SinoInsight 1
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published a commentary piece titled, “Unrelentingly Promote the Deepening of Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party” (堅持不懈把全面從嚴治黨向縱深推進). The article promoted Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption propaganda narratives from the sixth plenary session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection such as “strictly governing the Party” (從嚴治黨), “anti-corruption is always on the road” (反腐永遠在路上), and “self-revolution” (自我革命). The article was subsequently republished by major state propaganda outlets.The People’s Daily article praised Xi for “having the courage to turn the blade inward to the Party’s stubborn diseases, promoting strict governance of the Party with thundering force, implementing the requirements of Party management and governance with the spirit of nailing nails, stopped malign practices that have not been stopped for many years, [and] eliminated serious hidden dangers in the Party, the nation, and the military” during his time in office. The article added, “comprehensively and strictly governing the Party has achieved historic and pioneering achievements, and has had an all-round and deep-seated impact.”
The article pointed out that the “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party is still far from being a great success” because various elements that “weaken the Party” are always present, various dangers that “shake the Party’s foundations” are everywhere, and “outstanding problems” within the Party have not yet been fundamentally resolved. Only by “daring to turn the blade inward and daring to cut one’s own wrist,” bravely carrying out “self-revolution,” courageously meeting the “four tests” (governance test, reform and opening up test, market economy test, external environment test), and resolutely overcoming the “four dangers” (the danger of mental laxity, the danger of lack of ability, the danger of being divorced from the masses, the danger of passive corruption) will the Party stay a “Marxist ruling party” for a long time.
The article notes that the 20th Party Congress this year is a “major event in the political life of the Party and the nation,” and implies that for the event to be a success and for the maintenance of regime stability, the Party must continue to carry forward “the spirit of historical initiative,” promote “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party,” and maintain “political determination” against corruption.
Jan. 24
The Ministry of Public Security held a special meeting in Beijing on “eliminating the poisonous influence of the Sun Lijun political gang.” Wang Xiaohong, the MPS Party secretary and executive deputy minister of public security, delivered a speech at the meeting. The meeting was attended by MPS Party Committee members, as well as the leading cadres and leadership team members of provincial public security organs and police departments.
The meeting called on all public security organs to “adopt a more serious attitude, stricter requirements, and more power measures” to “resolutely and thoroughly eliminate the poisonous influence and hidden dangers of the Sun Lijun political gang.” The meeting added that the MPS Party Committee had established a special work leading group for eliminating the poisonous influence of the Sun Lijun political gang, and had strengthened communication and cooperation with discipline inspection and supervisory authorities, as well as the departments involved with organization and personnel, so as to “ensure the greatest synergy and best results in the eradication of circulating poisons.”
The meeting noted that the Sun Lijun political gang had committed the so-called “six seriousnesses” (嚴重性), including serious violations of discipline and the law, serious damage to Party unity, serious endangerment of the Party and nation’s political security, serious damage to the Party’s image and governance foundation, serious damage to the political ecology of public security organs, and serious losses to the image of public security forces.
The meeting requested that public security personnel “fully comprehend the serious danger of the Sun Lijun political gang from a political perspective; deeply recognize the importance, necessity, longevity, and complexity of eliminating poisonous influence; earnestly take elimination work as the top political task at present; and dare to face the problem head on, dare to get real and get tough, and ensure tangible results.”
The meeting pointed out that for leading cadres and leadership teams at all levels, the “deepening elimination of poisonous influence” is a reflection of their “political stance and political responsibility,” as well as a test of their “political wisdom and political ability.” The meeting also instructed leading cadres to be personally involved in the elimination effort (親自抓、具體抓，把自己擺進去、把職責擺進去、把工作擺進去) and “thoroughly investigate the people, events, and cases involved, and eliminate all political hidden dangers.” Those who fail to do this job well and carry out a thorough investigation will be “seriously held to account.”
OUR TAKE
1. The Xi leadership has kept up the momentum of elevating and promoting anti-corruption propaganda narratives, an initiative that has been gaining in strength and prominence from the start of the new year. The recurring use of vicious, “fighting” language (“turn the blade inward to the Party’s stubborn diseases,” “daring to break one’s own wrist,” etc.) indicates that Beijing is preparing major and possibly very shocking anti-corruption moves. The glorification of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and its role in saving the regime from disaster is meant to boost Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) and justify his effort to take a norm-breaking third term at the 20th Party Congress.
