Indian border. For example, the PLA could allow infected troops to engage in melee combat with Indian soldiers.
3. The CCP is on the verge of a “Berlin Wall moment,” and the Sino-Indian border crisis is one of many potential triggers. Businesses, investors, and governments need to track border conflict developments to avoid being blindsided by political Black Swans.
SinoInsight 2
In recent weeks, the CCP vigorously promoted the narrative of China being the first to recover economically from the virus. Last week, the CCP began to extol Xi Jinping’s role in curbing the coronavirus, and promoting the “safe” inoculation of hundreds of thousands with experimental vaccines.
Propaganda
On Sept. 7, Party and state propaganda outlets ran several articles praising General Secretary Xi Jinping’s “leading role in epidemic prevention and control efforts,” including “taking about a month to contain the epidemic’s spread, taking about two months to bring daily domestic cases to within single digits, and taking about three months to achieve decisive results in the Battle of Wuhan and the Battle of Hubei, as well as significant strategic results in the national epidemic prevention and control efforts.”
‘Vaccine diplomacy’
A Sept. 11 report in The New York Times details how the PRC is using the prospect of a coronavirus vaccine “in a charm offensive aimed at repairing damaged ties and bringing friends closer in regions China deems vital to its interests,” including Asia and Africa. The report claims the PRC’s vaccine pledges “help it project itself as a responsible player as the United States retreats from global leadership,” while its “ability to develop and deliver vaccines to poorer countries would also be a powerful signal of China’s rise as a scientific leader in a new post-pandemic global order.”
Experimental vaccines
On Sept. 7, Zhou Song, China National Biotec Group’s commission for discipline inspection head, told state media China National Radio that his company gave two experimental COVID-19 vaccines to hundreds of thousands of people under an emergency-use condition upon Beijing’s approval in July. “No one has shown any obvious adverse effects or got infected,” Zhou claimed. People who qualify for the emergency-use vaccine program in a scheme rolled out in late July include high-risk groups like frontline medical workers, diplomats and workers abroad, customs officials, food market workers, transportation workers, and some service industry personnel.
Separately, Chinese drugmaker Sinovac Biotech also announced last week that the firm’s chief executive and about 3,000 employees and their family members received an experimental vaccine.
State-backed pharmaceutical companies are not the first to conduct mass testing of experimental vaccines. In late June, the PLA approved the use of an experimental vaccine on military personnel. The military’s lead coronavirus researcher Major General Chen Wei and her team, as well as thousands of others, were among the first to receive the vaccine. According to a Nature magazine report, “the PLA-developed vaccine could give China additional geopolitical influence with favored countries being given priority access to the vaccine.”
The PRC is currently leading the global race for a COVID-19 vaccine with four candidates in the last phase of clinical trials.
OUR TAKE
1. We observed as early as February that the CCP will seek to capitalize on the coronavirus pandemic to advance its global domination agenda (以疫謀霸). We also analyzed in March that part of the CCP’s plan involves being the first to roll out a coronavirus vaccine and to create a so-called “Health Belt and Road” (or “Health Silk Road”). Recent developments indicate the CCP is making steady progress with its plan.
The CCP desperately needs a victory over the coronavirus now more so than earlier this year. China has yet to properly recover from the CCP’s lockdowns and the Chinese people’s resentment will only accrue until life is restored to normal. Additionally, the United States is eager to hold the CCP regime accountable for the huge loss of both human life and economic wealth. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s Huawei ban effectively stymied the CCP’s push for global dominance through the adoption of PRC 5G technology. With a successful vaccine and “Health Belt and Road” initiative however, the CCP will regain some ground in its advance for global hegemony, offsetting its 5G setback. The CCP can also potentially avoid being blamed (or at least not be punished too severely) for its role in the pandemic, winning redemption at home and abroad. In sum, a successful vaccine will greatly enable the CCP to survive and dominate by defusing hostile geopolitical sentiments and restoring the Chinese people’s faith in the Party.
Likewise, Xi Jinping needs a victory over coronavirus now more than ever. Xi’s policies have engendered much of the “perfect storm” of problems facing the CCP regime and undercut his “quan wei.” Xi’s recent efforts to boost his “quan wei” (see here and here) suggest that political rivals have pressured him at the recent Beidaihe meeting. His rivals will definitely capitalize on further failures in the lead up to the CCP’s Fifth Plenum in October. To maintain his position in the face of mounting elite opposition and make a strong case for a third term, Xi is gambling on a victory over the virus, which would greatly boost his “quan wei,” and debunk his factional rivals’ argument that he is unsuited to rule as a strongman (instead of being merely “first among equals” in a “collective leadership”). Xi, however, has sharply escalated his political risk by claiming premature victory over the coronavirus when the pandemic has yet to be fully contained; a second wave will turn today’s glowing propaganda about Xi into fodder tomorrow for his factional rivals.
2. We have reason to believe the CCP is not as successful with coronavirus as its propaganda claims, given China’s less than impressive economic recovery and Beijing’s continued unwillingness to allow investigations into the origins of the virus. There is sufficient reason to be highly skeptical of the CCP’s vaccine claims given the political stakes of the research. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo noted on Sept. 4 that “the Russians and the Chinese hurry these vaccines to market in an attempt to make not a medical breakthrough or an epidemiological breakthrough, but a political, diplomatic breakthrough” that is “not in the best interests of the world.”
The CCP’s poor record with manufacturing vaccines and vaccine safety also raises legitimate concerns about its mass testing of experimental COVID vaccines and any future rollouts. The distribution of faulty vaccines at home and abroad could spark another global public health crisis in the midst of an ongoing pandemic. Even if vaccine manufacturing adheres to safety protocol, there is no guarantee they will actually be effective. Vaccines based on the common cold virus, like those being tested by CanSino Biologics, could trigger a harmful immune response while not necessarily granting lasting immunity (see here). Meanwhile, those injected with inactivated vaccines like those produced by China National Biotec are at risk of dealing with a more potent COVID virus if they are infected due to a phenomenon known as antibody-dependent enhancement (see here). As Secretary Pompeo warned, a PRC vaccine that does not work “could create further devastation, further loss of life” and “further put this world at risk.”