Concurrently, the Xi leadership has become even more critical of the corruption legacy of Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction (“malign practices that have not been stopped for many years,” “serious hidden dangers,” etc.) while it advances “self-revolution” as the solution to averting regime collapse (see frequent references to the “cycle” conversation). This suggests that Xi Jinping is steeling himself and the regime for the possibility of Black Swan-level factional struggle action and laying the groundwork to justify said action while minimizing damage to the Party’s legitimacy when the time comes. Xi is likely looking to intimidate his factional rivals into inaction and compromise to prevent them from upending his third term bid.
2. The MPS’s establishment of a special work leading group to “eliminate the poisonous influence of the Sun Lijin political gang” is akin to designating Sun and his associates (including superiors and subordinates) an “anti-Party gang” (反黨集團, the most infamous being the Gang of Four). This indicates that the Xi leadership is taking the “hidden dangers” and risks of “political gangs” with utmost seriousness, and is determined to eradicate those elements from the political and legal affairs apparatus in particular and the regime at large.
Beijing will almost certainly investigate and severely punish a group of senior political and legal affairs officials before the 20th Party Congress. Sun Lijun’s former portfolio in the public security apparatus and Xi’s political agenda of replacing Jiang Zemin’s supra-authority organization hint at potential targets; former “610 Office” leading cadres and/or overseers like Guo Shengkun, Meng Jianzhu, and Liu Jinguo could find themselves on the chopping block. Jiang faction political and legal affairs officials who continued to resist Xi in his second term like Zhou Qiang could also be purged. Sun himself could face the death penalty or at least life imprionsoment.
Previously official statements about Sun Lijun and his “political gang” note that they were involved in corruption at the “intertwining of political and economic issues.” This suggests that investigations and purges connected with the Sun case could implicate influential elites involved in the financial sector.
3. Xi’s recent intensification of the anti-corruption campaign could be partly linked to mounting pressure against him from the Party elite. For one, China’s underwhelming economic performance in 2021 and the rise of economic and financial “major risks with spillovers” reflect badly on the Xi leadership’s stewardship of the regime, and would likely have emboldened elites to voice their dissatisfaction with the dismal situation.
Meanwhile, Xi is under pressure from the princelings and military elements to achieve “reunification” with Taiwan, and through invasion if necessary. The Party elite could latch onto growing international turbulence (brewing conflict over Ukraine and Russia; increasing international military maneuvers in the south and east China seas; coronavirus outbreaks in the West; a weakening and more divided America, etc.) and the opening of an “unprecedented” window of opportunity for the CCP to egg Xi into taking Taiwan posthaste.
If Xi is indeed dealing with growing internal pressure, it would make sense for him to “turn the blade inward” on the Party at this time with the anti-corruption campaign. When the elites are faced with tighter surveillance and become constantly preoccupied with their own safety, they would theoretically be less willing to bother Xi with their displeasures or challenge his leadership.
SinoInsight 2
Xi Jinping’s “historical resolution,” passed at the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, notably diminished (but did not repudiate) the importance of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” to the Party’s history. We analyzed at the time that Xi had done so because he was advocating a more “fundamentalist” interpretation of “Sinicized Marxism,” was looking to downplay the political legacy of Deng and succeeding Party leaders who followed in Deng’s footsteps (particularly factional arch-rival Jiang Zemin), and was attempting to make his own theoretical and practical “achievements” stand out and better justify his bid for a third term at the 20th Party Congress.
Since the Sixth Plenum, Xi and Party propagandists have continued to distance Xi’s “achievements” and legacy from that of Deng’s (see here and here). The Xi leadership has also been ramping up criticism of regime-endangering corruption in the Jiang era and promoting “self-revolution” (mainly the anti-corruption campaign) as the solution to averting regime collapse (see here and here).
Recently, a prominent CCP-linked overseas Chinese media outlet began promoting a counter narrative. Duowei News, a Beijing-based overseas Chinese language news site that is widely believed to be part of the Party’s “Great External Propaganda Plan” (大外宣) network and is known to carry messaging from various factions in the CCP elite, launched an article series commemorating the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour (鄧小平南巡30年) on Jan. 18.
The series, which contained 10 articles at the time of writing, advanced the following arguments and viewpoints:
Xi’s political legacy is a continuation of Deng’s
The headline of the first article in the series reads, “Common Prosperity is the Best Memorial to Deng Xiaoping” (共同富裕是對鄧小平最好的紀念). The article goes into the historical backdrop (collapse of the Soviet Union, international naysaying about socialism, etc.) when Deng made his Southern Tour in 1992 and claims that the latter “defined the essence and goal of socialism as common prosperity.”
The first article then quotes Deng on the topic of “common prosperity” during his Southern Tour, “The concept of common prosperity is proposed in this way: Some areas have the conditions to develop first, and some areas develop more slowly. Let the areas that develop first lead the areas that develop later, and eventually reach common prosperity together.” The quote, which history has since demonstrated to mean that the Party elite would get wealthy first before the masses get a slice of the pie, would be later cited in several articles in the series.
The fourth article in the series argues that while “Western media” believes that Xi Jinping had abandoned “reform and opening up,” the latter’s call for “deepening reform” (深化改革) is in fact a continuation of Deng’s legacy. “There has never been a major dispute over ‘reform and opening up’ within the CCP, and the Zhongnanhai elite’s promotion of reform has never ceased,” the article claims. “From Deng’s ‘reform and opening up’ to Xi’s deepening reform,’ the times, dilemmas faced, and specific goals to be achieved may have changed, but the challenges have not diminished.”
Deng and his ‘reform and opening up’ are fundamentally ‘left-wing’
Multiple articles in the series argue that Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” was not a repudiation of socialist fundamentalism but rather a practical response to regime crisis such as the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the post-Mao era when Deng rose to prominence, as well as the backdrop of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Tiananmen Square Massacre when Deng embarked on his Southern Tour after his official retirement.
The series also asserts that Deng remained committed to “left-wing” socialist fundamentalism despite promoting a “right-wing” agenda in “reform and opening up.” The sixth article explicitly states in its title, “Many People Overlook the Fact that Deng Xiaoping’s Base Value is Left-wing” (許多人都忽略了鄧小平的價值底色是左翼) before making the case for it. Meanwhile, the first article alludes to the practical application of “reform and opening up” for the purposes of socialism in quoting Deng on his Southern Tour, “Planning and the market are both economic means. The essence of socialism is the liberation of production forces, the development of production forces, the elimination of exploitation, the elimination of polarization, and ultimately the achievement of common prosperity.”
Deng should not be wholly faulted for the problems of ‘reform and opening up’
The sixth article acknowledges that Deng’s “reform and opening up” did lead to economic, environmental, social, and other problems. But the article counters, “just as the inventors of cars and trains would not be happy to see accidents happen, people today cannot look backward indefinitely and blame the inventors of cars and trains for the accidents.” Further, “on the whole, ‘reform and opening up’ has profoundly changed China’s national fortunes. It led to huge progress and a major turning point in China’s thousands of years of history. People’s living standards and comprehensive national strength have undergone qualitative changes. China is just around the corner from becoming the world’s largest economy.”
The series then argues that Deng and his “reform and opening up” should not be faulted for being unable to deal with all the problems during his time, particularly given the “common prosperity” formulation outlined by Deng (see first subsection). Also, Deng’s political legacy had achieved successes in its day but remains “unfinished.” Therefore, making “reform and opening up” a continued success is a “test” that his successors have to “pass.”
The first and sixth articles noted, “Each generation has its own problems and missions,” with the sixth article continuing, “No one can expect predecessors to solve all problems. That is simply impossible.”
The sixth article further notes, “How to finish the unfinished work of Deng Xiaoping, so that the huge development achievements accumulated in the 40 years of ‘reform and opening up’ can break the shackles of interest groups and be in accordance with the principle of socialist ‘common prosperity’ and sustainable economic and social development, and so that the people can have a share, is directly related to the credibility of Chinese socialism and the most fundamental test for today’s Chinese elites, especially those who are in power.”
The ninth article in the series observed that Jiang Zemin was “determined to pass Deng Xiaoping’s final test” of implementing “reform and opening up” after the latter’s Southern Tour. Jiang “publicly transformed into a strong supporter of ‘reform and opening up,” including his promotion of Deng’s Southern Tour remarks and calling for the establishment of a “socialist market economy” in a speech at the Central Party School on June 9, 1992. The article noted that Deng liked Jiang’s speech and advocated for it to be made the central theme of the 14th Party Congress, which Jiang promptly did.
The ‘redemption’ of Jiang Zemin
The seventh and ninth articles of the series goes into the backstory of why Jiang Zemin went along with Deng’s “reform and opening up.”
The articles noted that Jiang had earlier aligned himself with the “left-wing” faction in the Party elite represented by Chen Yun and other “conservatives.” The “left-wing” faction believed that the answer to international “anti-socialist” sentiments and the “peaceful evolution” theory post-Tiananmen and the collapse of the Soviet Union was a return to more fundamentalist policies. Thus in 1991, Jiang was promoting “class struggle” and “anti-bourgeois liberalization” while downplaying “reform and opening up.” Given Jiang’s rhetoric, Deng decided to go on his Southern Tour to save his political legacy.
The articles also pointed at the crucial reason convincing Jiang to abandon the “left” and move to the “right.” Citing Harvard scholar Ezra Vogel’s book “Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China,” the ninth article noted that Deng held a secret meeting in Zhuhai near Shenzhen with members of the military. During the meeting, which was supported by Jiang’s rival and Politburo Standing Committee member Qiao Shi, Deng allegedly said, “Whoever doesn’t reform will have to step down … Our leaders look like they are doing things, but they’re not doing anything useful.”
The ninth article noted that Deng’s secret meeting signaled two things to Jiang. First, Deng could be threatening to replace him with Qiao, whom “many regarded as having the qualities to be a top leader.” Second, Jiang, who was then Party General Secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commision, was actually not in control of the military; rather, the military still listened to Deng, and was swayed by the officials who attended the meeting like then-PRC president Yang Shangkun, his brother Yang Baibing (CMC secretary-general and General Political Department head), and CMC vice chair Liu Huaqing.
After Jiang “passed” Deng’s “final test” by moving to the “right” and backing “reform and opening up,” Deng helped him consolidate power by sidelining the Yang brothers and dismantling the Central Advisory Commission, according to the ninth article. The article added that Deng Xiaoping later told his younger brother Deng Ken in September 1993, “Now it is proven that after my retirement, Jiang Zemin and others have done a good job.”
‘Warning shots’ at Xi Jinping
The article series fires several “warning shots” at Xi. Most notably, Deng Xiaoping’s famous remark, “whoever doesn’t reform will have to step down” is repeated in several articles. The seventh article quotes Deng as saying in his June 1989 meeting with Henry Kissinger, “it can be said with certainty that whoever turns back [from ‘reform and opening up’] will be dethroned.”
The sixth article cautions, “It should be said that as long as we do not wish to return to the state of Cultural Revolution before ‘reform and opening up,’ do not wish to live like the North Korean people, or do not wish to see China repeat the mistakes of the Soviet Union, then Deng Xiaoping’s thinking and path are worthy of affirmation.”
The eighth article, which goes into the backstory of how Deng Xiaoping “institutionalized” CCP politics by getting rid of gerontocracy (the Central Advisory Commission) and imposing term limits, is almost certainly aimed at Xi Jinping and his third term bid. The article also “advises” Xi to designate a successor by noting the example set by Deng and other Party elders of “grooming good successors in their lifetime.”
The third article “advises” Xi to learn from Deng’s Southern Tour and “unite [the Party to] move forward as one” (團結一致向前看). After all, “today’s China is different from the Deng era; one can ‘hide strength, bide time’ [韜光養晦; Deng’s political legacy], make a fortune while keeping a low profile [悶聲發大財; Jiang’s political legacy], and have a certain space for trial-and-error [a signal that Xi is on an erroneous path]. The internal and external challenges facing China today dictate that the CCP needs to be more precise in its policies, and a more modernized system of governance and government capacity is needed to avoid subversive mistakes [避免顛覆性錯誤; again, this is hinted at Xi] and take China to another level.”
OUR TAKE
Duowei is known to carry messaging from various factions in the Party elite. The fact there are those in the elite who see the need for the Deng Xiaoping Southern Tour article affirms our earlier analysis regarding Xi Jinping’s effort to diminish the political legacy of Deng and his predecessors, and Xi’s more targeted propaganda and anti-corruption actions against the Jiang faction.
The central arguments of the article series and the daring to “advise” or “lecture” Xi on following Deng’s “reform and opening up” offer some clues as to the identity of the factional forces behind it. First, the Party elites involved in the article series are powerful enough, or believe that they are powerful enough, to commission a counternarrative to the Xi leadership’s current “self-revolution”/“historical resolution” propaganda. Second, the elites concerned are sympathetic to Jiang Zemin; while Jiang is “chided” for straying from Deng’s political legacy, he is given a “redemption” arc and upheld as a “model” for Xi to follow. Third, the tone of the article series is conversational and inclusive, which suggests that the Party elites are open to negotiation and compromise with Xi, provided Xi also makes some compromises on preserving Deng’s legacy and their interests. The elites who fit the aforementioned criteria include various princling factions, particularly those from the Deng camp and those with anti-Xi views, as well as the Jiang faction and its sub-factions like the Zeng Qinghong clique; it cannot be ruled out that the article series was backed by a collaboration of those suspects.
The effort by the article series to equate Deng’s “common prosperity” framework with that of Xi’s is duplicitous. As we previously analyzed, Xi’s “common prosperity” is modern-day wealth confiscation and transfer from the elite for redistribution to the masses, while Deng’s “common prosperity” prioritizes the elites over the masses. Reading between the lines, the Party elite behind the article series are highly aware that Xi is looking to sacrifice them at the expense of saving the regime and winning goodwill from the masses. Those elites would rather that Xi stick to Deng’s legacy and be tolerant of those who partook in Jiang’s legacy (“make a fortune while keeping a low profile”) so that their interests can be preserved.
Indeed, the article series holds out hope that Xi will turn away from his “subversive mistakes” of advancing “self-revolution” and re-embrace Deng’s “reform and opening up” in his quest to avert regime collapse. The article series crafts a narrative of Deng’s political legacy that allows Xi to “return to the fold” without “losing face”—Xi’s “deepening reform” is interpreted as a continuation of Deng’s “reform and opening up,” which is in turn interpreted as practical effort by both leaders to advance the CCP’s “survival-dominance” agenda; Xi’s currently misfiring policies are charitably interpreted as “a certain space of trial-and-error” while noting that the CCP needs to be “more precise” in its policies to meeting internal and external challenges; and Jiang Zemin is given a “redemption” arc to show that things do turn out well for those who have strayed as long as they are willing to “affirm” Deng’s “thinking and path.” Concurrently, the article series warns Xi that sticking to the “left-wing” political line would mean ruin for the regime, where the Chinese people could “live like the North Korean people” and where Xi is summarily “dethroned” for turning his back on “reform and opening up.”
The article series takes on another layer of meaning if the Jiang faction is its sole political backer. The Jiang Zemin “redemption” arc can also be read as a story of how Jiang was essentially held “hostage” by Deng and powerful military elements on the matter of “reform and opening up” and had no choice but to adopt Deng’s political legacy. This reading of the Jiang “redemption” arc grants the Jiang faction a degree of “flexibility” in negotiating with Xi Jinping—if Xi further marginalized “reform and opening up” and hence the political legacies of Party leaders who went along with it, the Jiang faction can argue that Jiang Zemin was really “left-wing” like Xi Jinping but was forced by the vicissitudes of factional struggle at the time to go along with Deng and the “right-wing” side of the intra-Party debate. Moreover, the Jiang faction could be signaling that they, like Jiang Zemin in Deng’s time, are willing to jump aboard the Xi bandwagon if they are granted amnesty from the anti-corruption campaign and allowed to retain their influence.
While the above is one possible reading of the article series, we assess that it is less likely. The broader themes of Duowei’s Deng Southern Tour series suggest that it is the work of a coalition of factional forces who oppose Xi’s policies but not necessarily his rule, and are open to negotiation to back Xi’s third term bid in exchange for a preservation of their interests. This “anti-Xi coalition” would be somewhat sympathetic to Jiang Zemin because many elites made fortunes during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance; however, they are not above throwing some shade on Jiang (as seen in the article series) because the princelings were mostly excluded from holding power under his long tenure (including the Hu period).
Meanwhile, the Jiang faction, being Xi’s chief rival and seeking his ouster, should be aware that they are unlikely to be afforded the luxury of a permanent truce. The Jiang faction and the Xi camp have come to compromises on numerous occasions but both then quickly found ways to renege on agreements. An example is compromises leading to Xi’s ally Wang Qishan exiting the Politburo Standing Committee at the 19th Party Congress, only for him to return later as an unofficial “eighth” member in his capacity as PRC vice president. Compromises were also likely made around the PRC’s 70th anniversary celebrations in 2019 as Xi strived for a semblance of intra-Party unity to convene the Fourth Plenum amid dissent over Sino-U.S. relations.
We believe there is little chance that the Duowei article series can change Xi Jinping’s mind about repudiating Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction given the deeply treacherous, “you die, I live” nature of factional struggle. Xi is even less likely to compromise with the Party elite should the “perfect storm” of crises facing the CCP regime escalate further, as he would require scapegoats to blame and sacrifice to cover up his failures and appease the Chinese people.
